THE FIGHT FOR GREEK SICILY

SOCIETY, POLITICS, AND LANDSCAPE

EDITED BY
MELANIE JONASCH

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Society, Politics, and Landscape

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OXBOW | books
Oxford & Philadelphia

Published in the United Kingdom in 2020 by
OXBOW BOOKS
The Old Music Hall, 106–108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JE

and in the United States by
OXBOW BOOKS
1950 Lawrence Road, Havertown, PA 19083

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Paperback Edition: ISBN 978-1-78925-356-6
Digital Edition: ISBN 978-1-78925-357-3 (ePub)
Kindle Edition: ISBN 978-1-78925-358-0 (Mobi)

A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Control Number: 2020931801

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Front cover: View over the plain of Catania towards Mt Etna from the Greek military outpost on Monte Turcisi (© M. Jonasch).
Back cover: Tower and doorway of the Greek fortress on Monte Turcisi (©

M. Jonasch).

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Acknowledgements

This book originates from a workshop entitled *War and Society in Colonial Sicily (WASICS)* held at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver from 27–29 April, 2018. The event was funded by the Volkswagen Foundation in the framework of a Postdoctoral Fellowship in the Humanities that I held during the academic year 2017–18. I am deeply grateful for the generous financial support of my studies, the inspiring workshop and the present book.

My gratitude extends to the colleagues at the Department of Classical, Near Eastern and Religious Studies of the University of British Columbia for providing the space and fertile environment, both for my personal research and for the conduct of the workshop. Heartfelt thanks go to Franco De Angelis and his family, who offered a warm welcome to Vancouver and repeated advice and support, not least concerning the implementation of the workshop. It is, in large part, due to his interest and enthusiasm that we extended the workshop theme beyond the mere presentation of military architecture and landscape to social and political aspects.

I am particularly grateful to the workshop participants, who did not shrink from the exertions of a long journey to Vancouver, a place of outstanding beauty yet geographically distant from our common field of research. This enthusiasm and dedication to our shared interest, ancient Sicily, was also evident and the guiding principle during the three days on the Pacific west coast. It generated rich discussion and fruitful exchange beyond the boundaries of the subject area, scientific approach, and stage of career.

Our interaction also benefitted from the participation of

Katharine Huemoeller (UBC), Matthew McCarty (UBC) and James Horncastle (SFU), who kindly agreed to chair sessions. Roger Wilson, Professor Emeritus at the University of British Columbia and a leading expert on ancient Sicily, had left for fieldwork by the time of the workshop but kindly shared his insights and experiences on other occasions.

There was broad consensus about making the rich and complementary contributions of the workshop available as a book. To enhance the range of expertise and evidence, we also invited selected researchers to complement some of the original papers. I warmly thank Lisa Irene Hau, Holger Baitinger and Massimo Frasca for having taken up this challenge, as well as Stefania De Vido who agreed to provide a final meditation on the topic and material presented in the essays.

For the reviewing process we had precious help from many anonymous experts, as well as from Pier Giovanni Guzzo, Erich Kistler and Philip Sapirstein. I thank my colleagues from the German Archaeological Institute in Athens and Rome, as well as Diego Barucco and Luigi Nifosì, who provided photographic material. Finally, I owe a particular debt to Judy Barringer, Valentina Mignosa, Jason Harris, and Andrew Ward for their tireless commitment to the linguistic quality of the book.

Melanie Jonasch
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Abbreviations

ANS	The American Numismatic Society
BTCGI	Nenci, C. and Vallet, G. (1977–2012) *Bibliografia topografica della colonizzazione greca in Italia e nelle isole tirreniche*, 21 vols. Pisa, Scuola Normale Superiore.
CIL	*Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (1863–)
CIS	*Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum* (1881–)
CNS	*Corpus Nummorum Siculorum* (1983–)
FGrH	Jacoby, F. *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (1923–)
HCT	Gomme, A.W., Andrewes, A. and Dover, K.J. (1945–1981) *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 5 vols. Oxford, Clarendon Press
IC	Guarducci, M. (ed.) (1935–1950), *Inscriptiones Creticae*, 4 vols. Roma, Libreria dello Stato
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae* (1873–)
IParK	Thür, G. and Taeuber H. (1994), *Prozessrechtliche Inschriften der griechischen Poleis: Arkadien.*

	Wien, Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften
LSJ	Liddell, H.G. and Scott, R. (1925–1940), *Greek English Lexicon*, 9th edn, rev. and aug. Oxford, Clarendon Press
POxy	*Oxyrhynchus Papyri* (1898–)
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (1923–)
SNG	*Sylloge Nummorum Graecorum* (1930–)
ThesCRA	*Thesaurus Cultus et Rituum Antiquorum*, I–V + index vol. (2004–2006)

Preface: word of welcome

This volume has its origins in an international workshop called *War and Society in Colonial Sicily* held at the Vancouver campus of the University of British Columbia on 27–29 April, 2018. Many of the participants were first-time visitors to Vancouver and so the excitement of both the workshop and the dramatic setting of this Pacific Rim city made the event memorable.

But the workshop and its location have more in common than simply being linked together by the present writer hosting the organiser (now editor of this volume) who held a Volkswagen Foundation Postdoctoral Fellowship. At first glance, Sicily and British Columbia seem incomparable. However, Sicily and British Columbia have long been places of cultural encounters and frontiers and have similarly witnessed periods of colonialism and imperialism, along with all of their inevitable consequences. Both landmasses have much coastline, touched by large and important bodies of water. Both hold sought-after natural resources, making them geopolitically strategic for this reason. In British Columbia's case, two contemporary mid-19th-century developments set this dynamic into motion. First, Captain Sir John Franklin's failed Artic Expedition of the late 1840s tried to find the so-called North-west Passage, a shortcut by sea to the east. Its tragic failure sent shockwaves throughout the British Empire. Second was the discovery of gold in the 1850s. Together these developments heightened the need for a swift and reliable line of communication between British Columbia and the rest of Canada. Attention turned to the creation of a railway. Settler colonists were now needed to fill the vast landmass to maintain a sovereign presence against the encroachment of the United States of America and Russia, interested in squeezing out the British Empire from this gold-rich Pacific North-west and the lucrative base it offered for trade with the east (and thus securing it for a Canada that shortly gained its independence in 1867).

The railway was completed in 1885, and Vancouver, a tiny and parochial community then called Hastings Mill, suddenly became a city in need of settlers and development. The strategic geopolitical significance of British Columbia became further accentuated during World War I and II. At the start of World War I, Richard McBride, the premier of British Columbia, purchased two submarines to defend the coasts against German imperial cruisers assigned to German colonial possessions in the Pacific Ocean. Premier McBride purchased the submarines without prior authorisation of the central government in Ottawa or the imperial government in London, both charged with the responsibility for military affairs. During World War II, because of perceived threats from imperial Japan across the Pacific Ocean, British Columbia and Vancouver became even more militarised, including the University of British Columbia campus where the international workshop was held, following the surprise attack on American military installations at Pearl Harbor. Soon thereafter the forced relocation of the vast majority of Japanese Canadians into internment camps away from the coasts reminds one of the forced relocations evident in the wars of Classical Greek Sicily. Both Sicily and British Columbia experienced military innovations thanks to their geopolitically strategic positions.

The case for a transcontinental railway that would make modern British Columbia and unite all of Canada from the Atlantic to the Pacific Oceans had been made 20 years before by Matthew Macfie (1865) in an important book published in London. As part of his arguments, Macfie drew on historical precedent, stressing how ‘Control of trade with the East has been coveted as a prime source of wealth by western nations from the remotest antiquity’.[1] He discussed the great leaders of history, including Alexander the Great, who opened trade with the East.[2] Historical precedence certainly helped to fire the imagination to invest in British Columbia, but the borderlands of ancient Greek Sicily and modern British Columbia were further entangled by projecting back in time the anxieties, fears and aspirations of contemporary settler colonialism which the British Empire most actively promoted around the globe. This was only to be expected by modern ruling Britons who viewed themselves as the direct descendants and heirs of ancient Greece. If Britain was ancient Greece, it was natural to think of Canada, steadily moving towards independence in 1867, as the ancient western Greeks of southern Italy and Sicily, as a colony, in other words, within a larger colonial dominion.

Of the many legacies that colonialism has left to both Sicily and British Columbia, a notable category is precisely this imagined similarity of speaking about ancient Greek Sicily in such modern colonial terms. This goes back right to the start of the frontier period in British Columbia, even before the main period of settler colonialism had begun in earnest. Geographical features were named after Classical and Mediterranean ones. This included the naming, in 1860, of an impressive (and potentially active stratovolcano like Mt Etna) mountain 50 km north of Vancouver, Mount Garibaldi. Interestingly, this occurred not only in the same year in which Garibaldi landed in Sicily to begin his unification of Italy but also at the same time as the British sought to consolidate their limited hold on a far-flung region and unify it with the rest of Canada, as part of which the Royal Navy was surveying Howe Sound, the triangular sound over which Mount Garibaldi stands. In the main gold fields of British Columbia, located in the Cariboo region, the small rural community of Likely is named after one of the region's most successful miners, John A. Likely. He is also known for his fondness of Plato (earning him the nickname 'Plato John') and for his philosophising. Interestingly, Likely's association with Plato and the gold fields of British Columbia can be situated within similar boom-and-bust cycles of Sicilian economics and wealth that worried Plato. To the south-east of Likely one can also find a Sicily Lake to the south of Italia Lake, as well as the nearby Corsica and Sardinia Lakes, so christened because their shapes resemble the originals. Apart from similarities in shape, some of British Columbia's semi-arid landscapes, like those around Osoyoos in the southern central interior, do in fact resemble Sicilian geography, vegetation and colours.

When the settlers began arriving in numbers, names and thinking derived from Classical and Mediterranean lands expanded. Just over 100 km to the east of Sicily Lake sits a town called Avola, named after its Sicilian counterpart, from which many of the early settlers were brought to build and work on the railway created in this part of British Columbia. Among some of the early settlers in the Fraser Valley of what is today Greater Vancouver lived a young Homer Thompson, the distinguished classical archaeologist who directed the excavations in the Athenian Agora, and who enrolled at the University of British Columbia in 1921 at the age of 15, where he completed his first two academic degrees. In a memorial tribute published in the year following Homer Thompson's death, which draws on family memoirs, oral histories, and photographs, my emeritus colleague Robert Todd writes as follows about Thompson's influences:

> His early life also, he claimed, gave him 'a surer understanding of major aspects of early Greek history. First: how did the early Greek colonists in the western Mediterranean adjust to the ways of the aborigines, often of decidedly different cultural levels? Secondly, in an old settled part of Greece such as Attica, how did the central authority in Athens deal with the many small but proud local authorities, the Demes? In the Chilliwack Valley of my time we had plenty of first-hand experience of both such situations'.[3]

These illustrate just a few of the highlights of a larger scholarly subject of Classical and Near Eastern inspiration in British Columbia that remains largely untapped. The mere outline offered here should have made clear that Sicily and British Columbia share more in common historically and intellectually than one might imagine. They have long been places of cultural encounters and frontiers, in both real and imagined ways, and for that reason move in parallel intellectually and culturally in a manner that respects little the time and space that separate the two. In welcoming you to the contents of this volume, we are reminded how war and society go hand in hand with colonialism and imperialism that are universal.

Franco De Angelis
University of British Columbia

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[1] Macfie 1865, 336.
[2] Macfie 1865, 336–338.
[3] Todd 2001, 3.

Introduction

Melanie Jonasch

All authors of this book are fortunate enough never to have experienced war firsthand. We live in privileged areas of the world, where no armed conflicts threaten life and health on a daily basis. But even without knowing the harsh reality of war, we recognise the immense influence that organised societal violence by state and non-state actors has on people and their living space, both in times of open conflict and in times of peace. Especially in recent years, we have had to learn the lesson that worldwide battlefields cast long shadows. As a consequence, the call for peace and unity, paramount during the last decades of the 20th century, is currently being drowned by a cry for security and control. The general sense of threat and the fear for personal safety increasingly affects our social practices and shapes our living environment, even distant as we are from actual scenes of war.[1] Indeed, the absence of organised societal violence is not synonymous with perpetual peace, so long as there remain reasons to fight within our global society.[2]

It goes without saying that the present situation cannot be retrospectively applied onto the past. The disposition for collective violent behaviour and the motives for the use of force have, however, not changed significantly in the past millennia.[3] In various fields of research concerned with human social behaviour, there is an ongoing debate about the reasons why people fight, for what purposes, and when they began to do it.[4] Biological, utilitarian and culturalist concepts have been invoked to shed light on the human propensity for violence, and materialist approaches analyse the evolutionary force of intergroup aggression.[5] The topic has also been embraced with enthusiasm in the fields of classical archeology and ancient history, since warfare and objects related to it play a key role in ancient historiography and material culture. In the last decades, the traditional 'drum and trumpet' approach, principally engaged with battlefield tactics and military history, has been increasingly overtaken by a more comprehensive perspective that considers warfare a social practice and takes intensified interest in its cultural and spatial context and the agents involved.[6] The outcome of this shift of focus is a remarkable number of publications that address the many faces of organised societal violence and the interdependencies between collective aggression and society.[7] In this vein, the workshop in Vancouver, whence this book originates, was entitled *War and Society in Colonial Sicily* (WASICS) and aimed at the exchange of archaeological and historical evidence concerning warfare and violent conflict in a deliberately restricted region and time-frame.

Ancient Sicily is, in fact, ideally suited for the study of the impact of collective aggression on people and their living space since it was a popular theatre of conflict throughout large parts of its history. During the 'colonial period' between the 8th and 3rd centuries BC, we can observe the oppression of local residents, multiple interstate wars, repeated *staseis* and intragroup power struggles, as well as large battles for territory and resources between major powers of the region and beyond (see timeline). In periods without imminent violent conflicts, autocratic regimes deliberately destabilised communities by highhandedly relocating them to new places or by undermining their social fabric with the introduction of new groups of settlers. Public and private space could be manipulated according to military necessities or the personal desires of a ruler. This list of possible manifestations of organised violence is impressive, but not exceptional within in the Greek world. After all, warfare and other aggressive means to pursue one's objectives were common phenomena in the ancient world. There are no efforts recognisable to achieve what today is understood as the ideal of a 'positive peace' or an egalitarian society with no reasons to fight.[8] Sure enough, peace was desirable within a group or *polis* and with the 4th century BC, the idea of a κοινὴ εἰρήνη – a common peace between all Greek *poleis* – gained momentum within the Hellenic world.[9] The appreciation of freedom among fellow Greeks becomes already clear in the speech of the Syracusan Hermocrates in front of the congress of Gela in 424 BC:

> But as to the question of peace, which all men agree is a most desireable thing, why should we not make it here among ourselves? Or, think you, if one person enjoys a blessing and another labours under adversity, it is not tranquility far more than war that will put an end to the latter and perpetuate the former? And has not peace its honours and less hazardous splendours, and all the other advantages on which one might dilate as easily as on the horrors of war?[10]

Yet, war was nevertheless considered a natural reality that helped to establish and maintain social order. Most frequently cited to document this basic attitude is a passage from the 'Melian dialogues' by Thucydides:

> Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can. And it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made: we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do.[11]

Peace seemed thus to have been a worthwhile and targeted condition but organised societal violence a reasonable action to achieve one's goals and rightful position of power.[12] This paradox reveals itself in the various contributions of the present book: in the bemoaning of the dramatic consequences of warfare and the yet persistent struggle for power and hegemony.

The 17 chapters of this book present a dense body of evidence for the imprint of warfare and political/territorial competition on the historical and archaeological record of Greek Sicily. They do not offer a general analysis of war-related phenomena in the ancient world or meditations over contemporary theoretical approaches. Neither do they scrutinise perceptions of war and peace in ancient historiography or philosophy or the role of violence in ancient societies. The single case-studies focusing on a clearly defined time and space instead offer a comprehensive picture of the reflections of warfare and collective aggression in Greek Sicilian society, politics and landscape. These three categories, which also figure in the subtitle of this book, are a *pars pro toto* for the many fields of human life and activity affected by organised societal violence. Although it is certainly not possible to separate the evidence neatly according to these categories, the book is roughly designed around them.

Society: The most obvious and dramatic impact of warfare on parts of the community is presented by **Stefano Vassallo**, who offers a baseline with his introduction to the recently excavated, yet already famous, collective tombs of the war dead from the battles at Himera in 480 and 409 BC. Both dates are crucial for the history of Greek Sicily and strongly connected to another major player in the western part of the island, the Greek city of Selinous. In an extraordinary overview, **Clemente Marconi**, **Andrew Ward**, and **Holger Baitinger** present weapon finds from recent excavations on the acropolis and the agora of Selinous. Because the social practices associated with weapons are not limited to warfare, the authors offer a range of interpretations of the different find contexts while considering sacred, military, and economic aspects.

Randall Souza directly addresses the consequences of military defeat for the losing combatants. Those who escaped death were often sold as slaves and vanished in the abyss of a historiography that usually focuses on the winners. Souza's paper offers a glimmer of hope for the defeated, who were sometimes able to find their way back to an independent civil life.

In his intriguing investigation of post-traumatic stress disorder with the defeated Athenians, **Bernd Steinbock** extends our perspective of war suffering beyond death and slavery. Thucydides' vivid description of the soldiers' trauma after the fatal defeat by the Syracusans in 413 BC is his point of departure. **Lisa Irene Hau** thoroughly discusses the reasons for the Greek author's particularly dramatic presentation of the events by taking us also beyond Sicily to other battlefields of the Greek world.

Ryan Johnson's contribution brings us back to the city of Selinous and offers vivid evidence for the existence of inner-group hostilities. The eloquent *defixiones* permit extraordinary insight into the social mechanisms of a multi-ethnic community.

Politics: **Franco De Angelis'** reflections on the motivations for, and consequences of, warfare opens this section of the volume. He argues against the overemphasis of ethnic/cultural reasons and invites a more pragmatic approach by considering, in particular, the impact of warfare on the economy.

The question of human resources for the battlefield is at the heart of **Jason Harris'** chapter. He offers insight into the effect of the mobilisation of large numbers of mercenaries from Sicily and abroad on the formatting and reformatting of Greek Sicilian communities and their role in the tyrant's power politics.

Mercenaries are also an important component of the chapter on settlement patterns by **Spencer Pope**. He focuses on the strategic settlement policy of Syracuse during the 4th century BC and its manifestations in the archaeological record.

In the same vein, **Michela Costanzi** takes a closer look at the formation and reformation of Greek and non-Greek cities during the 5th and 4th centuries BC with a special focus on the development of the mixed settlement of Halaesa Archonidea.

These two chapters concerned with settlements policy allow a smooth transition to the next section on landscapes, inasmuch as they deal with the role of strategic considerations on the shaping of the living environment.

Landscape: The many ways that landscape could be influenced by military necessities is also the core of my own chapter, which opens the final section of this book. On the basis of single case studies this essay demonstrates how organized societal violence, competition for land and resources, and other power political considerations could actively influence or incidentally modify human living space. One paragraph of this chapter refers also to places and monuments built to remember military victory or defeat within the commemorative landscape of a community.

Such a potential memorial site is the protagonist of the following chapter by **Giulio Amara**. In the light of new material evidence from the 'Athenaion' in Syracuse, he challenges traditional approaches towards the so-called temples of victory built after the battle at Himera in 480 BC.

Syracuse is also the basis of **Valentina Mignosa**'s chapter, which focuses on urban development. Her work takes us beyond the island of Ortygia and the 'Athenaion' and demonstrates how military events and necessities, demographic changes, and even personal interests could affect the formal shape and the social composition of a city. In the same way, **Massimo Frasca** offers a complementary portrait of the development of Leontinoi, a city in the immediate vicinity of Syracuse and constantly entangled in the power games of its mighty neighbour.

The nearly complete exclusion of a Carthaginian perspective from this collection of papers was not intentional, but an incidental consequence of the research interests of those who were able and adventurous enough to follow our invitation to Vancouver on rather short notice. While **Salvatore De Vincenzo** could not join us in Canada, he provided us with a written version of his contribution that takes us into the Carthaginian sphere of influence in the extreme west of the island. As in the two preceding chapters, he demonstrates how the physical appearance of the city Eryx was repeatedly modified according to political and military considerations.

The last chapter by **Claudio Vacanti** would also have fitted well in the section on politics, since new approaches to geopolitical cartography are his main concern. Using the example of the First Punic War, he invites us to alter our perspective when discussing dynamics of conflict. In relegating the Sicilian Greeks to the sidelines, his chapter marks the logical end of the fight for Greek Sicily highlighted here.

Stefania De Vido's afterword succeeds in recollecting all aspects addressed in this volume in a remarkably consistent and organic way. Her final comment concludes the present collection of papers, yet inspires and invites further research on the important, manifold, and topical subject of organized societal violence and its entanglement with space, power, and the individual human being.

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[1] See *cf.* the study by Molotch 2014; and Flint 2011, 37.

[2] In peace research and conflict studies, a distinction is made between a 'negative peace' (the absence of open conflict) and a 'positive peace' (a society free from reasons to fight). Among the vast bibliography on the

topic, see especially Polat 2010; Gießmann and Rinke 2011, 11–12; Flint 2011. The concept of positive and negative peace was also vividly debated in the final panel of the workshop.

[3] For a short history of warfare, see Maleševic 2010, 89–117.

[4] Among the most active are the fields of anthropology (*cf.* Kim and Kissel 2018), sociology (*cf.* Maleševic 2017) human geography (*cf.* Kobayashi 2009) and psychology (*cf.* Lopez 2017).

[5] Overviews of the different concepts are presented by Maleševic 2010, 50–85 and Helbling 2006, 116–120. For the evolutionary approach, see especially Bossen 2006; Morris 2014.

[6] For a definition of war as a social practice, see *e.g.* Bossen 2006, 100 [95]: ‘At the level of practice, war is conceived as acts of physical violence organized by two or more actors … The acts are directed at members of another group and are always embedded in a context of meaning which gives significance to the acts … At the level of society, practices of war are manifestations of one of four social sources of power – economic [production and exchange of subsistence needs], political [centralized, institutionalized and territorialized aspects of social relations], ideological [giving meaning, morale and aesthetics to aggression] and military [providing means of defense and aggression]…’

[7] See Rich and Shipley 1993a; 1993b; Raaflaub and Rosenstein 1999; Bekker-Nielsen and Hannestad 2001; Gilchrist 2003b; Otto *et al.* 2006; Bragg *et al.* 2008; Pritchard 2010; Brice and Roberts 2011; Payen 2012a; 2018; O’Brian and Boatright 2013; Franchi and Proietti 2015; Caston and Weineck 2016; Bettalli 2019.

[8] Effe 1989, 10: ‘Gedankengänge solcher Art, wie sie den modernen Pazifismus kennzeichnen, sind der griechischen Antike überhaupt fremd.’ On the concept of ‘positive peace’, see note 2.

[9] Bettalli 2019, 24–29; Jehne 1994.

[10] Thuc. 4.62.2: τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμολογουμένην ἄριστον εἶναι εἰρήνην πῶς οὐ χρὴ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ποιήσασθαι; ἢ δοκεῖτε, εἴ τῳ τι ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν ἢ εἴ τῳ τὰ ἐναντία, οὐχ ἡσυχίαν μᾶλλον ἢ πόλεμον τὸ μὲν παῦσαι ἂν ἑκατέρῳ, τὸ δὲ ξυνδιασῶσαι, καὶ τὰς τιμὰς καὶ λαμπρότητας ἀκινδυνοτέρας ἔχειν τὴν εἰρήνην, ἄλλα τε ὅσα ἐν μήκει λόγων ἄν τις διέλθοι, ὥσπερ περὶ τοῦ πολεμεῖν; ἃ χρὴ σκεψαμένους μὴ τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους ὑπεριδεῖν, τὴν δὲ αὑτοῦ τινὰ σωτηρίαν μᾶλλον ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν προϊδεῖν (trans. C.F. Smith).

[11] Words supposedly spoken during the siege of Melos by the Athenians in 416 BC, as preserved in Thuc. 5.105.2: ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ τὸ ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῇ, ἄρχειν: καὶ ἡμεῖς οὔτε θέντες τὸν νόμον οὔτε κειμένῳ πρῶτοι χρησάμενοι, ὄντα δὲ παραλαβόντες καὶ ἐσόμενον ἐς αἰεὶ καταλείψοντες χρώμεθα αὐτῷ, εἰδότες καὶ ὑμᾶς ἂν καὶ ἄλλους ἐν

τῇ αὐτῇ δυνάμει ἡμῖν γενομένους δρῶντας ἂν ταὐτό (trans. R. Crawley).

[12] Payen 2018, 23–24: ‘La guerre apparaît ainsi comme étant intégrée à la cité, mais par ses marges, comme une pratique anthropologique et une institution politique dont la nécessité ne peut être déclenchée qu’en fonction de contextes qui lui sont extérieurs, mais elle n’est pas une nécessité en soi.’

Chapter 1

Guerre e conflitti nella Sicilia centro-settentrionale tra la metà del VI e la fine del V sec. a.C.: una prospettiva archeologica

Stefano Vassallo

Between the second half of the 6th and the first decades of the 5th century BC, the inhabitants of central Sicily enjoyed a period of extreme prosperity and growth. This was probably due to in intense cultural and economic exchange, but also due to violent conflicts of which there is only little mention of in the sources. Apart from the famous battle of Himera in 480 BC, which was central for the power balance on the entire island, we do not know anything about the confrontations that unsettled the region. Archaeological research of the last decades allows, however, an idea of the motives and the problems connected with competition and armed conflicts in this time and geographical space.

La storia della Sicilia nella fase compresa tra la colonizzazione greca e la conquista romana, come la ricostruiamo dalle fonti scritte, è soprattutto una storia di guerre, battaglie, trattati di pace, scelte politiche contrastanti, ostilità e alleanze. Indubbiamente lo sviluppo sociale, economico e culturale dell'isola è anche il risultato dei conflitti e degli scontri militari di cui resta traccia nella storiografia, tutti furono ugualmente determinanti per la vita dei tanti abitati fioriti tra età arcaica e classica in tutta l'isola. Tuttavia sappiamo bene come le tensioni che sfociano in guerre segnano soltanto momenti, periodi circoscritti tra fasi di vita ben più durature, che caratterizzano le relazioni ordinarie tra comunità e genti diverse; la Sicilia antica non fa certo eccezione a queste dinamiche che segnano l'evolversi di ogni popolo.

Nello sforzo di tratteggiare le tracce dei conflitti nell'isola tra età tardo arcaica e classica in relazione soprattutto e principalmente al riscontro dei dati di scavo, va premesso che dal punto di vista archeologico non sempre è facile riconoscere i segni delle guerre e ancor di più metterli in relazione con fatti ricordati dagli storici. Gli strati di distruzione che frequentemente individuiamo nelle stratigrafie possono, infatti, avere molteplici spiegazioni: eventi naturali, terremoti, incendi, pertanto, l'esperienza maturata nei cantieri di scavo suggerisce sempre molta prudenza nell'attribuire queste tracce alla violenza dei conflitti.

Questa breve premessa appare opportuna per focalizzare lo scarno quadro offerto dalle ricerche sul terreno in relazione alle guerre verificatesi nell'isola in questa fase storica, alcune sono riconducibili a quelle ricordate dalle scarne fonti scritte, molte altre sono destinate a restare sconosciute per quanto riguarda i luoghi e il tempo delle azioni, probabilmente perché circoscritti, il più delle volte, a scontri locali che non trovarono 'dignità' di narrazione nella storiografia greca.


PALERMO
M. D'ORO
SOLUNTO
C. PAPARINA
CANNITA
M.PORCARA
F.IATO
F.ELEUTERIO
HIMERA
M.IATO
MONTAGNOLA
M.PIETROSO
C.SANNITA
F.S.LEONARDO
MURA PREGNE
M.D'ORO
BAUCINA
IL PIZZO
MONTE MARANFUSA
P.NICOLOSI
P. PIPITONE
F.IMERA SETT.
F.BELICE
C.ZZO DI POGGIOREALE
P.DI CASA
F.TORTO
M. RIPARATO
M.VECCHIA
COLLE MADORE
S.PUCCIA
ENTELLA
M.TRIONA
F.IMERA MER.
M.DI CAVALLI
BABALUCEDDU
TERRAVECCHIA DI CUTI
F.SALSO
ADRANONE
F.SOSIO
CASSERO
POLIZZELLO
CHIBBO'
B. MARIANOPOLI
CAPODARSO
F.PLATANI
ROCCAFERRO
RAFFE
SABUCINA

Figure 1.1. Sicilia centro-settentrionale tra VI e V sec. a.C., con i principali centri indigeni e le città costiere (© Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo).

Concentrerò la mia analisi sulla Sicilia centro-settentrionale, un'area caratterizzata, tra la metà del VI e la fine del V sec. a.C., dalla coesistenza di popolazioni con culture e tradizioni diverse: i Greci di Himera e gli *emporia* fenicio/punici di Solunto e Palermo sulla costa, i centri indigeni, sicani, distribuiti lungo tutte le vallate che collegano la costa tirrenica e mediterranea con il ricco entroterra (Fig. 1.1).[1]

È verosimile che proprio l'eterogeneità di queste genti possa avere generato tensioni, sfociate in scontri armati, alimentati dalla pressione coloniale greca e degli interessi Punici in un clima politico di generale incertezza. Allo stesso tempo, però, come detto prima, la ricerca archeologica documenta una fase di grande floridezza e prosperità nelle città costiere e negli abitati indigeni, attestata da un'intensa circolazioni di merci e di oggetti di pregio, sintomo di relazioni abitualmente non conflittuali, improntante a rapporti costruttivi di crescita economia e culturale diffusa.

Il VI sec. a.C.

Prendendo avvio dai decenni intorno alla metà VI sec. a.C., un secolo circa dopo le fondazioni occidentali di Himera e Selinunte e pochi decenni dopo quella di Agrigento, cercherò di evidenziare, attraverso i risultati delle ricerche archeologiche, i dati che si possono collegare a conflitti, tentando anche un collegamento con i pochi fatti storici noti: da questo punto di vista va ricordato che i riferimenti delle fonti a conflitti sono realmente sporadici e si prestano ad interpretazioni dubbie, non consentendo di tracciare un quadro chiaro degli eventi militari che coinvolsero le relazione tra colonie greche, *emporia* punici e insediamenti indigeni. Per altro, in questo studio si è privilegiata la prospettiva archeologica, senza entrare in aspetti dibattuti dalla critica storica, che meriterebbero ben altri approfondimenti da parte degli storici, ai quali, comunque, i dati archeologici, anche molto recenti, ci auguriamo possano offrire nuovi spunti di riflessione. In particolare tre sono gli episodi documentati dalle fonti su guerre che potrebbero avere coinvolto direttamente questa parte dell'isola. Li ricordo senza entrare, come si diceva poco sopra, nel merito della critica storica che da decenni si confronta su questi temi, con risultati e ipotesi spesso contrastanti. In primo luogo va ricordata l'azione di Falaride, primo tiranno di Agrigento: al di là delle notizie leggendarie sulla sua figura è indubbio, comunque, che egli attuò, poco prima della metà del VI sec. a.C. una politica espansionistica verso Nord, conquistando abitati indigeni, secondo una strategia volta a raggiungere la costa tirrenica, che ebbe come conseguenza una forte instabilità in tutto il territorio centrale dell'isola.[2]

Secondo episodio significativo riportato dalle fonti è la spedizione in Sicilia del cartaginese Malco, di cui parla Giustino in un problematico passo,[3] da interpretare in relazione ai rapporti tra Cartagine e le città fenicio-puniche di Sicilia, o forse, più probabilmente come reazione di Cartagine alle aggressive strategie greche; in ogni caso esso denota il clima di incertezza negli equilibri politici della Sicilia occidentale.[4] Un'ulteriore testimonianza delle tensioni 'militari' nell'entroterra coloniale, infine, è la notizia di una guerra vinta dagli Imeresi sui Sicani riportata in un'epigrafe di Samo, databile poco prima della metà del secolo.[5]

Dal punto di vista archeologico, diversi sono, invece, i dati riferibili, direttamente o indirettamente, a vicende di guerra in questa regione per il VI sec. a.C.

1. incremento delle fortificazioni.
2. contesti di distruzioni e abbandoni.
3. fasi di sviluppo a seguito di episodi di guerre.

Riguardo al primo punto, poco ancora sappiamo sulle più antiche fortificazioni greche, puniche e indigene della Sicilia occidentale: tuttavia, le ricerche sul terreno indicano, per l'età arcaica, soprattutto intorno alla metà del VI sec. a.C. o poco dopo, un generale incremento dei sistemi difensivi; dati significativi vi sono per le colonie greche di Selinunte, Agrigento, Himera e per l'isola di Mozia, dove, l'abitato fenicio/ punico venne interamente protetto da un muro di cinta costruito ex novo.[6]

Negli abitati indigeni la costruzione di fortificazioni è attestata, in diversi casi ed esclusivamente sulla base delle indagini archeologiche, nel corso del VI sec. a.C. Gli esempi più conosciuti sono quelli di Sabucina (dove fu costruito un imponente muro dotato di torri[7]), Vassallaggi, Monte Bubbonia, Gibel Gabib e Monte Raffa.[8] Una cronologia più precisa è stata accertata soltanto a Terravecchia di Cuti, con la datazione della prima fase del muro alla metà del VI sec. a.C.[9]

È indubbio che il mondo sicano, in questi decenni, pose al centro dei propri interessi la necessità di proteggere i propri abitati, in forte espansione demografica ed economica, con adeguati sistemi difensivi, evidentemente in reazione a crescenti minacce belliche.

Un altro aspetto, da riferire verosimilmente a conflitti militari, sono i contesti di abbandono negli insediamenti indigeni: un caso ben documentato è Polizzello, nella media valle del Platani.[10] Sull'acropoli ebbe vita, fin dal X sec. a.C., uno straordinario santuario indigeno organizzato con grandi edifici sacri circolari. Le ricche deposizioni votive di materiali misti, indigeni e greci, documentano la grande popolarità di un luogo di culto che dovette costituire anche un importante riferimento religioso per tutti gli abitati della vallata. In relazione al tema della guerra mi limito a segnalare due elementi, il primo è la presenza di un elmo bronzeo cretese con destinazione votiva databile nella prima metà del VI sec. a.C. (Fig. 1.2).[11] Come mai arrivò a Polizzello un elmo cretese, di tipo unico in Sicilia e raro anche a Creta? Tra le diverse ipotesi possiamo pensare ad un'offerta nel santuario sicano del bottino di una guerra combattuta contro la colonia rodio/cretese di Agrigento, ma potrebbe anche trattarsi dell'armatura di un mercenario cretese, che dedicò il suo elmo nel santuario.

Secondo elemento da collegare a un evento bellico è l'improvviso abbandono del santuario alla metà del VI secolo, che sembra riferibile, come ipotizzato da Dario Palermo, ad un episodio violento, nell'ambito di un panorama di conflitti generale che investì questa parte dell'isola.[12]

Gli elementi archeologici evidenziati: costruzione di fortificazioni, donazione votiva dell'elmo cretese e la fine della vita del santuario sono a nostro parere da mettere in relazione con la politica di Falaride diretta al controllo politico e militare dell'entroterra indigeno, creando forse tensioni con la stessa Himera.[13] In questo contesto si può leggere anche la notizia della guerra tra Himera e Sicani, cui farebbe cenno l'epigrafe samia sopra ricordata.

Per la seconda metà del VI sec. a.C. le ricerche archeologiche documentano, nell'area centro/settentrionale dell'isola, uno straordinario sviluppo economico e culturale; ad Himera gli scavi hanno fornito chiare indicazioni di una città ricca e in pieno sviluppo.[14] Ma anche i centri sicani partecipano di questo momento di prosperità; lo testimoniano i rinnovati schemi urbani, le nuove costruzioni di edifici sacri, sul modello greco e l'ampia circolazione di ceramica importata. Cito soltanto il caso di Colle Madore, dove, in questi decenni, fu ristrutturata un'area sacra e costruito un sacello di impianto architettonico e apparato decorativo di chiara matrice imerese, in cui è attestata la circolazione di vasellame legato a liturgie miste, greche e indigene, in un contesto devozionale aperto anche al culto di Eracle, raffigurato su un'edicola votiva con scena dell'eroe alla fontana.[15]



Figure 1.2. Polizzello: elmo cretese dalle deposizioni votive del santuario indigeno (prima metà VI sec. a.C.) (© Soprintendenza Beni Culturali ed Ambientali di Caltanissetta, da Palermo 2013, 306 fig. 4).

E’ probabile che questi decenni, di forte progresso demografico, economico e culturale degli abitati dell’entroterra, siano frutto dei nuovi equilibri politici instauratisi dopo anni segnati da conflitti tra Greci e Indigeni. Una nuova fase di vita felice, in cui la convivenza tra le diverse componenti etniche dette luogo ad una crescita globale del territorio, sotto la spinta dei modelli coloniali greci, la cui ricchezza era fondata anche sul controllo delle ricche risorse dell’entroterra.


MARE TIRRENO
Limite supposto dell'antica spiaggia
Staz.e di Bonfornello
Tempio d...
Burr.ne del Gatto
Piano Tamburino
Piano d'Imera
C.zo dell'Imperatore
M. Castellaccio
M. S. Calogero
Poggio Scacciapidocchi
M.ta della Signora
R. del Drago
C. del Mammaro
F. Torto
F. Grande
Imera settentrionale
R. Arbinuara
V. Argentiera
R.ca d'Antoni
C.zo l'Imolei
Sca Galera
M. Bovitello
R. Tabarrani
P.ta S. Nicola
P.ta Rasolocollo
C.zo Fallina
V. Pozo
Cerda
1 - Accampamento navale cartaginese
2 - Accamp. dei fanti cartag.
3 . Posizione fantii cartag. nelle battaglia
4 - Primo attacco agli Imeresi
5 - Fuga delle navi mediane
6 - Probabile via per la fuga dei fanti
7 - Cinta di Imera sec. il Mauceri
8 - Sobborgo del porto
9 - Campo di Gelone
10 - Probabile via dei cavalieri greci
11 - Fanti di Gelone nella battaglia
12-14 - Sortite degli Imeresi con Terone

Figure 1.3. Ricostruzione della battaglia del 480 a.C. secondo Luigi Parieti (da Pareti 1914, Tav. I). Ipotesi sulla ubicazione dei luoghi della battaglia dopo le ultime ricerche (© Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo).

Il V sec. a.C. e le battaglie di Himera

Maggiori conoscenze abbiamo sui conflitti avvenuti agli inizi del V sec. a.C.; in particolare grazie ai racconti di Diodoro Siculo e di Erodoto,[16] ai quali si deve un'attenta descrizione degli scontri culminati con la battaglia di Himera, del 480 a.C.[17] Davanti alle mura della città si affrontarono da un lato i Cartaginesi, desiderosi di ampliare il controllo territoriale in Sicilia, dall'altro una coalizione greca di Imeresi, Agrigentini e Siracusani guidata da Gelone.[18]

Non mi soffermo sulla critica storica di questa guerra, oggetto da tempo di approfonditi studi;[19] propongo, piuttosto, una sintesi dei dati archeologici utili a leggere meglio una pagina fondamentale non solo per la storia di Himera, ma anche di tutti i Greci d'Occidente; una battaglia celebrata dalla storiografia greca e messa in relazione alla vittoria ellenica nella seconda guerra persiana.

Un primo contributo alla ricostruzione dei fatti è l'individuazione del campo di battaglia. Diodoro ricorda che lo scontro avvenne davanti alle mura della città in uno spazio che da oltre un secolo è stato erroneamente localizzato dopo gli studi di Luigi Mauceri e Luigi Pareti, sulle colline sovrastanti la pianura costiera (Fig. 1.3).[20] Tale ubicazione era dovuta al fatto che fino a venti anni fa si riteneva che l'abitato occupasse quasi esclusivamente la zona collinare del Piano di Imera. La scoperta della città bassa, sulla pianura di Buonfornello, con le sue fortificazioni, ci permette, oggi, di fissare il campo di battaglia nella pianura costiera, tra le mura della città e la foce del Fiume Torto, in un'area che comprende anche la necropoli occidentale, dove abbiamo trovato significative testimonianze della battaglia (Fig. 1.4). In particolare appare verosimile una localizzazione degli accampamenti punici della flotta e dell'esercito, in continuità tra il mare, presso la sponda del Fiume Torto e le colline soprastanti; la battaglia si svolse, invece sulla fascia costiera, nell'attuale Piana di Buonfornello, davanti alle mura nord/occidentali della colonia, parzialmente messe in luce pochi anni fa.[21]



Figure 1.4. Ipotesi sulla ubicazione dei luoghi della battaglia dopo le ultime ricerche (© S. Vassallo).

Nella necropoli occidentale, ubicata di fronte alle fortificazioni della città, in un'area che fu probabilmente anche campo di battaglia, sono state scoperte, nel 2009, diverse fosse comuni e sepolture singole, attribuite alle deposizioni di soldati caduti nel conflitto del 480 a.C. Le deposizioni collettive occupano lunghe fosse, scavate nella sabbia, contenenti da un minimo di 2 a un massimo di 23 scheletri (Fig. 1.5). Diversi elementi permettono di collegare questi individui con i caduti nello scontro del 480 a.C., innanzi tutto l'esame antropologico:[22] si tratta sempre, infatti, di maschi di giovane età, deposti in posizione supina l'uno accanto all'altro, contemporaneamente e con un preciso ordine. In alcuni di essi sono evidenti i traumi delle ferite mortali. In diversi casi, vi sono ancora le armi da taglio e da lancio che non furono rimosse dai corpi prima della sepoltura. Tutti questi elementi ci hanno convinto che nei morti delle fosse comuni siano da riconoscere i caduti della battaglia del 480 a.C. e ad escludere l'ipotesi che possa trattarsi degli Imeresi uccisi da Trasideo, figlio del tiranno Terone, nel 476 a.C.[23] Infatti, le stragi cittadine, o altre cause di morti collettive improvvise in cui vi era necessità di dare sepoltura a numeri elevati di cadaveri, come epidemie e terremoti, comporterebbero la presenza di un campione di popolazione molto ampio: maschi, femmine, bambini, adulti e anziani, mentre sesso ed età degli scheletri delle fosse sono omogenei, inoltre il tipo di armi, quanto frecce, punte di lance e pugnali, è molto più sintomatico di scontri connessi a battaglia in campo aperto. I dati stratigrafici indicano una datazione ai primi decenni del V secolo. Altri scheletri di soldati morti in battaglia nel 480 a.C., sono stati messi in luce in sepolture monosome, in questo caso l'identificazione con individui morti in questo scontro è suggerito anche dalla presenza di corredi databili agli inizi del V sec. a.C.[24]



Figure 1.5. La fossa comune n. 3 dei soldati caduti nella battaglia del 480 a.C. (© Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo).

Tra i protagonisti della battaglia Diodoro Siculo ricorda in più punti il coinvolgimento delle cavallerie di entrambi gli schieramenti; anche di questo particolare abbiamo un'impressionante documentazione grazie al rinvenimento di almeno 30 tombe di cavalli. A nostro parere si tratta dei cavalli morti nei combattimenti; i loro cadaveri, rimasti sul terreno, furono sotterrati nel luogo in cui furono uccisi, vicino alle tombe dei soldati.[25]

Questi sono in sintesi i dati di scavo che per tanti aspetti confermano il passo storico e offrono diversi spunti di riflessione. In primo luogo c'è da chiedersi a quale dei due schieramenti appartenevano gli scheletri delle fosse comuni. È improbabile che nell'area di necropoli, riservata ai cittadini greci di Himera, venissero sepolti i caduti dell'esercito punico. È, pertanto, verosimile che le tombe collettive contenessero i resti dei soldati greci di Siracusa e di Agrigento, morti in battaglia lontano dalla patria e accolti nella necropoli imerese, dove furono appositamente scavate fosse comuni per deporre in situazioni di emergenza numerosi cadaveri. Possiamo anche ipotizzare che i Greci di Himera furono, invece, deposti nelle tombe monosome, in spazi forse già a loro destinati nelle sepolture di famiglia, accompagnati da oggetti di corredo, di cui sono invece privi i morti delle fosse comuni.[26]

Le fosse collettive di soldati come quelle imeresi sono rare in età arcaica e classica nel mondo greco; ricordo quelle di Olinto nella penisola calcidica, attribuite dal Robinson ai caduti nelle guerre contro Atene, del 432–428 a.C.[27] Quest'attenzione nel comporre i morti in sepolture in qualche modo ordinate, anche in circostanze drammatiche, come nei casi di Himera e Olinto, appare pienamente coerente con l'etica del mondo greco che aveva grande considerazione per il diritto alla sepoltura, anche perché il venirne escluso incideva sull'annullamento della memoria della persona e della sua dignità (Fig. 1.6, 1 e 2).

Analogo è lo schema ordinato delle deposizioni di Himera e di Olinto, indice di una grande attenzione verso i morti in battaglia; un rispetto senza tempo, come possiamo riscontrare, ad esempio, nelle tombe collettive di Arras, nel Nord della Francia, di soldati britannici del decimo battaglione del Royal Lincolnshire Regiment,[28] che appaiono simili a quelle imeresi nella disposizione dei cadaveri, e rivelano il forte senso della *pietas* e del rispetto dei corpi quando sono i compatrioti a seppellire i morti della propria parte. Un comportamento etico spesso misconosciuto, purtroppo, quando, invece, sono i vincitori, spinti da odio e intolleranza a seppellire i vinti; di questo abbiamo molti terribili esempi nella nostra 'civile Europa' anche in tempi molto recenti (Fig. 1.6, 3 e 4).[29]

Un altro aspetto di un certo interesse è la testimonianza della presenza dei mercenari che secondo Erodoto (7.165.1) militavano nell'esercito cartaginese; di essi lo storico riferisce un dettagliato elenco dei luoghi di provenienza da punti diversi del Mediterraneo Occidentale: '300,000 Fenici, Libi, Iberi, Elysici, Sardi, Corsi'. Una significativa conferma è suggerita dal rinvenimento, nella necropoli, di due schinieri bronzei, di produzione iberica, dell'area di Alicante, databili in età tardo-arcaica (Fig. 1.7).[30] Riteniamo che si tratti di un'offerta di armi tolte ai nemici e deposte sul campo di battaglia con valore celebrativo. Forse con lo stesso significato fu dedicato ad Olimpia uno schiniere iberico dello stesso tipo; non è improbabile che si tratti di un'offerta fatta dai vincitori di Himera nel grande santuario di Zeus. Un'altra testimonianza della presenza di mercenari Iberici nella battaglia sono due morsi di cavallo bronzei ad anello, che non sembrano di tipo greco e per i quali abbiamo significativi confronti coevi nella Spagna Nord/orientale (Fig. 1.8).[31]



Figure 1.6. 1: Fossa comune di Himera del 480 a.C. (© Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo); 2: Fossa collettiva di 26 morti ad Olinto del 432–420 a.C. (da Robinson 1942, 75, fig. 16.3); 3: Tomba 'Grimsby Chums' ad Arras del 1917 (© G. Prilaux, INRAP, da Désfosses

2006); 4: Tomba di 26 repubblicani, uccisi durante la guerra civile spagnola nel 1936, sepolti ad Estépar, Burgos, Spagna (© M. Modesto Mata, da https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9a/Spanish_Civil_War_-_Mass_grave_-_Est%C3%A9par%2C_Burgos.jpg).



Figure 1.7. Schinieri iberici 480 a.C.; probabile deposizione votiva (© Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo).



Figure 1.8. Cranio di cavallo con morso ad anello di bronzo probabilmente di tipo iberico (© Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo).

La violenza della battaglia è rimasta impressa in tutta la sua drammaticità nei traumi riconosciuti sulle ossa dei soldati e provocati da ferite di armi da taglio o da lancio,[32] come nell'individuo della tomba W576 che presenta tagli nel cranio e nella tibia, o di quello della tomba W482, con cranio parzialmente tagliato, probabilmente a causa di un colpo di spada. In alcuni casi sono state rinvenute anche le armi che causarono le ferite mortali e che non furono rimosse al momento della sepoltura. Esse offrono anche utili indicazioni per studiare la dinamica dei colpi e le modalità dei duelli: le più impressionanti sono le cuspidi delle lance di ferro, lunghe oltre 30 cm trovate in diverse parti degli scheletri (Fig. 1.9).



Figure 1.9. Tomba W2764 della fossa comune 7, con punta di lancia di ferro infissa nel torace (© Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo).



Figure 1.10. Punte di freccia di bronzo infisse negli scheletri: 1: nella scapola dx; 2: tra due vertebre (© Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo).

Ben attestate anche le punte di freccia, sia rimaste infisse nelle ossa, sia quelle, numerose, rinvenute sul piano di campagna di età greca, che confermano come l'area della necropoli fu anche teatro della battaglia (Fig. 1.10). Non mancano anche le armi da taglio: un caso significativo è un piccolo pugnale con lama curva, infisso nella spalla di un soldato.

Le conseguenze della guerra furono notevoli, sia per Himera, sia per l'assetto politico generale dell'isola. Gli anni successivi al 480 a.C. non si rilevarono facili per la colonia dorico-calcidese: Terone d'Agrigento, infatti, esercitò, attraverso suo figlio Trasideo un duro controllo sulla città fino al 470 a.C, suscitando una rivolta domata con la forza e facendo stragi di cittadini. Terone fu così costretto a ripopolare Himera con nuovi elementi dorici. Anche di questi anni complessi abbiamo, in qualche modo testimonianza negli scavi: il dato più eloquente è l'abbandono, probabilmente dopo il 480 a.C., dell'esteso quartiere/*emporico* extraurbano situato ad Est del fiume Imera.[33] Tale abbandono è stato causato probabilmente dalla crisi economica e demografica della colonia sotto Terone, ma anche perché, cessata la minaccia cartaginese, gli Imeresi preferirono forse abbandonare un settore della colonia privo di difese e a grande rischio in caso di nuove minacce armate.

I nuovi equilibri politici, sotto il forte controllo di Agrigento, sembrano avere generato una fase di instabilità in tutto il territorio della Sicilia Occidentale, una crisi evidenziata dalle ricerche archeologiche e di cui non resta traccia nelle fonti.[34] In molti degli abitati esplorati dell'entroterra appare evidente una fase di difficoltà economica e demografica; importanti abitati delle vallate del Platani e del Belice furono abbandonati. È il caso di Maranfusa e di Poggioreale, altri vissero una drastica riduzione delle importazioni ceramiche, della circolazione monetale e in generale del benessere di età tardo arcaica, come nel caso di Iato ed Entella. Nel territorio più vicino ad Himera, a Colle Madore, lo scavo ha rivelato nel santuario una distruzione causata da un forte incendio e il successivo abbandono.

Non siamo certi se questi episodi avvennero in concomitanza con la spedizione cartaginese del 480 a.C., in un clima di disordini generali, oppure se furono determinati successivamente dall'aggressiva politica di controllo da parte di Agrigento in un settore dell'isola che per la vicinanza con l'elemento punico, e forse in un sistema di alleanze non favorevoli all'elemento greco, subì pesanti ripercussioni dopo la vittoria di Terone.

Dal 409 al 405 a.C. l'intera isola fu scossa dalla nuova grande spedizione militare di Cartagine sotto il comando di Annibale: conquistate in pochi anni Selinunte, Himera, Agrigento, Gela e Camarina ebbe inizio una nuova fase di equilibri politici con la Sicilia Occidentale sotto l'eparchia punica. A Himera, la tragica battaglia del 409 a.C., svoltasi ancora una volta davanti alle mura occidentali della città bassa, come per la precedente battaglia del 480 a.C., ha lasciato segni archeologici molto chiari.

Mi limito a segnalare le tracce più evidenti di questo tragico evento. La scoperta pochi anni fa delle mura occidentali, oltre a definire chiaramente l'estensione della città e lo spazio della battaglia, ha confermato il racconto di Diodoro, il quale narra che i Punici, assediando la città, scavarono sotto le mura e ne fecero crollare alcuni tratti, riparati in fretta dagli Imeresi.[35] Ebbene, almeno in tre punti delle mura abbiamo trovato ampie lacune della struttura muraria e affrettati tentativi di ricostruzione, con elementi architettonici di rimpiego; una testimonianza che rende vivo il drammatico clima degli ultimi giorni della colonia (Fig. 1.11).


HIMERA
FS 2007
S13
18 MAR
A
B
A
B

Figure 1.11. Fortificazioni della città bassa, torre nord/ ovest: al centro – pianta con le lacune (punti A e B) probabilmente da collegare all'assedio di

Himera del 409 a.C.; in basso - la torre da nord; in alto - elementi architettonici utilizzati per colmare le lacune del paramento murario (© Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo).

Impressionante anche la scoperta di una grande fossa comune databile alla fine del V a.C., contenente oltre 70 scheletri (Fig. 1.12). Probabilmente, nei giorni dell'assedio gli Imeresi ebbero il tempo di seppellire i loro morti, anche se a causa del clima concitato dei giorni della battaglia, i cadaveri furono deposti su quattro livelli, in modo più disordinato rispetto alle fosse dei caduti del 480 a.C.[36] Ma la testimonianza più commovente della distruzione della colonia sono le centinaia di sepolture di cadaveri deposti in modo frettoloso e confuso, con schemi irrituali, senza orientamenti precisi, talvolta non più in connessione anatomica e relativi a uomini e donne di ogni età.[37] Gli scheletri, riferibili, forse ai cittadini trucidati nella città, sono stati rinvenuti nei livelli più superficiali della necropoli, nell'area più vicina alle mura (Fig. 1.13). Narra Diodoro (19.59–62) che i mercenari dell'esercito punico, entrati in città, fecero enorme strage di cittadini. Finora, nell'abitato sono stati rinvenuti solo gli scheletri di un uomo e di un cavallo, schiacciati sotto il tetto di una casa della città alta,[38] ma dove furono seppelliti gli altri? E' verosimile che, terminato il saccheggio, i superstiti portarono i cadaveri fuori delle mura, nell'area di necropoli più vicina all'abitato, e dettero loro sepolture precarie.



Figure 1.12. Necropoli ovest: la fossa 9 relativa ai caduti della battaglia del 409 a.C. (© Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo).


W3725
W3700
W3775
W3776

Figure 1.13. Sepolture precarie da attribuire, probabilmente, ai morti della strage del 409 a.C (© Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo).



Figure 1.14. Himera, città bassa: gli strati di distruzione del 409 a.C., con i crolli delle tegole e gli elementi di arredo rinvenuti sui pavimenti (© Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo).

Le tracce della violenta guerra sono palesi anche negli scavi dell'abitato, soprattutto nelle case della città bassa, dove i crolli dei tetti hanno sigillato pavimenti e materiali in uso al momento della conquista punica (Fig. 1.14). Spesso, abbiamo rinvenuto gli oggetti in uso nelle case che i superstiti non riuscirono a portare via.[39]

Gli esiti della guerra del 409 a.C. furono sconvolgenti anche per l'assetto geopolitico della Sicilia centro-settentrionale.[40] È ancora l'archeologia a suggerire importanti elementi di valutazione e a confermare che Himera, distrutta, cessò di vivere come polis; il suo ruolo di importante centro politico, in questo tratto di costa tirrenica, venne presto assunto da due nuove città: Termini Imerese e Cefalù, fondate in prossimità di promontori rocciosi e dotate di porti naturali più affidabili di quello imerese ubicato sul litorale sabbioso molto esposto alle mareggiate. Le indagini in queste due città hanno confermato la cronologia storica delle loro fondazioni, tra fine V e inizi IV sec. a.C. In questo rinnovato panorama di fondazioni, 'eredi' del ruolo di Himera, va probabilmente inserita pure Alesa Arconidea, fondata secondo Diodoro Siculo nel 403 a.C.[41]


Palermo
Mar Tirreno
Cannita
Solunto
Eleuterio
M.Porcara
Himera
P.S.Angelo
C.Sannita
La Montagnola
(Makella)
S.Leonardo
Mura
Pregne
Madonie
Monte
D'Oro
M.Falcone
Il Pizzo
Rasolocollo
Imera Sett.le
Pizzo
di Casa
Pipitone
Fiume Torto
Monte
Riparato
Polizzi
Spolentino
Vicari
Colle
Madore
Liste
Margana
Pizzo
Colobria
Serre di
Puccia
Cozzo
Puccia
Montagna dei Cavalli
(Ippana)
Kassar
Palermo
Mar Tirreno
Cannita
Solunto
Eleuterio
M.Porcara
Termini
Imerese
Cefalù
C.Sannita
La Montagnola
(Makella)
S.Leonardo
Mura
Pregne
Madonie
M.Falcone
Il Pizzo
Imera Sett.le
Polizzi
Generosa
Pizzo
di Casa
Pipitone
Monte
Riparato
Spolentino
Vicari
Fiume Torto
Montagna dei Cavalli
(Ippana)

Figure 1.15. A sinistra: gli abitati dell'area centro settentrionale dell'isola prima della fine del V sec. a.C. con Himera ancora in vita; a destra: la stessa area nel IV-prima metà III sec. a.C. (© Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e Ambientali di Palermo).

Anche l'assetto politico dell'entroterra subì grandi sconvolgimenti: gli scavi, pur se ancora limitati, rivelano che molti degli abitati di origine indigena, ubicati lungo le vallate dei fiumi San Leonardo, Imera Settentrionale e Meridionale e del Fiume Torto, vennero abbandonati o subirono una profonda crisi (Fig. 1.15). Soltanto alcuni di essi, rinforzati e rinnovati nell'assetto urbano, soprattutto dopo la metà del IV sec. a.C., proseguirono la loro esistenza sotto l'eparchia punica, fino alla metà del III sec. a.C., quando dopo la conquista romana ancora una volta la violenza della guerra determinò una frattura radicale nel sistema sociale e politico ed equilibri del tutto nuovi nei modelli di insediamento dell'intera Sicilia.

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[1] Vassallo 2010, 41–43.

[2] Bonacasa 1992; Luraghi 1994, 21–49. Una più recente interpretazioni sui decenni iniziali della vita di Agrigento, con bibliografia aggiornata è in Adornato 2011. Vedi anche il contributo di M. Jonasch in questo volume.

[3] Just. *Epit.* 18.7.1–2.

[4] Merante 1967; De Vincenzo 2013, 7–9.

[5] Manganaro 1965, 163–178; Dunst 1972, 100–106.

[6] Per Selinunte, D. Mertens sulla base delle tante indagini condotte sul terreno ipotizza una sistemazione dell'impianto fortificatorio in relazione alla ristrutturazione urbanistica della città, già nel primo quarto del VI sec. a.C.: Mertens *et al.* 2003a, 265; Mertens 2006, 195. Per la datazione della prima fortificazione di Agrigento non abbiamo dati stratigrafici certi: Marconi (1929a, 32) ipotizzò una prima cinta al momento della fondazione della colonia; Mertens (2006, 195) suggerisce una datazione in età falaridea mentre G. Fiorentini, nel suo volume sulle fortificazioni di Agrigento, per quanto riguarda la cronologia suggerisce una data alla metà o seconda metà del VI sec. a.C., sulla base di una 'datazione tradizionale', vedi Fiorentini 2009, 26–27. Su Himera vedi Vassallo 2006; per Mozia: Tusa 1985, 591.

[7] Panvini *et al.* 2008, 77–81.

[8] Per questi abitati della Sicilia centro-meridionale vedi le diverse schede nei volumi di Panvini *et al.* 2003a e Guzzone *et al.* 2005 con bibliografia di riferimento.

[9] Sul grande abitato ancora anonimo di Terravecchia di Cuti, rimasto in vita almeno dalla fine del VII sino alla fine del V sec. a.C., vedi Epifanio 1993; sullo scavo delle fortificazioni: Militello 1960, 27–35.

[10] Vedi Palermo *et al.* 2009 con bibliografia di riferimento.

[11] Taniasi 2009, 42–43, 246–147.

[12] Palermo *et al.* 2009, 310–311.

[13] Bonacasa 1992, 135–138; Luraghi 1994, 21–49

[14] Vassallo forthcoming.

[15] Vassallo 1999, 203–208.

[16] Diod. Sic. 11.20–26; Hdt. 7.165–167.

[17] Un'analisi della battaglia sulla base dei dati archeologici è in Vassallo 2011; 2016.

[18] Secondo Erodoto, al comando dell'esercito greco erano sia Gelone che Terone: tuttavia, dal racconto molto dettagliato di Diodoro Siculo relativi agli eventi che portarono allo scontro, alle fasi della battaglia e delle fasi successive, appare evidente che nello schieramento greco il primo comandante fu il tiranno siracusano, a cui vengono attribuite le scelte strategiche, le decisioni e il comando generale (Diod. Sic. 11.22–24).

[19] Una bibliografia recente sulla storiografia relativa alla battaglia è in Palazzo 2009.

[20] Sulla descrizione dei luoghi della battaglia vedi: Holm 1965, vol. I, 196–199; 393–402; Mauceri 1908, 390–402; Pareti 1914, 113–169.

[21] Vassallo 2011, 18–21.

[22] Lo Noce 2018.

[23] Vassallo 2011, 29 n. 4.

[24] Vassallo 2011, 27–29.

[25] Vassallo 2011, 32–33; Groppo e Vassallo 2019.

[26] Questa ipotesi trova oggi maggiore credito grazie anche alle analisi osteologiche: Kyle *et al.* 2018.

[27] Robinson 1942, 70–72, 75–77, 163–165.

[28] Desfossés 2006.

[29] Mi riferisco alle tragiche immagini che documentano tali disumani comportanti, del tutto privi di *pietas*, in varie aree d'Europa, come il trattamento dei cadaveri nella guerra civile spagnola (1936–39) nei campi di concentramento nazisti (1945), o le recenti fosse comune messe in luce di recente e relative alle stragi perpetuate nella guerra dei Balcani (1991–95) e ancora più nei tempi contemporanei in altre regioni vicine: in Siria e in Iraq.

[30] Vassallo 2014.

[31] Valentino e Vassallo 2018; Groppo e Vassallo 2019.

[32] Le armi rinvenute sono in corso di studio da parte di Matteo Valentino.

[33] Allegro 2014.

[34] Vassallo 2000; forthcoming.

[35] Vassallo 2011, 23.

[36] Vassallo 2011, 33–34.

[37] Vassallo 2015.

[38] Allegro *et al.* 1993/94, 1123.

[39] Vassallo 2005, 40–41.

[40] Un analisi storica approfondita su questa fase è in: Anello 1986.

[41] A tale proposito vedi anche il contributo di M. Costanzi in questo volume.

Chapter 2

War and the life of a sacred structure. Weapons from the NYU-UniMi excavations in the main urban sanctuary of Selinunte

Andrew Ward and Clemente Marconi

Se l'interconnessione tra guerra e società durante i periodi di aperte ostilità è chiara, altrettanto importante è l'influenza pervasiva che il conflitto ha avuto sulla società durante i periodi di pace. Questa constatazione non potrebbe essere più evidente che nei contesti rituali. Gli scavi condotti congiuntamente dall'Institute of Fine Arts (New York University) e dall'Università degli Studi di Milano, in convenzione con il locale Parco Archeologico, nel Tempio R – uno dei primi e più antichi edifici di culto nella fondazione greca di Selinous, situato sull'acropoli della città – hanno restituito centinaia di armi in bronzo e ferro databili tra la seconda metà del VII secolo e la prima metà del III secolo a.C. provenienti da contesti ben conservati associati alla costruzione e a ripetute ristrutturazioni dell'edificio nel corso dei secoli. Alcune di queste armi possono essere associate ai depositi di fondazione. Questo elemento ci permette di proporre delle considerazioni sulla influenza pervasiva della guerra nel rituale in Sicilia in età arcaica e classica. Allo stesso tempo, la scoperta di scarti di fabbricazione di punte di freccia, prodotte dopo il saccheggio della città nel 409 a.C., fa luce sulla vita nella Selinunte ellenistica.

Selinous (modern Selinunte) proves to be an excellent case study for the pervasive effect armed conflict had on all aspects of ancient Sicilian life. Founded in the third quarter of the 7th century BC, the settlement, in one form or another, would be a major player in many of the wars and ongoing antagonisms of pre-Roman Sicily. The city came into conflict with its Elymian, Phoenician, and Greek neighbours starting in the 7th, and continuing into the 6th and early 5th centuries; sided with the Carthaginians at the Battle of Himera in 480 BC; and instigated, through its conflict with Segesta, the failed second Athenian expedition. The sack of the city by Hannibal Mago in 409 BC is far from its last mention in the grand narrative of later historians, with the later settlement trading hands between Carthage and Syracuse until its large-scale abandonment within the context of the First Punic War.

The prominence of interstate conflict in ancient historical treatments of Selinous have, in turn, had a profound impact on how modern scholars interpret the archaeological record. The violent and totalising way that ancient authors like Diodoros Siculus describe (13.57–58.2) the sack of Selinous in 409 BC promoted a narrative in which the site was largely abandoned until its resettlement under Carthage in the second half of the 4th century BC, and that a Greek period gave way cleanly to a Punic period. Similarly, Diodoros' description (24.1.1) of the site's abandonment by the Carthaginians in 250 during the First Punic War was often taken as the end of life at the site, although there is growing evidence for a limited occupation into later centuries.

Yet, conflict did not occur simply at transitional moments, neatly bookending with their destruction or abandonment events otherwise placid periods in the material record. Just as our use of periodisation – the imposition of artificial divisions on the continuous flow of life prior to archaeological interpretation – is now approached more critically,[1] so too might we remember the influence violence, and the potential *for* conflict, had on life *between* major conflicts. The discovery of, to date, 165 weapons (Table 2.1) during recent excavations within and around Selinous' Temple R are instructive in two very different ways. Many of these weapons, particularly roughly 50 iron spearheads, deposited in several ritual contexts, reveal that one of the longest-running cults in Selinous had a warlike nature in constant need of reaffirmation. As cultic activity ceased within the structure, preparation for war took on a much more tangible character, indicated by an unusually large concentration of arrowheads within strata from the upper strata dating to the Late Classical and Hellenistic periods. Whether ritualized or profane, war and militarism were a pervasive feature of ancient Selinuntine life, what Pierre Bourdieu might call a 'structuring structure' on the perspectives of the settlement's occupants.[2]

Temple R

Starting in 2012, Temple R, an *oikos* temple (5.31 × 17.83 m) located in the southern sector of Selinous' main urban sanctuary, has been the focus of excavation and research by the mission of the Institute of Fine Arts – NYU and (since 2018) of the Università degli Studi di Milano (Fig. 2.1). Originally excavated by Francesco Saverio Cavallari in 1876,[3] and then Biagio Pace in 1921,[4] the building rose to prominence due to its importance in discussions of early Greek architecture and the so-called 'megaron' type temple (Fig. 2.2).[5]

The three-room structure – composed of a cella, adyton, and opisthodomos – is dwarfed by Temple C to the north. Yet, new discoveries by within and outside of Temple R allow us, arguably for the first time for a temple at Selinunte, to trace the intersection of architecture, ritual, daily life, and, in this case, war, from the foundation of the polis through to its later life as a fortress-town under Punic hegemony.



Figure 2.1. Aerial photograph of the main urban sanctuary with the peripteral Temple C centre, Hellenistic Temple B lower left and Archaic-Classical Temple R upper left (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).

Such an approach is possible with Temple R since, in the Hellenistic period, the interior of this structure and the surrounding area were systematically covered by a layer of fill about 1 m in depth. These fill actions completely sealed the Archaic and Classical phases of the building. This particular situation enables us now to reconstruct something approaching a continuous narrative of the building's life and, in turn, the settlement's social, religious, and cultural history. Following traces of limited occupation in the Mesolithic and the Bronze Age, the hill on which Temple R would stand was uninhabited in the early Iron Age and down to the time of Greek settlement. This would change with the foundation of Selinous (ca. 628 BC), when the area was first used for an open-air cult. By the end of the century, simple structures made of perishable materials were constructed along with associated ritual depositions, which were in turn dismantled ca. 590–580 BC to make space for the construction of Temple R, with its oikos plan and elevation made entirely of stone, apparently the first monumental temple documented in Selinunte.



Figure 2.2. Line drawing of Temple R and its interior ground surface prior to the excavation (Drawing by Filippo Pisciotta, © Institute of Fine Arts - NYU).

Worship would be continuous for about two and a half centuries, even when Temple R was partially damaged by fire ca. 500 BC, after which it was partly renovated, including a new floor in the *naos* area. The same goes for the renovation of the building and the continuation of ritual activity after the partial burning and looting of the temple towards the end of the 5th century, presumably on the occasion of the Carthaginian sack of Selinunte in 409 BC. The temple may have continued in use as a cult place in the first half of the 4th century, until its drastic transformation around 300 BC, including the fill that sealed the building's earlier phases.

Following Bjørnar Olsen's ontological reevaluation of how we understand the 'lives' of things, and especially religious structures,[6] the various phases of Temple R should be considered together, as a sort of palimpsest where one phase is not privileged over another. Both the dedications left throughout the building's time as a religious structure, and, possibly even the weapons scattered in the depositions that filled its interior long after that function had been lost, stands as testament to a Selinuntine worldview modulating a habitus strikingly like the modern concept of perpetual war.

Spear-won land?

The earliest evidence for Greek frequentation on Selinous' southern hill is preserved between the foundation trenches of the later stone Temple R. It consists of a relatively thick grey layer containing a large quantity of ash and animal bones, found in correspondence of the centre of the cella. Within the general stratigraphic sequence in this area of the sanctuary, this layer would seem to precede the early structures dated ca. 610. This early chronology is further supported by the radiocarbon dating of a sample of the faunal evidence from the strata to 647–548 BC, with a relative probability of 62% (DSH8723_GE, 2500 BP ± 40 BP). In all likelihood, this grey layer corresponds to the earliest cult activity in our area of the sanctuary, consisting in both animal sacrifice and votive offering, the latter including a bone hairpin and a small hydria from Megara Hyblaea.

Among these early votive offerings, three weapons were deposited in a provocative manner: one heavy thrusting spear,[7] with a long and heavy blade that pierced the sandy soil at a nearly 70° angle, and two smaller leaf-blades thrust into the ground such that they crossed one another, ultimately corroding into a single piece (Fig. 2.3). Seemingly, the weapon heads – if not the weapons themselves – were left *in situ*. The dedication of an offensive weapon planted blade-first into the ground is not without parallels. The closest comparison for the Archaic period and the Greek West comes from Selinunte itself, in the 6th-century deposit found associated with stele number 19 in the sanctuary of Zeus Meilichios, which included a sword and one or two daggers planted into the sand.[8]



Figure 2.3. Three iron blades (nos 144–146) found thrust into soil stratum with earliest signs of Greek habitation (SU 259). The larger isolated iron spearhead (no. 146) shown on right. Length ca. 33 cm (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).

In this case, the performative nature of planting three spears into the ground appears evident. Also, considering the dating of this action within the first generation of life of Selinous, one would think of its possible attribution to a prominent military commander among the settlers (including the *oikist* himself).[9] In the context of a new foundation in a foreign land, the symbolic value of this form of dedication can hardly be missed. In Greek and Roman culture, the spear was the instrument of conquest par excellence, since Homer,[10] and land could be spear-won or spear-taken (*doriktētos* and *doryalōtos*), two terms more well-known in their usage in Hellenistic royal ideology.[11] Despite arguments to the contrary,[12] evidence is lacking for an indigenous settlement in Selinunte soon before the Greek foundation, and so this was more-so a performative act, rather than a literal conquest. However, by the end of the 7th century the city was actively expanding its boundaries at the expense of its non-Greek neighbours.[13] The deposition on the acropolis likely reflects this aggressive attitude of territorial domination.

That being said, the discovery of spearheads as votive dedications does not come as a surprise. The dedication of both offensive and defensive weapons at Greek sanctuaries is not uncommon from the Geometric period onwards.[14] While Temple R lacks any evidence of defensive weapons, such as shields or armour, offensive weapons, particularly spears, swords, javelins, and arrows, appear prominently across Greek sanctuaries, with growing evidence from 7th and 6th century BC Sicily and Magna Graecia.[15] In the Greek West, there is a strong association between the dedication of weapons and female deities, which is also attested in mainland Greece.[16] In the case of dedications by individuals, this link can be best explained along two lines.[17] Either a deity has a particular association with war, and so weapons would serve as attributes, or dedications express the identity of the offerors, adult males dedicating weapons taken from their enemies or their own weapons. Our case could fit well the first scenario, considering how the available evidence seems to suggest that Temple R was dedicated to Demeter and Kore,[18] and that these two goddesses were closely associated with war at Selinous.[19]

Weapons and building rituals

The first phase of open-air cult in this area that would become the southern sector of the main urban sanctuary was followed by the building of two small rectangular structures, found respectively in the area of the adyton and to the south-east of the later Temple R, and dated to ca. 610 BC based on the pottery found within and below their floor surfaces. The two buildings had thick yellow clay floors and thatch roofs, and for the one to the east a mud-brick wall on a rubble foundation. The exact nature of these two structures remains unclear, but that they served a cultic function is strongly suggested by the type of pottery found pressed into their floors during use, and the burial of objects (including an entire deer antler) within pits beneath and surrounding their foundations. A broad-leafed spearhead with a thick blade was found in the floor surface of the building to the west, placed with apparent care within the clay along with intact vessels (nr. 114, Fig. 2.4).[20] This deposition is best understood as a foundation offering, in the light of the later evidence from floors associated with the construction and early 5th-century renovation of Temple R, and the foundations of the South Building.[21] Two further spears (S18 and S19) were found around the south-eastern structure in a stratum that abutted its intact foundations.



Figure 2.4. Iron spearhead (no. 114), discovered in situ within a late 7th century floor on left, and after stabilisation right. Length 17.5 cm (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).

When Temple R was constructed ca. 590–580 BC continuity in dedicatory practice is attested in an extensive foundation deposit placed with evident curation along the interior walls of the structure's naos, found below its still intact packed-clay floor. Here, along with a range of dedications including imported fine wares and local ceramics used in an *in situ* sacrifice and feast,[22] and other votives including loom weights, lamps, jewellery and a bone flute,[23] numerous iron spearheads and blades were found concentrated along the walls, laid parallel to or perpendicular to the ashlar courses (Figs 2.5 and 2.6), paired with other offerings. Created following the initial erection of the walls, the context is not a foundation deposit in the strict sense of the term, but served as a celebration of a successful construction, and as a form of consecration inaugurating cultic function before the floor was laid.[24]

Some of these iron weapons in the foundation deposit did not fare well and were uncovered in a highly fragmented state, unsurprising given the percussive forces inflicted on them by worshippers walking atop the clay floor above. Yet, a number (nos 51–57; 130–143) were found intact, in a variety of forms and typologies consistent with an early 6th-century dating,[25] indicated by associated ceramics. Iron weapons were also placed in the foundations of the original altar (nos 162–163) and found scattered within beneath the preparation for the exterior surface level associated with the early 6th-century use of the temple (153–154; 156–161).



Figure 2.5. Iron spearhead (no. 54) from the ritual deposit underneath early 6th-century clay floor of Temple R in south-eastern corner. Length 22 cm (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).



Figure 2.6. Iron spearhead (no. 131) from the ritual deposit underneath early 6th-century clay floor of Temple R, placed along the southern wall of the cella. Length 28 cm (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).

Within this sample and across the larger group, the typological variety of spear-heads suggests that they are drawn from actual military equipment, rather than being part of a single votive commission. The same applies to their composition; iron being the preferred metal for functional spears, as opposed to bronze spears that were primarily ceremonial by the 7th century.[26] Only a single spearhead that might be termed 'miniature' was among the deposit (Table nr. 157, at under 5 cm, was found in a matching context immediately to the south of the temple).

Twelve of the spearheads have leaf-shaped blades, with midribs terminating along the length and a beveled bottom widening to a varying width before coming to a point to form a blade roughly 20 cm in length (Fig. 2.7).[27] Some larger iron spearheads found in these early 6th-century contexts have no midrib, with much broader blades (Fig. 2.8). These broader-leafed blades would give way to proportionately longer, thinner, leaf blades in contexts associated with the construction of Temple C to the north and Temple R's late Archaic renovations (Fig. 2.9).[28] As has been demonstrated time and time again, a high degree of typological variation could coexist, with elongated blades, with some spearheads having blades exceeding 20 cm in length and bearing a midrib along the entire length of the blade (Fig. 2.10),[29] and other spearheads having longer sockets and leaf blades less than 20 cm in length (Fig. 2.11), being found throughout 6th-century contexts.



Figure 2.7. Iron spearheads (nos 126, 130–132) with leaf-shaped blades and midribs terminating part way up blade. Average blade length ca. 20 cm (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).

In addition to the spearheads, iron blades of varying length are found across these assemblages. By and large, they are simple Snodgrass type 1 two-edged leaf blades terminating in a long tang that would be inserted into a handle made of perishable materials (Fig. 2.12).[30] The beveled transition between blade and tang is in the long tradition of the Naue type swords, a popular form until the fourth quarter of the 6th century BC,[31] that would see use in 7th and 6th-century western Sicilian contexts[32]. These may be differentiated from those blades found in the later 5th-century deposits, that have near-horizontal terminations more in common with the later xiphos type.[33] One cannot exclude that some of these weapons were originally spoils of war, taken from enemies of Selinous. The polis was engaged in enough military confrontations between the late 7th and early 6th century BC to allow for this possibility.[34] However, while it may be tempting among the prevalent spears to associate certain types with those used by the Selinuntines, and others with those captured from their neighbours, specifically 'indigenous' iron spearhead types identified in other assemblages in western Sicily are absent,[35] and those that are present do not significantly diverge from those used contemporaneously throughout the Mediterranean. In the specific case of western Sicily, one may note the presence of offensive weapons from Contrada Mango at Segesta (on which see below) comparable with examples from Greek centres on the island (Selinous and Monte Casale), and of defensive weapons (three helmets and two greaves) of Italiote or Sikeliote production in the indigenous centre of Montagnola di Marineo.[36]



Figure 2.8. Iron spearheads (nos 156, 160) with wide blades and no midribs. Average blade length ca. 24 cm (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).

Be that as it may, it is unlikely that Temple R’s weapons were the consecration of spoils of war, a well-attested practice across the Archaic Greek world, including the West.[37] Instead, as these dedications were offered to the divinity of Temple R as part of a deposit celebrating the successful completion of the building, they most likely represented the community which built it. This use of weapons in a construction deposit finds several comparanda in the West, including the Archaic Athenaion in Syracuse.[38]

Being part of a larger ritual action that left remains of animal sacrifices and ritual meals, as usual,[39] the deposit’s weapons are necessarily found in association with faunal remains. At sites like Sicilian Naxos, the discovery of iron spearheads in association with pottery and animal bones has led to the suggestion that these weapons may have been used as utensils for sacrifices, including cutting, roasting, and picking the pieces of boiled meat at the banquet following the sacrifice.[40] The considerable number of spears in our deposit, their uneven distribution, and the presence of knives more appropriate for sacrificial rituals (blades like no. 53 tend to be under 20 cm in length) does not seem to support this scenario in our case.



Figure 2.9. Iron spearheads (nos 40, 50, 151) with long blades and no midribs. Average blade length ca. 30 cm (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).

Indeed, not everything in the foundation deposit is directly related to animal sacrifice and the ensuing ritual meal. Thus, for example, our martial dedications are often paired with one or more loom weight, in addition to vessels and the other dedications. Loom weights were not an uncommon dedication in Archaic Sicily,[41] and weaving played a prominent role in daily life at Selinous.[42] That these two material classes are emblematic in Greek thought and law of the martial and domestic spheres respectively is likely no coincidence.[43] Whether these paired depositions speak more to the nature of the patron deities, or to the identities of those making the dedication remains unclear.



Figure 2.10. Iron spearhead (no. 135) with pronounced midrib running length of blade. Preserved blade length ca. 16 cm (© Institute of Fine Arts –

NYU).



Figure 2.11. Iron spearheads (nos 163, 54–55) with short blades with midribs and large ferrules. Average blade length ca. 13.5 cm (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).

If the agency behind these assemblages' resonances may be ambiguous (and perhaps intentionally so), the weapon's placement in and around Temple R is not. As discussed, weapons in foundation layers are placed consistently with great care, in relation not only to other objects but also to the architecture itself. Spears are especially concentrated around the entrance to the cella, both inside the doorway and immediately outside. Excavation in the 2018 and 2019 demonstrated the deposition of spears outside of the walls. Two spearheads are found immediately beneath the foundations of an altar to the south-east of the temple. Rather than grouping the weapons in a single concentrated deposit, the lining of the building and the surrounding area of the sanctuary created the sense of fortification, or of arming; a strategic action that reinforces the city through the deity's protection. When the floor level was raised within Temple R, and a new white plaster pavement was laid in the early 5th century, spears and blades seem to have been necessary to symbolically refortify the structure (Fig. 2.13). When the soil along the west end of Temple R was disrupted for the construction of Temple C to its north, a (re)deposition was made of materials ranging from imported faience to a long-bladed spearhead bent at several points along its length (no. 147, Fig. 2.14). Change seems to have necessitated reconsecration, perhaps to maintain and promote the martial character of the structure housing one of the settlement's longest-running cults.

Pseudomorphs and ritual breakings

The intentional deformation of a weapon, evident in the just-mentioned spear-head, deserves special attention. Such bends in weapons are often associated with their ritualised 'killing'. The practice can be understood not only within the wider context of breakage and fragmentation of objects in Greek ritual[44] but also seems to have had an added layer of significance. As with other objects offered to a divinity, a weapon's destruction removes it from potential later usage, symbolising its elevation and new ownership. Weapons were powerful signifiers of civic identity or martial dominance, whether the weapons of a defeated foe or your own. Ritualised killing served to enhance both messages, and this destruction should not be understood as the lessening of a weapon's symbolic power.[45] Despite the symbolic potency of such behaviour, only a few of the spearheads bear recognisable signs of pre-depositional killing through bending the relatively brittle iron (namely, nos 40, 147, and 161).

The lack of pre-depositional damage to the iron itself is deceptive, though. The excavation of a spearhead, after all, does not presuppose a dedicant depositing a spear with an intact shaft as well. The butt-spikes that would have capped the other end of the larger lances, made sometimes of bronze and referred to as sauroteers,[46] are largely absent from the contexts in and around Temple R. The spears found beneath the temple's floors, then, could have been deposited as killed objects – just with their shafts broken instead of their blades. This lack, though, is not unusual, as such butt-spikes begin to appear as *tropaia* at Olympia only towards the end of the 6th century.[47]

There is further evidence to suggest ritualised killing by breaking the weapon along the no-longer extant wooden shafts. Pseudomorphs of wood were identified in the corrosion lining the socket interiors during the conservation of several of the spearheads discovered within and immediately outside of the temple's entrance. Created when iron corrosion replaces the organic material of wood as it decomposes, the psuedomorphs allowed mission conservator Brian Castriota to identify both the tree species,[48] and that the spear shafts were harvested from coppiced trees. For the discussion at hand, the transverse stress found in the pseudomorphs (no. 111, Fig. 2.15) suggests that the spearheads were not cleanly removed from their wooden shafts prior to deposition but were instead broken off with some force. As such, ritualised killing of weapons may have been more common at Temple R than the several surviving bent spearheads would suggests; a hermeneutic point with wider relevance in study of the dedication of arms in Sicily.



Figure 2.12. Iron sword (no. 141) and dagger (no. 115) with two edges and a bevelled transition between blade and solid tang. Blade lengths ca. 25 cm

and 13 cm respectively (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).

Weaponising the Gods

Such actions were not simply invocations of divine protection against a nameless foe. Instead, the dedication of weapons in sanctuaries in western Sicily can be thought of as a sort of sacred arms race. Selinous was not without competitors and, as discussed in the introduction, would fight intermittently with its neighbours, including the Elymians of the Belice valley interior. In her survey of dedications in indigenous sanctuaries in Archaic Sicily, Lela Urquhart noted that metal offerings, and especially those that express a symbolic focus on war or violence, are richest in the western portion of the island.[49] These include the famed armour from sites like Montagnola di Marineo as well as arrows, spearheads, belts, and cuirass discs from sites like Segesta and Colle Madore.[50] Francesca Spatafora has rightly argued that the dedication of weapons in indigenous contexts has long been mischaracterised. These were not barbarian chiefs burying themselves with their weapons, as mid-20th-century scholarship was wont to demonstrate. Instead, weapons begin to appear in great quantities primarily as dedications in indigenous sanctuaries beginning in the 6th century, and as such take on a more civic quality.



Figure 2.13. Iron spearhead (no. 118), right, found in the packing for the Late Archaic floor within cella of Temple R, shown left. Larger fragment ca. 17 cm in length (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).



Fig. 2.14. Iron spearhead (no. 147) with an apparent pre-depositional bend, from the foundation trench for the rear room added to the west side of Temple R. Blade length 26 cm (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).



Figure 2.15. Interior of the fragmentary iron spearhead no. 111, whose corrosion contains pseudomorphs of the original wooden shaft visible in magnification (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).

It could well be that this ritualised civic expression was a response to the territorial ambitions of coastal centres like Selinous, where martial power was expressed through the city's gods and temples.[51] Segesta, Selinous' most oft-cited regional rival, makes an apt comparison. Unfortunately, contextual information is limited for the Archaic-Classical urban cults, and so we must turn to Contrada Mango, the large extra-urban sanctuary of Segesta.[52] The surviving votive depositions from Contrada Mango, which sits prominently on the ancient route between Segesta and Selinous, provide a complex picture of the sanctuary's rituals. Of relevance to our discussion are the metals studied by Antonella Di Noto.[53] including a large quantity of bronze and iron objects ranging chronologically between the middle of the 6th and the first half of the 5th century BC, including an elaborate bronze-leaf lance with incised geometric decoration and *laminè* belts and cuirass disks characteristic of an Elymian warrior's panoply. This martial equipment was found lining the southern tract of the large perimeter wall of the sanctuary. An ongoing, new investigation of the associated materials will contribute to a clearer understanding of the particular nature of this deposit.[54]

Arrowheads and the militarisation of Selinunte

After Selinous was sacked in 409 BC by a Carthaginian army led by Hannibal Mago, documented archaeologically by excavations by the German Archaeological Institute in the area of the agora[55] and by the University of Bonn in the city's *kerameikos,*[56] Diodoros relates that the site was quickly reoccupied under the direction of the Syracusan general Hermokrates (Diod. Sic. 13.63). Around the same time, based on numismatic and ceramic evidence, Temple R was repaired and renovated following partial damage by fire and the looting of its adyton.[57] Although an initial rededication of Archaic and Classical votive materials suggests an intentional continuity of ritual activity within the structure at first, the type of weapon found from now on radically change. While the earlier strata had been characterised by primary depositions of spears and daggers, with only one arrowhead attested (the 6th-century bronze trilobate, no. 162), the later life of the structure is witness instead to scores of bronze arrowheads distributed throughout the soil matrixes of a number of surface preparation and floor levels.



Figure 2.16. Bifoil arrowhead (no. 7) found in fill associated with construction of Temple B, ca. 300 BCE. Length 10.5 cm (© Institute of Fine

Arts – NYU).

During this period, between the late 5th and late 4th centuries, the site's famed fortifications were constructed around its acropolis, as part of a series of renovations attributed to Hermokrates in 406 BC, a Punic garrison after 350 BC, and Agathokles around the turn of the 3rd century.[58]

The impulse of associating these arrowheads with actual use in the conflicts that embroiled western Sicily between the late 5th and late 4th centuries is strong. Of the 87 documented so far, a concentration of more than 50 of these arrowheads was found distributed amongst a preparation fill for a new surface necessitated by apparent damage to the temple at the end of the 5th century.[59] In such a context there is an understandable inclination to then associate the arrowheads with the actual sack of the city in 409, even if the arrowheads were not found in primary deposition within a destruction level *per se*, and are also found in the 4th-century fill layers above. After all, their appearance would then be part of a growing set of arrowheads found in destruction horizons associated with the Greco-Punic conflicts of the end of the 5th and early 4th centuries.[60]



Figure 2.17. Selection of bronze arrowheads from ca. 300 BCE fill layer and earlier 4th-century strata. Average length ca. 2.3 cm (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).

In analysing arrowheads, diagnostic variables include whether an arrowhead has a projecting socket or an internal socket, whether or not a reverse-facing barb projects from the socket's sheath, and whether the head has two blades (leafed) or three (trefoil). These criteria, forming the basis of Anthony Snodgrass' typology,[61] were nuanced and expanded by Holger Baitinger in his study of the weapons found at Olympia.[62] With the exception of one arrowhead with a long tang, clearly in secondary deposition within the foundations of Temple B[63] (no. 7, Fig. 2.16), and one unusual socketed bifoil (no. 34),[64] the sample is composed entirely trefoils with integrated sockets (Fig. 2.17), with pyramidal or finned sides.[65] They can be further subdivided into five distinct types: blunted pyramidals, pyramidals with points, and several variations on the barbed trefoil type defined by the proportional length of their barbs. While arrowheads are notoriously difficult to date typologically, the lack of bifoils, found across western Sicily into the 5th century, helps to confirm a later chronology, if not an association with a specific historical event. In turn, the presence of trefoil arrowheads, and particularly pyramidal forms where the foils and blade are integrated along their length, conform to the dating of the strata, and are widely in the region between the second half of the 5th and the end of the 4th centuries BC.[66]



Figure 2.18. Various bronze pieces associated with production, including clippings of excess bronze upper left, miscast arrowheads upper right, and a group of arrowheads still joined together after being removed from their mould below, shown at three angles (© Institute of Fine Arts – NYU).

One type of arrowhead does not predominate in the late 5th-century floor, nor does another replace it when the Hellenistic fill was placed decades later (where a single lead sling bullet, S10, was found in 2019). Instead, the arrowheads seem to be discards gathered up along with other materials during fill actions.

Why do we find so many, then? Rather than being deposited during use in a conflict, they may be better associated with a continuous manufacture of munitions at Selinous in the period of heightened active conflict between Syracuse and Carthage that lasted from Hermokrates' refoundation until the site's abandonment during the First Punic War. Within the sample, 34 arrowheads are pyramidal but blunt on their end. Rather than being broken, these blunt arrowheads were more likely never finished. Along with these blunt arrowheads, miscasts and other material associated with the production process are found. From casts, found by both the NYU-UniMi and DAI missions (Fig. 2.18) alongside individual arrowheads, a process may be reconstructed by which double-sided molds were first used, creating two rows of arrowheads reflected over a central axis.[67] Then, the two rows would be separated from one another, and then the excess bronze around each individual arrowhead would be clipped off. Only when this process was done, the top of the arrowhead would be worked, giving the trilobate tip a sharp point (Fig. 2.19).

In the agora of Selinous, an assemblage of trilobate arrowheads,[68] also preserving various stages of production, were found in 2006 and 2007 by the DAI mission at the extreme north-east limit of the excavated area.[69] Baitinger suggested, from their concentration and location alongside other production areas skirting the agora, the presence of a workshop. While such an identification is likely, that two recent excavations on the two hills of Selinous would just have happened to stumble upon the discarded refuse of two small workshops, is improbable. While a ritual aspect to the production of arrowheads in Western Mediterranean contexts cannot be ruled out,[70] the lack of evidence for continued cultic use of Temple R into the Hellenistic period suggests another profane manner of deposition. Rather, material related to weapons production likely fills post-409 strata throughout the site, discovered recently thanks to sifting and other elements of modern excavation. While it is tempting to associate this cast waste with soldiers under the command of Greek generals like Hermokrates, Dionysios I, Agathokles, or Pyrrhos, there is no reason to attach this production to a single historical event, but rather to a general militarized climate within Selinous following is reoccupation.



Figure 2.19. Blunted trefoil arrowhead left, and a 'finished' pointed trefoil arrowhead right. Lengths 2.4 and 2.3 cm respectively (© Institute of Fine Arts - NYU).

Further excavations in both the main urban sanctuary and the agora will provide more clarity. For now, the sheer quantity of arrowheads found so far is notable. If one were to conservatively extrapolate the number of arrowheads found by the NYU-UniMi and DAI excavations over the entirety of the Hellenistic settlement, it is likely that the city's storerooms would be filled with thousands of arrowheads, the rubbish that they used for public works riddled with discards so common that they were not worth saving.

Conclusion

In Cavallari's publication of his late 19th-century excavations in the Main Urban Sanctuary, he notes that stone catapult balls were found within the structure that would come to be known as Temple R.[71] This deposit is likely similar to other caches of such munitions found at Lipari and Segesta,[72] associated in those contexts with the

First Punic War. Although the ammunitions' present location is unknown, their discovery by Cavallari above the Hellenistic fill, which we can date now securely to around 300 BC, could associate them with a transformation of the building into some form of magazine in the lead up to the abandonment of the site in 250 BC – a compelling point considering the presence of so many arrowheads in immediately preceding strata. With Temple B's construction to the immediate east of Temple R and the substantial change to the interior of the structure thanks to the fill action, it seems likely that by this point our structure had lost its sacred function.

Such a transformation would not be unfitting for a building that had, throughout its life and its various iterations, reflected the way in which conflict, or at least the potential for, had permeated Greek colonial society and Western Sicily more generally. Whether through primary depositions of a ritual – and warlike – nature, or through the secondary depositions of weapons in its later use, Temple R's archaeological preserves the intersection of war and urban life. While modern scholarship may tend to divide ritualized actions like the supplication – and indeed armament – of divinities, from the creation and maintenance of real-world weapons and fortifications, they are, in a sense, part of the same calculus. Militarism was a part of daily life, a habitus modulating 'peacetime' as much as the moments of overt war, battles, and sieges that are such a conspicuous part of the historical record.

Table 2.1. Provisional list of metal weapons found during the NYU-UniMi Excavations in the Main Urban Sanctuary of Selinunte, 2007–2019.

No.	*Art. ID*	*Object*	*Tr.*	*SU*	*Original context*
1	M07.10	Iron knife handle	A	3	Hellenistic fill in area of Temple B
2	M07.13	Iron knife handle	A	5	Early 5th-century fill in front of Temple R
3	M09.32	Iron spearhead, fragment	K	2	Foundations of South Building, SW corner (ca. 490)
4	M09.35	Iron spearhead	K	2	Foundations of South Building, SW corner (ca. 490)
5	M10.33	Iron dagger	L	20	Dismantling of 5th-century structure and leveling in front of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
6	M10.34	Iron spearhead	L	20	Dismantling of 5th-century structure and leveling in front of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
7	M11.3	Bronze arrowhead, bifoil with tang	M	3	Hellenistic fill in front of Temple R
8	M11.33	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	M	3	Hellenistic fill in front of Temple R
9	M11.34	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	M	3	Hellenistic fill in front of Temple R
10	M11.56	Iron javelin head	M	3	Hellenistic fill in front of Temple R
11	M11.21	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	M	5	Hellenistic fill in front of Temple R
12	M11.32	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	M	17	Early 5th-century leveling in front of Temple R
13	M12.65	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	11	Hellenistic fill inside naos of Temple R
14	M12.66	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	11	Hellenistic fill inside naos of Temple R
15	M12.77	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	11	Hellenistic fill inside naos of Temple R
16	M12.75	Bronze arrowheads, production waste	O	13	Hellenistic fill inside naos of Temple R
17	M12.78	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	13	Hellenistic fill inside naos of Temple R
18	M12.125	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	O	17	Hellenistic fill inside naos of Temple R
19	M12.126	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	O	17	Hellenistic fill inside naos of Temple R
20	M12.23	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	22	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
21	M12.115	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	O	22	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
22	M12.116	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	22	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
23	M12.117	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	22	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R

24	M12.118	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	22	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
25	M12.119	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	O	22	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
26	M12.120	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	22	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
27	M12.121	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	22	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
28	M12.122	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	22	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
29	M12.123	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	22	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
30	M12.124	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	22	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
31	M12.134	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	22	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
32	M12.145	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	O	22	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
33	M12.16	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	26	Early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
34	M12.67	Bronze arrowhead, bifoil with socket	O	26	Early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
35	M12.68	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	O	26	Early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
36	M12.69	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	26	Early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
37	M12.70	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	O	26	Early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
38	M12.3	Iron spearhead	O	27	Foundation of early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
39	M12.6	Iron sword	O	27	Foundation of early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
40	M12.13	Iron spearhead	O	27	Foundation of early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
41	M12.29	Iron spearhead or sword, fragment	O	27	Foundation of early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
42	M12.22	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	28	Foundation of late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
43	M12.130	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	O	28	Foundation of late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
44	M12.131	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	28	Foundation of late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
45	M12.132	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	28	Foundation of late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R

46	M12.133	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	O	28	Foundation of late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
47	M12.134	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	O	28	Foundation of late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
48	M12.21	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	O	30	Foundation of early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
49	M12.60	Iron spearhead, fragments	O	30	Foundation of early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
50	M12.14	Iron spearhead	O	32	Foundation of early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
51	M12.71	Iron javelin head, fragments	O	33	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
52	M12.10	Iron blade, fragment	O	36	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
53	M12.11	Iron blade, fragment	O	36	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
54	M12.49	Iron spearhead	O	36	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
55	M12.50	Iron spearhead	O	36	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
56	M12.92	Iron blade, fragment	O	36	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
57	M12.93	Iron javelin head fragment	O	36	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
58	M12.80	Iron sword, fragments	O	37	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
59	M12.81	Iron spearhead, fragments	O	37	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
60	M13.42	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	111	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
61	M13.44	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	111	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
62	M13.52	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	111	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
63	M13.88	Iron sword, fragments	P	111	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
64	M13.4	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	115	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
65	cons13.173	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	118	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
66	M13.20	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	118	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
67	M13.29	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	118	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
68	M13.30	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	118	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R

69	M13.31	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	118	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
70	M13.32	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	118	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
71	M13.53	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	118	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
72	M13.54	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	118	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
73	M13.93	Iron sword, fragments	P	118	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
74	M13.131	Iron sword	P	118	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
75	M13.132	Iron spearhead fragment	P	118	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
76	M13.151	Iron sword or spearhead fragment	P	118	Hellenistic fill inside adyton of Temple R
77	M13.45	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	121	Modern fill of excavation trench in adyton of Temple R
78	M13.39	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	123	Late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R
79	M13.40	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	123	Late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R
80	M13.41	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	123	Late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R
81	M13.43	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	123	Late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R
82	M13.46	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	123	Late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R
83	M13.47	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	123	Late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R
84	M13.48	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	123	Late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R
85	M13.49	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	123	Late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R
86	M13.50	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	123	Late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R
87	M13.51	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	123	Late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R
88	M14.38	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	128	Foundation of original floor inside adyton of Temple R (590–580), disturbed by Hellenistic cut.
89	M14.44a	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	128	Foundation of original floor inside adyton of Temple R (590–580), disturbed by cut.
90	M14.44b	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	128	Foundation of original floor inside adyton of Temple R (590–580), disturbed by cut.
91	M13.134	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	129	Preparation for late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R

92	M13.135	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	129	Preparation for late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R
93	M13.37	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	131	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
94	M13.38	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	131	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
95	M13.55	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	131	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
96	M13.56	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	131	Fill of large late 5thcentury pit in adyton of Temple R
97	M13.117	Iron sword or spearhead fragment	P	131	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
98	M13.141	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	131	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
99	M13.142	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	131	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
100	M13.143	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	131	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
101	M14.43	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	131	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
102	M14.45	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	131	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
103	M14.46a	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	131	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
104	M14.46b	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	131	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
105	M14.46c	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	131	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
106	M14.056	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	P	131	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
107	M14.90	Bronze arrowheads, miscasts	P	131	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
108	M13.136a	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	132	Foundation of late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R
109	M13.136b	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	132	Foundation of late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R
110	M14.25	Iron spearhead, fragment	P	132	Foundation of late 5th-century floor inside adyton of Temple R
111	M13.129	Iron spearhead, fragments	P	134	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
112	M14.84	Bronze file	P	136	Fill of large late 5th-century pit in adyton of Temple R
113	M14.37	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	P	143	Foundation of original floor inside adyton of Temple R (ca. 590580), contamination
114	M15.10	Iron spearhead	P	145	Floor of 5th-century structure below Temple R

115	M17.11	Iron blade	Q	210	Hellenistic fill inside naos of Temple R
116	cons17.085	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	Q	212	Hellenistic fill inside naos of Temple R
117	cons17.085	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	Q	212	Hellenistic fill inside naos of Temple R
118	cons17.126	Iron spearhead	Q	213	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
119	cons17.129	Iron sword, fragments	Q	213	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
120	M17.78	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	Q	213	Late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
121	cons17.133	Iron spearhead, fragments	Q	216	Fill of pit under late 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
122	cons17.123	Iron spearhead, fragments	Q	217	Foundation of early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
123	cons17.124	Iron spearhead, fragments	Q	217	Foundation of early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
124	cons17.128	Iron spearhead, fragments	Q	217	Foundation of early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
125	M17.82	Bronze arrowhead, blunt trefoil with socket	Q	217	Foundation of early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
126	cons17.117	Iron spearhead	Q	222	Foundation of early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
127	cons17.131	Iron spearhead, fragments	Q	222	Foundation of early 5th-century floor inside naos of Temple R
128	cons17.125	Iron sword or spearhead fragments	Q	227	4th-century fill of cut inside naos of Temple R
129	cons17.132	Iron javelin head, fragment	Q	227	4th-century fill of cut inside naos of Temple R
130	cons17.118	Iron spearhead	Q	229	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
131	cons17.121	Iron spearhead	Q	229	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
132	cons17.122	Iron spearhead	Q	229	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
133	cons17.143	Iron sword and associated fragments	Q	229	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
134	cons17.144	Iron sword	Q	229	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
135	cons17.164	Iron spearhead	Q	229	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
136	M17.73	Iron spearhead, fragments	Q	229	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
137	M17.79	Iron blade, fragment	Q	236	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)

138	M17.80	Iron javelin heads (3)	Q	236	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
139	cons17.155	Iron sword	Q	236	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590580)
140	cons17.163	Iron spearhead	Q	236	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
141	cons17.145	Iron sword	Q	237	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
142	cons17.158	Iron blade, fragment	Q	237	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
143	M17.68	Iron spearhead	Q	240	Foundation of original floor inside naos of Temple R (ca. 590–580)
144	M17.65	Iron blade, part of crossed pair	Q	259	5th-century context, evidence of cultic activity
145	M17.66	Iron blade, part of crossed pair	Q	259	5th-century context, evidence of cultic activity
146	M17.67	Iron spearhead	Q	259	5th-century context, evidence of cultic activity
147	M18.7	Iron spearhead	R	31	Deposit along exterior of Temple R’s opisthodomos
148	M18.73	Iron spearbutt	R	36	Deposit along exterior of Temple R’s opisthodomos
149	M19.70	Iron spearhead socket	R	50	Mid-6th-century fill
150	M19.61	Iron spearhead	R	67	Early 6th-century fill
151	M19.76	Iron spearhead	R	87	Construction fills for Temple C
152	M19.60	Iron spearhead socket	R	89	Construction fills for Temple C
153	M19.63	Iron javelin head	R	90	Preparation for early 6th century surface, west of Temple R
154	M19.64	Iron spearhead	R	90	Preparation for early 6th-century surface, west of Temple R
155	M19.10	Lead sling bullet	S	2	Hellenistic fill to south of Temple R
156	M18.35	Iron spearhead	S	12	Preparation for early 6th-century surface, south of Temple R
157	M18.36	Miniature iron spearhead	S	12	Preparation for early 6th-century surface, south of Temple R
158	M18.35	Iron spearhead	S	12	Preparation for early 6th-century surface, south of Temple R
159	M18.35	Iron spearhead	S	12	Preparation for early 6th-century surface, south of Temple R
160	M19.26	Iron spearhead	S	12	Preparation for early 6th-century surface, south of Temple R
161	M19.39	Iron spearhead	S	17	Foundation of original surface outside Temple R (ca. 590–580)
162	M19.6	Bronze arrowhead, trefoil with socket	S	37	Foundation of early 6th-century altar
163	M19.4	Iron spearhead	S	37	Foundation of early 6th-century altar
164	M19.74	Iron spearhead	S	27	5th-century context, evidence of cultic activity
165	S19	Iron spearhead, fragmenntary	S	27	5th-century context, evidence of cultic activity

[1] *e.g.* Morris 1997; Kotsonas 2016.

[2] Bourdieu 1990.

[3] Cavallari 1876, 105.

[4] Pace 1922a, 239–240.

[5] Dinsmoor 1950, 45.

[6] Olsen 2013.

[7] Table 2.1 n. 144; Snodgrass type E, Baitinger type B9$_{a}$.

[8] Gàbrici 1927, 157–158 who links the particular placement of the weapons with the chthonic nature of the cult, followed by Spatafora 2006, 217 and La Torre 2011b, 85; see also Grotta 2010, 77–78, 258259; Parisi 2017, 65–66.

[9] cp. Malkin 1987.

[10] *e.g.* Hom. *Il.* 9.342.

[11] See more recently Virgilio 2003; Barbantani 2007.

[12] Rallo 1976/77.

[13] Marconi 2007, 68.

[14] Pritchett 1979; Baitinger 2018.

[15] Parra 2006; Spatafora 2006; La Torre 2011b; Parisi 2017, 524–527; Baitinger 2018, 4.

[16] Larson 2009.

[17] See esp. La Torre 2011b, 89.

[18] Marconi 2014a; Marconi *et al.* 2018, 86–87.

[19] Antonetti and De Vido 2006a, 154–156.

[20] *cf.* Baitinger 2001, cat. no. 642, Type A5.

[21] on which see Marconi and Scahill 2015.

[22] Marconi *et al.* 2018.

[23] Marconi 2014, 106–108; Bellia 2015.

[24] Marconi forthcoming.

[25] Baitinger 2001, 47.

[26] Schwartz 2009, 82.

[27] Including Baitinger Types A5, A8$_{b}$.

[28] Predominantly Baitinger Type A6$_{a}$; *e.g.*, M12.13 and M12.14.

[29] While sockets are not usually preserved, likely of Baitinger B8$_{d}$.

[30] Here a Snodgrass Type 1A, Baitinger Type 1 characterised by a tapering edge.

[31] Snodgrass 1964, 93–94.

[32] *e.g.* Tusa 2012, 134.

[33] Killian-Dirlmeier 1993, 118–130.

[34] Marconi and Ward forthcoming.

[35] Tisseyre 1996.

[36] Spatafora 2006, 218–220.

[37] See more recently Parisi 2017, 524.

[38] Orsi 1918, 576–577; La Torre 2011b, 93; Parisi 2017, 527.

[39] cp. Weikart 2002; Lambrinoudakis 2005; Parisi 2017, 549–555.

[40] Bergquist 1992, 46 n. 27; Lentini 2000, 159, 161 n. 38; Parisi 2017, 526.

[41] Agostiniani *et al.* 2014; Landenius Enegren 2017.

[42] Quercia and Foxhall 2017.

[43] Sofroniew 2011.

[44] Chapman 2000; Alexandridou 2013.

[45] Driessen 2013; for armour, see Graells 2016, 149–158; for the phenomenon as part of earlier funerary traditions, see Lloyd 2015.

[46] Schwartz 2009, 83. For the presence of such bronze spikes in Selinous' suburban sanctuary of Demeter Malophoros, see Gàbrici 1927, 367.

[47] Baitinger 2001, 54–55.

[48] The European beech, synonymous with spears: Shannon 1975, 43.

[49] Urquhart 2010, 152.

[50] Panvini 1998; Vassallo 1999; Spatafora 2011; Vassallo and Chiovaro 2014.

[51] Marconi 2007, 194–195.

[52] Tusa 1992, 617–625.

[53] Di Noto 1997, 581–587; see more recently Spatafora 2006, 218.

[54] De Cesare and Landenius Enegren 2019.

[55] See also Baitinger and Jonasch in this volume.

[56] Bentz *et al.* 2013.

[57] Marconi *et al.* 2018.

[58] Mertens *et al.* 2003a.

[59] Marconi *et al.* 2018, 73.

[60] for Agrigento, see Trombi 2016, 286–287; for Himera, M. Valentino, pers. corres.; for Mozia, see Termini 2005, 635; Famà 2006.

[61] Snodgrass 1964; 1967.

[62] Baitinger 2001.

[63] Snodgrass Type $\mathrm{1A}_6$, Baitinger Type IA_3.

[64] Baitinger Type IIA_{1c}.

[65] Snodgrass Types $\mathrm{3B}_4$, $\mathrm{3C}_2$, and $\mathrm{3C}_3$; Baitinger Types IIB_5, IID_{1b}, and IID_2.

[66] Snodgrass 1964, 148–153; Cleuziou 1977, 189; Baitinger 2001, 29–30; 2016, 23–27; for their use in the Punic world, see Elayi *et al.* 1995.

[67] As shown in Elayi *et al.* 1995, fig. 41.

[68] Of which 76 are catalogued – Baitinger 2016, 23–30.

[69] Baitinger 2016, 30; this volume.

[70] Scarci 2014.

[71] Cavallari 1876.

[72] Bernabò Brea 1998, 191–192; Chiovaro 2008.

Chapter 3

A dangerous place to live? Arms and armour in the Agora of Selinunte

Holger Baitinger

Dal 1996 al 2010 l'Istituto Archeologico Germanico ha condotto una serie di scavi sull'agorà di Selinunte, la colonia greca nel sudovest della Sicilia. Tra i reperti trovati in questi scavi figurava anche una straordinaria quantità di armi e armature. Questo ritrovamento è particolarmente notevole per il suo contesto: i reperti sono stati infatti rinvenuti all'interno dell'insediamento e non nel contesto di tombe o santuari. Solo alcuni pezzi provengono da deposizioni rituali, come ad esempio una spada di ferro del tipo Naue II. Altri evidenziano invece la presenza di truppe e azioni belliche nell'agorà: è il caso dell'elevato numero di punte di freccia databili tra il V e IV sec. a.C. Altri reperti, come alcuni resti di elmi greci e frammenti di punte di lancia indigeni, appartengono a quel folto gruppo di oggetti di bronzo arcaici intenzionalmente spezzati, simili per tipologia a una serie di gioielli dall'area dell'odierna Francia. Probabilmente questi oggetti sono stati conservati in questo specifico contest per il loro valore materiale: potevano servire come moneta di scambio o anche come materia grezza per essere ulteriormente trasformati in una possibile officina metallurgica sull'agorà.

War was nearly omnipresent in the Greek world, not only in the

Greek mainland, but also in Magna Graecia and in Sicily where the Greeks encountered both indigenous people in the hinterland and Phoenician cities in the western part of the island. It is no coincidence that we find thousands of weapons in Greek sanctuaries from the 8th to the 5th century BC, dedicated by Greek *poleis* after military efforts both against Greek and foreign enemies.[1] However, one would not expect to find many weapons in the centre of a Greek city – its agora – unless they belonged to an important urban sanctuary.

From 1996 to 2010, the Rome department of the German Archaeological Institute, under the direction of Dieter Mertens, conducted large-scale excavations in the agora of Selinunte, a city in south-western Sicily founded by settlers from Megara Hyblaea in 628 BC, according to the Greek historian Thucydides. The excavators investigated not only the central area of the public place, where a *heroon* came to light,[2] but primarily the edifices along the borders of the agora: halls along the northern and western extent, and several residential buildings dating to the 6th century BC along the eastern edge of the square.[3]



Figure 3.1. Archaic houses at the eastern border of the agora of Selinunte. View from the north with Temple C in the background (© H. Baitinger).

Excavations were successful, not only providing a wealth of information to clarify our understanding of the architecture and urban planning of an archaic Greek colony in Sicily, but also bringing to light a significant number of finds (Fig. 3.1). This material includes, among other things, a large quantity of metal small finds, despite excavations in settlements usually produce only small numbers of bronze objects, as such pieces could be easily melted down after they had lost their function, or after they broke and were no longer usable. Among this assemblage of metal objects, arms and armour are also represented, to a certain extent.

Except for the *heroon*,[4] and a small sanctuary at the eastern border of the agora,[5] the area is a civic space, comprising public, semi-public, and private areas, dissimilar to ritual contexts where votive gifts like weapons have been discovered in large numbers (e.g., in important Greek sanctuaries like Olympia, Kalapodi, or Philia).[6] Therefore, we would have expected to discover in the agora only small quantities of weapons, in contrast to Temple R on the acropolis. Indeed, the context begs questions, as to what the function and the meaning of these objects – both defensive and offensive weapons – might be in the context of a public place in the center of a western Greek colony. However, we will discover both correspondences and differences in the archaeological evidence from the agora and from Temple R.



Figure 3.2. Iron sword of the Naue II type from the agora of Selinunte, length approx. 53 cm (© DAI Rom, Selinunt-Archiv, D. Schmehle).

Arms and armour from the Agora – votive gifts, usable weapons, or scrap metal?

The most remarkable discovery is a completely preserved iron sword belonging to the so-called Naue II type (Fig. 3.2), a long-living type of cutting sword with a flange hilt.[7] It was found in the pastas house in Lotto 3 at the eastern border of the agora where it was placed parallel to an outer wall of Room b at a distance of about 20 cm, the hilt facing to the south while the tip was missing for unknown reasons (Fig. 3.3).[8] It seems highly probable that the sword was deposited here in the third quarter of the 6th century BC as part of a ritual action.[9] Such swords were used on the Greek mainland since the end of the Mycenaean period, but they lived on – now produced in iron – into the Geometric and Archaic periods.[10] As far as I know, the specimen from Selinunte is the only one discovered in a settlement context, while all the others were found in sanctuaries or tombs of the Greek mainland.[11] In the Greek West, such swords remain very scarce. Up to now, only one counterpart is known from Italy or Sicily: the fragmented sword from a Late Geometric warrior tomb in Cumae (fondo Artiaco, tomb 104).[12] Swords of a similar type from Temple R can be compared. This singular context in Selinunte, most probably a foundation deposit connected generally to the reconstruction of the pastas house in Lotto 3 around 540 BC,[13] hinders the interpretation, but maybe the chronological aspect is of significance. Such swords went out of use about the middle of the 6th century and they must have seemed already old-fashioned in a context of the third quarter of the 6th century. Was the sword connected with a long-living tradition or even with a (mythological) person essential for Selinunte's history?



Figure 3.3. Iron sword of the Naue II type in situ *(© DAI Rom, Selinunt-Archiv).*

In the agora, several elements of defensive gear were discovered, even though they have survived only as small fragments; e.g., four or five pieces of Corinthian helmets.[14] Such helmets are well known in the Greek world from the end of the 8th to the 5th century BC.[15] In southern and central Greece such helmets have been discovered in vast quantities in sanctuaries like Olympia or Delphi,[16] while in the ‘periphery’ of the Greek world (northern Greece, central and southern Italy, Sicily), they were part of the funeral equipment of rich warriors.[17] Until now Corinthian helmets were completely absent from settlement contexts. However, this may be a problem of identification and publication rather than a true absence in the archaeological record. The fragments in Selinunte were discovered in different areas of the agora and in different layers. They definitely do not derive from a sanctuary, despite surviving principally as nose guards and cheek guards as in Greek sanctuaries. Strikingly, defensive panoply is absent from Selinuntinan sanctuaries like Temple R on the acropolis or at Temple E on the East Hill,[18] with the only exception being two relief plates with heraldic lions from a Greek hoplite shield discovered in the extra-urban sanctuary of Demeter Malophoros on Contrada Gaggera.[19] In contrast to important sanctuaries in mainland Greece, the rarity of defensive gear at Selinus is characteristic of a trend in West Greek sanctuaries in southern Italy and Sicily until the end of the 6th century BC.[20]

One of the nose guards with a rounded termination can be dated to the (late) Phase II of Corinthian helmet, while another fragment with a pointed termination belonged to a helmet of the Late Archaic or Early Classical period (Phase III; Fig. 3.4).[21] In Sicily, Corinthian helmets are still quite scarce, an astonishing fact considering the number of Greek colonies along the Sicilian coastline.[22] Completely preserved Corinthian helmets like the one from Tomb 31 from the eastern necropolis of Montagna di Marzo (prov. of Enna) are still exceptional.[23] Concerning the objects’ later lives, at least one of the nose guards was broken deliberately by means of a chisel and could indicate the presence nearby of a metal workshop where the fragment was intended to be melted down. As before, though, this action could be understood as part of the ritualised ‘killing’ of a helmet.



Figure 3.4. Bronze nose guard of a Corinthian helmet from the agora of Selinunte, length 5 cm (© DAI Rom, Selinunt-Archiv, H. Bieräugel).

A most remarkable and, up to now, unique piece of evidence for armour in western Greece is a thin bronze scale from a scale corselet, discovered in 2003 in a stratum attributed to the third quarter of the 6th century BC (Fig. 3.5).[24] The lower end of the scale is rounded, while the upper end is slightly bent and broken. Three small holes arranged in a triangle served to fix the scale to a corselet. Such corselets with bronze, and later iron, scales were used in the Near East from the 2nd millennium BC and continued being used into the Iron Age. In the Greek mainland, such scales remain rare in the archaeological record,[25] though pictorial representations on Attic vases prove the existence of such corselets in the Aegean (e.g., on the famous Sosias *kylix* stored in the Antikensammlung in Berlin).[26] The bronze scale from Selinunte originates from the Eastern Mediterranean, and a Carthaginian provenance seems plausible.

Most of the spearheads discovered in the agora of Selinunte have also survived only as small fragments, especially those made of copper alloy (Fig. 3.6).[27] The presence of bronze spearheads – though in very small fragments – is interesting enough as they fell out of favour across Sicily over the course of the 7th century BC, meaning that were already unusual in warfare in the years after the foundation of Selinunte in 628 BC. One of the bronze fragments broken still shows on three sides the remains of a small hole at the lower end of the blade (Fig. 3.7). This element enables an identification of the fragment as part of a huge bronze spearhead of Snodgrass' type O, respectively Baitinger's type B IV, a characteristically Sicilian type of spearhead.[28] Comparisons may be found in large indigenous hoards of the so-called Finocchito horizon (ca. 730–650 BC) in eastern Sicily at sites such as Mendolito di Adrano (prov. of Catania) or Giarratana (prov. of Ragusa).[29] The fragment was discovered in a layer dated to soon after the middle of the 6th century, meaning that it was deposited at least 100 years after its fabrication. Most of the small fragments of bronze spearheads from Selinunte show traces of bending or cutting blows.[30] Hence, they were destroyed deliberately, either for 'profane' reasons, like preparation for melting, or for ritual reasons, including the 'killing' of weapons to destroy their inherent 'soul' or to prevent their re-use. Fragments of such bronze spearheads also appear in extra-urban sanctuaries such as Bitalemi near Gela or the sanctuary of Demeter Malophoros in Selinunte,[31] but are also found in indigenous Sicilian settlements like Polizzello near Mussomeli (prov. of Caltanissetta)[32] or Monte Iato (San Cipirello/San Giuseppe Iato, prov. of Palermo).[33]



Figure 3.5. Bronze scale belonging to a scale corselet from the agora of Selinunte, length 3.5 cm (© DAI Rom, Selinunt-Archiv, H. Bieräugel).



Figure 3.6. Small fragment of a bronze spearhead from the agora of Selinunte, width 3.1 cm (© DAI Rom, Selinunt-Archiv, H. Bieräugel).

As in the case of the helmets, or the many other voluntarily destructed bronze objects from the agora in Selinunte, the reasons for the fragmentary state of preservation must be the focus of discussion. About 150 fragmented bronzes, originating in the area of modern France (primarily bracelets, anklets, and axes), were carried to Sicily most probably already in a fragmentary state of preservation due to their value as raw material. Such objects appear in exactly the same condition and typological spectrum in scrap hoards of the 'Launac type' in southern France.[34] Most probably, these objects had lost their initial meaning and function long before being buried in backfills or leveling layers in the agora of Selinunte. Returning to the weapon fragments, did the Greek settlers still perceive them as elements of weapons, or only as scrap metal possessing an essential value as raw material, usable both as a store of value, and as a medium of exchange with indigenous people in a premonetary world?



Figure 3.7. Fragment of an indigenous bronze spearhead of Baitinger's type B IV with the traces of a small hole at the lower end of the blade from the agora of Selinunte, width 4.4 cm (© DAI Rom, Selinunt-Archiv, D. Schmehle).

In contrast, the iron spearheads from the agora in Selinunte are usually in a much better state of preservation than those made of bronze. At least one of them – almost completely preserved and about 35 cm long (Fig. 3.8) – seems to belong to a quite late layer of the 4th or 3rd century BC.[35] Was it deposited as part of a foundation deposit for construction? Or, is it a testament to an armed conflict in Selinunte, as with a bronze spear-butt of Baitinger's type III E, discovered in the destruction horizon of the large East Gate in the valley of the Gorgo Cotone, and connected with the capture of Selinunte by the Carthaginians in 409 BC (Fig. 3.9)?[36]

The large number of arrowheads discovered over the course of excavation is most probably also evidence for this armed conflict that created such a dramatic shift in the history of Selinunte, even if some of these weapons may be related to the presence of troops in the course of the 4th or the 3rd centuries BC. Most of the arrowheads discovered in the agora belong to Baitinger's late type II B 3 c, and to the II D-series of the Classical period (5th and 4th centuries), quite small and compact projectiles with an internal socket (Fig. 3.10).[37]



Figure 3.8. Completely preserved iron spearhead from the agora of Selinunte, length 35 cm (© DAI Rom, Selinunt-Archiv, D. Schmehle).

Among the bronze objects, these arrowheads are a clear diagnostic element for the later layers in the agora, while earlier layers of the late 7th and 6th centuries have produced only very small numbers of arrowheads. Several of these arrowheads show a deformed tip caused by impact with a surface, clear evidence for their actual use in a fight.[38] Most of these projectiles were unearthed in the agora in layers of the second half of the 5th or of the 4th/3rd centuries. Diodorus Siculus mentions explicitly Carthaginian archers fighting against Selinunte in 409 BC,[39] and he reports on the intensive final struggle in the agora when Selinunte was captured.[40] However, it cannot be excluded that archers serving in the armies of Hermocrates, Dionysios I, Agathocles, or Pyrrhos used such arrowheads; their presence in Selinunte is proved by literary sources, too. The arrowheads' role in the militarisation of the settlement is underlined by several semi-finished pieces and cone sprues (*Eingusstrichter*) discovered close together in layers datable to the 4th or early 3rd centuries BC, in the trenches A 2006 and A 2007 in the north-eastern part of the agora (Fig. 3.11).[41] The concentration of these pieces in a quite small area points to a nearby metal workshop producing arrowheads in this part of the (former) agora following its general abandonment after the sacking of Selinunte in 409 BC.



Figure 3.9. Completely preserved bronze spear-butt of Baitinger's type III E from the large eastern Gate in the Gorgo Cotone valley, associated with the destruction events of 409 BC, length 35 cm (© DAI Rom, Selinunt-Archiv, D. Gauss).



Figure 3.10. Two small bronze arrowheads of the II D series from the agora of Selinunte, height 2.1 and 2.2 cm (© DAI Rom, Selinunt-Archive, D. Gauss).



Figure 3.11. Cone sprues (Eingusstrichter) proving the production of bronze arrowheads in the agora of Selinunte, width 4.1 cm (© DAI Rom, Selinunt-Archive, H. Bieräugel).

Conclusion

In contrast to the weapons discovered in the excavations of the Main Urban Sanctuary by NYU-UniMi, ritual associations are less evident in the agora, even if some of the weapons seem to be intentionally deposited, especially the iron Naue II-sword from Lotto 3 (Fig. 3.2). Instead, other interpretations for the weapons come to the fore, the presence of troops producing and using arrowheads or other weapons – like the bronze spear-butt discovered among the destruction of the East Gate in the valley of the Gorgo Cotone (Fig. 3.9). Other weapons like the pieces of (Greek) helmets (Fig. 3.4) or (indigenous) spearheads (Figs 3.6 and 3.7) belong to the large group of intentionally fragmented bronze objects discovered in the agora of Selinunte. Most probably, we are dealing here with scrap metal stored for their value of raw materials, either for the accumulation of wealth, as a medium of exchange with other (indigenous?) peoples, or simply as a store of metal for workshop production in or near the agora of Selinunte. In any case, arms and armour from the agora represent traces of complex historical processes in Archaic and Classical Sicily, which must be interpreted in the context not only of the complete archaeological record documented in the agora, but also of the broader Greek colony – an important challenge for further research in Selinunte!

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[1] Baitinger 2011; Frielinghaus 2011.

[2] Mertens 2008.

[3] Preliminary reports: Mertens *et al.* 2003b; 2012.

[4] Mertens 2008.

[5] Hoesch 2003.

[6] Baitinger 2011; Frielinghaus 2011 – for southern Italy most recently Graells and Longo 2018.

[7] Baitinger 2016a, 35 n. 109, fig. 5, pl. 55.

[8] Helas and Baitinger 2015, 22 n. 18.

[9] Helas and Baitinger 2015, esp. 20, fig. 8; 29–31.

[10] Kilian-Dirlmeier 1993, 105–118.

[11] A list of the specimens found in various tombs of northern and central Greece as well as in sanctuaries of central and southern Greece can be found in Kilian-Dirlmeier 1993, 105–118.

[12] Pellegrini 1903, 256–258 fig. 31; Karo 1904, 7 pls 4, 5; Gàbrici 1913, pl. 27, 4 – A. Babbi (Mainz) is preparing a detailed publication of this important tomb.

[13] Helas and Baitinger 2015.

[14] Baitinger 2016a, 19–22 n. 1–5, pl. 1.

[15] Pflug 1988; Frielinghaus 2011.

[16] Frielinghaus 2007; 2011.

[17] Pflug 1988, 101 fig. 48 (distribution map).

[18] Scarci 2017.

[19] Gàbrici 1927, 346–348 fig. 145a–b.

[20] Baitinger 2011, 156.

[21] For the chronology see Pflug 1988; Frielinghaus 2011.

[22] Baitinger 2016a, 21 fig. 3.

[23] Most recently Agostiniani and Albanese Procelli 2018, esp. 156 n. 3; 157 fig. 12; 173–174.

[24] Baitinger 2016a, 22–23 no. 8, pl. 1.

[25] Jarva 1995, 38; Hansen 2003, 106 map 8 (distribution map).

[26] Jarva 1995, 39 fig. 13.

[27] Baitinger 2016a, 31–34 n. 88–106, pls 3–5, 54.

[28] Baitinger 2016a, 33 no. 88, pl. 3. On this type of spearhead, see Snodgrass 1964, 125 fig. 8 d; 128–129; Baitinger 2001, 38–39; 2013, 219–240.

[29] Albanese Procelli 1993, 63–64 n. G 1, G 2 fig. 22 pl. 11; 95 (type R 14 F); 119–39 n. M 98–M 307 fig. 28–40 pls 22–29; 178–181 (type M 3).

[30] Baitinger 2016a, 33–34 n. 89–98, pls 3, 4, 54.

[31] Bitalemi: Verger 2011, 41–42; 43 fig. 26a, 1, 2. Selinunte: (Gàbrici 1927, 368): ‘alcuni frammenti di cuspidi di lancia di bronzo, ridotte in pezzi ed offerte alla divinità come stipe’.

[32] Palermo 1981, 110 n. 57–64, pl. 40; 122–123; Albanese Procelli 2003, 20, 22–23 n. 1–20, pl. 1–2. 3, 1, 2.

[33] Courtesy of Christoph Reusser and Martin Mohr (Zurich). Publication in preparation by the author.

[34] Verger 2003; Verger and Pernet 2013; Baitinger 2016a, 166–179; 2016b. On the Launac hoards, see most recently Guilaine *et al.* 2017.

[35] Baitinger 2016a, 34 n. 99 pl. 54.

[36] Baitinger 2016a, 34–35 n. 107, pl. 54. On this type of spear-butt, see Baitinger 2001, 68 pl. 54, 1172–1174.

[37] Baitinger 2001, 21–22, 25–28; 2016a, 25–30 n. 28–82 pls 2, 3, 53.

[38] Baitinger 2016a, pls 2, 38; 53, 35, 44.

[39] Diod. Sic. 13.54.7.

[40] Diod. Sic. 13.57.2: ‘The Selinuntians gathered into the market-place and all who reached it died fighting there’ (trans. C.H. Oldfather).

[41] Baitinger 2016a, 30 n. 83–87 pls 3, 53.

Chapter 4

Enslavement and redemption in Classical Sicily*

Randall Souza

Le guerre siciliane dell'epoca classica comportavano frequentemente la riduzione in schiavitù su larga scala dei soldati sconfitti insieme con le popolazioni civili, tanto greche che puniche, sicule o elime d'origine. La vendita e il trasporto di questi gruppi significativi di schiavi si configurano come onde di mobilità non libera all'interno e all'esterno della Sicilia, che condizionano le economie e le società preesistenti. Sebbene la maggior parte delle popolazioni così dislocate sia quasi del tutto sparita dalla storia, disperdendosi o assorbita in altre comunità, esistono casi come quelli di Naxos e Motya, in cui popolazioni ridotte in schiavitù poterono recuperare la loro libertà e ristabilire delle comunità politiche. Sosteniamo che la condizione di schiavo non doveva perdurare secondo imposizioni giurisdizionali valide a vita, e che alleati influenti potevano rifiutare di riconoscere come legittimi e vincolanti questi asservimenti. Questi fenomeni di schiavizzazione di massa inondavano la rete del mercato di schiavi siciliano con nuove componenti e costituivano un 'effetto collaterale' della guerra in Sicilia. Tuttavia, le fonti riportano spesso notizia di gruppi che riuscirono ad affrancarsi dalla condizione schiavale. Così come una persona catturata in guerra o dai pirati spesso doveva contare sull'intervento di amici per recuperare lo status di cittadino libero, crediamo che, allo stesso modo, delle comunità ridotte

in schiavitù dovessero fare affidamento sugli alleati per ottenere libertà: l'intervento di questi ultimi, inoltre, era anche volto ad evitare che queste comunità, pur liberate, si sciogliessero del tutto.

One characteristic facet of war in Classical Sicily was the mass enslavement of defeated populations. Victorious generals not only seized soldiers on the battlefield but also frequently claimed all the inhabitants of a captured city as captives.[1] Sometimes they were transported to a capital city, say, Carthage or Syracuse, but sometimes they were sold on the spot; the full dynamics of population dispersal through the island's slave markets can rarely be known with any certainty. However, we can in some cases follow the people enslaved in this way and trace their itineraries, when they reappear as protagonists in the historical record. In this chapter I examine the refoundation of cities by their formerly enslaved inhabitants, because such refoundations represent an opportunity to partially reconstruct the experience of enslaved populations.

Cities founded by or with ex-slaves are rare in our record of the ancient Mediterranean, and for good reason: prior slave status was not usually an asset in establishing a city, and even if ex-slaves did participate in a foundation they did not usually advertise this fact.[2] In this chapter I follow the Naxians, who had been enslaved *en masse* but may have utilised a Rhegian manumission grant to leave behind those servile associations when they attempted to resettle as a community, first in Mylai and later in Tauromenion. Then I explore the circumstances around the foundation of Lilybaion, whose founders could only trace their origins to nearby Motya through a period of enslavement. In this instance, I suggest that the Carthaginians may have played a role similar to that of the Rhegians by refusing to recognise as legitimate the enslavement of the Motyans. In a jurisdictional mosaic like Sicily, neither slave status nor the stigma of former slave status necessarily persisted across borders. The two cases raise the possibility that a friendly power could help a community compartmentalize its experience of enslavement by enabling the population's transition back to freedom and communal self-determination. Just as an individual captured in war or by pirates often depended on the intervention of allies in order to regain citizen status, so enslaved communities needed allies to prevent them from dissolving completely.

Enforcement and subversion of slave status in Sicily

In the Greek Mediterranean, a slave's status as slave could only be enforced, ultimately, by the political authority active where the slave stood. Laws in *poleis*, *ethne*, and kingdoms, extended over the territory controlled by these entities but no farther, unless a treaty so specified.[3] Legal property rights, as one category of legal protection, also extended only as far as the borders of political (and perhaps military) authority. For citizens of one polity travelling through another, safety from robbery was regulated imperfectly through the potential right of reprisal, according to which a victim of theft obtained restitution by stealing from a member of the thief 's polity.[4] This was a universe in which individual citizens of each polity were empowered to act on their own; its smooth operation depended on travellers correctly identifying a perpetrator's identity, or perhaps simply knowing what city he was travelling through (and it was likely a he). It also seems rarely to have escalated out of control.

To the extent that a slave constituted property, slave status could potentially be shed at a political border.[5] In legal terms, a slave was a piece of property who could move, which meant that the system of reprisal did not necessarily work. A slave who escaped might be impossible to locate and a slaveowner who lost a slave this way could thus have no legitimate basis on which to exact restitution from citizens of one or another *polis*.[6] Greek slave owners employed trackers to find fugitive slaves but outside, perhaps, a few neighbouring *poleis*, it is extremely difficult to imagine that they could have met with much success.[7] In later periods, Roman law would establish procedures for the capture and return of fugitives but they depended on the broad authority of the Roman state and would have been unenforceable outside the bounds of that authority and, even then, successful escape was certainly possible.[8] In the wider Mediterranean during the 5th and 4th centuries BC, once a runaway slave passed the jurisdictional limits of the slave owner's *polis*, he or she became subject to whatever status was ascribed by whatever political authority existed wherever he or she went.

Scholarship is generally agreed that slaves frequently escaped, though the scale of the general phenomenon is unknowable in any quantifiable way.[9] Owners branded runaways as punishment and to mark them as disgraced, which must have meant horrific physical and psychological pain. This practice could also have made future attempts less successful, if populations generally knew that a person carrying such a disfigurement was not to be ascribed free status. Slaveowners in a foreign *polis* might be inclined to report and return any branded runaways they encountered not because of legal obligation but because they expected the same courtesy if their slaves escaped.

The population and officials of a *polis* might not have been able to distinguish a Greek runaway slave from a Greek foreign traveller, if the aspiring ex-slave did not bear physical marks of servitude. Differences in dialect whether broad or local would not necessarily be telling, nor would style or quality of dress, since the stranger might simply be from a *polis* where people spoke and dressed differently. In Athens, famously, one could not tell slaves, metics, and Athenian citizens apart.[10] While a measure of distinctive but partial Athenian egalitarianism explains that case, we need not imagine that other *poleis* closed their gates to foreigners of uncertain status.[11] Many smaller *poleis* were in frequent need of population, and new foundations or refoundations could offer a way into citizenship and safety. Indeed, one could say that a slave had successfully escaped once outside the jurisdiction of the original slave owner's *polis*.

Sicily in the 5th and 4th centuries was an island of several dozen *poleis*, which meant that one did not necessarily need to travel far to reach a foreign jurisdiction, at least when jurisdiction was functioning normally. While Dionysios I, the tyrant of Syracuse under whose reign the episodes discussed in this paper took place, regularly violated the territorial, political, and social integrity of other communities in Sicily, other powers just as regularly blocked his authority or checked his initiatives. His intermittent ability to project authority across the western Mediterranean did not amount to continuous omnipotence either in the region, in Sicily, or even in Syracuse itself. Most of the time, *poleis* in Classical Sicily exercised legal jurisdiction within their borders.

A Naxian diaspora between Sicily and southern Italy

Naxos was one of the oldest Greek cities in Sicily if not actually the oldest, a Chalkidian foundation on the island's east coast just north of Mt Aitna (see Pl. 1). While the Syracusan Deinomenid kings had attacked the Naxians from time to time, it is not clear whether they ever made permanent changes to the population of the city.[12] The Naxians had no major conflict with the Second Democracy in Syracuse and rode out the Peloponnesian War as allies of Athens without suffering as much as others. However, the very first foreign endeavor of Dionysios I after he consolidated power in Syracuse toward the end of the 5th century consisted of an attack on the cities of Chalkidian origin in eastern Sicily: Naxos and Katane. Diodorus tells us that in 403, Dionysios:

> led his force against Katane, for Arkesilaos, who was the commander of the Katanians, offered to surrender the city to him. Therefore, having been admitted to the city by this man in the middle of the night, he became the master of Katane. He took away the weapons of the citizens and set up a sufficient garrison there. After this Prokles, the leader of the Naxians, persuaded by a magnitude of promises, delivered his fatherland to Dionysios, who paid the gifts to the traitor, granted him his relatives, and andrapodized the city (τὴν πόλιν ἐξηνδραποδίσατο), and he left the possessions for the soldiers to plunder, and razed the walls and the houses. Treating the Katanians similarly (παραπλησίως), he sold the captives as slaves in Syracuse (ἐλαφυροπώλησε τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους ἐν Συρακοσσαις).[13]

According to this passage, then, the entire populations of Naxos and Katane were enslaved as captives of the victorious Dionysios.[14] Indeed, the cities must at least have been emptied of potential defenders, since Dionysios' next action was to grant Naxos and its territory to the Sikels of eastern Sicily, and to install his own Campanian mercenaries in Katane.[15] The Naxian and Katanian women, children, and other dependents were certainly enslaved, and Dionysios did not regularly destroy or encourage his soldiers to destroy potentially valuable human resources. It would therefore be odd if Dionysios, already in control of the two cities, killed off the fighting-age Naxian and Katanian men, considering that he no longer needed to kill them in order to get at their dependents, and he could raise additional funds by selling them as slaves.

Once enslaved, the Naxians disappear from view, as is typical of slave populations in our documentation, but, unlike most enslaved groups, they reappear. We meet them again as a defined community less than 10 years after the destruction of their city, showing that even while enslaved they had maintained an individual and perhaps a group identity as Naxians.[16] Dionysios' inveterate opponents across the Strait of Messina in Rhegion provided the opportunity for the Naxians to emerge back onto the regional stage. In his account for the year 394, Diodorus says that the Rhegians responded to provocative moves by Dionysios at Messana in the following way: 'first they received (ὑπεδέξαντο) those made into refugees (φυγαδευομένους) by Dionysios and plotting in opposition to him, and after this they settled the survivors of the Naxians and Katanians in Mylai …'.[17] Let us begin with the last item in Diodorus' report: 9 years after the mass enslavement of the Naxians and Katanians, there were survivors able to settle in Mylai, which might be explained in three ways.

First, perhaps not all the Naxians and Katanians were enslaved in the first place and some escaped before the cities were handed over; Diodorus' succinct narrative of Dionysios' actions does not forbid the possibility, and given the inherently selective nature of *andrapodismos*, some older men, women, and children could have remained even as the Sikels and Campanians gained political authority in the two cities.[18] In fact, any young boys who had been overlooked by Dionysios' soldiers and who in nine years had grown into adolescents would have been useful recruits for the Rhegians. More generally, any Naxians who had somehow escaped enslavement in 403 had also been 'made into refugees by Dionysios' and could have joined in the settlement at Mylai.

A second possibility is that some of those enslaved were sold to the Rhegians, who later manumitted the slaves in order to fortify a stronghold in Mylai against Dionysios' operations in Messana. It is possible that individual buyers purchased the Naxian slaves with manumission in mind, either on their own initiative or driven by social pressure to aid other enemies of Dionysios. Overall, a Naxian might have been worth more to the Rhegian *polis* as a free person, empowered to agitate against Dionysios, than as a slave.[19] This possibility involves a problem of collective action, since any particular Rhegian citizen would lose out by giving up his human property for the communal good. However, subscriptions (*epidoseis*) in times of emergency are common in Greek cities, and if the issue were presented as one crucial to Rhegion's survival it may have motivated individuals to subordinate their personal interests.[20] The author of the pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica* relates that the city of Mende ordered its citizens to sell all their slaves except for one man and one woman, with the proceeds to be loaned to the city.[21] The Rhodians, under siege in 305/4 BC 'voted to buy from their masters those of the slaves who had proven in the dangerous circumstances to be noble men, to set them free, and to make them citizens'.[22] Along similar lines, the *polis* of Rhegion could have, in effect, confiscated any slaves of Naxian origin from their Rhegian owners and set them free.

State-level redemption and manumission of politically valuable prisoners was not unheard of in the Mediterranean.[23] In Sicily itself, for example, the *polis* of Entella thanked the people of Egesta for redeeming Entellans captured as slaves in the middle of the 3rd century and, while the details of the redemption process are not known, it was conceptualised at least as an action taken by the Egestans as a *polis*.[24] It is possible, then, that Dionysios' political opponents in Rhegion and perhaps elsewhere intentionally bought the enslaved Naxians and Katanians with the express purpose of freeing them, in effect ransoming them.[25] Typically, ransoming a prisoner cost more than the price of that prisoner on the slave market; the higher price returned the prisoner to freedom immediately.[26] Once prisoners were sold into slavery they could be purchased for less money but the market could take them anywhere and they might never be found again. Even though Dionysios did not offer formal terms of ransom for the Naxians, the Rhegian *polis* may have found a way to redeem some or many of them by freeing those held by individual Rhegians.

A third source of resettlers is escape, by any of the means slaves used to escape in antiquity. As runaway slaves, Naxians and Katanians could perhaps expect a warm welcome in Rhegion as a matter of course but the offer of effective asylum in 394 may have encouraged and attracted more of them. Diodorus terms those received in Rhegion τοὺς ὑπὸ Διονυσίου φυγαδευομένους ('those made refugees [or exiles] by [or because of] Dionysios'), which need not refer exclusively to the Naxians and Katanians but aptly describes them. A state that welcomed runaway slaves and stood opposed to the power that had enslaved them in the first place might well view that enslavement as illegitimate and consider the runaway slaves to be refugees.[27] The verb ὑποδέχομαι can in fact mean to receive a supplicant or to harbour a runaway and, since most adult male Naxians alive in 394 had likely been enslaved in 403, those meanings may have had particular relevance in the historical tradition about this community.[28] Thus the account transmitted by Diodorus may indicate that the Rhegians harboured the Naxians and Katanians who had managed to escape their masters in nearby cities, and did not recognise or enforce their status as slaves.

Unfortunately the work of the Rhegians came undone quickly and the redeemed slaves were scattered once again. Diodorus goes on to report that after the Rhegians failed badly in an attack on Messana, '[The Messanians] immediately proceeded against Mylai and captured the city, and they let the Naxians who had been settled there go free under a truce. Thus these men went off to the Sikels and to the other Greek cities, and settled variously in various places'.[29] The omission of any reference to the Katanians is strange and should not be dismissed as accidental. I propose that Dionysios' conflict with the Sikels, particularly those whom he had settled in Naxian territory in 403, provides an explanation for differential treatment. In 396 the Carthaginian general Himilcon had, according to one tradition, induced those same Sikels to establish a fortified city on the hill above the ruins of Naxos, which became known as Tauromenion.[30] In the tyrant's mind this ungrateful and hostile city had to be checked, and releasing the Naxians, who might want to recover their city and territory from the Sikels, was one way to do this.

Three historical facts work in favour of such an interpretation. The first is that Dionysios fought a battle with the Sikels in Tauromenion that same year, 394, in which the badly wounded tyrant was nearly taken captive himself; his personal participation may indicate the intensity of his antipathy toward his enemy.[31] In fact, through a treaty with the Carthaginians in 392, Dionysios ultimately gained authority over the Sikels generally and Tauromenion specifically, which he subsequently emptied of its Sikel inhabitants and populated with his own mercenary troops.[32] The second is the acknowledged and predictable enmity between Sikels and Naxians dating back to the foundation of Naxos in the 8th century.[33] The third is the tradition that some Naxians did eventually resettle in Tauromenion: in 358/7 a certain Andromachos, who may or may not have been a Naxian himself 'gathered together the survivors from the destruction of Naxos by Dionysios', and settled them on the site of Tauromenion.[34] It is possible then that upon capturing Mylai in 394, Dionysios' proxies re-enslaved or killed the Katanians but released the Naxians in order to let them cause trouble for the Sikels in Tauromenion. On this reading the Naxians who had been enslaved managed to regain their freedom and live as a diaspora community among the Sikels and Greeks, until they could reassemble in the new city founded in their old territory, Tauromenion. The Naxians who had not been killed or enslaved would thus have been able to reunite with their compatriots in Mylai and again in Tauromenion.

The Naxian renaissance at Tauromenion is a fascinating topic in its own right, but the present study is constrained to focus more narrowly on the role played by the Rhegians in enabling the survival of the Naxian community.[35] I have suggested that Diodorus' compressed narrative linking the Rhegian reception of refugees to the resettlement of the Naxians in Mylai could represent a longer-standing program to aid the enemies of Dionysios. Rhegion would have been a natural destination for runaway Naxians, a jurisdiction unlikely to return them to servitude. At the same time, the Rhegians and others may well have taken a more active role in redeeming the Naxians by purchase or ransom, gathering them together over the course of several years.[36] The attempted resettlement at Mylai failed, but the intervention was vital to the survival of the Naxian community, since those enslaved would have remained enslaved. Without the Rhegians, Andromachos might not have found any Naxians answering to the name in 358/7, when he gathered the survivors of Naxos to settle in Tauromenion.

In a sad epilogue to these events, the Rhegians ended up paying dearly for their opposition to Dionysios. In 388 the tyrant besieged

Rhegion, succeeded in starving the inhabitants, and captured the city the following year, bringing 6000 Rhegians to Syracuse to be ransomed or sold as slaves themselves.[37] In their case, the ransom was one silver *mna*, the relatively low value of which can be explained either by the extremely poor health of the captives, or the tyrant's immediate need for cash. These Rhegians are not heard from again, though it is just possible that they were involved in their city's resettlement under Dionysios II in the 360s or 350s. While they had been in a position to protect the Naxian *demos*, nobody was in a position to protect them.

Motyan origins for the population of Lilybaion

Dionysios launched his second foreign excursion against the Carthaginians, eventually targeting the island-city of Motya, located in a lagoon at Sicily's westernmost extremity (Pl. 1). Extensive preparations in 398 were followed by a march westward along the south coast of the island. The next year, his allied Greek and mercenary army and navy appeared within view of Motya, whose inhabitants, expecting help from the Carthaginians, were not panic-stricken by the force of Dionysios but prepared themselves for a siege'.[38] Diodorus is quite explicit that the Motyans as a whole remained on their island and did not flee the city: as soon as Dionysios arrived, they destroyed the causeway leading to the mainland of Sicily.[39] During the siege itself and the street-to street battles for control of the city, Diodorus presents a consistent picture with the inhabitants of Motya willing to fight to the death 'holding before their eyes the horrors of captivity, and seeing no possible flight either by land or by sea'.[40] Furthermore, Syracusan control of the sea kept any marine traffic from reaching or departing from Motya: Diodorus notes plainly that while Dionysios' army was breaking into Motya '… and it was not possible to flee from the city, since the sea surrounded it, and their enemies were masters of the sea'.[41] Once the Motyans breached the causeway to the island, nobody could have escaped.

While many Motyans undoubtedly died in the preliminary battles and when Dionysios' army first entered the city, a significant number, including women, children, and elderly men, probably remained alive to take refuge in the city's temples. The account of Diodorus suggests that not all Motyans were killed:

> Immediately the entire force of Dionysios stole into the city, also by means of the mole, and every place was full of killing, for the Sicilian Greeks, hurrying to repay cruelty for cruelty, were killing everyone one after another, with absolutely no consideration for a child, for a woman, or for an old man. But Dionysios, wishing to andrapodize the city so that he could amass money, first restrained the soldiers from slaughtering the captives; since nobody paid attention to him, but he saw that the rage of the Sicilian Greeks was uncontrollable, he sent out heralds to shout and explain to the Motyans to flee to the temples honored among the Greeks. When this came to pass the soldiers stopped the killing, but they rushed to plunder the property….[42]

The city was already lost, or at least its organised defense had failed, and the soldiers of Dionysios were engaged in the destruction of what was now, according to Greek military norms, the tyrant's war-won property.[43] This narrative clarifies Dionysios' objective of neutralising the military-capable population and turning the dependent population into liquid wealth, presumably to pay his mercenaries though possibly for other purposes.

Diodorus also implies that it was principally the children, women, and elderly who took refuge in the temples by juxtaposing their suffering with Dionysios' decision to intervene. After describing the ruthlessness of the Sicilian Greeks, Diodorus writes Διονύσιος δὲ βουλόμενος ἐξανδραποδίσασθαι τὴν πόλιν ('But Dionysios, wishing to andrapodize the city'), suggesting plainly that the indiscriminate slaughter was an impediment to turning the civilian population into slaves. His narrative is even more explicit in stating that the offer of refuge succeeded: when the population fled into the proper temples, the soldiers did not follow them but started looting instead, so we must conclude that many Motyans survived.

There were certainly captives available to sell in the aftermath of the city's fall. To the noncombatants in the temples we should add any Motyan soldiers who decided to stop fighting and join them. Dionysios compensated his soldiers (and it is not clear whether στρατιῶται should include the mercenaries or not) by letting them plunder the city's considerable wealth, but 'sold as booty (ἐλαφυροπώλησεν) the surviving Motyans'.[44] These survivors can only be those who fled into the temples, along with anyone whom the Sicilian Greek soldiers had not yet reached when Dionysios sent out his heralds, and perhaps any Motyan soldiers captured but not yet killed. Compared with the situation at Naxos, a greater proportion of these Motyan survivors would likely have been women, children, and the elderly, given the violence and destruction involved in the city's unsuccessful defense against Dionysios' siege.[45] In order to follow the fate of these enslaved Motyans, we must try to determine to whom they were sold.

All these events took place before Dionysios and his army returned to Syracuse, so the enslaved Motyans must have been sold at or near Motya. This would represent a sensible operation for the general of an army of allies far from their homes.[46] If he needed cash to pay his own soldiers, as he frequently did, it would have been especially urgent to sell off the captives. In Sicily as elsewhere, unpaid soldiers could become a very big problem.

It is unlikely that Dionysios could have sold the slaves to his own soldiers, since the conscripted, allied, and mercenary forces had not been paid yet and would have lacked currency with which to buy them. One group who probably did have cash on hand were the owners of the 500 commercial vessels that had sailed west to accompany Dionysios' expedition and these are better candidates for the buyers of the captured Motyans. They likely had their homes in eastern Sicily since they brought Dionysios' siege engines and other supplies to Motya.[47] If they did buy the slaves, we may assume that they brought them back to eastern Sicily with them, in which case the entire surviving population of Motya would have been slaves in Greek and Sikel cities by the end of 397. This scenario, however, is virtually incompatible with the historical tradition about the foundation of Lilybaion.

The most likely possibility is that Dionysios sold the Motyan slaves to local inhabitants of western Sicily, perhaps to the people of Eryx who had capitulated immediately upon his arrival on the west coast. Diodorus says that the people of Eryx submitted because they hated the Carthaginians, which if true might make them eager buyers.[48] But even discounting that motivation, Eryx would have been one of the only western Sicilian communities not at that moment opposed to Dionysios, and that makes it at least conceivable that the tyrant would sell the captured Motyans there. In any event, I do not insist on Eryx as the main or only destination for Motyan slaves, since Dionysios' desire for cash would have induced him to conduct the business as quickly as possible. An ad-hoc slave market would have attracted people from the wider Elymian area, and it is difficult to imagine Dionysios refusing to sell or auditing each potential buyer for political inclinations. This scenario has the advantage of being consistent with the tradition about Lilybaion, as we will now see.

Lilybaion was undoubtedly a Punic city, and the Greek tradition considered it to have been founded by the survivors of Motya shortly after 397. The extant original text of Diodorus does not describe the foundation directly, but an excerpted summary preserved in Hoeschel's 1603 edition of Diodorean fragments notes, in the context of Pyrrhos' attack on the city in 278 BC, that '… this city [Lilybaion] was founded by the Carthaginians after the capture of Carthaginian Motya by the tyrant Dionysios. For they gathered together the survivors from this city and settled them at Lilybaion'.[49] If we believe that the only surviving Motyans were enslaved and sold by Dionysios near Motya in 397, then following this tradition means that Lilybaion must have been populated at least in part by these captives after they had either run away or been freed. Himilcon's counter-offensive of 396 retook nearly all the Elymian cities of western Sicily as well as Motya itself, so if people in these cities had bought survivors from Motya, then they could have been encouraged or forced to give them up.[50] The chain of ownership could have been more-or-less extended as the captives were resold but Himilcon returned after less than a year, so it may not have been difficult for the Carthaginians to gather the Motyans together again, perhaps paying for them and freeing them or confiscating them and freeing them. This short span of time also allows for perceptions to have diverged significantly: to their new owners, the Motyans were slaves, property to be bought and sold; to the Carthaginians, they were prisoners, fellow Punics to be redeemed. To be sure, the Carthaginians might also have brought settlers to Motya and Lilybaion from their home city or other parts of their empire, but the foundation story of Lilybaion can best be reconciled with the fate of Motya by treating the Carthaginians as primarily responsible for redeeming the Motyan captives.

In this reading, those enslaved at Motya were dispersed through the slave trade into the cities of western Sicily. These cities had capitulated to Dionysios at least partly out of fear, and they came back under Carthaginian control fairly quickly. When the Carthaginians under Himilcon arrived in 396, they would have found captured Motyans owned as slaves. I suggested above that the Rhegians had a political motivation not to respect or enforce the slave status of the Naxians and Katanians they encountered; in this case the Carthaginians had a similar motivation not to view the enslavements perpetrated by Dionysios as legitimate. While the political relationship between the Punic inhabitants of Motya and the Carthaginians in Carthage remains somewhat obscure, it is generally accepted that the two communities had distinct identities that were nonetheless strongly connected.[51] At the very least, Himilcon's military control of western Sicily meant that he had the ability to end the enslavement of the Motyans.

While the inhabitants of Motya evidently had no opportunity to be ransomed immediately after Dionysios captured their city, the Carthaginians may have reassembled them piecemeal through the slave trade. Thanks to ongoing archaeological work it is now abundantly clear that Motya was reoccupied shortly after its destruction.[52] While it is certainly plausible that the reoccupation was led by its former inhabitants, we cannot know for certain; all the survivors of Motya need not have relocated to Lilybaion, but all the initial settlers of Lilybaion could well have been survivors from Motya. Lilybaion itself, though very incompletely excavated, actually seems to have become populous only in the later part of the 4th century.[53] The foundation of the new city was a massive and ambitious undertaking, to judge from the impressive fortifications dating back to the 4th century, and so official Carthaginian involvement in procuring settlers should not surprise us.[54] If Lilybaion was in fact founded by the Carthaginians with survivors from Motya, then the historical context suggests that the Carthaginians had also assisted in recovering the Motyans from slavery. Indeed, redeeming captives and establishing a city may have been complementary aspects of a single Carthaginian initiative over the course of the 4th century.

In this discussion, I have proceeded on the assumption that the tradition linking the populations of Motya and Lilybaion contains an element of truth. It is entirely possible that this link may be imagined rather than real. Perhaps all the enslaved Motyans were brought to eastern Sicily, where they lost cohesion, memory, and collective identity; meanwhile the Carthaginians filled their new fortress-city with settlers from elsewhere. In that case, a myth of continuity would certainly have been attractive among the new colonists, and the story of the Motyans would come to a close.

However, if we take seriously the evidence at our disposal, then like the Naxians, the people of Motya were enslaved and later redeemed, and they played some part in the foundation of Lilybaion. It is certainly true that communities in the ancient Mediterranean created and cultivated fictive kinship ties, but usually they modified or invented figures and stories in the mythic past rather than drastically rewriting recent history. A simpler explanation for the foundation tradition is that the Carthaginians did in fact reassemble some of the enslaved Motyans and establish them in Lilybaion. No source specifies the mechanisms of the foundation, but I am proposing that it looked something like the reunion of the Naxians. Once in control of western Sicily again, the Carthaginians could have purchased the ex-Motyans in order to free them, or simply declared that they would shelter any Motyan runaway slave. They could have effectively expunged both enslavement and prior slave status from the record, so that the founders of Lilybaion could be proud to be called survivors from Motya.

Communities saved from erasure by powerful allies

The Naxians and the Motyans both nearly ceased to exist as communities as they faced the violence of Dionysios. Unless ransom was quickly paid, captives could be sold to anyone from anywhere, and resold any number of times, traveling great distances involuntarily and ending up in a city they did not choose.[55] While the Naxian and Motyan populations never had the option of a formal ransom, the difference between ransoming a captive and buying a slave for release was really just a question of terminology.

The experience of the both the Naxians and the Motyans could hypothetically have been analysed as ransom, which would downplay or erase their former status as slaves and maintain an untainted pedigree for their future resettlements. Still, they had passed through a state of slavery and would have come through it changed: the trauma of their uncertain itineraries could not be undone. In both cases displacement and dispersal threatened their survival as a collective entity, and in both cases powerful friends were needed to preserve the cohesion and autonomy of the once-enslaved community.

Such communities who did find benefactors were spared the fate of others that simply dissolved and they could avoid the challenges that came with other potential responses to enslavement, such as forming a maroon community, or openly revolting. For most victims of mass enslavement in the ancient world, there was no reunion. Open revolts often involved great violence and did not offer good long-term prospects, no doubt because organized states usually stopped them quickly.[56] Maroon or runaway societies tended to be short-lived, similarly a temporary rather than permanent solution.[57] Under the terrible circumstances of a treacherous betrayal or a violent siege, the best that a population enslaved *en masse* could hope for was a *polis* or other authority willing and able to assemble or attract the enslaved wherever they had landed. If the Naxians and Motyans persisted as groups with any meaningful collective identity, it was because they found a friendly jurisdiction, in which their enslaved status could be nullified, a first step to surviving subjugation and diaspora, and a necessary step in the process of re-establishing a cohesive and functioning community.

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[*] I wish to thank Melanie Jonasch (DAI) for her initiative in establishing the War and Society in Colonial Sicily workshop and her dedication in seeing this volume through to publication. I also wish to thank Franco De Angelis (UBC) for his generous turn as host to the workshop attendees in Vancouver. Finally, I thank the anonymous manuscript reviewer for critical feedback that helped me improve the clarity of this essay. Any remaining faults are my own, as are all translations from the original Greek.

[1] Moggi (2006, 77–79) weighs a number of possible explanations for the

regularity with which cities were destroyed or had their populations enslaved: 'un fenomeno abbastanza frequente nell'occidente greco, ma particularmente diffuso in Sicilia …'

[2] See Kamen 2009 on the ways in which accusations of slave status or descent, both genuine and rhetorical, reinforced status boundaries and discredited individuals who had changed their status.

[3] See Eckstein (2007, 38) on the lack of formal, binding interstate laws throughout Greek antiquity; he identifies only 'informal customs of interstate conduct' limited to 'protection of official envoys … not attacking neutral states during wartime; minimal protection of the civilian population of the enemy under certain specific circumstances; and abiding by sworn treaties'. Athenian enforcement of servile status through the procedure of *agoge* was limited to Athenian citizens in their home city: Maffi 2005, 263–264.

[4] Lintott (2004) demonstrates the widespread but informal nature of this practice. Agreements of *asylia*, which limited or negated the right of reprisal, become increasingly common in the Mediterranean during the Hellenistic period, for which see Riggsby 1996.

[5] Vlassopoulos (2011, 128) argues persuasively that slavery should be primarily understood as a form of domination, not simply as a property relation, and while this paper generally approaches the question as one of property and legal jurisdiction, perhaps it will satisfy his concluding appeal: 'We need to look at the constant negotiation of this relationship of power [including] the ways that slaves attempted to avoid or overcome their identification as slaves', among other questions.

[6] Treaties between states, *symbola*, might provide such a basis: Gauthier 1972. Cohen (2005, 300) writes: 'In the absence of special bilateral treaty relationships (*symbola*), the courts of the hundreds of independent Greek states were normally open only to litigants who were members ("citizens") of that state'. At Athens, the *dikai emporikai* might theoretically have given foreigners access to Athenian property law, but I am not aware of any cases in which they were used to recover runaway slaves. Walbank (1986, 353) speculates that *IG* II^2 144 with additional fragments, comprising an agreement between Athens and Stymphalos, may have specified measures for the return of runaway slaves. An agreement of the mid-3rd century between Miletus and several Cretan cities (*Milet* I 3 140 = *IC* I viii 6 = *Staatsverträge* III 482) specifies a somewhat confusing procedure for preventing citizens of the signatory *poleis* from being enslaved by one another and for the redemption of those who were erroneously enslaved: see Bielman 1994, 311–313.

[7] See Garland 2014, 145–148. We do know of agreements between *poleis* that provided for the return of runaways, e.g. *IG* V.2 357 (=*IPArk* 17,

Hellenistic treaty between Stymphalos and Demetrias) LL 151–159 and *IC* i.xvi.5 (Hellenistic treaty between Lato and Olous on Crete). Chaniotis (2011, 127–128 with n. 32) cites several cases in which states negotiating the end of armed conflict agreed to return any runaway slaves they found who had escaped in wartime. Ptolemaic Egypt, famous as something of a 'closed system,' was one large jurisdiction in which slave status could be enforced: see Llewelyn 1997, 245. I am not aware of blanket laws governing the return of runaway slaves throughout the other Hellenistic kingdoms or of documents alluding to kingdom-wide enforcement.

[8] See Bradley 2011, 367–372 on uncertainty about the scale or success of escape, but Knapp (2011, 157–159) argues in favour of fairly widespread success, noting the 'practical ease with which a runaway could melt into the population'.

[9] See McKeown 2011, 155–157.

[10] Xen. [*Ath. Pol.*] 1.10; see Vlassopoulos 2009b on the blurred boundaries between slave and free in Athens, with discussion of the passage in question (357). Non-Greek travellers must have had less success going unnoticed and might well have aroused an instant suspicion that they might be runaway slaves.

[11] Following the pessimistic outlook of Kudlien (1988), Garland (2014, 146) cautions, unnecessarily in my view, that 'it would have been difficult for [an escaped slave in a foreign *polis*] to remain at liberty, since foreigners were an inevitable source of curiosity, even in an accommodating *polis* like Athens'. Garland goes on to suggest that escaped slaves either 'probably threw themselves on the mercy of another slave owner in the hope that they would receive better treatment' or 'might have committed serious crimes while on the run, simply in order to stay alive'. These are two possibilities, but the outcome in which a slave successfully acted the part of a free foreigner should be taken seriously as well.

[12] Hippocrates' siege and 'enslavement' (*doulosyne*) ca. 498–491: Hdt. 7.154.2; Hieron's deportation of the Naxians to Leontinoi in 476: Diod. Sic. 11.49.1–2. Return of 'those expelled from their own cities throughout the domination of Hieron' to their homes in 461: Diod. Sic. 11.76.4. Diodorus does not explicitly name the Naxians, but they would certainly fall under the category of those displaced during Hieron's rule, and Diodorus' generally inclusive language (11.76.5: αἱ δὲ πόλεις σχεδὸν ἅπασαι; 11.76.6: αἱ δὲ πόλεις…σχεδὸν ἅπασαι) suggests that the Naxians did return from Leontinoi; see Asheri 1992, 158.

[13] Diod. Sic. 14.15.1–3.

[14] This interpretation follows the traditional translation of the verb *andrapodizein*: see Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 120–121. Gaca (2010) has

argued convincingly based on a wide-ranging analysis of historical accounts that the verb (*ex*)*andrapodizein* with a city as direct object means that the aggressors 'kill or shackle any adult males who fight against them … and who would pose a risk of future retaliation if left alive and at large. Once this step is finished, the aggressors then round up, select, and forcibly separate the malleable and exploitable young women and children from their unwanted relatives; and then they haul off their choice captives' (Gaca 2010, 153). It is unclear what her interpretation requires when a city is captured by treachery and the male inhabitants have been disarmed and cannot resist the enslavement of their dependents.

[15] Diod. Sic. 14.15.3.

[16] Exiled and otherwise dispersed populations frequently maintained corporate identity, as for example in the case of the Sicilians who returned to their *poleis* in 461, including the Naxians themselves, discussed above in note 12. What is notable in this case is not simply that a community survived in exile, but that it survived in slavery.

[17] Diod. Sic. 14.87.1.

[18] See Gaca 2010, 137–142.

[19] Any individual might purchase slaves with the intent of freeing them. For a discussion of such 'fictive sale' that emphasises personal relationships, with recent bibliography, see Kamen 2014, 284.

[20] Kamen (2009, 53) writes, of Athens, that 'we find "public" manumission taking place in extraordinary circumstances – namely, when the polis' corporate interests were threatened …' She also notes that the Athenians freed both publically and privately owned slaves in these emergencies. On *epidoseis* in general, see Migeotte 1992; Athenian *epidoseis* in times of crisis: Oliver 2007, 193–227. Cities also unsurprisingly initiated *epidoseis* to protect their own citizens, as at Hellenistic Teos, where the *polis* collected contributions as loans in order to ransom a number of citizens captured by pirates: *SEG* XLIV 949, on which see Merkelbach 2000.

[21] Arist. [*Oec.*] 1350a 12–15.

[22] Diod. Sic. 20.84.3, with the actual execution of the decree at 20.100.1.

[23] Pritchett (1991, 295–296) discusses numerous examples of politically motivated ransoming of enslaved and dispersed populations, including for instance the restorations of Stageira (Diod. Sic. 16.59.2, *cf*. Plut. *Vit. Alex*. 7.3 and Diog. Laert. 5.1.4) and Thebes (Diod. Sic. 19.53.2), and the collective ransom by Greek cities of Romans captured and sold by Hannibal (Liv. 34.50.3–6, *cf*. Diod. Sic. 28.13 and Plut. *Vit. Flam.* 13).

[24] *SEG* XXXV 999. The people of Entella certainly knew how to differentiate cities from individuals among their benefactors: *SEG* XXX

1121, another decree from the same dossier, thanks both the *koinon* of Petra as well as five or possibly six individuals from Petra.

[25] Hellenistic honorific decrees amply attest the attractiveness of redeeming prisoners either by paying ransom or by negotiating for release later. Bielman (1994, 293–294 and 301–307) describes the processes by which private individuals and states, respectively, could negotiate for the release of captives who had been enslaved. She concludes that even if a formerly free citizen were enslaved and sold, he or she would lose all connection with slave status upon release, see Bielman 1994, 322: 'Tout se passe comme si le Grec de naissance libre ne perdait jamais, même asservi, sa qualité virtuelle d'homme libre; il recourvrait la totalité de ses droits de citoyen sitôt rentré dans sa cité'.

[26] See Ducrey 1968, 238–246 and de Souza 1999, 65 for discussion of the relative advantages of ransom for pirates or other holders of captives.

[27] The collocation in Diodorus of the reception of the φυγαδευομένους just before the settlement of the survivors may also imply that he thought the two were causally connected, though his judgment would not in any case be conclusive.

[28] *LSJ s.v.* A1. Cicero described the Cilician city of Pindenissos in the 1st century BC as a city that 'used to receive runaways' (*fugitivos reciperent*): Cic. *Fam.* 15.4.10. Urbainczyk (2008, 43) hypothesises that the δοσλων πόλις of *Claros* I 13 L. 37 (= *SEG* XXXIX 1243), may likewise refer to a community that regularly harboured runaway slaves. Based on her review of the literary and epigraphic evidence, Zelnick-Abramovitz (2012, 124) concludes that 'a "City of Slaves" was not a figment of the Greek imagination; it did exist, as a result of slave revolts or as an intended refuge for slaves'.

[29] Diod. Sic. 14.87.3. Note that at this point, the 'Messanians' were no longer the descendants of Zankle-Messana, who had been killed or enslaved in 396 by the Carthaginians, but a group of several thousand Italian Lokrians and Bruttian Medmaians settled in the city by Dionysios: Diod. Sic. 14.78.5.

[30] Diod. Sic. 14.59.1–2. References to 'Himilcon's offers' indicate some degree of official Carthaginian assistance, as does the fact that the Carthaginians were apparently able to cede Tauromenion to Dionysios by treaty in 392. Bennett (1977) reconciles this foundation narrative with a second also preserved in Diodorus and mentioned below: the 'foundation' of the city by Andromachos, which must have involved adding settlers to an already-existing Sikel community.

[31] Diod. Sic. 14.87.4–14.88.5.

[32] Diod. Sic. 14.96.3–4. The Carthaginians had sponsored the establishment of Sikel Tauromenion in the first place, so the treaty of

392 BC probably involved an agreement that they would no longer protect the Sikels against Dionysios.

[33] Diod. Sic. 14.88.1.

[34] Diod. Sic. 16.7.1, where Andromachos has the proleptic ethnic Ταυρομενίτης but is otherwise not positively identified as Naxian, *pace* Sanders 1981, 395: '… Andromachus had suffered from Dionysius I, when his home town Naxos had been destroyed …'.

[35] For Naxians at Tauromenion in general Lentini 2002, Arena 2008, and most recently Lieberman 2018, 158–162; on specific continuities in cult and coinage, see Donnellan 2012 and Rossi 2005.

[36] Ancient authors' pervasive narrative compression means that the events Diodorus assigns to the year 394 may in fact have taken place over a longer span of time.

[37] Diod. Sic. 14.111.1–4, with pathetic depictions of the debilitated population under siege.

[38] Diod. Sic. 14.48.1.

[39] Diod. Sic. 14.48.2.

[40] Diod. Sic. 14.51.4.

[41] Diod. Sic.14.52.2; for Syracusan naval superiority at Motya see Diod. Sic.14.50.1–4.

[42] Diod. Sic.14.53.1–3.

[43] Compare Croesus' rebuke that once Sardis had fallen to Cyrus, the Persian soldiers were plundering the Persian king's own property: Hdt. 1.88. Caven (1990, 105) follows Diodorus in attributing a monetary motivation to the attempt to curb the slaughter of the Motyans, but also infers a degree of mercy from the 'not inhumane' Dionysios, which cannot be substantiated in the sources.

[44] Στρατιῶται compensated with plunder: Diod. Sic. 14.53.3; quotation: Diod. Sic. 14.53.4. Caven 1990, 106: '… it would seem that many – perhaps most – of them were, in fact ransomed by their neighbours (perhaps by the Segestaeans), as was the common practice.' But in fact Dionysios was besieging Segesta along with Entella at the time and is unlikely to have sold them slaves or anything else. I argue below that it is more likely to have been other neighbours, perhaps the people of Eryx.

[45] Gaca (2010, 151–152) somewhat inexplicably claims, contrary to Diodorus' clear narrative at 14.53.1–2, that 'the Motyaean men had dashed his [i.e. Dionysios'] hopes by killing off their youthful dependents just prior to the city's fall' (151) and that the Greek soldiers were 'outraged … at the fighters for cheating them out of andrapodizing the city by their preventive slaughter of the attractive, young, healthy, and productive women and children of Motya' (152).

[46] Diod. Sic. 14.53.5. For the immediate sale of captives so as not to

weigh down a travelling army, see for instance Polybius 4.75–77: when Philip V captured the Peloponnesian city of Thalamai in 219 BC, the large number of captives and plunder made his army 'heavy and unmanageable', and forced him to make a priority of selling them off. G. Lutatius Catulus immediately sold at Lilybaion the captives he had taken in the Battle of the Aegates in 241 BC, probably for similar reasons: see Polyb. 1.61.

[47] Diod. Sic. 14.47.7.

[48] Diod. Sic. 14.48.1.

[49] Diod. Sic. 22.10.4 in the Loeb edition (Walton 1957); Hoeschel 1603, 159. Caven (1990, 110) condenses what must have been a complicated process: 'The former inhabitants of Motya were redeemed and settled on the site, to form the citizen body of the new city'. As I argue below, there can be no question of such an instantaneous transfer. Pausanias 5.25.5–6 may preserve some memory of Motya and a Carthaginian resettlement effort, but he places the city in southeast Sicily and does not directly address the foundation of Lilybaion: see Nenci 1988. Diod. Sic. 13.54.4 mentions a well called 'Lilybaion' at the site of the future city and says that this is where Hannibal landed in preparation for the invasion of 409 BC. While we should be suspicious of anachronism it is unlikely that the Carthaginians of Motya were completely ignorant of the commanding headland of Lilybaion or the rest of the lagoon. Diod Sic. 11.86.2 also mentions the people of Lilybaion by name in the context of the events of 454 BC, for which see Perale 2012–2014.

[50] The quotation is from Thuc. 7.75.4; see p. 93 n. 109 below. Exchange or release of captives is common enough in ancient treaties that Himilcon may well have insisted on the return of any Carthaginians held as slaves as a precondition for peace with these cities.

[51] See Prag 2006 on the nature of this relationship and the ambivalent terminology of our Greek and Roman sources.

[52] Continued occupation of Motya is documented most clearly by Famà 2002, 50 and Nigro 2004.

[53] The earliest burials known thus far from the Lilybaion necropolis date to ca. 350 BC, though these are few compared to those of the 3rd century: Bechtold 1999, 18. It is possible that the earliest inhabitants were buried at the nearby Birgi necropolis, whose burials, 7th–3rd centuries BC, have not been securely identified with a specific habitation: Griffo 1997. Archaeologists have discovered traces of occupation on the site of Lilybaion dating from the 5th century, including evidence that the site was used as a port in that period, suggesting that human activity in the area predated the official foundation of the city by the Carthaginians: see Perale 2012–2014, 315 with bibliography.

[54] On the city's fortifications and planning see Caruso 2006.

[55] Braund (2011, 113) characterises the Mediterranean slave trade as 'organized around the minimal needs of a fragmented and much-ramified market' and concludes that '[a]lmost anyone might buy or sell a slave, anywhere'.

[56] See Urbainczyk 2008; a major exception is the successful revolt of Messenian Helots in the 460s BC (Luraghi 2003, 111–112).

[57] E.g. the community of runaway slaves created by Drimakos on Chios, perhaps in the 3rd century BC, with a degree of acceptance if not authorisation from the Chians: Nymphodoros, *FGrH* 572F4, *cf*. Fuks 1968; Cartledge 1985, 38–39; Urbainczyk 2008, 30–31 and 53–54, and most recently Zelnick-Abramovitz 2012, 122–124. The alternative communities formed by the Sicilian slave revolts of the 2nd century BC were notably temporary.

Chapter 5

‘Sufferings too great for tears’: the destruction of the Athenian expeditionary corps in Sicily[1]

Bernd Steinbock

La prima parte di questo capitolo consiste in un’introduzione generale sul tema del trauma di guerra e nella presentazione delle tre sfide che pone l’applicazione del concetto moderno di stress postraumatico alle realtà del mondo greco antico: il problema della diagnosi retrospettiva dello stress postraumatico; l’inesistenza del concetto teorico di ‘trauma di guerra’ nel mondo greco antico; la possibilià di applicare questo concetto come fosse ‘universale’, valido per tutti i contesti storici o meno.

La seconda parte utilizza il racconto di Tucidide sulla ritirata degli Ateniesi da Siracusa nel 413 a.C. per dimostrare come tanto loro quanto i loro alleati sperimentarono situazioni di estremo stress: non solo il disagio della campagna militare, già di per sé notevole, ma anche il trauma della ritirata e della possibile cattura. A partire dalle cause note del trauma di guerra in età contemporanea, intendo sostenere l’argomento che il sistema di valori ateniese, insieme alle caratteristiche sociali, tattiche e tecnologiche della campagna siciliana, resero i soldati greci particolarmente vulnerabili e inclini a sviluppare sintomi postraumatici. Oltre a queste prove circostanziali, il racconto vivido di Tucidide di angoscia, sensi di colpa e disperazione (7.75) si rende testimone del fatto che i sopravvissuti, con i quali lo storico ha

conversato nel tentativo di ricordare gli eventi della guerra nel modo più accurato possibile (1.22.2), soffrivano ancora le conseguenze della traumatica esperienza in Sicilia.

Introduction

The incessant military competition in colonial Sicily came at a high human cost borne by the common soldiers fighting these wars. In his chapter, Stefano Vassallo presents in moving detail the archaeological evidence of those who paid the ultimate price on the battlefield.[2] But even the survivors of these wars over Sicily did not necessarily escape unscathed, as this chapter seeks to show. The first part of this contribution provides a general introduction to the concept of war-induced trauma and discusses some of the challenges that the application of this modern concept to the ancient world poses. The second part uses Thucydides' account of the Athenian retreat from Syracuse in 413 BC as a case study to argue that during the final phase of the Sicilian Expedition the Athenian soldiers had catastrophic war experiences that by far exceeded the hardships of typical hoplite campaigns and thus resulted in – what is called today – combat or war-induced trauma in at least some of the survivors.

Challenges of studying ancient Greek combat trauma

With the publication of *The Face of Battle* in 1976, the British military historian John Keegan has fundamentally changed the nature of the field of military history. Rejecting the traditional study of battles from a general's perspective, where military units are often treated like pieces on a chessboard, Keegan set out to reconstruct the battles of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme, as they were experienced by the individual soldiers fighting them.[3] Victor Davis Hansen was the first to apply this novel approach to ancient Greek warfare. Drawing on archaic and classical Greek literary and archaeological sources, Hanson provided a compelling step-by-step reconstruction of what it must have been like for a Greek soldier to fight a typical hoplite battle.[4]

It is not surprising that in the vein of this new, more empathetic approach to ancient Greek warfare, the psychological costs of war eventually also became an object of study.[5] In 1994, Jonathan Shay, a clinical psychiatrist treating Vietnam veterans with severe Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), argued for the timeless nature of war-induced psychological trauma by pointing to the depiction of war and its devastating psychological effects in Homer's *Iliad.*[6] Shay saw in Achilles the archetype of the combat soldier who, after experiencing first the betrayal of what is right by his commander and then the loss of his closest comrade, falls into a berserk rage – a pattern familiar to him from the accounts of his patients. In a second monograph, Shay used Homer's *Odyssey* to explore the difficulties combat veterans face trying to reintegrate into civilian life.[7] Inspired by Shay's work, Classicists have tried to identify potential cases of war-related PTSD in Greek historiography and other literary genres.[8] In recent years, the study of war-induced trauma in ancient Greece has received a further boost from the remarkable resonance of ancient Greek depictions of war-weary heroes and non-combatants with contemporary war veterans in the *Theater at War Productions* and the *Ancient Greeks/Modern Lives* program.[9]

While the positive effects of classical literature on contemporary veterans suffering from post-war trauma are widely appreciated, scholars' attempts to transfer the modern concept of PTSD to the ancient world have been met with considerable scepticism.[10] This criticism has overall had a salutary effect, since it encouraged scholars of historical post-war trauma to refine their theoretical models. Studies of war-induced trauma in ancient Greece face three challenges, which I will discuss along with possible ways forward.

Challenge 1: retrospective diagnoses of PTSD?

War-related PTSD is today a formal diagnosis, pronounced by medical professionals after numerous hours of personal interviews with affected individuals.[11] Considering that historians obviously lack this type of direct access to ancient Greek combat veterans, one wonders how they might be able to identify potential cases of PTSD in ancient Greece. With the help of a list of present-day diagnostic criteria of PTSD, Lawrence Tritle, a pioneer of ancient Greek trauma studies and a Vietnam War combat veteran himself, set out to diagnose retrospectively cases of war-induced trauma in ancient Greece, drawing on incidental depictions of soldiers' mental conditions in Greek historiography, votive inscriptions and other literary sources.[12] With this method, Tritle identified the Athenian Epizelus' sudden blindness in the battle of Marathon as hysterical blindness or conversion disorder (Hdt. 6.117),[13] the Spartan Aristodemus' reckless daring in the battle of Plataea as a result of his survivor guilt and suicidal behaviour after the death of his comrades in the battle of Thermopylae (Hdt. 7.229–231; 9.71),[14] Gorgias' description of the sudden panic in battle survivors (triggered by the sight of weapons and armour) as long-term psychological trauma (*Helen* 16–17),[15] and Xenophon's characterisation of the Spartan mercenary leader Clearchus as a lover of war as war-addiction (Xen. *An.* 2.6.1–15).[16] Such retrospective diagnoses of PTSD are problematic, though.

Making a conclusive retrospective diagnosis of PTSD in ancient literature is difficult for several reasons.[17] First, the very definition of PTSD – and with it the list of symptoms – is not fixed but has constantly been evolving over the last century. Wartime psychic trauma was known as 'Soldier's Heart' during the American Civil War, as 'Shell Shock' during World War I, as 'Battle Fatigue' in World War II and is now being called 'Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder' since the Vietnam War or 'Combat Stress Reaction' since the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.[18]

Second, PTSD, as it is defined in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM IV-TR), shares many symptoms with other stress-induced mental disorders, such as Acute Stress Disorder,[19] Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (C-PTSD), Panic Disorder, Conversion Disorder,[20] or Disorder of Extreme Stress Not Otherwise Specified (DESNOS).[21] The Canadian military establishment uses the umbrella term Operational Stress Injury (OSI) for any persistent psychological difficulty resulting from operational duties performed by a Canadian Forces member. Depending on the duration of post-traumatic symptoms, it distinguishes between Combat Stress Reaction (CSR), Acute Stress Disorder (ASD), and PTSD, but emphasises that there is considerable overlap between these three conditions.[22]

Third, the portrayals of the behaviours and mental dispositions of characters in Greek literature are generally not unmediated depictions of reality, but carefully crafted by authors steeped in the literary tradition of their respective genres. Employing a contemporary checklist of medical symptoms for retrospectively diagnosing one particular war-induced stress condition (such as PTSD) in ancient Greece is therefore extremely difficult.[23]

A sensible way for historians to get around these pitfalls is to avoid ascribing a precise medical diagnosis to ancient Greek historical or fictional characters seemingly suffering from mental illnesses. Consequently, most ancient Greek trauma studies today prefer the less technical and more inclusive terms 'combat trauma'[24] or 'war trauma' as shorthand for the full range of adverse psychological reactions to combat (including what we today would call PTSD) and rightly emphasise that in ancient Greece just as today war-induced psychological traumata varied in degree.[25]

Following the lead of Jonathan Shay, Sara Monoson, and others, I use the term 'war (or combat) trauma' in this chapter to refer 'to catastrophic war experiences that can produce severe, persistent, and disabling anxiety commonly known as "posttraumatic stress disorder" (PTSD).'[26] The events in question are 'outside the range of usual human experience and … would be markedly distressing to almost anyone'.[27] Such war experiences include exposure to extreme violence, gruesome physical injuries, brutality, extreme physical strain, deprivations and intense suffering, prolonged separation from family and friends, but also moral wounds such as experience of betrayal, profound grief over the loss of a close comrade, and exposure to the suffering of civilians. Among the most common disabling symptoms are flash-back memories, consuming survivor guilt, depression, social isolation, suicidal feelings, loss of trust, outbursts of rage and the persistence of adaptations necessary to survive battle (such as hyper-vigilance).[28]

Challenge 2: absence of a theoretical concept of combat trauma in ancient Greece

The second challenge for applying the modern concept of war-induced trauma to ancient Greece lies in 'the apparent absence of a concern with combat trauma'[29] in ancient Greek culture, as David Konstan notes.[30] Unlike many present-day veterans suffering from PTSD, Achilles does not show post-traumatic symptoms, such as flashbacks, trouble sleeping, or unmotivated aggression at the end of the *Iliad*. Furthermore, from the ancient Greek perspective, an episode of manic battle frenzy is not a sign of a mental disorder, but an *aristeia*, *i.e.* 'the highest manifestation of a fighter's excellence'.[31] This valorisation of irascibility and pugnaciousness in Greek culture might be owed to the brutal reality of incessant warfare, where it seemed advisable to praise such people as fierce warriors and sent them back into battle rather than label them as damaged. In other words, behaviour that we might now perceive as post-traumatic might have been ubiquitous in ancient Greece, even though it was generally not described as problematic.[32] The Spartan Aristodemus might be a case in point. Herodotus ascribed Aristodemus' suicidal daring in the battle of Plataea not to survivor guilt (as Tritle does in his interpretation),[33] but rather to his commendable desire to redeem himself in the eyes of his fellow Spartans for his alleged cowardice in the previous battle.[34] But this only shows that Herodotus and other Greeks (notably not his fellow Spartans) considered such suicidal daring praiseworthy; it is still plausible that Aristodemus' behaviour did in fact stem from survivor guilt, as Tritle argues.

The fact that the ancient Greeks (and Romans) failed to identify 'the pathology of combat trauma explicitly'[35] does not mean that they were unfamiliar with the devastating psychological effects of war.[36] On the contrary, the perceptive portrayals of troubled warriors in Greek literature, such as Homer's depiction of Odysseus' breakdown at Alcinous' court, triggered by Demodocus' song of the sack of Troy (*Od.* 8.516–531),[37] or Heracles' madness causing him to kill his own family in Euripides' *Heracles*,[38] rather suggest that both the poets and their audiences were all too familiar with this type of post-battle behaviour.[39] As Alan Greaves points out, the tropes and motifs used in these literary portrayals of troubled warriors 'drew their power from the fact that they were recognisable to the ancient audience (…) for whom battle traumatised individuals were not a rare occurrence but, on the contrary, were recognisably commonplace within the society around them'.[40] From this perspective – Greaves argues – one might even conclude that in ancient Greece 'PTSD, Conversion Disorder and other traumatic stress conditions were not rare but, in fact, completely ubiquitous.'[41]

Challenge 3: combat trauma as universal or culturally specific phenomenon

The third – and in my eyes most serious – objection to transferring the modern concept of combat trauma to ancient Greece calls into question the universal nature of combat trauma, which the studies of Shay, Tritle, Meineck, and others presuppose.[42] Jason Crowley makes a strong case that PTSD ‘results from the interaction of two variables, namely the human being and his or her environment’,[43] and demonstrates that both of these, *i.e.* the attitudes and core beliefs of combatants as well as the socio-military environments in which they fight, are not universal but historically and culturally specific. To illustrate his point, Crowley compares the societal values and the social, tactical and technological environments of the classical Athenian hoplite and the 20th-century U.S. infantryman (particularly of the Vietnam War era), and concludes that the latter shows ‘a profound propensity for PTSD’[44] due to a convergence of historically specific negative factors, while the former ‘was effectively immunized against the same risk’[45] thanks to both a fully internalised militaristic value system and the social comfort and close tactical support inherent in the Athenian hoplite phalanx.[46]

Crowley deserves praise for having identified several key factors that influence if and to what extent soldiers develop war-induced psychological trauma. Yet in his desire to emphasise the historical and cultural contingency of combat trauma, Crowley has overstated his case. His insistence on the complete absence of any kind of combat trauma in classical Athens is contradicted by both the depiction of traumatised individuals on the tragic stage and the Greek historians’ detailed accounts of actual military campaigns. Crowley’s verdict about the classical Athenian hoplite seems to be based on the reconstruction of an ideal-typical hoplite campaign which does not adequately take into account how much the actual military campaigns of the Peloponnesian War differed from Crowley’s ideal-typical reconstruction.

The Athenian retreat from Syracuse as catastrophic war experience

The second part of this chapter uses Thucydides’ account of the final phase of the Athenians’ Sicilian expedition as a case study. It shows that the Athenians and their allies were exposed to extreme war experiences that by far exceeded the hardships of normal military campaigns and therefore likely resulted in psychological trauma for at least some of the survivors.[47] Drawing on Crowley's methodological framework and known causes of contemporary war-induced trauma, I argue that the Athenian value system and the particular social, tactical and technological environments during the Sicilian campaign rendered the Athenian soldiers in fact very susceptible to developing post-traumatic symptoms. In addition to this circumstantial evidence, Thucydides' own perceptive depiction of the Athenian soldiers' anxiety, self-blame and despair suggests that the survivors he spoke to still suffered greatly under the weight of their traumatic experience in Sicily.

In 415 BC the Athenians, rulers of a mighty naval empire in the Aegean, sent an enormous armada to Sicily to support their ally Egesta and to conquer (if possible) the entire island, especially the great city of Syracuse. In a fierce siege, the Athenians brought the Syracusans to the verge of surrender, until the latter – with help of the Spartan commander Gyllipus – managed to turn the tables on their besiegers (Fig. 5.1). The Syracusans prevented the Athenians from completing their encircling wall,[48] captured the Athenian camps at the entrance to the Great Harbour and began winning naval engagements. The arrival of a second Athenian fleet under Demosthenes in 413 BC notwithstanding, the Syracusans managed to trap and destroy the entire Athenian fleet in the Great Harbour and, after a relentless pursuit over land, first forced the rearguard of the retreating Athenian expeditionary corps to surrender and then annihilated the vanguard at the river Assinarus (Fig. 5.2).[49]


Siege of Syracuse
Escarpment line
Athenian walls
Incomplete section of Athenian wall
Syracusan walls
A 1st Counter wall
B 2nd Counter wall
C 3rd Counter wall
D Syracusan wall, winter 415/14
Ships
Circular Athenian fort
Athenian forts
0.5 1km
0.5 1mi
Leon
Trogilus
Labdalum
C
Euryalus
EPIPOLAE
D
Piccolo Seno
Syce
Temenites
City wall of Syracuse
A
LITTLE HARBOR
B
Syracuse
Lysimeleia marsh
Athenian Fleet
Ortygia
Anapus River
Cyana River
Olympieum
GREAT HARBOR
Dascon
Plemmyrium

Figure 5.1. Siege of Syracuse (reworked from Kagan 1981, 232, map 11).


Athenian Retreat from Syracuse
Escarpment line
Athenian line of march
Athenian camp (nights 1-7)
A Acraean Bald Rock
B Cava Castelluccio
C Cava Spampinato (Calatrelli)
D Contrada Raiana
E Demosthenes' surrender
F Nicias' surrender
1km 5km 10km
1mi 5mi 10mi
Sortino
Monte Climiti
Catana
Thapsus
A
5
B
4
2-3
Solarino
C
Floridia
D
Epipolae
1
Syracuse
Anapus
Cyana
Palazzolo Acreide
Acrae
Plemmyrium
Helorine Road
Cassibile
Cacyparis
E
Estate of Polyzelus
IONIAN SEA
Avola
Erineus
Noto
6-7
Assinarus
San Paolo
F
Helorus

Figure 5.2. Athenian retreat from Syracuse (reworked from Kagan 1981, 341 map 12).

Risk factors leading to war-induced trauma

Several risk factors, known today to make soldiers prone to developing post-traumatic conditions, emerge from Thucydides' account of the Sicilian expedition: prolonged separation from family and friends, physical hardships, brutality, deprivation, and extended exposure to lethal danger.[50] Even before the Athenians and their allies set out on their fateful retreat from Syracuse in September 413, they had already experienced physical and mental hardships far beyond those of a typical hoplite campaign. Whereas the latter was usually restricted to a period of several weeks over the summer and involved the destruction of the enemy's crops and a decisive hoplite engagement,[51] the initial Athenian expeditionary force was on campaign for more than 2 years (June 415–September 413) and was engaged in intense siege warfare in the environs of Syracuse for almost 1½ years (April 414–September 413).[52] Such long separations from family and friends are known today to increase the risk for soldiers to incur psychological trauma.[53]

The physical and mental hardships of the prolonged campaign began taking a toll on the Athenians' morale, once Nicias gave up on the completion of the circumvallation of Syracuse and focused his attention on controlling the entrance of the Great Harbour by occupying the barren headland of Plemmyrium in the summer of 414 BC (see Fig. 5.1). Maintaining this outpost put a particular strain on the Athenian sailors stationed there, as is evident from Thucydides' remarks: 'And it was not the least in consequence of this that the suffering (κάκωσις) of the crews then first began.[54] For their water supply was scanty and not nearby, and at the same time, whenever the sailors went out to fetch firewood they were destroyed at the hands of the Syracusan horsemen who controlled the country'[55] (Thuc. 7.4.6).[56]

Even though the large reinforcement sent from Athens under the command of Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived only several months before the expedition's utter destruction, it nevertheless had – from July to September 413 BC – its fair share of the physical and mental hardships of this campaign.[57] After an unsuccessful attempt on the Syracusan cross-wall, Demosthenes tried to use the element of surprise and led a full-scale night attack against the Syracusan fortifications on Epipolae.[58] The attack soon stalled, and chaos ensued among the Athenian troops once they got in disorder and were unable to distinguish friend from foe in the moonlight.

Mistaking the paeans of their own Dorian allies (the Argives and Corcyraeans) for those of the Dorian Syracusans, the Athenians ‘not only became panic-stricken but also came into hand-to-hand combat with one another’ (Thuc. 7.44.7). In addition to the casualties from this type of ‘friendly fire’,[59] many Athenian and ally troops lost their lives by jumping off the cliffs while fleeing from the enemy. The psychological impact of this horrific failure of the Athenian expeditionary corps was immense. Considering this calamity and the ‘utter loss of morale that now prevailed in the army (πρὸς τὴν παροῦσαν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ κατὰ πάντα ἀρρωστίαν, Thuc. 7.47.1)’,[60] the Athenian generals – for the first time – seriously debated abandoning their mission.[61]

The soldiers’ low morale resulted not merely from this recent devastating defeat, but also from their unbearable living conditions. By the summer of 413 BC, the Athenians and their allies were in poor physical health. According to Thucydides, they were ‘distressed by illness’ (Thuc. 7.47.2) brought about by the summer season and the Lysimeleia marsh, where they were encamped. Dover makes the reasonable suggestion that the Athenians ‘may have fallen victim … to the malaria of the coastal regions of Sicily’ or other ‘fly-borne intestinal diseases [which] flourished in the conditions in which the Athenians were compelled to live’.[62]

This war in Sicily was also characterised by extreme brutality, another stressor known to increase the risk of developing post-traumatic conditions.[63] Thucydides mentions, for instance, that when Gylippus captured the Athenian fort at Labdalum shortly after his arrival in the summer of 414 BC, he ‘put to death all whom he took in it’ (Thuc. 7.3.4).[64] Similarly, when the Syracusans captured 18 Athenian triremes in a naval battle in the Great Harbour in the summer of 413, ‘they killed their crews to a man’ (Thuc. 7.53.3).[65] On this occasion alone, more than 2000 Athenians and allies were put to death.[66] By this point, the brutality of the fighting had reached a new level.[67] As a result, participants in this military campaign had to live with the distressing knowledge that capture most likely meant death.

One of the most severe stressors for the Athenians and their allies during the final phase of the expedition was the enduring deprivation of food and sometimes even water.[68] Soon after the eclipse of the moon on 27 August 413, they ‘no longer had supplies for their immediate needs’ (Thuc. 7.60.2). For, ‘in the expectation that they would sail away, they already had sent word to Catana and told them to bring no more provisions’ (Thuc. 7.60.2), but then had delayed their departure due to the lunar eclipse.[69] Consequently, there was already an extreme food shortage when the Athenians and their allies finally set out from their camp in mid-September after their decisive loss in the naval battle in the Great Harbour.[70] According to Thucydides ‘the hoplites and horsemen, contrary to their usual custom, carried their own food, some due to the lack of attendants, others through distrust of them (…). But even so they did not carry enough, for there was no longer food in the camp’ (Thuc. 7.75.5).[71] In his account of the first 5 days of the retreat (Fig. 5.2), Thucydides mentions four more times the Athenians’ desperate attempts to secure food.[72] This severe deprivation was surely one of the factors that compelled the rearguard under Demosthenes on Day 6 to surrender their arms under the promise that ‘no one should suffer death either by violence or by imprisonment or by want of the bare necessities of life’ (Thuc. 7.82.2).[73] The vanguard under Nicias was in no better condition. Thucydides states that when the Syracusans caught up with them and renewed their attacks on Day 7 after failed surrender negotiations, ‘these men too were in a wretched plight through lack of food and of all necessaries’ (Thuc. 7.83.4). On the next day, Nicias’ troops were so tormented by thirst that, when they reached the river Assinarus,[74] they gave up all order and blindly rushed in (Thuc. 7.84.2–3). Ignoring the enemy’s relentless barrage of missiles, they fought with one another over the water that had at once become foul from mud and blood (Thuc. 7.84.5).[75]

The Athenians and their allies’ deprivations did not end after their surrender. No fewer than 7000 of them were locked up in the stone quarries of Syracuse.[76] Thucydides provides a detailed description of the prisoners’ abysmal conditions (7.87.1–4).[77] They were crowded together in a very small space, and – since there was no roof – exposed to the heat of the day and the autumn cold at night, which caused illnesses (7.87.1). They had to sleep, eat and defecate in the same cramped space (7.87.2).[78] Since the dead were heaped together upon one another – some having succumbed to their wounds, others to illnesses – the stench was intolerable (7.87.2). For 8 months they suffered from hunger and thirst, since each of them was given extremely little food and water, specifically only one κοτύλη (*i.e.* 0.27 litres) of water and two κοτύλαι of food (*i.e.* 270–275 cm^3) a day. On Sphacteria, in 425 BC, the Athenians had allowed the Spartans to supply even their slaves with twice the amount of food per man per day (4.16.1).[79] Thucydides remarks that 'of all the other ills which men thrown into such a place were likely to suffer there was none that did not befall them' (7.87.2). The conditions improved to some extent after the first 70 days, when the Syracusans 'sold all the rest, except the Athenians and any Sicilian and Italian Greeks that had joined the expedition' (7.87.3). Thucydides' silence concerning the fate of the remaining prisoners has been taken by later writers (Diod. Sic. 13.33.1 and Plut. *Nic.* 29.1) and some modern scholars to mean that they too eventually died in the stone quarries.[80] Others conjectured that, at the end of the 8-month-long period they – like the rest of the Athenian allies beforehand – must have been sold into slavery.[81] Yet D.H. Kelly has argued convincingly that the Athenians and the Sicilian and Italian Greeks were kept in the stone quarries to be ransomed by their relatives after the winter.[82] As a result, presumably a fair number of Athenian captives eventually returned home, bearing the psychological scars of this horrific ordeal.[83]

In my analysis of the psychological stress endured by the Athenian expeditionary corps during its retreat, I finally employ one of Jason Crowley's own categories, *i.e.* the extended exposure to lethal danger. In his discussion of the technological environment of the classical Athenian hoplite, Crowley argues that – unlike the 20th-century US infantry man, who was often in the psychologically toxic situation of being completely helpless in the face of lethal artillery fire – the Athenian hoplite was usually able to counter the threats he faced with 'the most psychologically benign Lazarus response, namely direct action',[84] 'to remove or escape the threat.'[85] This was true in typical hoplite warfare, but not during the 8-day-long retreat from Syracuse.[86]

According to Thucydides, the Athenian expeditionary corps set out from their camp 'arranged in a hollow square (ἐν πλαισίῳ), first the division of Nicias leading the way, the one of Demosthenes following. The baggage-carriers and most of the masses were enclosed inside the ranks of the hoplites' (7.78.2).[87] Yet all along the march 'the Syracusan cavalry, riding alongside, harassed them, while their light-armed troops hurled javelins upon them' (7.78. 3). In his account of the 8-day-long retreat, Thucydides mentions these missile attacks ten (!) times.[88] As Hornblower astutely notes in his commentary: '[t]his theme relentlessly recurs (…) up to the terrible Assinaros chapter (84); the insistent iteration of language "enacts" the equally insistent and relentless Syracusan harassment'.[89]

The Athenian hoplites were unable to take effective counter measures against these incessant missile attacks by the Syracusan cavalry and light infantry. For, the enemy's missile troops avoided close quarter contact, and the Athenian hoplites were too immobile and exhausted to pursue them effectively.[90] The latter could only hope that their shields and body armour would protect them. The Athenian sailors, baggage carriers, and camp-followers in the centre of the hollow square were in an even more precarious situation. They had no means of escaping the endless barrage of arrows and javelins. For 8 long days, the Athenians and their allies were continuously exposed to this lethal threat and lacked the ability to take direct action to either remove or escape it. According to Crowley, such prolonged exposure to life-threatening danger is one of the main risk factors for developing post-traumatic symptoms.[91]

Explicit description of war-induced psychological stress

So far, I have provided circumstantial evidence for the existence of combat trauma in ancient Greece by identifying known causes of contemporary war-induced psychological trauma in Thucydides' account of the final phase of the Athenians' Sicilian expedition. The remaining part of this chapter discusses instances, where Thucydides explicitly described the painful emotions and the mental anguish felt by the participants in this military catastrophe.

Jason Crowley rightly insists that combat soldiers' core norms and values play a key role in how they are affected by the experience of war. In his seminal paper *Beyond the Universal Soldier*, he contrasts the modern US infantry man, who first must unlearn the Judeo-Christian commandment of 'Thou shall not kill!', to the Athenian hoplite, who had been brought up with Athens' militaristic ideology.[92] Similarly, in his monograph *The Psychology of the Athenian Hoplite*, Crowley asserts that ‘for Athenian men, combat was entirely unproblematic’ and denies ‘that they suffered any form of combat trauma’.[93] Granted, fighting and killing the enemy was a commendable act for Athenian hoplites, but this is only one aspect of the Athenian value system. It is evident in Thucydides’ account of the disastrous retreat that the Athenian soldiers felt they were violating three other, equally important tenets of this value system with devastating psychological consequences. They left their dead unburied. They thought that their gods had forsaken them, and they abandoned their wounded comrades to die.[94]

Thucydides writes that after the devastating loss in the sea battle in the Great Harbour ‘due to the magnitude of their current ills – the Athenians did not even give a thought to the dead or the wrecks, to ask leave to take them up’ (7.72.2).[95] We know from Sophocles’ *Antigone*, Euripides’ *Suppliants*, Lysias’ funeral oration, the events after the battle of Delium and the Arginusae trial, that the recovery and burial of the dead was regarded as one of the highest religious and social norms in Classical Greece.[96] In his dramatic account of the Athenians’ departure from their camp 2 days later, Thucydides tells us explicitly how the soldiers felt about violating this moral imperative: ‘with the corpses being still unburied, whenever someone saw one of his friends (τινὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων) lying dead, he was plunged into grief mixed with fear (ἐς λύπην μετὰ φόβου καθίστατο)’ (7.75.3).[97] The chief emotion experienced by the Athenians was distress and grief (λύπη), prompted not just by the fact that one of their close friends had been killed in action or succumbed to his wounds, but also by the painful realisation that they would have to leave the bodies to be eaten by scavengers and to rot in the sun.[98] Their fear (φόβος) probably did not only pertain to the fate of their dead friends, but even more to their own, considering the potential repercussions of the dereliction of this sacred duty.[99]

Another culturally specific factor that weighed heavily on the Athenians’ minds was the feeling that they were being forsaken by their gods. This is most evident when a thunderstorm with heavy rain began right after the Athenians failed to force their way up a barricaded path, presumably the Cava Castelluccio on Monte

Climite.[100] Thucydides remarked that this thunderstorm and rain 'caused [the Athenians] to be still more disheartened, for they thought that all these things too were conspiring for their destruction (ἐνόμιζον ἐπὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίγνεσθαι)' (7.79.3).[101] Dover sees in this remark an indication of 'divine displeasure'[102] and Hornblower a 'definite hint of religious interference'.[103]

The strongest evidence for war-induced trauma is found in Thucydides' vivid account of the profound grief and moral anguish the Athenians and their allies felt upon leaving their camp in Syracuse (7.75.1–5).[104] Just as in the case of the two other violations of Athenian norms, we are not left to conjecture but told explicitly how extreme war experiences affected the departing soldiers' psyche.[105] 'It fell to the lot of each man to perceive things that were painful both to sight and mind (ξυνέβαινε τῇ τε ὄψει ἑκάστῳ ἀλγεινὰ καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ αἰσθέσθαι)' (75.2). The first cause for this pain was – as discussed above – the horrific sight (ὄψις) and thought of the implications (γνώμη) of the unburied corpses of dead friends, which plunged the soldiers into 'grief mixed with fear' (75.3).[106] Yet this awful transgression only ranks second behind an even more serious violation of the Athenian value system, *i.e.* the abandonment of wounded and sick comrades to their fate.[107] They 'far more than the dead caused pain (λυπηρότεροι ἦσαν) to those <seeing> them (τοῖς [ζῶσι] <ὁρῶσι>) and were more pitiful (ἀθλιώτεροι) than those that had perished' (75.3).[108] Thucydides proceeds to describe in great detail the desperate actions of the wounded (75.4).[109] Turning to entreaty and lamentation, they called out individual comrades and kinsmen, demanding to be taken along. And clinging to their tentmates, they dragged themselves along as far as they could, but then fell behind, calling down the wrath of the gods on their comrades for abandoning them.[110]

To understand the psychological impact of these unheeded entreaties, one has to keep in mind that in 5th-century Greece, the transport of the sick and wounded was not directed and organised by generals or other military leaders but fell to the wounded man's attendants, personal friends or tentmates, as Rachel Sternberg has shown.[111] It is precisely the failing to fulfill this personal moral obligation towards one's wounded friends and tentmates that has such devastating effects on the departing soldiers’ psyche.[112]

Thucydides mentions not only the pain and grief (ἀλγεινὰ; ἐς λύπην μετὰ φόβου καθίστατο; λυπηρότεροι ἦσαν) caused by the sight and sounds (ἀντιβολίαν καὶ ὀλοφυρμὸν; ἐπιβοώμενοι; ἐπιθειασμῶν καὶ οἰμωγῆς) of the wounded, but also the utter sense of helplessness (*aporia*) of the departing soldiers, which is mentioned both at the beginning (ἐς ἀπορίαν καθίστασαν) and the end (ἀπορίᾳ τοιαύτῃ) of this description and thus provides the frame for this pathetic scene (75.4).[113]

Crowley rightly sees in the social comfort and close tactical support of the Athenian hoplite phalanx an effective protection against PTSD.[114] But on this occasion in Syracuse, we see the flipside of this close relationship between individual Athenian soldiers. Being forced to leave their dead friends and relatives unburied and to ignore the desperate pleas of their wounded friends, relatives and tent-mates plunged the departing soldiers into unbearable ‘moral anguish’.[115] In an uncharacteristically detailed way, Thucydides describes the emotional state of the departing soldiers.[116] The whole army ‘filled with tears and in such a state of helplessness (δάκρυσι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα πλησθὲν καὶ ἀπορίᾳ τοιαύτῃ), did not easily depart, even out of a country that was hostile, and though they had already endured sufferings too great for tears (μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα τὰ μὲν πεπονθότας ἤδη) and feared concerning the unseen future what they might still have to suffer (τὰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφανεῖ δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσιν)’ (75.4). This is the only time in his entire work that Thucydides mentions tears, undoubtedly to underscore the departing soldiers’ unbearable feeling of utter helplessness in the face of the heart-wrenching pleas of their wounded comrades.[117] The next sentence, which functions as a hinge between Thucydides’ depiction of the departing soldiers’ individual suffering (75.2–4) and his reflections on the general significance of this shameful retreat as the greatest reversal of a Greek army (75.5–7), features two more abstract nouns describing the departing soldiers’ emotions. There was ‘a general feeling of dejection’ (κατήφειά τέ τις)[118] and ‘much self-blame’ (κατάμεμψις σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλή).[119] This shame and self-condemnation among the soldiers, who saw themselves forced to abandon their wounded comrades, has rightly been identified by Peter Meineck as ‘an ancient description of what is now termed "survivor guilt"'[120] and what constitutes a key characteristic of war-induced trauma.[121]

Thucydides’ craft

At the end of this chapter, a few critical remarks about Thucydides, the main source for this case study, are in order. I anticipate two types of objections against my argument for war-induced trauma among the survivors of the Sicilian expedition, one raised by ancient historians, the other by literary scholars of Thucydides. The latter might object that we should not take Thucydides’ vivid and pathos-evoking account as a Rankian report of ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen’.[122] This is a legitimate concern. Thucydides was indeed a great literary artist, who emplotted his account of the Sicilian expedition as a tragedy and employed countless Homeric and Herodotean echoes.[123] Yet this does not automatically mean that what he described did not happen, as Simon Hornblower in his literary and historical commentary reminds us: ‘Did the Athenians fight for the bloody muddy water? Did their army resemble the refugees from a city taken by siege, a latter-day flight from Troy? (75.5n. above). We should not dismiss [Thucydides’] account of these horrors as “mere” literary effects.’[124] After all, distinguishing his treatment of speeches and events in his methodological chapter (1.22.1–3), Thucydides insists that he wrote down the events of the war – such as the Athenians’ departure from their camp and their 8-day-long retreat – ‘only after investigating [them] on each point with as much accuracy as possible (ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβείᾳ περὶ ἐκάστου ἐπεξελθών)’ (1.22.2).[125] The vividness (*enargeia*) of Thucydides’ account may in fact be ‘a byproduct of *akribeia*; that is, the hard work of getting the details right may also yield the material needed for a vivid account’.[126]

A sceptical ancient historian might point out that Thucydides merely reported how the Athenian soldiers felt at particular moments during the campaign, but that there is no hard evidence for any survivors with post-war trauma in the expedition’s aftermath. We should bear in mind, though, that, since Thucydides was not present at the events himself, his account of the facts of the war was – as he himself assured us in his methodological chapter – composed not as he learned them ‘from any chance informant (ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος)’ nor ‘as it seemed to [him] (ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει)’ – *i.e.* falling ‘back upon an imaginative reconstruction’[127] – but on the basis of a rigorous investigation and examination of various participants in these events (1.22.2).[128] Consequently, it is a reasonable inference that it was precisely Thucydides' repeated encounters with the survivors' persistent feelings of guilt and anguish – both typical symptoms of post-war trauma – that compelled Thucydides to write about the abandonment of the camp, the massacre at the river Assinarus, and the prisoners' agony in the stone quarries in this highly dramatic fashion.[129]

Conclusion

In sum, Jason Crowley is right to emphasise that the occurrence of war-induced trauma is dependent on culturally and historically specific factors. Yet his assertion that the Classical Athenian hoplite 'was effectively immunized'[130] against developing combat trauma is less convincing, as an analysis of the catastrophic Athenian retreat from Syracuse has shown. The deprivations, brutality, physical hardships, prolonged separation from family and extended exposure to lethal danger, which the Athenians endured in Sicily, were far beyond the normal hoplite experience and can thus result in combat trauma.[131] In addition to his circumstantial evidence, Thucydides provides explicit descriptions of the soldiers' mental anguish and self-blame which the survivors of this disaster had shared with him. Even though our evidence for combat trauma is often scanty, as scholars of Greek warfare we should remember that in ancient Greece as elsewhere wars came at a psychological cost to be borne by the soldiers fighting them.

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[1] The quotation is from Thuc. 7.75.4, see p. 93 n. 109 below. Earlier versions of this paper were delivered at the international workshops on *War and Society in Colonial Sicily*, organised by Melanie Jonasch at the University of British Columbia and on *Combat Stress and the Pre-Modern World*, organised by Owen Rees and Jason Crowley at Manchester Metropolitan University, respectively. I wish to thank those audiences for the extraordinary generosity of spirit in which the discussions were conducted and for the many critical questions and insightful comments. For reading drafts of this paper and for their many useful suggestions, I am very thankful to Richard Parker and Stephanie Dennie. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to Lisa Hau for her judicious criticism and

thoughtful response (see the following chapter), which will prove invaluable for my further research on Thucydides' literary artistry in representing the Athenians' traumatic defeat in Sicily. I am most grateful to Melanie Jonasch for her editorial acumen and for inviting me to contribute to this exciting project in the first place. All misconceptions and mistakes that remain are, of course, my own.

[2] See Vassallo in this volume.

[3] For Keegan's critique of the deficiencies of traditional military historiography, see Keegan 1976, 13–77. For the immense scholarly impact of Keegan's novel approach on the study of warfare in the ancient world, see Wheeler 2011, 64–69 and Hanson 2007, 16–18.

[4] *Cf*. Hanson 1989. See also Hanson 1991, a collected volume of papers employing the Face of Battle approach to ancient Greece. Despite these compelling reconstructions, there are still many open questions regarding the details of hoplite fighting. Especially the origins of the hoplite phalanx, its compactness and the nature of the final push (*othismos*) are still heavily debated. For an introduction to these controversies, see Kagan and Viggiano 2013. For the most recent challenge to Hanson's orthodox model, see Konijnendijk 2017.

[5] For this new focus on empathy with soldiers, rather than glorification of their accomplishments, see Hanson 2007, 17.

[6] Shay 1994.

[7] Shay 2002.

[8] See especially the pioneering work of Tritle (2000; 2004; 2009).

[9] From 2009 to 2013, at more than 100 sites across the United States, the *Ancient Greeks/Modern Lives* program (spearheaded by Aquila Theatre and supported by the National Endowment for the Humanities) brought together the American veteran community and the general public in staged readings from Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, Sophocles' *Ajax*, Euripides' *Heracles* and Homer's *Odyssey*. These performances were moderated by scholars and followed by town-hall-style discussions, which explored the effects of war on soldiers, their families and society at large. *Cf*. Meineck 2014, xi and https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704198004575310990768316182. The *Theater of War Productions*, co-founded by Bryan Doerries and Phyllis Kaufman in 2009, similarly presents readings of Sophocles' *Ajax* and *Philoctetes* to service members and their communities to help initiate conversations about the psychological wounds of war. To date, over 80,000 service members, veterans and their families have participated in these performances throughout the United States, Europe, and Japan. *Cf*. Doerries 2015, http://theaterofwar.com/about, and https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/books/review/the-theater-of-war-by-bryan-doerries.html. For recent comparative studies of ancient and

modern war trauma, see Meineck and Konstan 2014; Caston and Weineck 2016.

[10] See, for instance, Lee's 2001 review of Tritle 2000: 'As an attempt to come to grips with the tragedy of Vietnam and with the author's own experience there, *From Melos to My Lai* is powerful and moving (…). Yet the very personal perspective which Tritle employs makes *From Melos to My Lai* in some ways less compelling as an investigation of ancient Greek warfare and society. Perhaps most significantly, by insisting on exact and consistent cross-cultural matches between Greece and the United States, Tritle tends to read more than is warranted into the ancient evidence. There are as well points where his analysis does not adequately address the divergences between ancient and modern experiences.' Similarly, Couvenhes 2005, 431. Some scholars consider the very concept of PTSD and traumatic memory as a modern social-cultural construct; *cf.* Young 1995, 5; Fassin and Rechtman 2009, 6, discussed in Tritle 2014, 87–88 with n.s 6 and 7.

[11] *Cf.* Greaves 2013, 92, 96; Monoson 2014, 135.

[12] *Cf.* Tritle 2000, 58–61, who used Shay's (1994, xx) list of symptoms of PTSD, which was in turn based on the revised third edition of *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (*DSMIII-R*); see also Tritle 2004, 326: 'I believe it is possible to argue with little doubt that Xenophon [in his portrayal of Clearchus] in fact provides us with the first known case of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, or PTSD, in the Western literary tradition.' For an excellent recent study of combat stress disorders in ancient Greece, which endorses Tritle's findings and underscores the remarkable consistency of psychiatric reactions to combat stress throughout history, see Ustinova and Cardeña 2014.

[13] Tritle 2000, 63–64; 2014, 91–93. See also Greaves 2013, 93, Raaflaub 2014, 27 and Ustinova and Cardeña 2014, 742–743.

[14] Tritle 2000, 75–77.

[15] Tritle 2009; 2010, 127–28, 158–60; 2014, 91–92. For a detailed discussion of Gorgias as the only classical Greek author who recognised and discussed the long-term mental disorders following exposure to battle, see Ustinova and Cardeña 2014, 740–741.

[16] Tritle 2000, 55–78; 2004. See also Ustinova and Cardeña 2014, 743.

[17] Greaves 2013, 89–96.

[18] *Cf.* Meineck 2014, xi–xii; Tritle 2014, 93–94; Greaves 2013, 91: 'It can therefore be seen that, throughout the history of the 20th century, each generation has re-defined for itself what we may (for now, at least), continue to call "PTSD".' In his discussion, Greaves refers to the fourth, revised edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-IV-TR) from 2000, which has now been replaced by DSM-V from 2013. It is indeed remarkable to what extent both the

classification and the list of symptoms of PTSD have changed within the medical community from its first inclusion in the DSM-III in 1980 to the publication of the DSM-V in 2013; *cf*. Ustinova and Cardeña 2014, 740 and Crowley 2014, 118 n. 13 with further literature on these changes.

[19] A diagnosis of Acute Stress Disorder is used if the symptoms develop and resolve themselves within four weeks of the traumatic event; *cf*. DSM-IV-TR 469–472 and Greaves 2013, 92.

[20] Conversion Disorder, also known as Hysterical Conversion Reactions or Somatoform Reactions, is a condition in which psychological responses to a traumatic event are somatised, leading, for instance, to paralysis in a limb or sudden blindness, for which there is no physical cause. *Cf*. DSM-IV-TR, 494 and Greaves 2013, 92. Epizelus' sudden blindness at Marathon (Hdt. 6.117) is, according to Tritle (2000, 63–64; 2014, 91–93) and Greaves (2013, 93) almost certainly a case of Conversion Disorder.

[21] For a brief discussion of these overlapping and related stress-induced psychological injuries, *cf*. Greaves 2013, 91–93. For the easy confusion (and thus misdiagnosis) of PTSD with other mental disorders (especially schizophrenia), see also Shay 1994, 168–69.

[22] Tritle 2014, 98; Garbutt 2006.

[23] Greaves 2013, 95–96.

[24] Using the term 'combat trauma' rather than 'Post Traumatic Stress Disorder' has the further advantage of acknowledging that affected individuals do not display a mental *disorder* but suffer from a psychological *wound* or *injury*; *cf*. Shay 2004, 4; Monoson 2014, 155 n. 16.

[25] See the various contributions to Meineck and Konstan 2014; *cf*. Monoson 2014, 156 n. 28: 'I acknowledge that it is problematic to look for the elements of a culturally constructed modern medical diagnosis (war trauma, PTSD) in the ancient record and classify our sources accordingly. I do, however, remain confident that it makes sense to consider how war experiences, especially when they go catastrophically wrong, can stress the human psyche in ways that are recognizable.' For the different degrees of post-war psychic injuries, see especially Tritle 2014, 98.

[26] Monoson 2014, 134. As seen in the definitions above, the term 'war (or combat) trauma' can be used to refer both to the catastrophic (*i.e.* traumatic) experience that can lead to a persistent psychic wound and to the psychic wound (as in 'war-induced trauma') resulting from a traumatic event. *Cf*. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, s.v. trauma: '2: an agent, force, or mechanism that causes trauma' and '1b: a disordered psychic or behavioral state resulting from severe mental or emotional stress or physical injury'. In this paper, it will be clear from the

respective context whether ‘trauma’ refers to the catastrophic event or the resultant psychic wound.

[27] Shay 1994, 166, quoting diagnostic criteria A from DSM-III-R, 250.

[28] For this concise definition of ‘war trauma’, see Monoson 2014, 134–135; for a detailed discussion, see Shay 1994. For persistent adaptations to danger and examples of how certain smells, sounds, *etc* function as triggers to reactivate traumatic experiences, see Shay 1994, xiv–xix. For survivor guilt, see Shay 1994, 69–72; 2002, 78–82; James 2014, 238–239; Herman 1992, 54.

[29] Konstan 2014, 8.

[30] *Cf*. Konstan 2014, 2–3.

[31] Konstan 2014, 4.

[32] Konstan 2014, 8, 11–12. See also, Greaves 2013, 97–98 and Ustinova and Cardeña 2014. The latter argue persuasively that, while Hippocratic physicians turned a blind eye to mental disorders they could neither explicate nor treat, the 5th century BC sophist Gorgias stood out as the only intellectual to connect psychological trauma to combat.

[33] *Cf*. Tritle 2000, 74–77.

[34] *Cf*. Hdt. 7.231, 9.71.2–4. Herodotus approved of Aristodemus’ suicidal battle frenzy, but his fellow Spartans did not and refused to grant him a prize for bravery. For this critique of Tritle’s retrospective diagnosis of Aristodemus, see Crowley 2014, 118 n. 18. *Cf*. also Konstan 2014, 4.

[35] Konstan 2014, 2.

[36] Ustinova and Cardeña (2014, 741–742) argue persuasively that – while Greek authors rarely mentioned any long-lasting consequences of combat stress – they were well familiar with the immediate psychological effects of warfare, manifested in such phenomena as paralysing fear (*phobos*), panic, terror, temporarily losing one’s mind, *etc*.

[37] For an excellent discussion of Alcinous’ deep understanding of the mental anguish of the war-weary Odysseus, *cf*. Race 2014. See also Tritle 2014, 88–89.

[38] It is disputed among scholars, whether Euripides depicts the cause for Heracles’ madness as wholly external – brought about by the goddess Lyssa, *i.e.* Madness personified – or as the result of Heracles’ prior war experience, as his father Amphitryon seems to suggest (Eur. *Her*. 965–967); *cf*. Konstan 2014, 4–6; Ustinova and Cardeña 2014, 741. For the resonance of this play with contemporary veterans, see Meineck 2012, 18–19.

[39] *Cf*. Greaves 2013, 96–98. Monoson (2014, 155 n. 15) calls these literary depictions ‘hidden’ examples of war-related post-traumatic stress, reflected in tragedy.

[40] Greaves 2013, 98.

[41] Greaves 2013, 98.

[42] *Cf*. Shay 1994, xiii: '[The] epic gives center stage to bitter experiences that actually do arise in war (…). Homer has seen things that we in psychiatry and psychology have more or less missed.' Meineck 2012, 7: 'The effects of combat trauma are well described in the dramatic literature of the Ancient Greek.' Drawing on recent studies in neuroscience, evolutionary biology and biochemistry, Tritle (2014, 97) sees in the continuity of human biology over the last 150,000 years clear proof for the 'universality of trauma'.

[43] Crowley 2014, 106. While making a case for the universal nature of combat stress disorders, Ustinova and Cardeña (2014, 740) also acknowledge the importance of the following determining factors: 'biological (*e.g.*, genetic predispositions), psychological (*e.g.*, coping strategies), and interpersonal (*e.g.*, social support)'.

[44] Crowley 2014, 111.

[45] Crowley 2014, 117.

[46] Crowley 2014, 115–116.

[47] Post-traumatic stress conditions are caused by catastrophic experiences that are 'outside the range of usual human experience and … would be markedly distressing to almost anyone' (Shay 1994, 166, quoting diagnostic criteria A from DSM-III-R, 250). As Crowley (2014, 105–107) rightly insists, in determining what constitutes 'usual' human experience, one must not apply anachronistic, universalist assumptions, but consider the particular cultural and historical conditions of the individuals in question. The point of reference for assessing the experiences of the Athenian expeditionary corps in Sicily should therefore not be the usual experiences of contemporary soldiers, but those of classical Greek hoplites and sailors.

[48] The course of the Syracusan winter wall of 415/14 BC and the corresponding Athenian siege wall is heavily debated among ancient historians and archaeologists. Based on Thucydides' description of the siege activities (esp. Thuc. 6.75.1, 96–103; 7.1–7), it makes the most sense to assume that both walls ran northwards (*cf*. πρὸς βορέαν, Thuc. 6.99.1) across the eastern section of Epipolae and to identify Trogilus, the tentative endpoint of the Athenian encircling wall (Thuc. 6.99.1), with Santa Panagia, a small natural harbour at the northern coastline of the Epipolae plateau – an identification which is also supported by Livy 25.23.10; *cf*. Dover 1965a, viii Map of Syracuse 415–413 BC; Dover *HCT* 4.469–75 with Maps 1 and 2; 1971, 283–284; Kagan 1981, 232, 244 with n. 35 and map 11; Andrews 1992, 452–454 with fig. 40; Lazenby 2004, 144–146 with map 10; Hornblower 2008, 489–490, 523–529, 541–554; Rhodes 2010, 141–142 with map 7. Alternatively,

Drögemüller (1969, 71–96, 127–130 with Abb. 14–19), Green (1970, 182–186 with map on p. 184) and Polacco and Mirisola (1998, 18–23; 1999, 211 Tav. II) propose that Trogilus be located not at the northern but at the eastern coastline in the Piccolo Seno area near the Scoglio Dei Due Fratelli. This, however, is difficult to reconcile with Thucydides' account and would require postulating an undue conflation of two separate sources in Livy 25.23.10 (*cf.* Dover 1971, 284). Moreover, Drögemüller and Polacco are not in agreement about the exact course of the Syracusan winter wall, the former suggesting that it reached the eastern coastline south of the Latomie Dei Capuccini, and the latter placing it atop the plateau north of these stone quarries; *cf.* Drögemüller 1969, 72; Polacco and Mirisola 1998, 18–23; 1999, 211 Tav. II. Beste and Mertens (2015, 249–250) accept Drögemüller's and Polacco and Mirisola's hypothesis that the Syracusan winter wall ran eastward but admit that 'auch von dieser Mauer freilich … fehlt jede Spur im Gelände' (249). For a summary of the various stages of the siege and of the different types of walls employed, see Mignosa in this volume. While Mignosa (n. 67, Fig. 14.3) favours Polacco and Mirisola's reconstruction (1999, 211 Tav. II) over Dover's (1965a, viii), it seems best to me – in light of the inconclusive archaeological evidence – to give preference to the literary sources and assume that the Syracusan winter wall ran indeed northwards across the eastern section of Epipolae, as Fig. 5.1 shows.

[49] For a detailed contemporary account of the Sicilian expedition, see Thuc. 6–7. For later sources, *cf.* Diod. Sic.12.82–13.18 and Plut. *Nic*. For modern historical reconstructions, see Green 1970; Kagan 1981, 159–372; Andrews 1992, 446–463; Devoto 2002; Lazenby 2004, 131–169; Hanson 2005, 201–269; Rhodes 2010, 139–147; Tritle 2010, 144–164; Brice 2013, 623–641.

[50] For extreme war experiences that can cause psychic injuries, see Monoson 2014, 134–135, Shay 1994, and the section 'Challenge 1: retrospective diagnoses of PTSD?' above. On deprivation in particular, see Shay 1994, 121–124.

[51] The need of typical citizen soldiers to tend to their farms and the absence of state-organised systems of supplies usually limited the scope and duration of campaigning during the classical period. The Peloponnesian invasions of Attica during the first phase of the Peloponnesian War, for instance, lasted on average merely 30 days; *cf.* Rawlings 2013, 14, 25. For the experience of a typical hoplite campaign, see Hanson 1989. The number of prolonged military campaigns increased during the Peloponnesian War, however. The use of coins allowed Athens to maintain troops in the field longer than the traditional summer window of operations, as, for instance, during the

siege of Potidaea 432–430/29 BC; *cf*. Rawlings 2013, 15.

[52] For the duration, see Dover 1965a, 40, 95. After taking possession of the Epipolae plateau, the Athenians first erected a fort, called the 'circle' (Thuc. 6.98; see Fig. 5.1). From there, they began building a siege wall northward and later a double siege wall southward towards the Great Harbour. The Syracusans sought to keep the access to their city open by constructing two counter walls in the plain south of Epipolae. Yet, after heavy fighting, the Athenians managed to seize and dismantle the Syracusan counter walls and complete their own double wall from the 'circle' down to the Great Harbour (Thuc. 6.99–103). With the help of the Spartan general Gylippus, the Syracusan finally succeeded in building (and defending) a third counter wall (see Fig. 5.1) and thus foiled the Athenians' attempt at circumvallation (Thuc. 7.2–6). *Cf*. Lazenby 2004, 144–152; Brice 2013, 630–633.

[53] *Cf*. Monoson 2014, 134.

[54] Thuc. 7.4.6: ὥστε καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων οὐχ ἥκιστα τότε πρῶτον κάκωσις ἐγένετο. The phrase τῶν πληρωμάτων … κάκωσις does not denote 'the losses which the crews experienced', as Crawley (1876, 484) suggests, but refers to the crews' physical and mental hardships; *cf*. *LSJ* s.v. κάκωσις, II. suffering, distress, Th. 2.43; πληρωμάτων Id.7.4.

[55] The translations of Greek into English are my own, but they sometimes draw freely on standard published translations.

[56] The devastating effects of this situation on the morale in the Athenian camp is also explicitly expressed in Nicias' letter to the Athenians: the foraging crews were being wasted by the Syracusan cavalry and both servants and mercenaries were deserting the camp; *cf*. Thuc. 7.13.2. See also Dover *HCT* 4.383, 388–389 and Brice 2013, 633.

[57] For the arrival of the Athenian reinforcement in July 413, see Dover 1965a, 31.

[58] For this night attack on Epipolae, see Thuc. 7.43–44; Dover *HCT* 4.421–424; Lazenby 2004, 157–159; Hornblower 2008, 621–630; Brice 2013, 636.

[59] Hornblower 2008, 630. In modern times, killing one's own troops accidentally by 'friendly fire', is a major risk factor for developing post-traumatic symptoms; *cf*. Monoson 2014, 134. For an earlier, equally horrific, Athenian 'friendly fire' incident at the Battle of Delium, see Thuc. 4.96.3 and Monoson 2014, 137–138.

[60] For ἀρρωστία as 'loss of morale' (*pace* Dover *HCT* 4.424), see Hornblower 2008, 632 and *LSJ* s.v. ἀρρωστία, 2. *moral weakness,* D. Prooem. 53; *loss of morale,* Th.7.47.

[61] In this debate among the generals, Nicias – trusting in pro-Athenian elements in Syracuse and still hoping for a successful outcome of the campaign – prevailed over Demosthenes, who proposed to return home

or at least to relocate the army to friendly Catana. When the Syracusans prepared a new offensive, Nicias finally came around and consented to a withdrawal, but then again – after the lunar eclipse on 27 August 413 BC – changed his mind and insisted on staying for thrice 9 days as the soothsayers prescribed. *Cf.* Thuc. 7.47–50; Dover *HCT* 4.424–429; Lazenby 2004, 159; Hornblower 2008, 631–645; Brice 2013, 637.

[62] Dover HCT 4.424. The sickness among the troops continued or became even worse in the days or even weeks between Demosthenes' initial proposal to depart and Nicias' consent, immediately before the lunar eclipse; *cf.* Thuc. 7.50.3.

[63] *Cf.* Monoson 2014, 134.

[64] *Cf.* Panagopoulos 1978, 127.

[65] In a naval engagement a few months earlier, the Athenians sank 11 ships of the Syracusans and 'killed most of the men on board except for the crews of three ships whom they took prisoner' (Thuc. 7.23.4). On the same day, Gylippus captured the three Athenian forts at Plemmyrium, whereby 'many were killed, but also many taken prisoner' (Thuc. 7.24.2). *Cf.* Panagopoulos 1978, 127–128.

[66] *Cf.* De Voto 2002, 61 n. 1; Panagopoulos 1978, 130. According to Diod. Sic. 13.13.8, the Athenians lost 2000 men in this naval engagement, but Busolt (1904, 1380 n. 2) makes the reasonable suggestion that the number of those killed on the 18 triremes was probably already more than 3000. The exact number is impossible to determine, but if one estimates between 100 and 200 crew members per trireme, the number ranges from 1800 to 3600 men.

[67] *Cf.* Panagopoulos 1978, 130.

[68] Finding sufficient drinking water and firewood had already been a problem for the naval force stationed on Plemmyrium, the rocky headland at the entrance of the Great Harbour, in the summer of 414; *cf.* Thuc. 7.4.6.

[69] *Cf.* Kagan 1981, 329. For the delay caused by the lunar eclipse, see Thuc. 7.50.4.

[70] For the decisive naval battle in the Great Harbour, see Thuc. 7.59–72; Dover *HCT* 4.441–450; Kagan 1981, 329–335; Andrews 1992, 460–461; Lazenby 2004, 160–162; Hornblower 2008, 671–704; Brice 2013, 637. The exact date of the Athenians' departure is difficult to determine since Thucydides does not tell us how many days after the lunar eclipse on 27 August 413 the Syracusans launched their next attack. De Voto (2002, 62 n. 3) dates the sea battle leading to Eurymedon's death to 6 September, the battle of the Great Harbour to 10 September and the beginning of the Athenian retreat to 12 September.

[71] For the Athenian retreat, see Thuc. 7.75–85; Dover *HCT* 4.451–460; Kagan 1981, 337–353; Andrews 1992, 461–462; Lazenby 2004, 163–

165; Hornblower 2008, 708–738. The Athenians' exact route is still uncertain (see Fig. 5.2). Against earlier interpretations, which identified the Athenians' initial destination as Acrae and the blocked pass as the Cava Spampinato (Calatrella) or the Contrada Raiana (*cf. Dover HCT 4.455–458*), Green (1970, 322–326) argued convincingly that the Athenians tried to reach Catana by forcing their way up the Cava Castelluccio (the Acraean Bald Rock (Ἀκραῖον λέπας) in Thuc. 7.78.5) onto Monte Climiti. Green's Cava Castelluccio hypothesis has been accepted by Dover 1971; Kagan 1981, 339–343 with map 12 (Fig. 5.2); Hornblower 2008, 723, 725–726.

72 On Day 1, Nicias tried to encourage the troops by telling them that 'messengers have been sent ahead to the Sicels to meet them and to bring provisions with them' (Thuc. 7.77.6). On Day 2, the Athenians came upon a few houses and found some food (Thuc. 7.78.4), but on Day 3, 'they no longer had provisions as before', since the enemy cavalry prevented them from foraging (Thuc. 7.78.6). After the heavy fighting in the pass on Mount Climiti on Day 5, 'the army was in wretched plight, since by now they were in want of all supplies' (Thuc. 7.80.1). For a timeline of the 8-day-long retreat, see Dover *HCT* 4.455.

73 *Cf.* Devoto 2002, 64: 'As the assault wore on, overcome by heat, thirst, hunger and fatigue, Demosthenes' men began to break down.'

74 The identification of the river Assinarus is uncertain. Dover (1965b, 69); Devoto (2002, 65–66); Lazenby (2004, 165); Hornblower (2008, 729, 735) identify the river Assinarus with the modern Fiumare di Noto, since its upper reaches have also been called Asinaro, but based on the marching distances and topographical markers provided by Thucydides, Green (1970, 334–335) and Kagan (1981, 341, 349) identify the Assinarus with the modern river Tellaro (*cf.* Fig. 5.2).

75 *Cf.* Green 1970, 332–338; Kagan 1981, 348–350; Devoto 2002, 64–67, Hornblower 2008, 731–739.

76 Thucydides speaks explicitly of a total of 7000 prisoners in the stone quarries (7.87.4). This means that only about 1000 men of Nicias' column were taken as public prisoners, after many had been killed and many had been hidden away as private slaves (7.85.3); these 1000 joined the 6000 men who had surrendered a few days earlier (7.82.3) with Demosthenes; *cf.* Dover *HCT* 4.464. Based upon Diod. Sic. 13.19. 2, Devoto (2002, 68) makes the unconvincing suggestion that Thucydides was wrong and that 7000 of Nicias' men were taken as prisoners at the Assinarus, bringing the total number to 13,000. It is impossible to determine which of the eight former stone quarries in Syracuse was used as prison for the Athenians. Devoto (2002, 67) favours the Latomia di Paradiso, whereas Freeman (1892, 408) and Green (1970, 347) consider the Latomia dei Cappuccini a likely candidate. The latter

currently features a sign commemorating the Athenian prisoners in one of its caverns.

[77] For modern historical reconstructions, see Freeman 1892, 408–410, 716–719; Kelly 1970; Green 1970, 347–350; Panagopoulos 1978, 132–144; Dover *HCT* 4.464; Devoto 2002; Lazenby 2004, 166.

[78] *Cf.* Dover 1965b, 71; Hornblower 2008, 743.

[79] Dover *HCT* 4.464.

[80] Busolt 1904, 1397–1399; Panagopoulos 1978, 142–144.

[81] Dover *HCT* 4.464; Lazenby 2004, 166.

[82] Kelly (1970, 128) makes the reasonable argument that, had the Syracusans in fact let the prisoners die: 'Thucydides might have been expected to notice such a brutal act, especially as he was so interested in the way in which standards of inter-state conduct deteriorated during the war.' Moreover, one might add, that it served Thucydides' literary goals to omit the ransoming of the remaining prisoners lest it undermine his dramatic depiction of the enormity of the Athenian disaster (*cf.* the section 'Thucydides' craft' below). Kelly's (1970, 129–130) strongest pieces of evidence consist of the reappearance of the general Menander as commander at Abydus (Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.16) and at Aegospotami (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.16, 26) and the various mentions of returning (and ransomed) soldiers (see next note).

[83] Among the returning Athenian captives, there were the survivors of the expedition mentioned by Andocides as returning home 'in disgrace' (Andoc. 3.30), those sustained (and probably ransomed) through the payment of 100 minae by Epicerdes of Cyrene (Dem. 20.41–42), and the presumably 270 captives ransomed from the 5 talents, raised by the son of Polystratus through raids of the Syracusan countryside from his base at Catana (Lys. 20.24–25); *cf.* Kelly 1970, 129–130 with n. 1.

[84] Crowley 2014, 116. Lazarus (1966) distinguishes between two different responses open to an infantryman faced with lethal danger: (1) taking direct action against the enemy, *e.g.* by killing, suppressing, or breaking contact with them, or (2) – if direct action is not possible – taking palliative action to reduce its stressful effects through denial, alcohol, drugs, or humour. The former action is psychologically benign, the latter psychologically malignant. *Cf.* Crowley 2014, 110–11, 114, 116 and Buskist *et al.* 2004, 723–724.

[85] Crowley 2014, 110.

[86] Since Greek hoplites were typically protected by friendly light armed troops and cavalry during deployment, advance, and retreat, the main threat during hoplite battles came from the stabbing spears and swords of similarly equipped enemy hoplites. This threat could be effectively countered by approaching and killing the opposing hoplites or by breaking contact with them and fleeing; *cf.* Crowley 2014, 114–116. For

the mechanics of close-quarters hoplite fighting, see also V.C. Hanson in Hanson 1991, 63–84 and Lazenby 1991. To be fair, Crowley (2014, 114–116) explicitly states that he describes the psychological impact of ‘conventional operations’ and even mentions exceptional situations, in which a hoplite ‘might find himself exposed to the javelins thrown by enemy cavalry and light infantry, as well as the sling stones and arrows of enemy slingers and archers’, but he does not discuss the potential psychological stress resulting from continued exposure to such exceptional situations.

[87] For the formation of the πλαίσιον, a hollow rectangular square formed by hoplites, see Thuc. 6.67.1, Xen. *An.* 3.2.36–37, 3.4.42, Krentz 2007, 159 and Konijnendijk 2017, 57. The Athenians probably formed one long rectangular square, with Nicias commanding the vanguard and Demosthenes the rearguard; *cf.* Lazenby 2002, 163. But it cannot be ruled out that each of the two commanders formed his own πλαίσιον; *cf.* Dover 1965b, 66; *HCT* 4.464.

[88] Day 1: harassed on march (78.3); Day 3: harassed on march (78.6); Day 4: pelted at Acraean Bald Rock (79.2); Day 5: harassed on march (79.5); Day 6: Demosthenes surrounded by cavalry (81.2), Demosthenes surrounded and pelted (81.4), Demosthenes pelted (82.1); Day 7: Nicias surrounded and pelted (83.3); Day 8: Nicias harassed on march (84.1), Nicias pelted at Assinarus (84.4); *cf.* Hornblower 2008, 723.

[89] Hornblower 2008, 722; the note continues: ‘Other key words are βάλλω, “I throw” (or προσβάλλω, ”I throw at”), also used in a nightmare and grinding sequence of repetitions, and sometimes combined with πανταχόθεν, “from all sides” (or πανταχῇ, or the epic περισταδόν, 81.4 or περι-στάντες, 83.3); προσέκειντο, “they harassed them” (as here [i.e. 7.78.3] and 84.1); and κύκλος, “circle”, often in a form meaning “from all sides”, and cognate.’

[90] *Cf.* Thuc. 7.79.5: ‘On the next day [Day 5] they [i.e. the Athenians] advanced, and the Syracusans, surrounding them, threw missiles on them from all sides and wounded many; if the Athenians attacked they retreated, but if the Athenians retreated they would charge, falling chiefly upon the rearmost in the hope that by routing them a small bit at a time they might put the whole army in a panic.’ *Cf.* Dover 1965b, 67. For the tactics of light-armed troops and cavalry, see Sage 1996, 40–54.

[91] Unlike in typical hoplite battles, during the retreat the Athenians and their allies maintained close contact with the enemy for eight days and consequently suffered from a lack of sleep as well (for night marches, see Thuc. 7.80.1, 83.4–5). All of these stressors aggravate the vulnerability to PTSD, as Crowley demonstrates in the case of the 20th-century US infantry man. The progressive exhaustion, compounded by

sleep deprivation, is – as psychologists recognize – ‘a toxic combination that lowers the soldier’s mental resilience and intensifies his vulnerability to psychological breakdown’ (2014, 111).

[92] *Cf*. Crowley 2014, 106–107, 111–113. Crowley (2014, 115) insists that ‘the religiously amplified and militarized norms and values internalized by the Athenian hoplite were stunningly congruent with his tactical role, which was to close with and kill his enemy’. For the present-day influence of the nonviolent Judeo-Christian ideals of love, mercy, and respect for life, see also Bourke 1999, 215–241.

[93] Crowley 2012, 104 and 191 n. 158, respectively.

[94] For the purpose of this paper, I focus on these three underexplored transgressions of Athenian norms during the disastrous retreat and refrain from critiquing Crowley’s reconstruction of the Athenian value system. For a critique, see Christ 2013, 504 and Steinbock 2015.

[95] After both land and naval battles, the losers typically asked for a truce to recover their dead; *cf*. Krentz 2007, 175–177 and Pritchett 1985, 235–237. Through the emphatic use of νεκρῶν with the postposition πέρι in the colon νεκρῶν μὲν πέρι ἢ ναυαγίων οὐδὲ ἐπενόουν αἰτῆσαι ἀναίρεσιν (7.72.2) Thucydides underscores how extraordinary this total neglect of the dead was in light of the Greeks’ usual practice.

[96] *Cf*. Hornblower 2008, 702–703. Obeying the unwritten and divine laws, Sophocles’ Antigone performs the burial rites for her brother Polynices in defiance of Creon’s orders and under the threat of the death penalty (*cf*. Soph. *Ant*. 255–56, 450–470). For the recovery and burial of the Seven against Thebes as one of the paradigmatic myths expressing the Athenian self-image as altruistic hegemon and defender of divine rights, see Eur. *Supp*. 19, 311–12, 526–527, 563, Lys. 2.7–10, and Steinbock 2012, 155–196. The importance of recovery and burial of the dead after battle is also illustrated in the Arginusae trial, which led to the execution of six Athenian generals for neglecting to recover both the shipwrecked survivors and the bodies of the dead after the victorious naval battle at Arginusae due to a storm; *cf*. Xen. *Hell*. 1.6.34–7.35, Diod. Sic. 13.100–102; Sternberg 2006, 114–115; Rhodes 2010, 158, 177. The dispute over the Theban refusal to return the bodies of the Athenian fallen after the battle of Delium also highlights this issue; *cf*. Thuc. 4.97–101 and Hornblower 1996, 308–317. On the religious importance of burial, see Parker 1983, 43–48 and Todd 2007, 219.

[97] Thuc. 7.75.3: τῶν τε γὰρ νεκρῶν ἀτάφων ὄντων, ὁπότε τις ἴδοι τινὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων κείμενον, ἐς λϭπην μετὰ φόβου καθίστατο (…). The substantive ὁ ἐπιτήδειος denotes a ‘close friend’; *cf*. *LSJ* s.v. ἐπιτήδειος, α, ον, A.II.2 also as Subst. *a close friend,* οἱ ἐ. one’s *friends*. According to Konstan (1997, 63–64), the circle of one’s ἐπιτήδειοι includes not only friends (φίλοι) but also relatives (οἰκείοι).

[98] According to Parker (1983, 45–46), the thought of a friend’s body devoured by scavengers was as hateful to the Greeks as it is to us today. If Greek tragedy is any indication, the dishonour of being deprived of a proper funeral was more a concern than a potential exclusion of the soul from the underworld. For λυπή as pain of mind, grief, see *LSJ* s.v. λυπή A.2. Similarly, Sternberg (2006, 120) translates λυπή ‘as ”distress” instead of “pain” because it is clearly psychological as opposed to physical’. For the role of profound grief over the loss of a close comrade in the development of post-traumatic symptoms today see Shay 1994, 39–68.

[99] See Classen and Steup 1908, 196 and Marchant 1910, 200: ‘μετὰ φόβου – partly because they had neglected a duty so sacred as burial, partly because the dead if unburied were likely to haunt the living, partly because they had not gone through the rites of self-purification’. Parker (1983, 44) notes that at Athens, those who failed to perform at least a token act of burial ‘were threatened by one of the “Bouzygean curses”’. Moreover, they might also have feared to suffer the same horrifying fate as their dead friends; *cf*. Sternberg 2006, 121.

[100] See Fig. 5.2 with n. 70.

[101] Thuc. 7.79.3: ἔτυχον δὲ καὶ βρονταί τινες ἅμα γενόμεναι καὶ ὕδωρ, οἷα τοῦ ἔτους πρὸς μετόπωρον ἤδη ὄντος φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι· ἀφ’ ὧν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι μᾶλλον ἔτι ἠθύμουν καὶ ἐνόμιζον ἐπὶ τῷ σφετέρῳ ὀλέθρῳ καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γίγνεσθαι.

[102] Dover 1965b, 67.

[103] Hornblower 2008, 724. It was a typical Greek thought that divine displeasure was communicated by the elements; *cf*. Zeus sending violent rain in anger about crooked judgements in Hom. *Il*. 16.384–388; *cf*. Hornblower 2008, 725.

[104] For an excellent discussion of this passage, see Sternberg 2006, 117–130. While focusing on the plight of the wounded and the engendered pity of the departing soldiers, she does not connect the latter’s moral anguish to combat trauma, though.

[105] Thuc. 7.75.2–3: ‘And it was terrible, not in one aspect only of their circumstances, in that they, having lost all their ships, were retreating, and, instead of great hope now found themselves and their city in danger, but also in that, on the abandonment of their camp, it fell to the lot of each man to perceive things that were painful both to sight and mind (ξυνέβαινε τῇ τε ὄψει ἑκάστῳ ἀλγεινὰ καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ αἰσθέσθαι). (3) For with the corpses being still unburied, whenever someone saw one of his own friends lying dead, he was plunged into grief mixed with fear (ἐς λύπην μετὰ φόβου καθίστατο); and the living who were being left behind, wounded and ill, far more than the dead caused pain to those <seeing> them and were more pitiable than

those that had perished (πολὺ τῶν τεθνεώτων τοῖς [ζῶσι] <ὁρῶσι> λυπηρότεροι ἦσαν καὶ τῶν ἀπολωλότων ἀθλιώτεροι).' In this famous description of the enormous psychological weight crushing down on the departing Athenian soldiers Thucydides moves from the general realisation of the loss of the fleet and the resultant danger for the soldiers themselves and their city to the pangs of pain felt by the individual soldiers forsaking their dead and wounded friends (Thuc. 7.75.2). *Cf.* Smith 1886, 142: 'the general result is contrasted with the personal experiences of the individual.'

[106] Sternberg 2006, 120 perceptively notices how in the phrase τῇ τε ὄψει ἑκάστῳ ἀλγεινὰ καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ 'Thucydides refines the notion of sight, showing how vision affects thought'.

[107] Kagan (1981, 337) also considers the abandonment of the living even more painful to the departing soldier than the sacrilege of leaving the dead unburied. The abandoned sick and wounded were entirely at the mercy of the vengeful Syracusans and their allies; for death and enslavement as general fate of captives, see Pritchett 1991, 203–312; Raaflaub 2014, 28.

[108] For this passage, see Sternberg 2006, 121. She argues convincingly that both λυπηρότεροι ('more distressing', 'more painful') and ἀθλιώτεροι ('more pitiable') describe the psychological effect that the sight and sound of the wounded have on the departing soldiers, whereas Dover (*HCT* 4.451) translates as 'more wretched' and sees it as a quality of the dead 'from their own point of view'. See also *LSJ* s.v. ἄθλιος, α, ον A.II.2. in moral sense, *pitiful, wretched*. For λυπηρός τινι as 'causing sorrow, pain for someone', see Classen and Steup 1908, 196. Classen rightly thinks τοῖς ζῶσιν out of place, especially as the same expression has just been used very appropriately for the καταλειπόμενοι. He explains τοῖς ζῶσιν either as a gloss to make the active meaning of λυπηρότεροι clear or as a scribal error for τοῖς ὁρῶσιν; *cf.* Classen and Steup 1908, 196; Smith 1886, 143. I consider τοῖς ὁρῶσιν the most likely reading, since it is in line with Thucydides' emphasis of the traumatising effects of sight and sound on the departing soldiers.

[109] Thuc. 7.75.4: 'For turning to entreaty and lamentation, they brought the men to a state of utter helplessness (ἐς ἀπορίαν καθίστασαν), demanding to be taken along and crying out aloud to each one if someone saw anywhere one of his comrades or kinsmen (ἄγειν τε σφᾶς ἀξιοῦντες καὶ ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐπιβοώμενοι, εἴ τινά ποϭ τις ἴδοι ἢ ἑταίρων ἢ οἰκείων, τῶν τε ξυσκήνων ἤδη ἀπιόντων ἐκκρεμαννϭμενοι), and clinging to their tent-mates, who were now leaving, and following after them as far as they could (ἐπακολουθοῦντες ἐς ὅσον δϭναιντο, εἴ τῳ δὲ προλίποι ἡ ῥώμη καὶ τὸ σῶμα), and then, when their mental strength and bodies failed them,

falling behind, though not without many appeals to the gods and lamentations (οὐκ ἄνευ [ὀλίγων] <πολλῶν> ἐπιθειασμῶν καὶ οἰμωγῆς ὑπολειπόμενοι), so that the whole army, filled with tears and in such a state of helplessness (ὥστε δάκρυσι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα πλησθὲν καὶ ἀπορίᾳ τοιαϭτῃ), did not easily depart, even out of a country that was hostile, and though they had already endured sufferings too great for tears (μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα τὰ μὲν πεπονθότας ἤδη) and feared concerning the unseen future what they might still have to suffer (τὰ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφανεῖ δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσιν).'

110 The difficult manuscript reading οὐκ ἄνευ ὀλίγων ἐπιθειασμῶν καὶ οἰμωγῆς was defended by Classen, who translated 'not without "few" – *i.e.* faint – appeals to the gods and lamentations', but it has rightly been rejected by Steup; *cf.* Classen and Steup 1908, 275–276. Following Valla's Latin translation, many editors sensibly emend ὀλίγων to πολλῶν; *cf.* Smith 1935, 152–153 and Hornblower 2008, 710. For the persuasive interpretation of ἐπιθειασμοί ('appeals to the gods') as calls upon the gods to punish their disloyal comrades for forsaking them, see Orwin 1994, 136 and Sternberg 2006, 121–122.

111 Sternberg 1999 and Sternberg 2006, 104–145, especially 116–117 and 128–29. That wounded soldiers looked for help from friends, relatives, or tentmates is also confirmed by Pl. *Alc.* 115b. For a soldier's moral obligation to look after a wounded comrade, see also Xen. *Anab.* 5.8.8–11.

112 It is evident from Thucydides' detailed account that the wounded did not appeal to just any fellow soldier, but only to close friends, relatives, and tentmates (ἕνα ἕκαστον ἐπιβοώμενοι, εἴ τινά ποϭ τις ἴδοι ἢ ἑταίρων ἢ οἰκείων, τῶν τε ξυσκήνων ἤδη ἀπιόντων ἐκκρεμαννϭμενοι; 75.4). The fact that these desperate appeals were made by very close friends exacerbated the devastating impact on the departing soldiers' psyche. Moreover, the expression ἄγειν τε σφᾶς ἀξιοῦντες ('considering it worthy, i.e. demanding that they take them along') also conveys this moral obligation; *cf.* Sternberg 2006, 127–128.

113 For *aporia* overpowering every other emotion (*e.g.* pity), see Sternberg 2006, 123.

114 Crowley 2014, 113–114 makes a strong case that the Athenian hoplite 'mobilized, deployed, and fought alongside his fellow demesmen'. The demes, as face-to-face communities, were the by far most cohesive social units in Athens, whose members were 'religiously, economically, politically, and socially integrated'. See also Crowley 2012, 43–49.

115 Sternberg 2006, 122. On the flip-side of closely knit military units, see Greaves 2013, 95: 'The intensity of the relationships that existed between the men in a citizen army like the classical Greek phalanx

would also have intensified the trauma of seeing fellow soldiers cut down, as the victims had been the close friends, neighbours, relatives and possibly even lovers of the traumatized individual left behind.' Yet Greaves 2013, 95 – like Crowley – also acknowledges the vital role of close social ties in minimizing the risk of developing post-traumatic symptoms.

116 Thucydides' descriptions are usually very matter-of-fact and rarely contain detailed descriptions of the emotions of the historical actors; *cf.* Sternberg 2006, 118–119 and Hau in this volume.

117 By choosing the poetic expression δάκρυσι πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα πλησθὲν instead of the prosaic δακρύων πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα πλησθὲν, Thucydides signals to his readers that the psychological pain of these Athenian soldiers equalled the suffering displayed on the tragic stage in Aeschylus' *Persians* (*cf.* Aesch. *Pers.* 134: πίμπλαται δακρύμασιν). Similarly, the expression μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα τὰ μὲν πεπονθότας ἤδη ('having already endured sufferings too great for tears') is reminiscent of Herodotus' story of the Pharaoh Psammenitus, who silently endured his daughter's enslavement and his son's execution, declaring that 'his own sufferings are too great to cry over' (τὰ μὲν οἰκήια ἦν μέζω κακὰ ἢ ὥστε ἀνακλαίειν; 3.14.10); *cf.* Smith 1900, 71–72 and Hornblower 2008, 710.

118 The epic word κατήφεια originally means 'looking down from modesty' or – as in this case here – 'looking down from shame'. *Cf.* Hom. *Il.* 16.498; Smith 1886, 144; Smith 1900, 73; Hornblower 2008, 710

119 Thuc. 7.75.5: 'There was also a general feeling of dejection and much self-blame. For indeed they looked like nothing else than a city secretly fleeing after a siege, and no small city either.' (κατήφειά τέ τις ἅμα καὶ κατάμεμψις σφῶν αὐτῶν πολλὴ ἦν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἢ πόλει ἐκπεπο-λιορκημένῃ ἐῴκεσαν ὑποφευγοϭσῃ, καὶ ταϭτῃ οὐ σμικρᾷ·). On strictly linguistic grounds, one could point out – as Andrew Fear has kindly done at the Combat Stress conference at Manchester Metropolitan University – that the feelings of dejection and self-blame resulted (*cf.* γὰρ) from the Athenians' shameful flight in the manner of a sacked city and not from the abandonment of the wounded. Yet considering the flow of the narrative, Sternberg's (2006, 124) suggestion that the men's self-blame also 'arises from the immediate context, and follows logically and thematically from the preceding sentence, which depicts the sick and wounded begging to be taken along,' is entirely convincing and is supported by Nicias' speech (7.77.4), which seems to endorse both explanations.

120 Meineck 2012, 11. See also Sternberg 2006, 126: The departing soldiers' feelings 'likely include[d] pangs of conscience, each man's

sense of failed obligation toward his comrades’.

[121] For survivor guilt, see Shay 1994, 69–72; 2002, 78–82; James 2014, 238–239; Herman 1992, 54: ‘Feelings of guilt are especially severe when the survivor has been a witness to the suffering or death of other people. To be spared oneself in the knowledge that others have met a worse fate creates a severe burden of conscience. Survivors of disaster and war are haunted by the images of the dying who they could not rescue. They feel guilt for not risking their lives to save others, or for failing to fulfill the request of a dying person. In combat, witnessing the death of a buddy places the soldier at particularly high risk for developing post-traumatic stress disorder.’

[122] Ranke 1824, vii. For an excellent brief overview of literary scholarship on Thucydides, see Rusten 2009, 9–11, 14. For Thucydidean vividness (*enargeia*), see Plut. *De glor. Ath.* 347a; Walker 1993; Connor 2017, 217–219. For Thucydidean pathos, see Lateiner 1977; Sternberg 2006, 117–130; Hau 2016, 203–204; Joho 2017, 599–600. For the narrative power of Thucydides’ account of the Athenian retreat, see Marchant 1912, 201; Connor 1994, 198–199; and Macaulay 1875, 387, who called it ‘the *ne plus ultra* of human art’.

[123] For tragic features in Thucydides’ account, see Macleod 1983; Rood 1998, 183–201; Joho 2017. For epic and Herodotean influences, see Smith 1900; Allison 1997; Rengakos 2006; Hornblower 2008, 709–713. For the tragic story arc, see Hau 2016, 194–215 and Hau in this volume.

[124] Hornblower 2008, 734. Similarly Hall 2007, 11: ‘Thucydides (…) is currently enjoying considerable popularity among more philologically-minded scholars, who have justly drawn attention to the highly accomplished literary qualities of his work. The account of the disastrous Athenian expedition to Sicily in 415 is a case in point. Apart from the fact that this particular episode is very deliberately emplotted as a tragedy (…), Thucydides’ account consciously employs echoes taken from his predecessor Herodotus’ description of the Persian invasion of Greece in 480 (…).’ After offering a few examples Hall 2007, 12 continues: ‘Yet does this recognition of Thucydides’ literary artistry provide sufficient grounds for denying that the events which Thucydides describes ever happened?’

[125] *Cf*. Thuc. 1.22.2–3: ‘But regarding the facts of what was done (τὰ δ’ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων) in the war, I considered it right to write them down, not as I learned them from any chance informant (ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος πυνθανόμενος) nor as it seemed to me (ὡς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει), but only after investigating both events at which I myself was present and events reported to me by others, on each point with as much accuracy as possible (ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβείᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου ἐπεξελθών). And to ascertain these facts was laborious, because those

who were present at each event did not give the same reports about the same things, but according as anyone excelled at goodwill for one of the two sides or memory.'

[126] Connor 2017, 219. In her thoughtful response (Chapter 10 in this volume), Hau concedes that the pathos-evoking departure scene (7.75) might well be based on the vivid testimony of Thucydides' eye-witnesses, but rightly insists – by pointing to his rather dispassionate and abstract account of the atrocities committed during the civil war in Corcyra (3.81–83) – that Thucydides, even if he received vivid and emotional eyewitness testimonies (as he surely did in the case of Corcyra), was still 'master of his narrative', and the level of detail and emotion at every point reflects first and foremost his authorial plan. I fully agree that Thucydides – as the gifted writer that he was – shaped his source material to suit his literary aims and that an investigation of these literary aims is essential for understanding Thucydides' endeavour as a whole. My main goal in this chapter was to tie Thucydides' account of the Athenians' pitiful departure from Syracuse to the historical experience of the survivors, by arguing that Thucydides' vivid and emotive depiction likely results from his historical method – as it is described in 1.22.2 – of cross-examining numerous eye-witnesses to achieve the highest level of *akribeia* possible in the representation of the events of this war.

[127] Marincola 1989, 222. In his interpretation of Thuc. 1.22.2, Marincola makes a convincing case that Thucydides – unlike historians of the more distant past – saw no need for imaginative reconstruction or for guessing at motivation. As a writer of contemporary history, he aspired 'to learn of actions and recover motivations from the actors themselves, from his own experience as an actor or eyewitness, and from other eyewitnesses' (1989, 222). On Thucydides' comparison of eyewitness accounts and his superiority to Herodotus, see also Hau 2016, 195–196.

[128] For Thuc. 1.22.2–3, see the previous note.

[129] If this hypothesis is correct, it also accounts for the unusually detailed sensory description in the departure scene. For it is precisely haunting images, sounds, and smells associated with horrendous experiences that dominate the traumatic memory of survivors. For the suggestion that the abandonment of the camp scene is based on interviews of survivors, see also Sternberg 2006, 117. Hornblower (1987, 150) speculates that it was written soon after the event. Cagnazzi's (1989, 495) startling suggestion that Thucydides himself took part in the expedition as a trierarch has rightly been rejected by Rood (1998, 194 n. 54) and Hornblower (2008, 690).

[130] Crowley 2014, 117.

[131] Taking Crowley's justified scepticism to heart, I have applied Shay's

universalising definition to the culturally and historically specific condition of the Classical Athenian hoplite. For this universalising definition of a traumatising experience as an ‘an event that is outside the range of usual human experience and that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone’, see Shay 1994, 166, quoting from DSM-III-R, 250.

Chapter 6

Trauma and morality in Thucydides

Lisa Irene Hau

Questo contributo prende spunto dalla convincente ipotesi di Steinbock che il racconto tucidideo della spedizione ateniese in Sicilia si possa interpretare come prova dell'esistenza della sindrome post traumatica tra i reduci degli scontri. La ricerca di Steinbock prende le mosse dall'indagine sulle ragioni che inducono Tucidide a narrare gli eventi successivi alla battaglia in modo così vivido e coinvolgente, soprattutto se paragonato ad altri episodi parimenti importanti dell'opera ma nei quali si ritrova meno enfasi. La questione è tanto più interessante se si considera la predilezione dello storico per il resoconto basato su testimonianze oculari degli eventi e che implicherebbe come fonte, anche per questa sezione della narrazione, la viva voce dei sopravvissuti. Lo studioso paragona, a valore di esempio, un'analisi del racconto della guerra civile a Corcira e della piaga, entrambi eventi traumatici riportati nell'opera tucididea, e tuttavia narrati in uno stile completamente diverso: il primo, con uno spiccato prevalere in primo piano dell'astrazione e della tipizzazione dell'evento; il secondo, caratterizzato dall'intrecciarsi, in un racconto sintetico e astratto della piaga, della vivida descrizione dei sintomi della malattia. Il contributo perviene alla conclusione che, sebbene il racconto tucidideo della spedizione in Sicilia sia una efficace e valida testimonianza della sindrome da stress post

traumatico, esso non ha nella descrizione di questa condizione la sua ragion d'essere. Le motivazioni della profondità e della vividezza della descrizione sono infatti da ravvisarsi nella struttura stessa della narrazione: la descrizione degli eventi successivi agli scontri si colloca infatti nel punto più alto della parabola narrativa sugli eventi di quegli anni e convoglia in sé il messaggio morale dell'opera tucididea, che gli Ateniesi stiano pagando, con queste sofferenze, il fio delle loro colpe.

The study of combat trauma in the ancient world has led to some fruitful new readings of ancient texts in the past 25 years. The recent questioning of the validity of such an endeavour, *i.e.* of the validity of assuming that combat trauma is transcultural and could occur in any society in any time period, has had the beneficial effect of sharpening the thinking and methodology of those scholars who work with the concept, but has also cast doubt on the entire project. In his article in the present volume, B. Steinbock succeeds in showing that although all combat experience in ancient Greece may not necessarily have led to trauma in its participants, certain particularly harrowing events almost certainly did. The Sicilian Expedition of the Athenians in 415–413 BC is a perfect case in point: Thucydides' narrative makes clear both the unusual harshness of the demands it made on the soldiers and their – and their commander's[1] – unusual moral crumbling in the face of it.

Steinbock's argument rests on the assumption that Thucydides' narrative goes back to eye-witness accounts, and that its vivid and emotional style, as well as the focus on the act of leaving behind the dead and wounded and on their pitiful pleas for help, reflect their trauma. While he makes a convincing case for this, it begs a question: if we assume, as most scholars do, that Thucydides overwhelmingly based his work on the testimonies of eye-witnesses (rather than on written sources, literary or inscriptional), why did he not relate more events in a vivid and emotional style? Even if every military expedition did not lead to trauma, survivors would still hold strong memories of it and would presumably convey these to an interviewer in a lively and vivid fashion. Yet, Thucydides' account is most often terse, and when he narrates horrific events such as the destruction of Plataea (3.68) or Melos (5.116), the narrative shocks exactly by its lack of descriptive and emotional details.[2] This means that we must assume that Thucydides, throughout most of the *History*, has completely rewritten what he received from witnesses, not only through amalgamation of different testimonies, ironing out of inconsistencies, and inference of missing pieces of information, such as the motivations of decision makers who were not available for interview, but also through a change of register: by changing a series of oral, personal stories into a homogeneous, impersonal narrative told by a covert, omniscient narrator.[3] The question discussed by Steinbock of to what extent Thucydides' literary artistry in the narrative of the Athenian retreat from Syracuse makes his work unreliable as a piece of historiography seems to me to slightly miss the point. We are never going to be able to know for certain whether Thucydides' account of the emotional suffering of the Athenian soldiers during the retreat distorts the facts. But we can, and should, speculate about why he chose to focus on the suffering of the soldiers, and to portray it so vividly, in this particular instance and not elsewhere. Why did Thucydides choose to foreground the personal experiences of soldiers in the account of the retreat from Syracuse?

A useful passage for comparison is the famous account of the civil war in Corcyra (3.81–84). Thucydides surely talked to eye-witnesses to and survivors of the violence in Corcyra just as he talked to eye-witnesses to and survivors of the retreat from Syracuse, but the two narratives are startlingly different. The Corcyra events are harrowing, but they are narrated from a far-off birds-eye perspective, and the narrative never zooms in on particular murders or betrayals:

> The Corcyraeans for their part, when they realised that the Attic ships were sailing towards them and the enemy ships were departing, took the Messenians who had previously been outside the city and brought them in. They then ordered the ships they had manned to sail around into the Hyllaic harbour, and while the ships were on their way round they killed any of their enemies they caught. They also put ashore all of the men they had persuaded to go on to the ships and did away with them too, then went to the temple of Hera, persuaded about fifty of the suppliants there to stand trial and condemned them all to death. [3] The majority of the suppliants, however, whom they had failed to persuade, when they saw what was happening set about putting an end to each other's lives right there in the temple precincts; and some

> hanged themselves from trees, while others took their own lives any way they could. [4] For the seven days that Eurymedon stayed there after arriving with his sixty ships, the Corcyraeans went on slaughtering those they took to be their enemies: some they charged with overthrowing the people, but some were in fact killed because of personal feuds, and others at the hands of those who owed them money they had lent them. [5] Death came in every shape and form, and everything that is liable to happen in such a situation did take place – and worse besides. Father killed son, men were dragged from temples and killed right beside them, and some were even walled up in the temple of Dionysus and died there.[4]

This is the narrative of the beginning of the violence in Corcyra. It gives concrete information about events at the beginning, but does not delve on visual images, the cries of the victims, or any emotions of the participants or onlookers.[5] Everything is seen from a distance and told in a dispassionate voice. The information is damning, of course: the tricking of suppliants into standing trial with the sole intention (we gather, although this is not said) of condemning them to death, deaths and murders in a temple, the killing of personal enemies and debtors under pretence of protecting the *polis*. But none of this is narrated in particularly emotional or vivid terms and there is no zooming in on the horrors on the ground. The narrative becomes most horrific when it becomes most abstract, in section five: ‘Death came in every shape and form’.

The abstract mode continues over the following three long chapters as Thucydides talks of the savageness of the conflict and the debasement of human nature (3.82.1–2), the change in semantics as people call vicious deeds and immoral acts by dignified names (3.82.3–5), the destruction of family ties as political ideology takes over (3.82.6– 7), the root cause, namely desire for power (3.82.8), the dominance of evil throughout Greece and the disappearance of traditional morality (3.83), and the breakdown of law and order in the face of human passion (3.84).[6] The whole passage is terrifying, but for completely different reasons than the narrative of the retreat from Sicily. In the Corcyra narrative, the terror comes from the way in which the abstraction makes the event typical, an example of what happened here for the first time, but afterwards became the norm throughout Greece: ‘Such was the savage progress of the civil strife, and it seemed all the worse because it was the first of its kind, though later practically the whole Greek world was in turmoil …'[7]

This typifying goes so far as expecting the reader to be able to imagine particulars with a terse prompt from the narrator: 'and everything that is liable to happen in such a situation did take place – and worse besides' (3.81.5, quoted above). In fact, it is not just set up as typical for this particular time in Greece, but for humankind throughout history: 'as always does and always will happen while human nature remains what it is, though the degree and kind of the damage may vary in each case according to the particular circumstances'.[8] This is exactly what gives this passage its lasting power to shock: it is not the narrative of particular murders and betrayals, but of the capacity of human beings throughout time and across cultures to commit atrocities against each other.

The narrative of the retreat from Syracuse on the other hand, as Steinbock has rightly shown, terrifies by its specificity, its vividness, by what we may with a narratological term call its immersiveness.[9] It uses descriptions of sights, sounds, and emotions to focalise the narrative through the suffering soldiers and make the reader feel like s/he is experiencing the events alongside them. This makes the narrative the opposite of abstract, namely experiential.[10]

In one important passage in the *History* Thucydides combines the experiential and the abstract mode: in the narrative of the Plague (2.47–54).[11] This passage begins, like the narrative of the civil war in Corcyra, with a concrete, but unemotional account by a covert narrator, here covering the outbreak of the plague, the inability of doctors to help, and the ineffectiveness of prayers and votive offerings, which leads to a feeling of being 'defeated by the evil' (ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ νικώμενοι, 2.47.4). After listing some hypotheses of the causes of the disease, Thucydides then switches into an unusual personal mode and becomes an overt narrator telling of his own experience:

> For my part I will say what it was like as it happened and will describe the facts that would enable anyone investigating any future outbreak to have some prior knowledge and recognise it. I speak as someone who had the disease myself and witnessed others suffering from it.[12]

Then follows a detailed description of the symptoms of the plague

(2.49). Here the perspective changes from the distant birds-eye view of the covert, omniscient narrator to the ground-level, blood-and-guts perspective of the eye-witness and participant. The horrible list of afflictions ends with the words: ‘Some suffered a total loss of memory straight after their recovery and no longer knew who they themselves or their friends were’ (τοὺς δὲ καὶ λήθη ἐλάμβανε παραυτίκα ἀναστάντας τῶν πάντων ὁμοίως, καὶ ἠγνόησαν σφᾶς τε αὑτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους, 2.49.8). In the next section, Thucydides takes a step back again to examine once more the bigger picture, but not before having stated that ‘the form the plague took defied all reason. When it attacked anyone it was beyond all human endurance …’ (γενόμενον γὰρ κρεῖσσον λόγου τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου τά τε ἄλλα χαλεπωτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν φύσιν προσέπιπτεν ἑκάστῳ, 2.50.1). From a distance, he talks about the dying, the general despair, the lack of care, the lot of survivors (all in 2.51). Then he zooms in and describes the piling up of dead bodies and the ‘reeling about’ of the ‘half-dead’ in search of water (2.52.2), but there are no details of sounds (or smells) or of the emotions of the helpless onlookers as in the narrative of the Sicilian retreat. Finally, the plague narrative becomes abstract as Thucydides describes how it was this incident that led to increased lawlessness in Athens as people lost all morality in the face of random death. The passage concludes with ‘such was the burden of suffering the Athenians bore’ (τοιούτῳ μὲν πάθει οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι περιπεσόντες ἐπιέζοντο, 2.54.1).

Like the narrative of the retreat from Syracuse, the first part of this narrative bears the imprint of the trauma (although not combat-related) suffered by the survivors. The description of the experience as one of being ‘defeated by evil’ and suffering something which ‘defies all reason’ and is ‘beyond human endurance’ reflects this trauma. The memory loss of some of the victims may also be due to psychological trauma rather than to any physical effect of the disease. In this case, in contrast with the retreat from Syracuse, the eyewitness to the catastrophic event was Thucydides himself, and the trauma was his own.[13] This may be why he keeps his tone impersonal and does not focus on any particular individuals: recalling the screams of loved ones is too traumatic. Towards the end of the passage, it resembles more the narrative of the civil war in Corcyra as the plague is presented as a catalyst for lawlessness and the breakdown of morality.

The plague in Athens, the Civil War in Corcyra, and the retreat from Syracuse were all catastrophic events liable to cause trauma. Thucydides puts stress on them because his history is a history of disasters and suffering, as he signals in his preface (1.1.1) when he states that the war was the greatest 'disturbance' (*kinesis*) in Greek history.[14] So why did Thucydides narrate some horrific events in vivid details and others not? We will, of course, never be able to know for certain what was in Thucydides' mind, but the following presents one possible and, it seems to me, likely answer to that question.

The Corcyraean civil war, to Thucydides' mind, was not unique, but was rather one case of illness in an epidemic which struck all of Greece. For that reason, he turned it into an abstract example of human capacity for evil. The Plague and the Athenian retreat from Syracuse, on the other hand, are both presented as unique events (leaving aside the question of whether this is a true representation): the plague 'did not get into the Peloponnese to any significant extent, it invaded Athens in particular and after that other densely populated areas elsewhere' (ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τὰ πολυανθρωπότατα, 2.54.5), but we are never told anything about where these densely populated areas might be or how they coped with the epidemic, which creates the impression that the described catastrophe was uniquely Athenian. Similarly, the defeat of the Athenians in Sicily was 'the most momentous of any in this war and indeed, in my view, of any we know reported in Greek history – for the victors the most glorious, for the vanquished the most disastrous. They were completely and utterly defeated. Their misery was extreme in every respect and it was, as the expression goes, a case of total annihilation. They lost army, ships, everything, and few out of many returned home'.[15] These famous closing lines are full of superlatives and other expressions to make the event seem worse than anything that has ever befallen any people, that is, as unique to the Athenians.

Athens is the protagonist of the *History*, and a protagonist who undergoes a story arc well-known from both Herodotus and 5th-century Athenian tragedy: a powerful man/people overreaches himself/itself in overconfidence and subsequently suffers horribly. The Plague comes early in the story arc; it responds to Pericles' idealistic Funeral Oration and demonstrates that even the great Athenian people can be brought low by external circumstances. The defeat in Sicily confirms this at the top of the story arc: the Athenians have now over-reached themselves (in attempting to conquer Sicily) and committed numerous acts of arrogance and brutality (the most recent being the destruction of Melos in the last chapter before the Sicilian Expedition is decided on, 5.116.4), and the natural consequence is their suffering and losses during the retreat. This is a highpoint of the deeply moral story that Thucydides is telling, and for that reason, the suffering is highlighted by means of sensory and emotional details not found elsewhere in the work. (The story, of course, continues in book 8, and we cannot know what the ending would have looked like, but can only assume that the final climactic events would have been told with an equal measure of vividness and emotion).[16]

Thucydides was a gifted writer, and he used many different techniques throughout his work: dry, factual narrative, speeches, dramatic dialogue, abstract narrative, and vivid, emotional narrative. His different narrative styles are due to deliberate choice. The Athenian retreat from Syracuse is singled out as being far and away the most immersive and emotional passage in the *History*. For this reason, it is a unique source for the experience of the Athenian soldiers who survived it and the trauma they sustained, as Steinbock has shown. This is, however, not its raison-d'être. Thucydides chose to emphasise it in this way in order to stress the uniqueness of the Athenian suffering, as well as its cause:

> The general misery (…) seemed hard to bear in their present circumstances, especially considering that the early glamour and bravado for the enterprise had come to such a humiliating conclusion. This was certainly the greatest reversal that ever befell a Greek army: they had come to enslave others but were now going away fearing that fate for themselves; instead of the paeans and prayers with which they had launched out, they were heading back again with curses of a very different kind ringing in their ears.[17]

It is clear from the careful parallels drawn between the outset of the expedition and its end here, that Thucydides is intending the reader to keep both in mind and compare them: since the Athenians set out in splendour and arrogance ‘to enslave others’, the enterprise had to end in catastrophe. If the survivors were indeed plagued by combat-trauma, which I see no reason to doubt after Steinbock’s analysis of their experiences, the traumatisation of his eye-witness reporters only reinforced Thucydides’ sense that the Athenians were suffering the consequences of their own ill-conceived actions. Similarly, his vivid representation of the trauma reinforces the moral of his narrative. This means that, even if we can legitimately use the narrative of the retreat from Syracuse as evidence of combat trauma, we cannot from the absence of such emotional narratives elsewhere in Thucydides’ *History* conclude that this was the only trauma-inducing event of the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides was master of his narrative, and its level of detail and emotion at every point reflects his authorial plan rather than the reports of eye-witnesses.

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[1] Steinbock’s focus is on the soldiers and he does not discuss the evidence for the traumatisation of Nicias, their general. It is an interesting question, however, whether the demoralisation evident in his letter home (7.11–15) and his last speech (7.69) may be an effect of combat trauma.

[2] This point has often been made, but best by Strasburger 1982, 989–990.

[3] Thucydides’ narrative is often referred to as using ‘zero-focalisation’, but this gives the unfortunate impression that the events are telling themselves. They are told by a narrator, but a narrator who, most of the time, makes an effort not to draw attention to himself. For an analysis of Thucydides’ narratorial voice, see Rood 2004.

[4] Thuc. 3.81.2–5: Κερκυραῖοι δὲ αἰσθόμενοι τάς τε Ἀττικὰς ναῦς προσπλεούσας τάς τε τῶν πολεμίων οἰχομένας, λαβόντες τούς τε Μεσσηνίους ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἤγαγον πρότερον ἔξω ὄντας, καὶ τὰς ναῦς περιπλεῦσαι κελεύσαντες ἃς ἐπλήρωσαν ἐς τὸν Ὑλλαϊκὸν λιμένα, ἐν ὅσῳ περιεκομίζοντο, τῶν ἐχθρῶν εἴ τινα λάβοιεν, ἀπέκτεινον· καὶ ἐκ τῶν νεῶν ὅσους ἔπεισαν ἐσβῆναι ἐκβιβάζοντες ἀπε-χρῶντο, ἐς τὸ Ἥραιόν τε ἐλθόντες τῶν ἱκετῶν ὡς πεντήκοντα ἄνδρας δίκην ὑποσχεῖν ἔπεισαν καὶ κατέγνωσαν πάντων θάνατον. [3] οἱ δὲ

πολλοὶ τῶν ἱκετῶν, ὅσοι οὐκ ἐπείσθησαν, ὡς ἑώρων τὰ γιγνόμενα, διέφθειρον αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ ἀλλήλους, καὶ ἐκ τῶν δένδρων τινὲς ἀπήγχοντο, οἱ δ᾽ ὡς ἕκαστοι ἐδύναντο ἀνηλοῦντο. [4]ἡμέρας τε ἑπτά, ἃς ἀφικόμενος ὁ Εὐρυμέδων ταῖς ἑξήκοντα ναυσὶ παρέμεινε, Κερκυραῖοι σφῶν αὐτῶν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς δοκοῦντας εἶναι ἐφόνευον, τὴν μὲν αἰτίαν ἐπιφέροντες τοῖς τὸν δῆμον καταλύουσιν, ἀπέθανον δέ τινες καὶ ἰδίας ἔχθρας ἕνεκα, καὶ ἄλλοι χρημάτων σφίσιν ὀφειλομένων ὑπὸ τῶν λαβόντων: [5] πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη θανάτου, καὶ οἷον φιλεῖ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ γίγνεσθαι, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ ξυνέβη καὶ ἔτι περαιτέρω. καὶ γὰρ πατὴρ παῖδα ἀπέκτεινε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀπεσπῶντο καὶ πρὸς αὐτοῖς ἐκτείνοντο, οἱ δέ τινες καὶ περιοικοδομηθέντες ἐν τοῦ Διονύσου τῷ ἱερῷ ἀπέθανον. (Thucydides texts used: Jones and Powell 1942 and Mynott 2013. All translations of Thucydides are by Mynott 2013).

[5] The most obvious onlooker being Eurymedon, who with his 60 ships surely could have ended the massacre had he wanted to. Thucydides does not say this, but the only reason for him to mention Eurymedon and his ships at this point seems to be to put them in the reader's mind alongside the atrocities committed. Briefly noted by Hornblower 1991, *ad loc.*

[6] For good analyses of this passage, see Edmunds 1975; Macleod 1979; Hornblower 1991, *ad* 3.82–83. Many scholars believe 3.84 to be a later addition by a different author, but it is written in the same unique style as the rest and may also be a draft which was only included in a single or very few ancient manuscripts. See Hornblower 1991 *ad loc.*, with reference to earlier discussions, and Mynott 2013, 214 n. 3.

[7] Thuc. 3.82.1: 'οὕτως ὠμὴ <ἡ> στάσις προυχώρησε, καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτη ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη'.

[8] Thuc. 3.82.2: '… γιγνόμενα μὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόμενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι διηλλαγμένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ μεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται'.

[9] For immersiveness see Ryan 2001, Allan 2020, and Hau 2020.

[10] For the experientiality of Thucydides' writing, see Grethlein 2013, 29–52.

[11] For an overview of scholarly literature on the Plague, see Hornblower 1991 *ad loc.* To this can now usefully be added Bellemore and Plant 1994; Morgan 1994; Kallet 2013.

[12] Thuc. 2.48.3: ἐγὼ δὲ οἷόν τε ἐγίγνετο λέξω, καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἄν τις σκοπῶν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὖθις ἐπιπέσοι, μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ἔχοι τι προειδὼς μὴ ἀγνοεῖν, ταῦτα δηλώσω αὐτός τε νοσήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ἄλλους πάσχοντας.

[13] The idea of Thucydides being personally traumatised by his experience of living through (and suffering and recovering from) the plague comes from a student of mine, Mariana Leszczyk, who may publish something on this in the near future.

[14] For Thucydides’ *History* as a history of disasters and suffering, see Strasburger 1982.

[15] Thuc. 7.87.5–6: ξυνέβη τε ἔργον τοῦτο [Ἑλληνικὸν] τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον τόνδε μέγιστον γενέ-σθαι, δοκεῖν δ᾽ ἔμοιγε καὶ ὧν ἀκοῇ Ἑλληνικῶν ἴσμεν, καὶ τοῖς τε κρατήσασι λαμπρότατον καὶ τοῖς διαφθαρεῖσι δυστυχέστατον· [6] κατὰ πάντα γὰρ πάντως νικηθέντες καὶ οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐς οὐδὲν κακοπαθήσαντες πανωλεθρίᾳ δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ πεζὸς καὶ νῆες καὶ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀπώλετο, καὶ ὀλίγοι ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐπ᾽ οἴκου ἀπενόστησαν.

[16] For a more developed version of this interpretation, see Hau 2016, 194–215, with references to earlier scholarship.

[17] Thuc. 7.75.6–7: οὐδ᾽ ὧς ῥᾳδία ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἐδοξάζετο, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀπὸ οἵας λαμπρότητος καὶ αὐχήματος τοῦ πρώτου ἐς οἵαν τελευτὴν καὶ ταπεινότητα ἀφῖκτο. [7] μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τὸ διάφο-ρον τοῦτο [τῷ] Ἑλληνικῷ στρατεϭματι ἐγένετο, οἷς ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ ἄλλους δουλωσομένους ἥκειν αὐτοὺς τοῦτο μᾶλλον δεδιότας μὴ πάθωσι ξυνέβη ἀπιέναι, ἀντὶ δ᾽ εὐχῆς τε καὶ παιάνων, μεθ᾽ ὧν ἐξέπλεον, πάλιν τοϭτων τοῖς ἐναντίοις ἐπιφημίσμασιν ἀφορμᾶσθαι.

Chapter 7

The curse tablets of Selinous: evidence of social strife?[1]

Ryan Johnson

Nel VI e V secolo a.C. la città di Selinunte si ergeva come centro di contatto tra persone e culture della Sicilia e del Mediterraneo antico. Tra questi vi erano i Greci, i Siculi, gli Italioti e i Punici. L'evidenza epigrafica dal sito, tuttavia, indicherebbe che la città fu devastata dalla discordia sociale. Tra gli altri documenti, è indicativa una lex sacra contenente delle prescrizioni per la purificazione da spiriti ostili, forse conseguenza di 'colpe di sangue'. La maggior parte delle testimonianze relative ai vari gruppi etnici residenti a Selinunte viene da un corpus di defixiones nelle quali singoli membri dei numerosi gruppi etnici si trovano inscritti. Questo paper analizza entrambe le fonti, la lex e il corpus di defixiones – quest'ultimo in modo particolare – al fine di cercare di capire cosa potrebbero dirci questi documenti sui gruppi etnici di Selinunte e sui possibili confitti tra di loro.

The city of Selinous in the 6th and 5th centuries BC was situated in a nexus of intercultural contact and trade. With this contact came new and diverse ethnic groups, bringing new religious and cultural ideas. This also, however, resulted in a city plagued by social conflict, as documents found on site such as the so-called *lex sacra*, a text which outlines purificatory rituals including, perhaps, those for blood-guilt, and a corpus of *defixiones*, or binding spells, attest.[2] In the era in which these texts were composed Selinous was a primarily Greek city, although one with a significant non-Greek population as well, including Sikels, Italiots, and Punics.[3] This form of the city lasted until 409 BC when it was sacked by the Carthaginians. And although the city was resettled after 405, it was definitively under the power of Carthage by this point and so was of a different character than it was before.[4] Therefore, the sack of 409 provides a *terminus ante quem* for the texts I shall discuss. As for the *defixiones*, a particularly noteworthy feature of the ones from this site is that they contain many non-Greek names of different ethnic origins.[5] These names can provide evidence of the ethnic backgrounds of the individuals listed in the *defixiones* as an indication whether Selinous suffered from civil strife. Indeed, Selinous could be described as a particularly 'restless' city, one that was rocked by political and social turmoil. Thus, many of the city's most famous documents, including the *lex sacra* and the *defixiones* may well have been composed as a result of this turbulent environment.

The sanctuary of Malophoros and the *Campo di Stele* at Selinous have yielded, in addition to a so-called *lex sacra*, a large corpus of *defixiones*.[6] Inscribed on sheets of lead and currently totalling 32 in number,[7] these are the oldest examples of the Greek curse tablet on record, first appearing in the 6th century BC.[8] Following these, the next-oldest examples come from Attica in the later 5th century and, while there is the possibility that the inhabitants of Attica inscribed older curses on perishable material (and therefore that cursing in this manner was practiced here before it was in Sicily), the difference in dates between the Sicilian tablets and those from Attica suggest that the Selinuntine examples came first.[9]

These curse tablets or binding spells were created with the intent to harm the individuals listed on them via supernatural means.[10] This intent was aided, moreover, by the deposition of the tablets in graves or the sanctuaries of chthonic deities, thereby allowing the invoker of the curse to employ the powers of the Netherworld.[11] Curse tablets from the Classical world consist of five genres, originally delineated by Auguste Audollent.[12] Although there is not room enough to describe all of these genres in this paper, it should be stated that a great number of the so-called *defixiones iudicariae*, or ‘judiciary spells’, have been found at Selinous and, as their name indicates, these tablets contain spells meant to hinder one’s opponent and his witnesses at a trial.[13]

In their chapter in a recent publication on the city, Alessandro Iannucci and Federicomaria Muccioli raise the question of whether the *plethora* of non-Greek names in the Selinuntine corpus of curse tablets are an indicator of inter-ethnic strife.[14] Although the question remains open at this point in time, Iannucci and Muccioli raise a significant possibility that we must not discount. To be sure, the multitude of Greek and non-Greek names inscribed in the tablets are at least indicative of a multicultural presence at the site.[15] Furthermore, I propose that we ought to consider whether Selinous itself was a particularly restless or troubled city, even in comparison to contemporaries such as Athens. Although Athens has a greater number of curse tablets, the early date for the Selinuntine examples (as early as the late 6th century)[16] and the relatively large number of the corpus, 32 at last count,[17] suggest a high degree of competition and, indeed, enmity among individuals at Selinous prior to the Carthaginian destruction of the city in 409. That this enmity existed is potentially reinforced by the presence of the so-called *lex sacra* and its rituals to purify one from a hostile spirit.[18]

The rituals in question are found on lines 1–13 in Column B of the *lex sacra* and deal with purification from an ἐλάστερος.[19] It is uncertain exactly what an ἐλάστερος is, although it is likely some sort of avenging spirit, since ἐλάστερος derives from the verb ἐλαϭνω: to drive/pursue, or, as Noel Robertson would render it, to strike.[20] As for why the ἐλάστερος would pursue an individual, Michael Jameson, David Jordan, and Roy Kotansky claim that it is due to blood-guilt. They base this on the word for the individual the ἐλάστερος is pursuing, who is named in the *lex sacra* as an αὐτορρέκτ̣ας. Those authors equate αὐτορρέκτ̣ας with αὐτοφόνος.[21] Both of these terms can be rendered as ‘slaying with one’s own hand’, although the meaning of this is vague.[22] In their interpretation this equates to bloodshed, and thus the purification from an ἐλάστερος is a purification from blood-guilt.[23] It is even possible that this purification was intended for those who had committed homicide during a period of *stasis*, although this cannot be determined for certain.[24] Robertson, however, interprets αὐτορρέκτ̣ας as referring to one who offers a purificatory sacrifice on his own, and therefore we should not automatically assume an instance of manslaughter or homicide.[25] Regardless of the meaning of αὐτορρέκτ̣ας, however, the presence of rituals to purify oneself from an ἐλάστερος are likely indicative of social strife of some kind at Selinous. This would certainly be the case if they were meant to purify individuals from blood-guilt, but even if not, one would have to question how they came to be the target of vengeful spirits in the first place. Regardless of how this was believed to occur, it was certainly the case that many inhabitants of Selinous became the target of curse tablets.

As for the curse tablets themselves, many of the examples from Selinous, even among those that are still legible, do not appear to belong to any known genre (such as judiciary spells).[26] Rather, they consist simply of a list of names with no evidence of the offenses the listed persons have caused toward the dedicator of the tablet, nor of any intended effect (such as erotic desire or economic ruin). Due to the early date of the Selinous tablets, it could be that these particular examples would have been accompanied by oral rites at the time of their dedication and therefore constitute relics attesting to the evolution of cursing in the Greek world from a purely oratorical practice to one dominated by physical and non-ephemeral material.[27] This hypothesis is complicated somewhat, however, by the fact that there exist contemporaneous examples from Selinous consisting of fully developed judiciary spells.[28] Thus, while it is possible, and is indeed likely the case, that intermediaries between oral and physical practices of cursing existed at Selinous at a coterminous point with fully developed curse tablets, these examples should not be grouped with the contemporaneous judiciary spells found on site. Although it is plausible that these lists of names consisted of opponents in a trial, without the presence of corroborating epigraphical evidence it is currently impossible to assign them to a particular genre of curse. This does not mean, however, that these lists are useless in a study of the practice of cursing at Selinous. Indeed, these lists can be of use in an attempt to determine the linguistic origins of the names therein, thereby giving us clues as to the ethnic makeup of the city and perhaps whether inter-ethnic strife was indeed a part of the social fabric of Selinous.[29]

Concerning the topic of inter-ethnic strife, certain relevant examples of Selinuntine curse tablets which might serve as indicators of intercultural contact and influence bear discussion. Due to limitations in space, I shall analyse three examples which demonstrate both the applicability of these tablets in determining the ethnic makeup of Selinous as well as the difficulties of their interpretation. One particular tablet reads:[30]

recto.
Σελιν<ό>ντιος
[κ]ạὶ ha Σελινο-
ντίο γλõσ(σ)α ἀπεσ-

τραμ(μ)έν’ ἐπ’ ἀτ<ε>λ-
είαι τᾶι τέ|ν|ον | ἐν|γράφο
καὶ τõν ξένον συν-
δίϙον {συνδίκων} τὰς γλόσ(σ)ας ἀπε-
στραμ(μ)ένας ἐπ’ ἀτε-
λείαι τᾶι τένον
ἐνγρạ́φο.

verso.
Τιμασòι καὶ ha Τιμασõς γλõσ(σ)α [ἀ]πεστραμ(μ)έ-
ναν ἐπ’ ἀτελείαι τᾶι τένο¯ν ἐ<ν>γράφο
Τυρρανὰ καὶ ha [Τυρρ]ανᾶς γλõσ(σ)α [ἀπε]στρ-
αμ(μ)έναν ἐπ’ ἀτελείαι τ[ᾶι τ]ένο¯ν ἐ<ν>γ[ράφο] | πάντον[31].

recto.
Selinontios
And the tongue of Selinontios
Is turned back
To unfulfillment.
I inscribe as well
The tongues of his foreign witnesses-
Turned back
To unfulfillment
I inscribe
Their [tongues].

verso.
Timasos’ tongue and Timasos I inscribe-
Turned back to their unfulfillment.
Tyrrhana and Tyrrhana’s tongue I inscribe-
Turned back to the unfulfillment of them all.

This tablet is listed as number twenty in Luca Bettarini’s Corpus *delle* defixiones *di Selinunte*. It is of interest chiefly for its style of composition and the potential clues it offers as to the ethnic makeup of Selinous in the period in which it was inscribed. Written in the early 5th century,[32] this curse provides an example of a judiciary spell from Selinous. The genre to which this curse belongs is made clear due to the foreign witnesses listed as victims in the text. What is remarkable, however, is the unity between the vocabulary used in the curse and the object on which the curse was written. In this curse we read that the tongues of the victims are ‘turned back toward unfulfillment’. This language is mirrored by the curse having been inscribed on a circular lead disc and in spiral script on the reverse.[33] Thus, just as the tongues of the victims are turned back, so too is the text through which they are cursed.

The other main point of interest in this example is the apparent use of gentilic adjectives to name particular victims of the curse, along with the cursing of what I render (based on ξένον συνδίϙον) as ‘foreign witnesses’. There is currently no evidence as to where these witnesses might be from or even exactly what classifies them *xenoi*, though there are numerous possible interpretations. One possible explanation is that they were labelled this way because they were from a different Sicilian *polis* such as Akragas. Another possibility is that they were resident aliens of Greek descent residing in Selinous. It is even possible that they were non-Greek residents of the city, or that they were non-Greeks from a different city in alliance with Greeks at Selinous. This last possibility was more probable on Sicily than elsewhere in the Greek world. Being a primarily aristocratic institution, *xenia* depended upon the viability of the aristocracy. Furthermore, since aristocracies in Greek Sicily were more unstable than those on the mainland they developed a greater reliance on international connections.[34] These international connections included not only Greeks from other *poleis*, but

Etruscans and, in particular, Carthaginians as well. Therefore, the institution of *xenia* as it existed on Sicily made the island a common ground for Greek and Punic culture, in addition to the native, Italic, and Etruscan cultures that were found on the island as well.[35] This hypothesis is further supported by the presence of the name Tyrrhana, which Sophie Bouffier translates as 'the Tyrrhenian woman' and who could have been in alliance with the community of Selinous.[36] Thus, the possibility that these 'foreign witnesses' were non-Greek must not be discounted. Nevertheless, all that can be determined for certain is that certain individuals' relationship with the man listed as Selinontios classified them as *xenoi*. Regardless, the fact that they are described as such in this curse is perhaps indicative of the social conflict within Selinous in the 5th century. This is seen again in the name Selinontios. Hence, two of the victims appear to be named only as 'the Selinuntine man' and, as stated above, 'the Tyrrhenian woman.' It should be noted, however, that in Laurent Dubois' analysis of the text he states that these names do not designate the victims' ethnicities, although he gives no explanation as to why.[37] Thus, if these two names are in fact demonyms then this particular text would offer evidence both for the use of gentilic adjectives as a substitute for proper names in curse tablets and for Etruscan contact of some sort via the appearance of the name Tyrrhana. The cursing of foreign witness along with Tyrrhana would also provide evidence of social strife.

Dubois' statement ought not to be dismissed entirely, however. While it is conceivable that the use of the gentilic Tyrrhana could have been sufficiently precise for the curse to target effectively the particular victim its dedicator had in mind, one would be hard pressed to believe the same about Selinontios, given that this particular curse was dedicated at Selinous and could therefore target any number of Selinuntine men. Still, it may have been the case that the dedicator of this curse reasoned that this would be sufficient and, as I shall discuss below, there appear to be separate cases of the use of demonyms in the Selinuntine corpus of curse tablets.

The second text to be discussed reads as follows:

Χάμις ἐπέχ̣ο
κα<ὶ> νόσο ῥοπᾶι

ἐπ’ ἀτελείαι ho-
τ̣[ι] κα[··]ε̣[··]ο̣ντι.[38]
I, Chamis, hold [the victim] down
And in a crisis of illness
May whatever they wish
Go unfulfilled.

Appearing as number seventeen in the Bettarini volume, this tablet was composed in the period 500–450 on a rectangular lead lamina that was folded into four parts.[39] I choose to analyse this text not only for its potential as an indicator of inter-cultural contact but also because it illustrates well the difficulty of interpreting these texts. As for the name in the first line of the tablet, I present Bettarini’s transliteration, which gives what appears to be the name Chamis in the nominative. Thus, the first line of the text would translate to ‘I, Chamis, hold down [the intended victim]’. This reading does present difficulties, however. Namely, there does not appear to be a subject for the verb ‘to hold down’. It is possible that the subject of the verb came further down in a part of the text now broken, but from what we have left of the tablet it is impossible to know for certain.

Laurent Dubois, however, presents two alternative possibilities. The first is that what we have left of the text does not contain a name at all. Rather, Dubois argues that the first word should be rendered χαμαί or ‘on the ground’ and treats the following sigma as an abbreviated 2nd person singular accusative masculine pronoun.[40] Thus, the first line would read ‘I hold you down on the ground’. The second possibility retains the interpretation of the sigma as a pronoun but renders the first word of the text as Χάμι, with the interpretation that this is the vocative of an indigenous name.[41] Thus, the first line of the text would read ‘O Chamis, I hold you down’. Lastly, it is possible that ‘Chamis’ is the correct way to transcribe the text but instead of deriving from an indigenous name Chamis is an unusual Greek name that comes from χάσκω: to yawn/to gape, or from χήμη: yawning/gaping and could be translated along the lines of ‘seashell’.[42] Regardless, the first line of this text remains controversial.

The rest of the text presents difficulties as well, due to the fact that its incomplete nature makes it difficult to ascertain exactly what constituted the objective of the curse. The second line contains the phrase νόσο ῥοπᾶι, which roughly translates to a 'crisis of illness,' although it is unclear what this means specifically. Nevertheless, the ultimate objective here is apparently that whatever the victims of the curse desire go unfulfilled. That there were in fact multiple victims inscribed on this tablet is demonstrated by the third person plural ending of a now illegible verb at the end of this text (ο̣ντι). In spite of the evidence we can gather about the objective of this curse, however, it remains impossible to assign it definitively to any of the genres outlined above. While it is entirely plausible that this is another judiciary spell due to the preponderance of examples of this genre in the Selinuntine corpus, on account of the fragmentary nature of the tablet this cannot be confirmed. Still, as a further indicator of contact with non-Greeks at Selinous and as an example of the ways in which interpretation of these tablets might vary, this remains an enlightening example.

Lastly, there is inscription number 23 in the Bettarini volume, commonly known as the Great *Defixio* of Selinous:

> [Ἀ]πελον τὸν Λυκίνο κα{κα}ταγράφο {καταγράφο} πὰρ τὰν hαγνὰν
> [θ]εὸν τὰν ψυχὰν αὐτõ καὶ τὰν δύνασιν καὶ Λυκῖνον
> τὸν hάλο hυιὸν καὶ τὸν ἀδελφεὸν αὐτõ· καὶ αὐτὸν
> πὰρ τὰν hαγνὰν θεὸν τὸν Ναύερο<ν> τὸν hάλο hυιὸν
> καὶ Βοτυλον τὸν Ταμίραντος καὶ τὸς hυιὸς
> καὶ Σαριν καὶ Ἀπελον καὶ Ῥõμιν τὸν Καιλίο{ν} πὰρ τὰν hαγνὰ<ν> θε-
> ὸν καὶ τὸς hυιὸς καὶ Σαριν τὸν Πυρ(ρ)ίνο καὶ Πύρ(ρ)ον
> τὸν Πύρ(ρ)ο{ν} πὰρ τὰν hαγνὰν θεόν· καὶ τὸς Ῥοτύ-
> λο hυιὸς τõ Πύρ(ρ)ο πὰρ τὰν hαγνὰν θεὸν καὶ
> δύνασιν καὶ γλόσ(σ)ας· Πλακίταν τὸν Ναννελαίο
> καὶ hάλον τὸν Πυκελεί<ο> ἐγὸ τὰν ψυχὰν καταγρά-
> φο πὰρ τὰν hαγνὰν θεὸν καὶ δύνασιν αὐτõ[ν]·
> Καδοσιν τὸν Ματυλαίο καὶ Ἐκοτιν τὸν Μάγον̣<ος>
> ἐ̣νκαταγρά{ο}φο {ἐνκαταγράφο} πὰρ τὰν hαγνὰν θεὸν τὰ<ν> ψυχὰν
> αὐτõν· τὸν Φο<ί>νικος hυιὸν τõ Καιλίο καταγράφο
> πὰρ τὰν hαγνὰν θεόν. Ἀπελος Λυκίνο, Λυκῖνος Πύρ(ρ)ο,
> Ναν(ν)ελαιος, Ἐϙοτις Μάγονος, hαλος Πυκελείο{ν}, Ῥõμις Καιλ-
> ίο{ν}, Ἀπελος ho Φοίνιϙος {Φοίνικος}, Τιτ(τ)ελος Φοίνιϙος,

Ἀτ(τ)ος Ναυεριάδα,
Τιτ(τ)ελος Ναν(ν)ελαίο{ν}, Σαρις Ῥόμιος.[43]

I inscribe Apelos the son of Lukinos to the holy goddess,
His soul and his power and Lukinos
The son of Halos and his brother: And
To the holy goddess [I inscribe] Naueros himself the son of Halos
And Botylos the son of Tamiras and his sons and Saris
And Apelos and Rhômis and Kailios [I inscribe] to the holy goddess
And his sons and Saris the son of Pyrrhinos and Pyrrhos
The son of Pyrrhos [I inscribe] to the holy goddess: And the sons
Of Rhotylus the son of Pyrrhos [I inscribe] to the holy goddess,

Both their power and their tongues: [As for] Plakitas the son of Nannelaios
And Halos the son of Pykeleios, I inscribe their soul
To the holy goddess and their power:
[As for] Kadosis the son of Matylaios and Ekotis the son of Magôn
I inscribe to the holy goddess their soul:
I inscribe Phoinix/the Phoenician man the son of Kailios
To the holy goddess. Apelos the son of Lukinos, Lukinos the son of Pyrrhos,
Nannelaios, Eqotis the son of Magôn, Halos the son of Pykeleios, Rhômis the son of Kailios,
Apelos the son of Phoinix/the Phoenician man, Tittelos the son of Phoinix/the Phoenician man, Attos
The son of Nauerias, Tittelos the son of Nannelaios, Saris the son of Rhômis.

The tablet in question here is the largest among the Selinuntine corpus and perhaps the one which has proven the most fruitful for the study of curse tablets at the site. It was inscribed ca. 500–450 on a rectangular lead lamina and placed in the sanctuary of Malophoros.[44] It frequently invokes the power of the so-called 'holy goddess,' although the exact identity of the deity remains unclear. Dubois states that she is likely Persephone.[45] and it is quite possible that this is the case, although since the tablet was found in the sanctuary of Malophoros (*i.e.* the 'Fruit-Bearer) it is also possible that we should identify her as Demeter.[46] That an agricultural-chthonic deity was invoked in this curse should come as no surprise, however. Indeed, the *poleis* of Sicily witnessed a fusion of local deities of agriculture with the Greek gods of the Netherworld.[47] Thus, these divinities would have been worshiped broadly in the Greek city-states of Sicily as well as feared for their control over the powers of the Netherworld. Clear evidence of this is seen from the sanctuaries of Malophoros and Zeus Meilichios at Selinous, as well as the *defixiones* found within them.[48] Nevertheless, it is unclear as to what genre of curse this example belongs. A large number of men and their sons are cursed, along with their tongues, their power, and their souls. Due to the curses upon their power (essentially, their ability to act) and upon their faculties of speech, it seems likely that this is an example of a judiciary spell, although this cannot be determined for certain.

This tablet is, however, a particularly fruitful source of information regarding the ethnic makeup of Selinous in the 5th century. The names listed in this curse derive from multiple origins and offer insight into the cultures with which the people of Selinous had contact. First of all, there are the names of Greek origin. These include Lukinos, Pyrrhos, Pyrrhinos, and Plakitas.[49] There are also two names of apparent Sikel origin. These names are Apelos and Tittelos.[50] In addition to these, there are the Etrusco-Italic names Rhotylos, Kailios, Matylaios, Pykeleios (which, respectively, could correspond to the Italic Rutulus and the Latin Caelius, Matellius, and Puculeius/ Buculeius, respectively), as well as Rhômis.[51] Lastly, the name Magôn is of Semitic origin and was often found in the Carthaginian military hierarchy,[52] while the names Ekotis/Eqotis, Kadosis, Saris, Halos, Attos, Tamiras, and Nannelaios are of unclassifiable origin, although according to Laurent Dubois the names Tamiras and Nannelaios may be Asiatic.[53]

Thus, in addition to the presence of Greeks, we see evidence for peoples of Italic and Etruscan, Semitic, and native Sikel heritage residing at Selinous, along with individuals whose origins we cannot ascertain. As a final note, the name Phoinix ought to be examined more closely. While it is entirely possible that this name was given to a man of Greek origin, as both Dubois and Renato Arena state in their readings of this text,[54] one could also read Phoinix as a gentilic, and thus translate it as ‘the Phoenician man,’ as Bouffier believes it should be.[55] This name, along with Tyrrhana and the names of Sikana and Leukana, which are also attested from

Selinous, could indicate a pattern at Selinous of referring to foreigners by gentilic adjectives.[56] With the limited evidence available, it is currently impossible to know for sure, but if the names of Selinontios and Tyrrhana from Bettarini 20 above are in fact gentilic substantive adjectives as opposed to proper names then there could be the possibility for a precedent of such use in the Selinuntine corpus of curse tablets, thereby enabling Phoinix to be read as a demonym as well.

Lastly, we might question what this plethora of names can tell us about the social make-up of the city of Selinous prior to its destruction. What was it that caused the person or persons who composed this tablet to feel the need to curse such a large and diverse group of people? One likely possibility is that they were rivals or witnesses in a legal imbroglio. It is also possible that they were competitors in business, although this seems less likely given that there are no other known curses against business competitors from the site. Or perhaps, given the large number of names listed under the curse, the author(s) of this text simply considered them their enemies for a multitude of reasons. Unfortunately, from the evidence currently available we have no way of knowing. What we can discern, however, is that prior to its destruction in 409 the city of Selinous was inhabited by people from multiple cultural backgrounds, which included individuals of Greek, Italic, Etruscan, Sikel, and Semitic heritage. Furthermore, while there is not yet enough evidence to determine whether ethnicity itself was a cause of social tension and strife, the large number of curse tablets from Selinous at least demonstrate that the city experienced a significant degree of conflict.

The *lex sacra* and the *defixiones* of Selinous are indicative of a city that was at once a melting pot of people from numerous cultural backgrounds and a site of citizens at odds amongst themselves. While it cannot yet be determined that the multicultural dynamic at Selinous was itself a cause of this tension, the various ethnicities listed on the curse tablets seem to indicate that it was a factor. The purificatory rituals of the *lex sacra*, moreover, appear to anticipate social tension or even *stasis*, and so provide a means for citizens to purify themselves after the conflict had ended. More research is required if we are to possess an in-depth knowledge of the ethnic and cultural interaction that took place at Selinous, but for now it must suffice to say that it was a *polis* of diverse citizens and residents, sometimes working with each other, and sometimes against one another. And while this knowledge can serve to undercut popular notions of mono-ethnic Greek *poleis,* it also demonstrates that, even if in a somewhat different form, we must take caution in assuming that the multi-ethnic city-states of the ancient Greek world were devoid of the problems that arise in multi-ethnic cities of our own time.

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[1] This research is based in part on my dissertation, titled *The* κατάδεσμοι *of Selinous: Intermediaries between Near Eastern and Greek Traditions of Cursing*. It is meant, first and foremost, to pose questions and prompt discussion about the nature of the social fabric of the city of Selinous and whether this fabric was particularly frayed in comparison with other Sicilian and Greek city-states of the time.

[2] See Ianucci *et al.* 2015, 9–30.

[3] For an overview on the coexistence of ethnic and cultural groups in western Sicily see Ampolo 2012.

[4] See De Vido 2009a, 111–126.

[5] On this topic see, for example, Dubois 1989, 39–54 and Bettarini 2005.

[6] Jameson *et al.* 1993, 125.

[7] Bouffier 2010, 89.

[8] Bremmer 2010, 17.

[9] Bremmer 2010, 17.

[10] Jameson *et al.* 1993, 125.

[11] Eidinow 2007, 140–141.

[12] See Audollent 1904.

[13] Graf 1997, 120.

[14] Ianucci *et al.* 2015, 13.

[15] Crippa *et al.* 2009, 95.

[16] Bremmer 2010, 17.

[17] See Bettarini 2005.

[18] See Carbon 2015, 165–204.

[19] Robertson 2010, 213.

[20] Robertson 2010, 229–233.

[21] Jameson *et al.* 1993, 54.

[22] Robertson 2010, 214.

[23] Jameson *et al.* 1993, 54.

[24] Jameson *et al.* 1993, 57–58.
[25] Robertson 2010, 225–228.
[26] See Bettarini 2005.
[27] Murano 2012, 634.
[28] See, for example, Bettarini 20 (= *SEG* 4.37).
[29] In particular, see Bettarini 23 (=*SEG* 16.573), discussed at length further below.
[30] All transcriptions are taken from Bettarini 2005. All translations are my own.
[31] Bettarini 20 = *SEG* 4.37.
[32] Bettarini 2005, 95.
[33] Bettarini 2005, 103.
[34] Berger 1992, 86.
[35] Berger 1992, 86–87.
[36] Bouffier 2010, 93.
[37] Dubois 1989, 49.
[38] Bettarini 17 = *SEG* 26.1115.
[39] Bettarini 2005, 87.
[40] Dubois 1989, 42–43.
[41] Dubois 1989, 43.
[42] Curbera 2009, 108.
[43] Bettarini 23 = *SEG* 16.573.
[44] Bettarini 2005, 112.
[45] Dubois 1989, 51.
[46] White 1967, 335.
[47] Berger 1992, 75–76.
[48] See Grotta 2010, 7–61.
[49] Dubois 1989, 51.
[50] Dubois 1989, 52.
[51] Dubois 1989, 52.
[52] Antonetti *et al.* 2006, 421.
[53] Dubois 1989, 52.
[54] Dubois 1989, 51; Arena 1989, 64.
[55] Bouffier 2010, 102.
[56] Antonetti and De Vido 2006b, 421.

Chapter 8

Energising the economy: present results and future directions[1]

Franco De Angelis

La guerra ha alimentato l'economia della Sicilia greca e ha contribuito sia all'intensificazione dei tratti economici intrinseci alla società che allo sviluppo di nuove caratteristiche. Il ruolo della guerra nell'economia dell'isola è ben noto. Al contrario, meno chiare sono le cause dei diversi episodi bellici, anche a giudicare dalle eterogenee spiegazioni avanzate negli ultimi duecento anni. Lo scopo di questo contributo è duplice. In primo luogo, si vuole mettere in discussione il paragone, in essere a partire dalle fonti del V secolo a.C., tra le guerre della Sicilia greca contro Cartagine e le guerre della Grecia contro la Persia. Un simile parallelo storiografico ha infatti gettato la Sicilia e il Mediterraneo occidentale nel suo insieme in un quadro narrativo fuorviante che ha oscurato i veri moventi della guerra, da ricercare piuttosto all'interno dell'isola e del suo territorio. Le nostre prime ricerche suggeriscono che il controllo delle risorse e delle reti economiche potrebbe essere stato uno dei motori principali delle guerre di Sicilia. In secondo luogo in questo contributo ci proponiamo di andare oltre il troppo generale assunto che la guerra è motore dell'economia, per pervenire a un'analisi particolareggiata dei fenomeni per area e per campagna militare. Sosteniamo infatti che questa direzione della ricerca – l'indagine

condotta per casi studio sul legame tra guerra ed economia – rappresenti un terreno fertile e bisognoso di approfondimento. Nella parte conclusiva proponiamo alcune direzioni future di analisi, facendo un bilancio degli studi attuali su guerra ed economia nella Sicilia arcaica e classica e mostrando le potenzialità euristiche di un nuovo approccio al tema.

What caused war to happen in pre-Roman Sicily? In her introduction to this volume, Melanie Jonasch has outlined the various theories advanced over the past 200 years to explain the causes of violence and war. These theories include sociobiological, cultural and economic factors. This paper will focus primarily on the economic factors, while not ignoring altogether the other two. I will approach the question via two inter-related strands. I will argue, first, that economic factors played a part in causing warfare in pre-Roman Sicily and so should be included, more than they currently are, among the causes for explaining this important historical phenomenon. Second, I will argue that warfare energised the economy, that, in other words, even if one disagrees with the idea that economic factors caused warfare in pre-Roman Sicily, warfare had important effects on the economy. Whether we are talking about the World Wars or Classical Sicily, warfare contributed to both the intensification of a society's pre-existing economic features and the development of new ones. Warfare's role in growing and developing the economy to all parties involved is well known. The challenge for the historian of ancient warfare lies in moving beyond these well-known large generalisations to scaling down the discussion to a particular state or a particular military campaign. This paper argues that this is where the situation is at with regard to pre-Roman Sicily. It takes stock of the present results regarding warfare and economy in Archaic and Classical Sicily and compares them to the kind of knowledge we ideally should, and could, have. Some future directions are also suggested in order to energise this field, with a view to taking us closer to revealing the dynamics between warfare and economy in pre-Roman Sicily.

Economics as a cause for Sicilian warfare

I turn to the first part of my paper that economic factors played a part in causing warfare to happen in pre-Roman Sicily and so should be included, more than they currently are, among the causes for explaining this important historical phenomenon.

I begin my argument by sending out a few warning shots against the usual factor put forward for causing war in pre-Roman times, namely ethnocentrism and its associated political and cultural dimensions. For historians of the Archaic and Classical Greek worlds, the Persian Wars have, of course, played a decisive role in shaping ancient and modern perceptions of what caused them to happen beyond this particular conflict. Classicists and non-classicists alike have recently challenged the central role of the Persian Wars. They have stressed two general points of relevance here.[2] The first emphasises the problematic nature and periodisation of the ancient texts upon which modern scholars have built an idealised picture of a kind of proto-nationalist struggle of western freedom versus eastern autocracy. These ancient texts, as is now generally well known, are self-consciously ethnocentric, xenophobic and prejudicial. The second point is related and concerns questioning the homogeneous and clearly bounded cultural and political behaviour demanded of such views, in which the collective actions of a group, in this case all Greeks, are assigned cohesive attributes and personality traits marching in lock-step against an inimical Other, in this case the Persians. This line of thinking, moreover, shares the laudable approach of setting any incidents of conflict and warfare against a long-term historical perspective in which we are better able to gauge whether any short-term actions have the explanatory power credited to them against a more consistent canvas of cultural interaction. What this discussion has taught me is that it can be transferred to other regions and periods of ancient history, such as the Carthaginian-Greek wars in Sicily, and that, accordingly, we must be careful of making assumptions and following the rhetoric, stereotypes and discourses of our ancient and modern sources. In other words, we must look beyond any claims of cultural and ethnic motives to see if there are different possible underlying realities.

Besides these theoretical considerations, two further points regarding pre-Roman Sicily may be made. The first concerns ancient historiography.[3] Herodotus' synchronism (7.166) that the Battles of Salamis and Himera took place on the very same day in Greece and Sicily has to be viewed in its historiographical context and as politically motivated metahistory seeking to foster Panhellenism. For these reasons, although Herodotus put the Greeks' wars against Persia and Carthage on a parallel track, we must be cognisant of the historiographical motivation behind this and question the validity of thinking about them in the same terms. The second point entails setting Herodotus' supposed synchronism against a long-term historical perspective of Carthaginian-Greek realities in Sicily. Robin Osborne has summed up these realities well as follows:

> Between them, the Delphic Charioteer and the Motya youth indicate the two faces of the western Greeks. One face maintained that they were part of the world of mainland Greek cities, sharing their values. The other face belonged in a world where Greeks were only one group among many, competing and cooperating by turns with rather scant regard for ethnic origins. The continuing history of the cities of Sicily repeatedly displays the tension between these two sides, as Greeks from the mainland, both in what they do and in what they write about Sicily, assume that it is the Delphic Charioteer with which they have come face to face, only to discover that somehow in Sicily the familiar always becomes unfamiliar, and the rules are different. The importance of the events of 480 BC [*i.e.*, the Persian and Carthaginian Wars] in this ongoing story lies in the fact that only by understanding the difference between what went on in the Greek mainland and what went on in Sicily can we understand the divergent histories of the two areas. Along with the Persians, the mainland Greeks repelled the cultures of the east: classical Greece was culturally isolated in a way that archaic Greece had not been. But the defeat of the Carthaginians at Himera meant no such divorce for the western Greek world: the Carthaginians maintained a presence in Sicily and, unlike the Persians, they would before long be back there active as a military force. In the meantime contact with that world had commercial advantages…. The world of classical Greek Sicily was in many ways but the archaic world writ large. The same could not be said of the world of mainland Greece.[4]

Because of Sicily's extensive intercultural and interethnic interactions and integration, including longstanding commercial ones, warfare caused solely because of cultural and ethnic factors seems implausible for this reason too.

Part of the problem here also has to do, no doubt, with our modern framings of the role of the economy in ancient life. There is an immense contrast between the importance we give the economy in today's world as to compared to how little importance we give the economy in the ancient world. There is a whole Wikipedia page, for instance, devoted to 'It's the Economy, Stupid'.[5] To refresh the reader on the background of this now famous phrase, we have to go back to the 1992 US Presidential Election between Bill Clinton and the late George W. Bush senior. James Carville, Clinton's campaign strategist, coined the phrase 'The Economy, Stupid' as one of the three messages that the campaign team were instructed to focus on with voters. The phrase subsequently developed into 'It's the Economy, Stupid'. It has become a so-called snowclone, spurring on the creation of other neologisms that start with the contraction 'It's' and end with whatever the coiner seeks to emphasise, such as, to cite only two economic-related creations: 'It's the deficit, stupid' and 'It's the math, stupid'. The fact that the original phrase and its variant have stuck and been applied to other situations is precisely because we live in an economically-minded world, in which whatever the country or language, the economy dominates political and social discourse because of its central importance in all our lives.

Generally speaking, we lack this same economic-mindedness when we study antiquity. One might be asking oneself right now: do I run the risk of transferring this given of our time – 'It's the Economy, Stupid' mindset – onto antiquity without wondering whether it properly belongs there? The answer is a resounding 'no'. In fact, the economy had a more central role in antiquity than most classicists seem to be aware of, judging from the pointed, though meant to be encouraging, comments in this very vein made in recent publications. The editors of the *Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* state at the very beginning of their introduction how Greco-Roman economic historians have transformed their subject through new publications, new questions, and new methods over the past two generations, but lament how 'their advances are as yet barely known outside the specialist community'.[6] After reviewing the main features of this transformation, and how their volume relates to it and surpasses it, they make two more revealing statements for our purposes: 'The cultural achievements of classical Mediterranean civilization rested on a remarkable economic efflorescence'[7] and 'The Greco-Roman world generated a distinct Iron Age economics, involving much larger movements of staples through markets, concentrations of people in cities, extensive monetization, and investment in the stock of knowledge. Puny as these developments were compared with what has happened since the 18th century, they were unprecedented.'[8] I doubt whether any of the significance of these points has sunk in with Classical scholarship at large, beyond that of economic history *per se*, when we read similar interjections in the most recent economic history of the ancient Mediterranean published by Joseph Manning.[9] Throughout his introduction, we can find sentences like 'Why does any of this matter? Because understanding the structure of premodern economic behavior is an important window into ancient life more broadly'[10] and 'I hope … to give the reader a sense of how large, how dynamic, how rich and varied, and how deeply interesting the study of ancient economies has become …'.[11] What I want to emphasise most strongly from these quotations is that economics are intrinsically crucial to anyone interested in Classical antiquity, and that this importance is not a figment of the modern imagination projecting issues and values from the present onto the world of antiquity where they were not similarly important. For this reason, economics belong to and are relevant to all of us studying antiquity, whether or not we consider ourselves economic historians at all, in part, or in whole.

Further support for this point can be found in the words and actions of the ancients themselves. I begin by illustrating this by coming back to the point made earlier about how war is not necessarily caused by nationalism or proto-nationalism alone with an ancient example relevant to Sicily, namely Thucydides and the Athenian invasion of Syracuse. Thucydides was, and is, of course the master of historical causation, making a distinction, as no doubt his fellow Athenians did too, between the superficial or claimed cause of action (the so-called *prophasis*) and the deeper or real cause of an action. Throughout his work, Thucydides and his Athenians often talk about striking up alliances or coming to the aid of Ionians for reasons of kinship. This kinship diplomacy is pervasive and is discussed throughout one of the standard histories of this period by

Simon Hornblower,[12] who agrees that it usually conceals a deeper causation.[13] The best example of this kinship diplomacy 'smokescreen' concerns Leontini in Sicily in 424 BC, where Thucydides puts this starkly: 'The allies of the Leontines now sent to Athens and appealed to their ancient alliance and to their Ionian origin, to persuade the Athenians to send them a fleet, as the Syracusans were blockading them by land and sea. The Athenians sent it upon the plea of their common descent, but in reality to prevent the exportation of Sicilian grain to the Peloponnese and to test the possibility of bringing Sicily into subjection'.[14] Later on, in book 6, as the Athenians launched into the invasion of Sicily, Thucydides attributes solely economic motives to his fellow Athenians, the earlier fictive claims of kinship being nowhere to be seen. He says that the democratic masses and soldiers supported the invasion because of dreams of endless pay that Sicily might bring them.[15] Still later Thucydides has the turncoat Alcibiades, now speaking from Sparta where he had sought refuge, make a speech to convince the Spartans to send aid to Syracuse, so that it would not fall into Athenian hands. In doing so, Alcibiades emphasizes this same economic importance of Sicily to Athens' revenues to pay for its soldiers, but he also adds how securing Sicily's grain supply could also be used to support a military assault on the Peloponnese, through the back door so to speak, by the Athenians.[16] It was the risk of these economic assets falling out of Syracuse's hands into those of the Athenians that caused the Spartans to act and to reopen the Peloponnesian War by supporting the theater of war in Sicily. The control of economic resources, or at least having favorable access to them, is not just found in Thucydides; it can also be found in the roughly contemporary work by the so-called Old Oligarch (2.11).

The importance of economics is not just a peculiarity of the Athenian Empire. In fact, it could be argued that the Athenian Empire was following in the footsteps of acquiring economic resources and networks that had developed in Sicily and the western Mediterranean as a whole at an earlier date. In the 6th century, we witness growing competition for natural and human resources, which resulted in the formation of larger states and the forging of alliances between sovereign states. These alliances could include trade treaties, such as those between Carthage and Rome.[17] In general, spheres of influence were delineated and enforced, sometimes with outright blockades.[18] If we return to Herodotus (7.154.2–4) in his account of Gelon and his reaction to the Athenian and Spartan ambassadors who came seeking help to fight the Persians, we see that it is because of economics that Gelon reproached the ambassadors. He had not received help from Greece in freeing the emporia, a point that Herodotus thought worthwhile to put in Gelon's mouth. According to Michel Gras,[19] these emporia are to be viewed as trade routes (and not necessarily to be associated with particular cities, like Himera and Selinous), which Gelon and Carthage were in dispute over in the Sicilian Channel. Herodotus is referring to a situation that plausibly reflects a historical reality in Sicily and the western Mediterranean.[20] Herodotus' synchronism that the Battles of Salamis and Himera occurred on the very same day may have served a particular historiographical purpose, but his causation for the war between Carthage and Syracuse is clearly ascribed to another: economics. Gras is not the only modern scholar to underline the importance of trade. Frank Schleicher has recently argued for trade as the reason for Selinous' destruction at the hands of Carthage in 409 BC.[21] All these Sicily-based arguments gain in further plausibility when we zoom out to the larger western Mediterranean and comparative contexts. Andrew Wallace-Hadrill explains the long-term political and military trajectory in the pre-Roman western Mediterranean as a battle ultimately between Carthaginian, western Greek, and Roman economic networks.[22] In world history, globalisation, commercialisation and competition have always gone hand in hand, and have often been accompanied by accelerating rates of innovation and hostility and violence.[23]

The ancients, through their accounts, recognised and talked openly about something we have only seriously started to reappreciate in the 21st century – that the historical ecology of the Mediterranean was micro-regional, and that, as a result, its space was more interconnected and economically interdependent than most modern historical accounts, including those devoted to warfare, have realised. In emphasising the economy, I am not arguing for a monocausal explanation and reasserting the *homo* *economicus* line characteristic of scholarship dealing with modern warfare.[24] I recognise that while kinship and proto-nationalism may have served as the initial ‘smokescreen’ for the Athenians to get involved in Sicily, and that conflict and warfare could, in the minds of some, have been partly caused by cultural and ethnic factors, Herodotus and Thucydides remind us that we need to include economic factors. In general, we need to have a healthy suspicion of our ancient sources, which should be analysed carefully for what are, in effect, historiographical discourses that have predisposed us to thinking about the causes of warfare.

Economics as an effect of Sicilian warfare

Even if one disagrees with the idea that economic factors caused warfare in pre-Roman Sicily, warfare had important effects on the economy. Warfare energised the economy once it started and contributed to both the intensification of a society’s pre-existing economic features and the development of new ones. Where do we stand on this matter with regard to pre-Roman Sicily? I take stock of the present state of play regarding warfare and economy in Archaic and Classical Sicily and compare them to the kind of knowledge we ideally should, and could, have.

Let me begin by addressing a challenge that exists for the historian of warfare. We have many recent works, especially in the French tradition, that have outlined the relationship between warfare, economy, and society.[25] Many other similar works could have easily been cited from this and other traditions in other languages, but the results of this exercise would have essentially been the same. For the point that I would like to make concerns the scale of the discussion. It is easy enough to talk about war, society, and economy when one uses all of the Greek world, in the case of Garlan’s book, when one focuses on all of the Classical Greek world in the case of the edited book by Prost and the special edition of *Pallas*, or when reviewing a selection of recent works (not just those published in French) that span the Archaic, Classical, and Hellenistic worlds, as Couvenhes, Péré-Noguès do in their round-up. One would think that we now know everything we need to know about warfare, society and economy that there is to know for the Archaic, Classical and Hellenistic periods of Greek history from this small selection. Quite to the contrary, however. My comments are *not* intended to belittle the very valuable contributions of these and any other similarly broadly conceived works. It is certainly beneficial to have, for instance, synthetic accounts of booty and plunder, mercenaries, finances and fortifications that sum up the available evidence over wide swathes of time and space. The challenge, I believe, lies in moving beyond such large generalisations to scaling down the discussion and focus in on a particular state or a particular military campaign. I say that because that is precisely the challenge I faced, and was left with, in my recent book.[26] There are many obvious gaps in scholarship, ranging from the seemingly small and irrelevant to the big and glaringly relevant, in what we should and could know about warfare, society and economy. These deserve highlighting, instead of being left buried in this detailed, 500 page book. Let me, in the first instance, focus in on the gaps I drew attention to for the wars of the early 5th and early 4th centuries, as examples of the big and glaringly relevant, and then turn more generally to the Archaic and Classical periods for examples of the seemingly small and irrelevant.

In the 'Economics' chapter, I noted various gaps.[27] How were Hippocrates' soldiers, who made his wars of conquest possible, fed? What impact did these unprecedented demands on sustenance – probably double the usual daily caloric intake – have on agricultural intensification both in Gela's territory and any other territories beyond that might have played a role in supplying his foodstuffs? What about imports of raw materials, like metals, also used in unprecedented quantities for the weapons and coinage that lie at the base of Hippocrates' military machine? The absence of metal deposits from this period creates silences that the researcher should put on a wish-list. For Hippocrates' successor, Gelon, who moved the center of power to Syracuse, establishing the Syracusan territorial state that continued until incorporated by Rome in the 3rd century, other fundamental economic issues require clarification. I think in particular of the surplus grain production that Herodotus attributes to Gelon in speaking to the Athenian and Spartan ambassadors who came for help against the Persians. Research designs that could detect surplus grain production and urbanrural dependency, including the extraction of an agricultural surplus, still remain to be formulated and carried out. The centralised agricultural policies put into place by the Deinomenids, the economic basis that made their power, wars, and empire possible in other words, have been hardly addressed in any kind of systematic way. All sorts of other economic questions could be raised and attempted to be answered, such as land clearance, food storage, the possible existence of a common system of weights and measures across the domains controlled by Deinomenids, and the physical stature of Syracuse's soldiers.[28] What impact did all this have on shipping, port, and communication routes on land and sea? The same problem of scholarly inattention applies even more to the Emmenids of Akragas, whose activities are less documented by literary sources and whose archaeology is thus in greater need of development and diversification.

In the same chapter, I noted significant gaps for the wars and economics of Dionysius I.[29] The physical size of his territorial empire, in terms of land and population, was large by the standards of the time and thus, theoretically speaking, this mere fact alone put the matter of food supply on his agenda in a big way. However, the very, very little we know about Dionysius I's agricultural production throws into stark relief what remains to be done. Again, research designs that could detect surplus grain production and urban-rural dependency, including the extraction of an agricultural surplus, still remain to be formulated and carried out. The centralised agricultural policies put into place by Dionysius I, the economic basis that made his power, wars, and empire possible in other words, have been hardly been addressed, let alone in any way systematic way. Again, as in the case of the Deinomenids and Emmenids, all kinds of economic questions could be raised and attempted to be answered, such as land clearance, food storage, and the possible existence of a common system of weights and measures across the domains controlled by Dionysius I. What impact did all this have on shipping, ports, and communication routes on land and sea?

Many big and glaringly relevant gaps, and probably still others, exist in our knowledge of the economics of the Deinomenids, Emmenids and Dionysius I. As contributions towards rectifying these gaps, I would of course single out the matters raised in several of the contributions in this volume: more and better studies of fortifications, sanctuary dedications, coins, burials and so on. But our wish-list of research does not stop there with the big and glaringly relevant gaps, for what are seemingly small and irrelevant gaps from across the Archaic and Classical periods more generally could also be added to this wish-list. For how can we gauge the significance Sicily's wars in pre-Roman times had on society and economy, if we do not know what characteristics society and economy had before the wars, so as to permit us to compare and contrast the two periods? Therefore, the gaps in our knowledge of pre-war periods are highly relevant for our understanding of the periods of war and that is why I have described these gaps, from across the Archaic and Classical periods more generally, as seemingly small and irrelevant, simply because they might be easily overlooked in the first instance. That does not necessarily mean that I think these other gaps are in any sense less important, since what we are striving for is as complete a picture as we can possibly form. To take one example of what I am getting at, what was the level of production, if any, of salted fish and their associated amphorae before the local armies were mobilised into standing armies and the mercenaries supplementing them came to town? Did war in this case create a completely new economic activity or was a pre-existing economic activity intensified to meet the unprecedented demand for this high quality protein required by the fighting force? The seemingly small and irrelevant could also cover climate and landscapes.

Many of the big and small gaps I have drawn attention to derive from perspectives that are comparative and theoretical in nature. A comparative approach would allow us to appreciate not only the possibilities of developing all our source types, but it would also allow us to appreciate the limitations of all our source types. There is still a tendency to base our accounts of warfare in ancient Sicily on literary sources, which are usually treated with a believe-all attitude characteristic of earlier times. When we have so little ancient literary material to go on, there may be an unwitting reluctance to give up anything through, say, post-modern literary theory. Of course, this is in general a problematic way of going about things, even for more recent periods of history.

I think, for instance, of the observations made in connection with the surface survey conducted in the territory of Centuripe. Here the dissonance has been noted between the discovery of the remains of Canadian military posts from the 1943 campaign around Mt Etna and the official written Canadian military reports which do not mention these posts, otherwise documented only via archaeological finds.[30] The Canadians are no different from other militaries, ancient through modern, in not having the most accurate written records that do not match up with the archaeological record. In addition, as is well known, written sources say only particular things. As we are reminded once again by the editors of the *Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World*, quoted earlier and, this time, still within the first paragraph of their introduction: 'Most ancient historians rely on literary sources produced by and for a leisured elite. These say notoriously little about economics …'[31]. This is perhaps the main reason as to why economics are little discussed in accounts of ancient warfare; the written sources say very little about these activities in the first place and so very little space is given over to economics. Moreover, since archaeology has traditionally taken its stimulus for what questions to ask and investigate from what is generally mentioned in the written sources, that is another handicap presented to the growth and development of what we could call archaeological economics. It is also for these reasons that I began this paper with a general discussion of the causes of warfare found in literary sources, since it is a more widely applicable issue. Therefore, we have to bear in mind the silences inherent in our literary sources regarding things economic, and we should try instead to imagine how this economic factor may have played a role in those cases in which we have neither professed or actual causes directly stated in some written source.

But there is also, of course, the perhaps even-harder-to-face situation of the limitations of all our source types. What about all the military training and preparation that make war possible? It is often said that war is mostly about waiting and training for the big day or big campaign. To help the reader appreciate what I am getting at here, let me take the example that I use in teaching the military innovations of Philip II of Macedon. Diodorus Siculus

(16.3.1–3) and other sources, for instance, have very little to say about all the hours of training that went into producing the best army in the ancient world in the second half of the 4th century BC. That is not something due to the lateness with which contemporary ancient writers took note of the rise of Macedon, and so missed out on recording this background to the Macedonian war machine. It is instead due to the nature of our ancient (and even modern) sources, which took little interest in recording the aches and pains of individual soldiers. This is where a thought-provoking modern parallel made by Chris Gosden comes in.[32] David Beckham, the famous footballer, would be hard pressed to put it into words of how he bends it while on the soccer pitch. Through his extensive training, his muscles and body instinctively know how to move at the right moment. When one transfers this over to warfare – and it is not an exaggeration to do so, as Gosden is after all trying to help us understand better ancient hunters with their spears – the physical and bodily requirements of military training and engagement, as well as all the hefty economic activities and budgets needed to support them before the war itself ever actually begins, are usually absent as written texts. These requirements can be conjured up somewhat by looking closely at, for instance, the arrowhead used to illustrate the programme of the original workshop on which this volume is based, through the comparative insights offered by experimental archaeology and ethnoarchaeology, to help make up for the silences of the sources. What size were the people, in terms of height and other physical attributes, needed to wield the weaponry we find, and what can we deduce from our fragmentary material of how much material overall was required to equip armies? What constituted the perfect arrowhead and what line separated a perfect from a flawed piece to earn entry into the quiver of an ancient archer? These and others are questions that we can legitimately pose and perhaps even find an answer to in future scholarship. A comparative approach which compels us to think of these kinds of questions, many of them not just economic alone but surely supported in large part by economic means, is so desperately needed, in order to bring ancient Sicily in line with research conducted on other periods of ancient and later history.

Conclusions

The main aim of this paper has been to emphasise the importance of economics to warfare and society in pre-Roman Sicily. My argument has been divided into two parts. In the first part, I began by questioning the usual factor put forward for causing war in pre-Roman times, namely ethnocentrism and its associated political and cultural dimensions, an argument which, in particular, has drawn oxygen from the Persian Wars in playing a decisive role in shaping ancient and modern perceptions of what caused wars to happen beyond this particular conflict. Ancient sources, such as Herodotus and Thucydides, need to be handled carefully when they link the Persian and Carthaginian wars or claim kinship ties as the cause for war. Such sources must be placed in their original historiographical context, driven more by politically motivated metahistory than by representing realities. Part of the problem here also has to do no doubt with our modern framings of the role of the economy in ancient life. Since ancient sources say so little about ancient economics, an immense contrast has emerged between the importance we give the economy in today's world as compared to how little importance we give the economy in the ancient world. Economics played an essential role in antiquity and need to figure more centrally in our scholarly concerns, notwithstanding the inattention generally given to the subject by ancient writers.

I then argued, in part two, that warfare had important effects on the economy. This does not rest on accepting the argument made in part one of this paper. Warfare energised the economy once it started, contributing to both the intensification of a society's pre-existing economic features and the development of new ones. I outlined our current state of play regarding warfare and economy in Archaic and Classical Sicily and compared them to the kind of knowledge we ideally should, and could, have. More comparative and theoretical approaches will help to energise this field by suggesting new avenues for empirical investigation, as well as their limits. The overall aim is to take us closer to revealing the dynamics between warfare, society and economy in pre-Roman Sicily. Overall, I have attempted to show how the economy energised, and was energised by, war. I hope to have energised future readers of this contribution, in focusing on economics as a worthwhile and viable topic in and of itself and especially how they relate to war and society.

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[1] I am most grateful to Melanie Jonasch for deciding to hold her Volkswagen Foundation postdoctoral fellowship with me in Vancouver and for organising the original workshop on which this volume is based. Both were very enjoyable and stimulating occasions.

[2] Malešević 2010, 179–201; Vlassopoulos 2013, 1–2, 7–8.

[3] Purcell 2003, 20–21; Morgan 2015, 37–38.

[4] Osborne 2009, 330.

[5] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/It%27s_the_economy,_stupid, accessed on 4 December 2018.

[6] Morris *et al.* 2007, 1.

[7] Morris *et al.* 2007, 7.

[8] Morris *et al.* 2007, 10.

[9] Manning 2018.

[10] Manning 2018, 4.

[11] Manning 2018, 6.

[12] Hornblower 2011, 12, 40–41, 82–84.

[13] See more fully in Fragoulaki 2013.

[14] Thuc. 3.86.3–4 (trans. R. Crawley).

[15] Thuc. 6.24.3.

[16] Thuc. 6.90.4.

[17] Richardson 2008.

[18] De Angelis 2016, 105, 278–279, 295.

[19] Gras 2000.

[20] De Angelis 2016, 278.

[21] Schleicher 2017.

[22] Wallace-Hadrill 2014, 303–304.

[23] Christian 2011, 364–405.

[24] Malešević 2010, 58–64

[25] To cite a selection: Garlan 1999; Prost 1999; Ducrey *et al.* 1999; Couvenhes and Péré-Noguès 2005.

[26] De Angelis 2016.

[27] De Angelis 2016, 273–283.

[28] The mass burials found at Himera already provide some remarkable evidence (see the contribution by Stefano Vassallo in this volume). We await the final publication of their skeletal remains for other potentially revealing details, such as anthropometric data. In general, we still know very little of the physical anthropology of Greek Sicily, see De Angelis 2016, 134–221.

[29] De Angelis 2016, 304–311.
[30] Biondi 2010, 141–148.
[31] Morris *et al.* 2007, 1.
[32] Gosden 2004, 31–33.

Chapter 9

The power of movement: mercenary mobility and empire building in Sicily during the Classical Period[1]

Jason Harris

Questo capitolo si concentra su una questione fondamentale della storia politica della Sicilia antica: quali furono gli strumenti adottati dai tiranni del periodo classico per tenere sotto controllo ampie zone dell'isola, e del territorio esterno ad essa, nonostante i numerosi episodi di stasis in città e le continue minacce esterne. A questo interrogativo si può rispondere attraverso l'analisi della guerra, dell'utilizzo dei mercenari 'stranieri' durante l'età dei Dinomenidi e di Dionisio il Vecchio e soprattutto della loro mobilità nell'isola. Sebbene l'impiego di un numero considerevole di soldati fosse cruciale per vincere le diverse battaglie (in particolare contro i Cartaginesi), l'equilibrio tra la mobilità militare e l'integrazione sociopolitica (ossia l'interruzione della mobilità) era il fattore chiave perché questo 'ciclo' di 'utilizzo' dei mercenari e successivo loro conferimento di cittadinanza avesse successo. Inoltre, l'introduzione dei mercenari 'barbari' (per esempio, i Siculi e i Campani) attraverso un trattamento privilegiato, fungeva da elemento propulsivo per lo sviluppo e per la cosmopolitizzazione degli imperi nascenti. Infine, questo 'ciclo d'uso' dei soldati favorì la mobilità militare supplementare, compresa quella degli artigiani e dei tecnici specializzati. L'innovazione *nella tecnica bellica esito della loro immigrazione in Sicilia garantì le vittorie sul campo di battaglia. Tutti questi fattori interconnessi crearono degli imperi multietnici duraturi e d'ispirazione per i regni ellenistici.*

When one evokes the figure of the ancient Greek tyrant, various themes (none of them particularly good) come to mind: violence, rupture, change, impermanence. Aristotle echoes this lack of stability when he notes that tyrannies normally were of short duration.[2] Yet the annals of history record several tyrants in ancient Sicily who ruled for substantial periods of time and died in power (*e.g.* Gelon, Hieron I, Dionysius I, Agathocles). In the face of civil strife at home and enemies abroad, how did these rulers adapt without recourse to established sociopolitical institutions or citizen support? While studying the answer to this conundrum, the presence of another actor looms large in ancient Sicily: the mercenary. Although many narratives of Greek military history focus on the hoplite as the epitome of Greek valor and loyalty to the *polis*, the reality of Greek warfare was far different. Large numbers of light infantry and mercenaries increasingly played a pivotal role in Greek warfare during the Classical Period. Nowhere was this dependence on mercenaries more prevalent than on the island of Sicily, where the 5th and 4th centuries BC saw vast swaths of land absorbed into the empires of Syracusan tyrants.[3] This chapter will seek to answer one major question: how were the deployment of mercenaries and the growth of empires under the tyrants connected?

To find a solution to this question, this chapter will evaluate several processes that worked together to successfully create a collaborative relationship benefiting both tyrant and soldier. First, these rulers recruited and paid tremendous numbers of mercenaries to fight for their armies at various times during their rule. The magnitude of these troop numbers while fighting internal conflict and external threats (mainly the Carthaginians) allowed the Deinomenids and Dionysius I to seize power and to establish their rule. Their hegemony only became long-lasting, however, when this encouragement of constant movement to/around the island by mercenaries was balanced by processes of integration for soldiers into new social, economic, and political environments. Such stability was reflected in a third process that often occurred concurrently: the integration of non-Greek troops with full rights. The incorporation of these 'barbarian' peoples, together with cities conquered with the aid of other mercenaries, reduced conflict and created a stable rule that then provided the opportunity for tyrants to invite skilled workers to migrate. This war-related mobility (the fourth process), by creating innovation in military developments across Sicily and augmenting mercenary might, both allowed tyrants to continue winning on the battlefield and energised these empires to spread even beyond Sicily.

Myriads of mercenaries: large-scale movement of mercenaries to/ around Sicily

Greek tyranny has been linked inextricably with the use of force (home-grown hoplites or foreign mercenaries) since its beginnings. When one researches the definition of tyranny in ancient Greece, namely what constituted such a political regime and how it functioned, numerous narratives of tyrants throughout the Greek Mediterranean prove that one definition of tyranny is difficult, especially as the instability of their regimes over many years required a flexibility that gave rise to vast differences in the development of tyrannical rule. Nevertheless, ancient authors defined tyranny partially by the use of foreign military might before and during rule. During the Archaic Period, tyrants both employed their own *polis*' troops and imported Greek hoplite soldiers,[4] including the poet Archilochus of Paros, who famously shirked his duty as a mercenary by tossing away his shield during battle.[5] Encouraged by new socioeconomic processes facilitated by coinage,[6] newly hired mercenaries circulated throughout the Greek Mediterranean, often paid from the coffers of tyrants. While early tyrants seized power with the support of citizens, they strengthened and extended their hegemony through the aid of mercenaries. Polycrates of Samos followed this process of nascent empire-building by gaining power with local troops but then hiring mercenary forces[7], likely with his own coinage and through bonds of *philia* with King Amasis of Egypt.[8] The Athenian tyrant Peisistratus also seized power through the machinations of his own citizens and subsequently supplemented his army with mercenaries.[9] His strategic marriage alliances, including his marriage to Timonassa, the daughter of the Argive Gorgilos,[10] cemented his power by accessing additional troops through his sons, Iophon and Hegistratus. Although citizens of Argos (and illegitimate according to Athenian law),[11] they brought Argive aid to their father and served as the leaders of his new foundations beyond Athens.[12] Like Polycrates, Peisistratus used extra profits and long-distance alliances (*e.g.* Lygdamis of Naxos) to procure mercenaries.[13] These early examples in extant sources only suggest occasional use of mercenaries with limited numbers. In addition, there is little evidence of long-term integration socially or politically under these rulers. Nevertheless, these mercenaries proved extremely useful to tyrants on mainland Greece for the maintenance of their fragile power.

In the western Mediterranean during the 5th and 4th centuries, increasing large-scale employment of mercenaries further established tyrannical rule and empire growth. As the hegemony of the Deinomenids and Dionysii spread throughout Sicily and abroad, the recruitment and mobilisation of soldiers expanded accordingly to protect new areas of influence, to quell internal conflict, and to extend the rule of Syracusan tyrants beyond the *polis*.[14] The source material unfortunately provides only troop numbers and their homelands, with processes of conscription and deployment (*e.g.* recruitment centers and personnel, arrival and departure methods) little-known. The numbers provided nevertheless demonstrate that thousands of mercenaries were traveling into and around the island for many decades. Thus, the first step in the process for Syracusan tyrants of creating an empire was maintaining power for extended periods of time through the recruitment of mercenaries. Unlike on the mainland, *stasis* within the cities and external threats from non-Greek peoples (*e.g.* Carthaginians and Sicels) constantly threatened possible tyrannical rule. With *polis* populations and the size of enemy armies both large, tyrants first needed to recruit and lead sufficient numbers of troops to neutralise these threats and to even begin thinking of establishing an empire.

Gelon, former tyrant of Gela who seized power in Syracuse after *stasis* between the *dêmos* and élite *gamoroi*, created a mini-empire throughout eastern Sicily with mercenary support during his 7-year rule (485–478 BC).[15] After enforcing large-scale mass migrations to

Syracuse with citizens of other Sicilian cities, he deployed thousands of mercenaries to supplement citizen troops in his power expansion.[16] When the confederation of Greek *poleis* sought his help during the Persian invasion of Greece by Xerxes, Gelon boasted of 20,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, 2000 *psiloi hippodromoi*, 2000 slingers, and 2000 archers,[17] a number raised by Diodorus Siculus to 50,000 infantrymen and 5000 cavalry at the siege of Himera in 480.[18] As discussed later, sources suggest that 10,000 of the mercenaries were given Syracusan rights under the tyrant.[19] The Deinomenids also possessed a substantial navy (Herodotus suggests 200 triremes) for their battles against the Carthaginians and Etruscans.[20] Although troop numbers in ancient sources, including Herodotus, are suspect (as with his 2.6 million-member Persian force under Xerxes), the number of soldiers and ships for Gelon are not egregiously over-estimated. After the death of Gelon, his brother-successor Hieron I also maintained thousands of mercenaries, as illustrated by the foundation of Aetna in 476/5. As will be discussed further below, after transferring the populations of Naxos and Catane to Leontinoi (to keep them under his watchful eye), Hieron imported 5000 Syracusans and 5000 mercenaries from the Peloponnese to inhabit his new foundation.[21] Although the logistics of these events are not discussed in detail, these few examples of mercenary numbers prove that the employment of hired help ensured Syracusan rule in eastern Sicily during the early 5th century.

Under Dionysius I (405–367 BC), the scope of this military deployment increased exponentially. Seizing power after the Carthaginian invasion of 406, he convinced the *dêmos* to appoint him *stratêgos autokratôr*, a military springboard to tyranny.[22] While early support partially derived from the citizenry, with citizen-soldiers forming part of Dionysius' forces, mercenaries quickly became necessary for protecting and expanding his dominion. By immediately proposing a pay increase decree, he won over many mercenaries and brought reinforcements from Gela to rebuff the Carthaginian invasion.[23] Soon after, in 404 BC, when a Syracusan revolt threatened his authority, he called upon Campanian cavalry, who quashed the unrest.[24] These Campanians, in addition to 10,000 bodyguards on Ortygia, continued to provide support during his nearly 40-year rule. The total numbers of troops noted by Diodorus Siculus for Dionysian campaigns fluctuated: 30,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry in 406, 80,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry at the siege of Motya in 397, 20,000 infantry and 1000 cavalry overseas against the Italians in 390, and 30,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry ready for the Fourth Punic War at the time of his death.[25] In addition to land soldiers, Dionysius also had 300 triremes at hand on several occasions.[26] While some of these numbers certainly are inflated (*e.g.* the siege of Motya), tens of thousands of soldiers likely were employed.[27] Dionysius spent much of his reign recruiting troops, as the sources recount at least ten recruitment campaigns,[28] and effects of this large-scale deployment appear later in his dynasty under his son Dionysius II,[29] when similar large numbers appear in the sources.[30] Yet, while analysing scope or size of armies, we see that the largest number of troops did not always result in victory on the battlefield. Dionysius consistently mustered smaller forces than the Carthaginian empire with its vast resources (although Herodotus, Ephorus, and Timaeus also inflated its numbers).[31] Nevertheless, the most crucial criterion for victory was the ability of Dionysius to at least muster *enough* troops to challenge and defeat Carthage through the recruitment of mercenaries, combined with the mastery of other economic processes.

A crucial economic process arose appeared when the employment of such substantial numbers of mercenaries created numerous logistical problems, most crucially the method of payment.[32] Even if mercenary salaries only covered basic costs and were supplemented by loot and land grants,[33] the regular *sitos* and *misthos* for thousands of troops, together with one-off gifts (*dôreai* and *athla*[34]), added up quickly.[35] The annual salaries for mercenaries and the navy under Gelon amounted to several thousand talents, while the amount necessary for army salaries under Dionysius approached 1000 talents (not including the upkeep of 300 triremes and enormous expenses for fortifications and campaigns).[36] Emissions of large currencies suitable for paying troops first appeared under Gelon, with the *pentêkontalitra* of 479 BC, while a series of silver dekadrachms were struck between the period of 406–397 BC for Dionysius. This latter series, with engraver marks of Kimon and Euainetos and the imagery of a quadriga and head of Arethusa, supported his campaigns against the Carthaginians.[37] Although many cities established by Dionysius only minted coins after his death, numismatic evidence illustrates the spread of Dionysius' empire, as Dionysian coinage appeared within his sphere of influence in Magna Graecia, especially at sites tied to mercenary settlement.[38] Furthermore, coins found at Catane after its re-population with mercenaries at the very end of the 5th century depict the motif of the butting bull, while coins minted at Kephaloidion in the same period also contain military imagery.[39] Coin emissions under Campanians at Entella and Nakone further prove the economic integration of mercenaries into the sociopolitics of Dionysius' empire. While these issues demonstrate some degree of economic independence (especially as most formerly independent cities stopped minting coins during the 4th century), these communities nevertheless were beneficiaries of the tyrant's munificence.

Although little is known concerning Deinomenid monetary policy, the long reign of Dionysius demonstrated flexibility and innovation (while providing fodder for his detractors to portray him as sacrilegious and a greedy degenerate). He literally debased coinage, after reducing the standard by half and introducing re-stamped coins at double the original value (drachma = didrachm).[40] He also issued new tinplated bronze tetradrachms similar to his original silver dekadrachms that increased his buying power and reduced debts.[41] This division between standard 'international' coinage and debased coinage for local markets demonstrates his ability to improvise to meet needs.[42] He increased revenues diversely through taxation on his own citizens (depicted as suffering under the tyrant's mercenaries) and other *eisphorai,*[43] occasionally sold slaves of defeated cities to make extra money, 'borrowed' from temples or his own citizens (while not returning the money), sold jewellery and furniture, and even apparently helped himself to orphans' property.[44] In order to supplement his coffers, Dionysius plundered the temples of various deities, including Hera Licinia, Leucothea, Asclepius, Persephone, Eilythuia, and Olympian Zeus.[45] Although some depictions may derive from the *topos* of the tyrant as sacrilegious and barbaric (or confirmed this trope if true), they surely reflect some reality of the ability of Dionysius to find the necessary funds to acquire mercenary forces throughout his reign. Any damage to his image or anger by the citizenry would have been more than offset by military and political gains.[46] Nevertheless, while convincing large numbers of mercenaries to come temporarily was relatively easy, this constant mobility of soldiers was not conducive to political stability. As discussed in the next section, keeping soldiers loyal and accessible through long-term integration required greater investments by tyrants but provided more long-lasting value.

Staying or going: the balance between mercenary mobility and integration

The second stage of the process of empire-building through mercenaries was their proper integration into the sociopolitical landscape to ensure continued service and support. Migration was the primary vehicle for transforming Greek culture, as colonisation and trade spread Greeks and their *polis*-foundations around the Mediterranean and Black Sea, just like ants or frogs around a pond in the famous simile of Plato.[47] The evidence of this mobility remains elusive and biased, however, with few traces in the historical record,[48] as ancient (and modern) authors, with their obsession for foundation stories, genealogies, fixity and stability, sought to denigrate or erase mobility as dangerous and to depict migrants as lacking loyalty and identity.[49] In this vein, Sicily appeared negatively as an island always on the move, famously denigrated by Alcibiades when he encouraged the Athenians to invade the island and described their instability and bastardisation due to mixed populations and frequent changes in government.[50] Yet, mobility was a positive force in society. As demonstrated by recent research in (social) network theory and analysis,[51] the transfer of people, goods and ideas created a supra-*polis* system that unified regions[52] and encouraged further movement through networks of reciprocity and obligation.[53] Thus, the migrant mercenary life could solve many economic and demographic problems (*e.g.* when crops failed or when cities faced over-population or *oliganthrôpia*),[54] after connectivity was generated during recruitment processes through networks of *philia* or when tyrants procured soldiers through alliances or through the use of *xenologoi*, whose job was to gather mercenaries.[55] Due to its location, Sicily became a bridge between the cultures and economies of the western and eastern halves of the Mediterranean.[56] The Deinomenids and Dionysii used this geographic position and their wealth to enlist Greek and non-Greek mercenaries, while the possibility for land ownership and sociopolitical integration convinced these soldiers to stay. The ability for tyrants to find the correct balance between mobility and stability thus was the second step in creating a successful empire.

This balance often was depicted as overly tipped in the direction of mobility, which was created by problems in mainland Greek affairs,[57] as poverty and constant warring had destroyed the landscape, with a lack of arable farmland unable to support the population.[58] These challenges forced many Greeks to improve their life abroad,[59] with increasing numbers unattached to a *polis* as *planômenoi* (wanderers) who settled temporarily.[60] Literary sources bewail these lost souls, bereft of their home city and citizen identity while traveling from place to place as *xenoi.*[61] Isocrates especially addressed these threats from political instability and mobility (*e.g. stasis* and exile).[62] His letters to contemporary Greek leaders, including Philip II of Macedon, Dionysius I of Syracuse, and Jason of Pherae, reflect his obsession with strengthening the weakened Greek people.[63] While one solution for penury was employment as a mercenary, which offered the possibility for decent pay and land grants,[64] Isocrates portrays mercenaries as an additional threat, who banded together, wreaked havoc, and threatened the safety of all Greeks.[65] He thus suggests that all *planômenoi* be settled in Asia within new lands under Macedonian hegemony, while Xenophon also saw the Persian Empire as a new homeland for these groups.[66] Such proposals seek to rectify this hyper-mobility in the landscape through integration.

Contemporary literary works discuss the relations between mercenaries, tyrants and the *polis*. Xenophon's *Hiero*, perhaps written for (or regarding) Dionysius I[67] and portraying a (staged) conversation between the poet Simonides and the Syracusan tyrant Hieron I, analyses benefits for (and dangers to) the tyrant when employing mercenaries. Mobile mercenaries frequently are juxtaposed with the stable citizenry, as when tyrants are depicted as trusting their bodyguards more than citizens[68] (although these guards could harm their paymaster if bribed by forces hostile to the tyrant).[69] These mercenaries also created tension between the tyrant and the *polis*, as Hieron complains how citizens suspect that the tyrant maintains his mercenary force at their expense for his personal needs.[70] The figure of the bodyguard in light of this discussion is quite interesting, as they in some ways represented a fixed immovable force protecting the tyrant in the center of the *polis*, although they themselves were often migrants from elsewhere. In response, Simonides counsels Hieron that these soldiers should serve as the bodyguard of the entire community,[71] so that the *polis* would happily bankroll mercenary expenses.[72] This new process would breach the gap between mobility and stability by integrating mercenaries positively into the community. This transition of mercenaries from a mobile threat to community resource thus mirrored the transition from tyrant to perfect *basileus*, even as the tyrant attempts to expand his dominion beyond the confines of his *polis* Syracuse. His concerns no longer should face inward toward his own desires but rather outward to his citizens, a process that would result in a more stable *polis*.

The dichotomy between the threats of (mercenary) mobility and (*polis*) stability appears even stronger in the *Poliorcetica* of Aeneas Tacticus, dated to 360–340 BC. The 4th-century *polis* of Aeneas Tacticus was susceptible to constant change from internal and external forces, especially when allowing mobile elements, including mercenaries, into its sociopolitical space[73]. As with the *Hiero* of Xenophon, Aeneas closely links the influx of mercenaries with the spread of tyranny in the Late Classical Period, with the scope of tyranny spanning the entire Greek Mediterranean,[74] and counsels the citizens by recounting the dangers of mercenaries within the *polis* walls. The 4th- century army in the *Poliorcetica* was increasingly mercenary-based (*i.e.* international and professional), with this increase in scope and foreignness creating new threats to citizen safety. Thus, Aeneas warns that the soldier population should remain below the citizen population[75] and that magistrates must control the movements of mercenaries.[76] Frequent movement meant that soldiers had no loyalty to their paymaster and could harm the *polis* if mercenaries deserted, organised campaigns for the enemy, created factionalism, or supported tyrannies.[77] To remedy this problem, mercenaries should be partially integrated into the socioeconomic fabric of the city, namely paid by state coffers and quartered within the polis[78] (although they also should be distributed through the city to prevent rebellion and removed from the political bodies).[79] Although Aeneas was conversely squeamish about providing too much access to the institutions of the *polis*, focused more on control of migration (rather than integration), and was not enamoured of tyranny, he echoed the concerns of other contemporary, authors concerning hyper-mobility and its effects on the larger community.

Although integration of mercenaries was key for establishing empires under the Syracusan tyrants, the works discussed above demonstrate that a balance between proximity and distance was crucial. Mercenaries needed to be nearby to offer support at a moment's notice but should not be *too* close due to citizen anger, if mercenaries were perceived as favourites of tyrants or citizen overseers, and due to the threat of sedition.[80] Extant sources provide limited examples of integration processes under the Deinomenids and Dionysii into various sociopolitical environments within Syracuse and Sicily. While recounting *stasis* in Syracuse after the expulsion of Thrasybulus and the fall of the Deinomenids, Diodorus notes that Gelon had brought in 10,000 mercenaries to Syracuse, of whom 7000 remained two decades later.[81] Most importantly, this narrative proves that these soldiers had been enfranchised with land and full rights. As older elements of Syracusan society (the former citizens and *gamoroi*) clashed with newer (other Greeks transferred to Syracuse and mercenaries), a debate arose concerning *politographia*, namely their identity as Syracusan citizens.[82] Many of these soldiers given rights thrived, as proven by dedications at panhellenic sanctuaries, especially at Olympia, that identify mercenaries who transferred their primary identity to Syracuse. Several appear in the literary or epigraphic record: Astylus of Croton, Phormis of Maenalus, Praxiteles of Mantinea, and Agesias of Arcadia, all of whom refer to themselves as Syracusan.[83] The new status of these soldiers afforded them the luxury of travelling, competing, and dedicating votives to express their new identity publicly.[84] Although such inclusion of mercenaries into the socioeconomic fabric of the city could have proved unpopular with the former citizens, Gelon nevertheless saw the protection and safety of his increasing territory against internal and external threats through the permanent establishment of troops as far more important.

With the former mercenaries of Gelon protecting his rule in Syracuse, Hieron branched out by further integrating new groups of soldiers in eastern Sicily. The most famous example was his foundation of Aetna in 476/5 with 5000 Syracusans and 5000 Peloponnesian mercenaries.[85] The city was provided Dorian laws to reflect its Syracusan roots, as the surrounding region previously was Chalcidian.[86] This foundation not only allowed Hieron to reward his troops with land but to vaunt his role as oikist and promulgator of a new empire, as demonstrated in *The Women of Aetna*, a drama commissioned by him and composed by Aeschylus,[87] whose setting uniquely traverses various locations in Sicily that reflect the new areas of Dorian Deinomenid domination.[88] The appearance of the Palici in the tragedy, central figures in Sicel mythology, further indicates the (at least ideological) importance of local indigenous peoples into his rule. Numismatic evidence, with images of Zeus Aetnaeus, portray the tyrant as an agent of Zeus and Dikê in establishing this new hegemony,[89] while Pindar's *Pythian* 1 likewise depicts Hieron as the Dorian epitome of traditional Greek values of justice and order, as he creates this new community and empire.[90] Aetna was so important to Hieron that he was buried at the site (a sort of permanent integration into the landscape) and thus became an oikist-hero and preserved his *kleos* far beyond his death. His tomb and future festivals, together with epinician poetry and coinage, not only bear witness to the importance of integrating troops permanently into the landscape but also prove the ideological and propagandistic usefulness of such efforts in empire-building. This formula would be used effectively several decades later under Dionysius I.

At the end of the 5th century, in the same way he had increased the number of troops employed in his service, Dionysius increased these processes of mercenary integration across Sicily. Soon after taking power in 405 BC, Dionysius followed in the footsteps of Gelon and radically transformed the social structure of Syracuse by redistributing land to both mercenaries and freed slaves.[91] These newly enfranchised *neopolitai*[92] ensured the proximity of loyal forces (rather than rebellious aristocrats) who would serve in defensive or offensive military roles. Nevertheless, as reflected in the speech of Theodorus in front of the assembly in Syracuse, substantial numbers of troops among the tyrant's bodyguard overly antagonised the citizens (by making them feel like slaves within their own *polis*) and posed their own threat to the tyrant of overturning his rule.[93] Thus, while integration was crucial, so too was maintaining a proper distance for most soldiers. The most effective way of settling troops more permanently to guard Dionysius' growing empire while ensuring detachment from *polis* affairs was the creation of *phrouria* (garrisons), as 4th-century mercenaries often expected to remain for extended periods abroad.[94] These *phrouria*, generally referring to a complex of military buildings different from a *polis*,[95] acted as military buffer zones against the Carthaginians and as guard stations that controlled the tyrants' holdings.[96] While extant sources give little information concerning the length of time in which mercenaries would be stationed in these garrisons, stays of months or even years would have been common. As the *phrourion* was a locus of military mobility that became a more stable part of the landscape, its status often changed to/from a *polis*, as demonstrated by Aetna, Mylae and Kephaloidion.[97] This ephemeral status is best represented by Leontinoi, whose inhabitants were moved to Syracuse in the 420s (with their *polis* converted into a *phrourion*), then returned in 405 BC with autonomy under the treaty with Carthage, and finally saw their city become a *phrourion* again in 403 BC.[98] A 'new' foundation of Leontinoi with full integration of mercenaries through land grants in 398/7 reflected its ideological importance as a power base[99] and a solution to recompense disgruntled soldiers for their service (while keeping them close at hand for times of military need).[100] Dionysius also handed over Naxos and Catane, whose inhabitants had been sold into slavery, to Sicel and Campanian mercenaries in 403/2,[101] while Tauromenium fell to a similar fate after 392 BC, when local Sicels were expelled in favour of mercenaries.[102] Other garrisons were placed across the island on previous sites (Aetna, Messana and Himera) or at new foundations (Tyndaris and Adranum).[103] Such large-scale movements of soldiers and integration reflected other policies of mass migration under the Syracusan tyrants,[104] which often rewarded groups of non-citizens at the expense of *poleis* hostile toward tyranny. This second process of empire building through integration thus fulfilled several needs: to distribute troops permanently throughout Dionysius' empire, to keep these troops happy by providing them with land, to dispense with possible threats from rebellious subjects within Syracuse and on Sicily, and to discourage possible invasion by Carthage.

A multi-ethnic empire: non-Greek soldiers under the Syracusan tyrants

The events at the aforementioned sites of Naxos, Catane and Adranum indicate the progression to a third stage in empire-building (especially under Dionysius I), namely the sociopolitical integration of non-Greek ethnic groups into the rule of the Syracusan tyrants. Sicily was a unique location within the Greek Mediterranean, where Greeks had frequent contact with indigenous 'barbarian' groups (Sicels or Elymians) and newer arrivals (Carthaginians and Campanians). Although this multi-ethnic environment encouraged rich cultural exchange, it also provided many opportunities for conflict. In light of these military threats to the tyrants, the integration of selected ethnic groups provided further stability and encouraged further political development, since less conflict allowed tyrants to direct resources to expansion of territory rather than constant defense. The enrollment of troops under the Deinomenids and Dionysii was influenced strongly by Carthaginian practices of recruiting ethnically diverse armies during their invasions of Greek Sicily in 480 BC and post-410 BC.[105] Before the sieges of Selinus and Acragas, Carthage had heavily recruited a multi-ethnic force from Libya, Spain and Numidia,[106] with even Greeks appearing among Carthaginian troops during Dionysius' siege of Motya.[107] Carthage also attempted to integrate soldiers in western Sicily, as when Himilcon promised land for soldiers in 396 BC,[108] and long-term mercenary settlement increased after Carthage expanded their *epikrateia*, as demonstrated by numismatic and archaeological evidence.[109] Under the Deinomenids, while mostly Greek mercenaries served, archaeological evidence from tombs suggests the occcasional use of Italian mercenaries.[110] The number of ethnic groups within Dionysius' army multiplied, with Greek mercenaries (perhaps the largest group) from the mainland recruited through bonds of *philia* or *symmachia*,[111] with Iberians and Celts[112] key in the final years of Dionysius I's rule while he expanded into the mineral-rich areas of Italy.[113] The two main 'barbarian' peoples who served under Dionysius, the Sicels and Campanians, often were rewarded with special forms of integration, most often land grants.

Having preceded the arrival of Greek colonists,[114] the Sicels inhabited the eastern half of Sicily and interacted both peacefully and violently with the Greeks, with varying degrees of acculturation.[115] Although not unified politically, the Sicels (mostly) united under the aegis of Ducetius during the mid-5th century[116] and continued to threaten Syracuse after establishing an alliance with Athens[117] and supporting them during the Sicilian Expedition.[118] While the Sicels were given autonomy from both Syracuse and Carthage under the 405 BC treaty with Carthage,[119] Dionysius quickly attempted to gain the support of these Sicels, whose participation had political, military, and ideological consequences for his empire. Since Dionysius' status as a tyrannical *homo novus* lacked the stability and legitimacy of other governmental forms, these 'indigenous' inhabitants of Sicily could provide a propagandistic base. Thus, members of his court (likely Philistus) created narratives and tales regarding his 'supernatural' birth, namely that his mother (after she dreamt of giving birth to a satyr) consulted Sicel seers at Hybla Gereatis, who identified Dionysius as future leader of Sicily.[120] These Sicel seers appeared again to translate the portent of a swarm of bees at Leontinoi at the beginning of his rule.[121] These portents suggested divine sanction (as satyrs helped Zeus to bring *kosmos* to the world) and his leadership abilities (as Dionysius represented the queen bee leading his empire), while the appearance of Sicels in these stories reflected an attempt to take advantage of their identity as rooted in the Sicilian island and chronological continuity for his transgressive rule. He also founded the Sicel town/garrison Adranum, named after the Sicel god Adranus, who was tied to the Palici, local deities who became part of the propagandistic program of Hieron at Aetna through their appearance in Aeschylus' *The Women of Aetna.*[122] One may ask, why bother with propaganda? Would the Sicels (or anyone) believe such fanciful stories about the tyrant, and would they encourage the Sicels to follow Dionysius? 'Myths' about *polis* foundations, heroes, and births (stories that may seem ridiculous to modern readers) nevertheless were commonly propagated throughout the Greek world to establish legitimacy and were believed as fact (while examples certainly exist in the modern era of leaders, especially dictators, whose life stories are rife with fantastical stories). In any case, even if these propagandistic overtones were considered dubious by the Sicels, they reveal a concerted effort by tyrants to approach these non-Greeks as 'partners' in their new empire and sharers of a common identity. Although Sicels became politically weaker and more Hellenised during the 4th century, since they remained a formidable road-block to expansion, Dionysius intentionally gave them a pre-eminent military position in his multi-ethnic empire.

Soon after seizing power, Dionysius went on the charm offensive by guaranteeing the autonomy of the Sicel towns Herbita and Enna, where he placed the aristocrat Aiemnestos in power and then removed him to ensure the 'liberty' of the citizens.[123] As mentioned above, in 403, Dionysius sold into slavery the citizens of Naxos (a Chalcidian city who had sided with Athens during the Sicilian Expedition) and transferred their territory to Sicels.[124] Although the aforesaid foundation of Adranum in 400 BC receives only a brief mention in Diodorus,[125] the site likely served as a garrison for Sicel troops in the hinterland. Sicel mercenaries additionally appeared during the tyrant's sack of Motya in 397 and were stationed in the far west of the island after his victory.[126] Although many Sicels revolted by 396/5 BC, Dionysius maintained rule over them in the 392 treaty with Carthage.[127] Such garrisons provided military support in central Sicily, which buffered his domain from Carthaginian expansion. Employment of Sicels also limited (although did not entirely prevent) Sicel rebellion, which would have diverted valuable resources from Dionysius' later expansion into Magna Graecia and the Adriatic.[128] While the Sicels were occasionally on the receiving end of Dionysius' attacks (as when they were expelled from Tauromenium in 392 BC to make room for more mercenaries),[129] they generally were treated far better than other ‘barbarians’ with whom the Greeks came into political and military contact.

A second ethnic group incorporated into the new empire of Dionysius I were the Campanians, Italian mercenaries who first fought for Carthage during the campaign of 480 BC (although ‘Campanian’ mercenaries first explicitly appear in historical sources as cavalry in 410/409).[130] After serving Carthage, they deserted to Dionysius[131] and saved the tyrant during the Great Revolt of the Syracusan *dêmos* in 404 after quelling the unrest.[132] After their service under Dionysius, a group of 1200 Campanian cavalry fulfilled the nightmare scenario that Greeks feared concerning mercenaries by invading the western Sicilian town of Entella and killing every male citizen.[133] Although here the Campanians did not peacefully integrate, the next decades reflect continued presence in the Sicilian sociopolitical landscape and processes of Greek acculturation.[134] After Dionysius expelled the inhabitants of Catane in 403 BC, he gifted its territory to Campanian mercenaries, who were later transferred to the *phrourion* of Aetna in 396 and established themselves firmly at Entella, Galeria, and Tauromenium.[135] While their population was never substantial, the Campanians appear over the next two centuries in literary evidence (*e.g.* Plato’s fear that Oscan will overtake Greek on Sicily) and coin issues.[136] Integration also appears in the material record, as pottery and placement of Italian tombs in *necropoleis* suggest participation of Campanians in trade markets.[137] By the mid-4th century, several Italians appeared at Delphi representing Sicily in *thearodokoi* lists, spoke fluent Greek, and composed Greek poetry.[138] As with the Sicels, integration of these non-Greeks obviously aided Dionysius militarily, with easy access to professional soldiers for defensive or offensive maneuvers (although his lack of trust in them kept them mostly away from Syracuse). Unlike the Sicels, however, whose ties to the past bolstered the legitimacy of Dionysius, these Campanians represented the future of his empire, with a new ethnic group stabilising his hegemony. Concerning both groups, Dionysius ironically integrated them best into his empire by allowing them to maintain parts of their identity and to maintain traditional customs, as seen through these aforesaid religious and numismatic examples.

Unlike other Greek rulers, the Deinomenids and Dionysius embraced the diversity of their empire and overturned the old divide between Greek and barbarian. While those least favoured in this new ethnic classification were the Carthaginians (not surprising),[139] Chalcidian Greeks, victims of long-standing ethnic conflict on the island, also were punished.[140] Dorian Greeks, Sicels, and Campanians became the beneficiaries of new policies under the Syracusan tyrants for both military and ideological reasons. While this new cultural model not only created new multi-ethnic spaces within his empire, the acceptance of these new non-Greek elements allowed Dionysius to avoid additional conflict and, by doing so, to incorporate both Greek *poleis* and non-Greek areas into his burgeoning empire.

Staying ahead of the game: the effects of warfare on innovation and empire-building

With the (mostly) successful integration of Greek and non-Greek mercenaries in Sicily and abroad quashing threats to rule and providing more stability under the tyrants, new political and economic processes flourished, especially as success in warfare and the general peace in its aftermath both encouraged power accumulation and state formation.[141] Recent research concerning the early modern period has revealed warfare as a catalyst for modernisation and political/economic developments, as it forced opposing forces to innovate and to progress, so that they might gain advantages over their opponents.[142] While warfare often damaged farmland and caused depopulation of many areas (likewise experienced in ancient Sicily), it ultimately provided advantages to larger cities that expanded in the wake of rural weaknesses.[143] Can we apply this type of progress-through-conflict model to ancient Sicily? As in early modern Europe, military conflict first encouraged urbanisation within Syracuse under Gelon and Dionysius and subsequent state development through fiscal reforms, economic development, and the incorporation of defeated cities into the empire. Furthermore, processes of warfare in both locations and periods fostered complementary processes of migration, including rural-to-urban migration, as citizens sought safety from raids and destruction by marauding forces.[144] Together with these migrant citizens often arrived artisans and tradesmen from abroad, as urban centres offered more opportunities and economic diversification.[145] Human mobility from faraway locations also encouraged the exchange of ideas and interaction between skilled workers and technological masterminds. In both early modern Europe and ancient Sicily, these latter movements occurred most often in peacetime, after warfare was followed by treaties and stability.

While the Deinomenids and Dionysii revolutionised Sicilian sociopolitics through their integration of mercenaries, they also innovated and expanded their architectural and technological capacity. The fourth and final step in the process of empire building discussed in this chapter regards the fostering of innovation in the architectural and military realms as a catalyst for further empire creation. Tyranny, originality, and progress went hand-in-hand earlier in Greece, as seen under Polycrates of Samos, who commissioned the construction of a great tunnel by Eupalinos of Megara, the erection of the Heraion by Rhoikos, the production of harbour moles and shipsheds, and the development of a new warship.[146] Similar innovation was common in Sicily, where city-planning and warfare had distinctive qualities from those on the mainland.[147] Such uniqueness appears in large-scale city expansion projects in Syracuse undertaken by Gelon to incorporate thousands of new citizens, including mercenaries, into Syracuse.[148] Building over/around earlier *necropoleis*, Gelon enlarged the city area to 100–120 hectares by adding new districts (Achradina, Neapolis and Tyche), aqueducts, and public buildings to create a new 'megalopolis' and capital for his growing empire.[149] Dionysius followed Gelon both by increasing the population of Syracuse through mass migration and the enfranchisement of slaves/ mercenaries and by developing its architectural infrastructure (*e.g.* repairing the *proasteion* of Achradina and its agora).[150] He also built up the island of Ortygia from 404 BC to house his bodyguards, complete with military headquarters, extra walls with impressive gates, and a new palace.[151]

Complementing these architectural feats were advancements in military science. Under Gelon, advances were more limited: a new arsenal and port likely welcomed a new fleet developed with aid from outside sources.[152] In the late 5th century, military developments exploded, with new types of fortification built across Sicily, specifically *emplekton* walls that strengthened fortifications against the attacks of Carthage.[153] This combination of innovation and labour organisation under Dionysius is best illustrated by the construction of the Epipolae walls in 401, during which time nearly 20 km of walls with numerous towers and gates, encompassing 1800 hectares of Syracusan territory, were built in a matter of weeks.[154] Additional innovations appeared in 4th-century Syracuse.[155] One such example was the catapult, perhaps invented by the Pythagorean Zopyrus of Tarentum, which had widespread use under Dionysius in his siege warfare (*e.g.* Motya in 397).[156] This originality in warfare also appeared on the sea, as Dionysius increased his navy through the development of the Great Port and the Lakkios harbour, together with the construction of *neosoikoi* that likely housed over 300 ships.[157] Dionysius also encouraged the creation of the *penterês* (quinquereme), a new ship that first appeared when reinforcing his alliance with Locri Epizephyrii in Magna Graecia.[158] Such war efforts were possible through the movement of many migrants to Syracuse: engineers, masons, and other laborers who traveled to work for this enormous war machine.[159] Processes of mobility begat further processes of mobility, as the immigration of mercenaries, followed by subsequent warfare, military victories, and stable hegemony encouraged new groups of skilled workers and scholars to Syracuse. The large-scale engineering projects and inventions resulting from this migration kept Dionysius ahead of his enemies on the military front and ensured the continued success and growth of his empire by complementing the military success of mercenaries under his control.


Sociopolitical Integration
Ethnic Integration
Innovation & Development
Large-scale Deployment

Figure 9.1. Processes of mercenary mobility and empire building.

We may conceptualise the establishment and growth of empire under the Deinomenids and Dionysius as a flowchart, illustrated in Figure 9.1, a constantly moving positive feedback loop. At the beginning of his rule, procuring large numbers of troops/mercenaries allowed the tyrant to successfully conquer his enemies and establish his hegemony. Integrating them sufficiently into the sociopolitical landscape of Sicily provided ready labour and weapons when protecting or expanding the empire. As this empire grew, the tyrants also embraced non-Greeks inhabiting or introduced into their territory to ensure the protection of all areas, including the hinterlands and buffer zones. This increased peace and stability allowed for further mobility of skilled workers, engineers, and other migrants who fostered innovation and military developments. These developments encouraged tyrants to spread their hegemony farther, which required more mercenaries and thus restarted the cycle. Although the flowchart is simplistic and somewhat reductive, since these processes often were not continuous and since many processes were occurring simultaneously in various stages (especially since the autocratic power inherent to tyranny allowed for extreme flexibility), it nevertheless emphasises the interconnected nature of these processes in extending the territory of these tyrants.

The results of the movement of migrants (*e.g.* mercenaries and others linked to war efforts) were secure empires that continued after the deaths of Gelon, Hieron, and Dionysius I. The 38-year reign of Dionysius I especially revealed the possibilities when large-scale deployments of mercenaries were employed properly: zones under his dominion that stretched throughout much of Sicily, Magna Graecia, and the Adriatic. Thus, several honorary inscriptions from Athens affirmed his personal control of more expansive areas by calling him not the ‘tyrant of Syracuse’ but ‘the leader of Sicily’.[160] In one sense, the journeys of these mercenaries to and across Sicily represented the political growth of these tyrannical realms in physical form, as individuals and groups spread out across the landscape of Sicily under the control of the tyrant like pieces on a military chessboard. Their subsequent integration nevertheless represented the strength of this new political system, one that deliberately included various non-Greek peoples. It was this balance of mobility and stability that ultimately allowed these empires to flourish and to expand to new dimensions not previously seen, a process foreshadowing the multi-ethnic empires that appeared later during the Hellenistic Period.

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[1] I would like to thank Melanie Jonasch for the invitation to present at her conference, from which this chapter derives, and for her constant support while I undertook research at the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut. I am also especially grateful to Harvard's Center for Hellenic Studies for their generosity and continued access to research resources. I finally would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for many useful suggestions.

[2] Ar. *Pol.* 5.1315b (αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ τῶν τυραννίδων ὀλιγοχρόνιαι πᾶσαι γεγόνασι παντελῶς).

[3] Note that this chapter will not evaluate the reigns of Dionysius II, Dion or Agathocles. While much of the same practices and processes continued under these later tyrants, the extant sources concerning the study of the Deinomenids and Dionysius I best illustrate the establishment of the relationship between mercenary mobility and empire building.

[4] Regarding early examples of mercenaries, Drews (1972, 139–143) notes that early mercenary soldiers were termed *epikouroi* (allies). Van Wees (2002, especially 77–78) examines the relationship between tyranny and hoplite armies when tyrants seized power. For ancient discussion, see Arist. *Pol.* 5.1305a and 5.1310b.

[5] *POxy.* 30.2508 refers to the Parian Archilochus as a mercenary at Thasos and Euboea. His famous fragment on throwing away his shield quoted in Plut. *Mor. Instit. Lac.* 239b also refers to his service against Thracians on Thasos.

[6] For early forms of coinage as mercenary payment, see Schaps 2004, 146–149 and 157–158, as well as Seaford 2004, 97–98 and 128.

[7] Polyaenus, *Strat.* 1.23.2 states that Polycrates seized power with his brothers and a party of supporters, after which Lygdamis, tyrant of Naxos, added reinforcements. Hdt. 3.120.3 notes that Polycrates seized power with a small number of hoplites, while 3.45.3 catalogues the mercenaries employed by the Samian tyrant. For Polycrates' rise to power, see Forsdyke 2005, 64–69, chapter 4 of Shipley 1987, and White 1954.

[8] For the alliance between Polycrates and Amasis, see Hdt. 3.39.2. Hdt. 3.56.2 notes that Polycrates struck coins of lead covered in gold,

although he calls this a silly tale.

[9] Peisistratus' use of foreign soldiers appears in Hdt. 1.61.4 and *Ath. pol.* 15.2 (where he receives the help of Lygdamis of Naxos, Thebans, and Eretrian cavalry when seizing power after his second exile). For analysis, see Singor 2000 and Pleket 1969, 26–29.

[10] For the marriage of Timonassa to Peisistratus, see especially *Ath. pol.* 17.4. His legitimate son Hippias continued this practice, by marrying his daughter to the son of the tyrant of Lampsacus (Thuc. 6.59.3).

[11] For mention of the sons of Peisistratus, see Hdt. 5.94, *Ath. pol.* 17.3, and Plut. *Vit. Cat. Mai.* 24.5. Hegistratus (as Thessalus) is mentioned alongside Hippias and Hipparchus in Thuc. 6.55.1. Regarding the unequal nature of this marriage and the Argive identity of the sons, Duplouy (2006, 86–88) evaluates these marriages as following the custom of aristocratic clans.

[12] For their extra services to Peisistratus, see *Ath. pol.* 17.4 and Hdt. 1.61.4 (where 1000 Argive soldiers under Hegistratus appeared as auxiliary forces for Peisistratus), as well as Hdt. 5.94.1 (where Hegistratus is appointed tyrant of Sigeum by his father).

[13] For profits from northern mines, see Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2000, 10–15.

[14] For an overview of warfare in Sicily, see De Vido 2013b and 2016.

[15] *Cf.* Polyaenus, *Strat.* 5.6 for the hire of Sicel mercenaries under his predecessor, Hippocrates of Gela, in the 490s.

[16] These groups included inhabitants of Gela and Camarina, together with the élites of Megara Hyblaea and Euboea (*cf.* Hdt. 7.156, Thuc. 6.4.1–2, 6.5.3 and 6.94.1, Strabo 10.1.15, and Polyaenus, *Strat.* 1.27.3). For further discussion of these migrations, Luraghi 1994, 281–291; Moggi 1976, 100–114.

[17] Hdt. 7.158.4 (παρεχόμενος διηκοσίας τε τριήρεας καὶ δισμυρίους ὁπλίτας καὶ δισχιλίην ἵππον καὶ δισχιλίους τοξότας καὶ δισχιλίους σφενδονήτας καὶ δισχιλίους ἱπποδρόμους ψιλοϭς).

[18] Diod. Sic. 11.21.1.

[19] Diod. Sic. 11.72.3.

[20] Corretti 2006 analyses the development of the navy under the Deinomenids and suggests that most fleet advances were made under Hieron. For increased sea power, see Diod. Sic. 11.51 and 11.88.

[21] For its foundation, see Diod. Sic. 11.49.1 and Strabo 6.2.3. Although Diodorus does not mention mercenaries, the following clause that he imported them as sufficient help for any need (ἔχειν βοήθειαν ἑτοίμην ἀξιόλογον πρὸς τὰς ἐπιοϭσας χρείας) suggests their presence. The scholium to Pind. *Pyth.* 1.120b mentions other groups (namely from Gela and Megara). For this foundation, see Luraghi 1994, 335–338; Millino 2001, 151–153; Raffone 2004, 68–71.

[22] For the election of Dionysius as *stratêgos autokratôr*, see Diod. Sic. 13.94.5–95.1. For analysis of this position, see De Vido 2013a, 51–53. For warfare in the context of 4th-century history, see De Vido 2008.

[23] Diod. Sic. 13.95.1, Diod. Sic. 13.96.14, and Diod. Sic. 13.96.2. Diod. Sic. 13.93–96 and 13.109–113 record early military support before the 405 BC treaty with Carthage.

[24] Diod. Sic. 14.7–10, Isoc. *Archid.* 44–45, and Ael. *VH* 4.8.

[25] See Diod. Sic. 13.86.4–5 for the forces of 406, Diod. Sic. 14.47.4–7 for Motya, Diod. Sic. 14.100 for his war against the Italian League, and Diod. Sic. 15.73 for the Fourth Punic War. Caven (1990 *passim*) discusses the forces of the tyrant in his wars. While only the first half of Dionysius' rule is described in detail by ancient authors, this final figure (and his importance to Athens and mainland Greece at the end of his rule) demonstrates consistent ability to muster troops for four decades.

[26] In addition to the Fourth Punic War, Ael. *VH* 12.61 also notes 300 triremes during his attack on Croton in the late 380s.

[27] Mele 1993 suggests that Dionysius had 400–500 triremes, over 100,000 infantry, and over 10,000 cavalry at his disposal. Of these forces within each battle, he also suggests that one-third were mercenaries.

[28] Griffith (1935, 195–196) discusses these campaigns, among both mainland Greeks and indigenous groups (*e.g.* Diod. Sic. 14.34.3, 14.44.2, 14.55.6, 14.62.1).

[29] Dionysius II used mercenaries and *phrouria* to maintain power, although economic problems and shrinking mercenary forces left him vulnerable, *cf.* Tagliamonte 1994, 139–144 and Castrizio 2000, 24–25. Pl. *Ep.* 7.348a (*cf.* Diod. Sic. 16.5) notes the effects of liquidity on his attempts to lower the *sitos* given to his troops.

[30] Diod. Sic. 16.9.2, Plut. *Vit. Dion* 14, Nep. *Dion* 10, and Ael. *VH* 6.12. For Plato and mercenaries, see Plut. *Vit. Dion* 19.8 and Pl. *Ep.* 7.348. During Dionysius II's conflict with Dion, he maintained 10,000 bodyguards on Ortygia (who famously despised and plotted murder against Plato, who had wanted them removed), 100,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.

[31] In 409, Ephorus notes the number of Carthaginians as over 200,000, while Timaeus records 100,000. In the invasion of 406 BC, Ephorus suggests a force of 300,000 and Timaeus a force greater than 120,000, *cf.* Diod. Sic. 13.54.1–5.

[32] Thuc. 1.13. For the relationship between mercenaries, tyranny, and empire, see Trundle 2006, 66–69.

[33] Daily mercenary pay in the 4th century under Dionysius I was 4 obols or 1 drachma (with cavalry paid more), *cf.* Tagliamonte 1994, 157–164; Miller 1984, 155–156.

[34] For *dôreai* and *athla*, see Diod. Sic. 14.9.8, 14.18.6, and 14.42.1.

[35] Millino 2001, 178–181 analyses various types of payments. Ael. *VH* 6.12 notes the huge amounts of grain needed for troops under Dionysius II. The *sitarêsion* for 140,000 troops yearly has been calculated as 1,000,000 *medimnoi* (= 52,500,000 litres) of grain. See De Angelis 2016, 302–313; 2006 for agricultural needs under the Dionysii and the importance of grain for Sicilian tyrants.

[36] De Angelis (2016, 275–280 and 314–318) analyses military costs for Gelon at ca. 4000 talents per year, the construction costs for the Epipolae at 1700 talents and the Motya campaign of 397 at 2100 talents; *cf*. Caccamo Caltabiano *et al.* 2006, 659–661 for expenses under Dionysius.

[37] For the minting of the *pentêkontalitra*, see Diod. Sic. 11.26.5. For analysis and dating of dekadrachms and tetradrachms of Dionysius, see Arnold-Biucchi 2008, 19–22, who mentions other contemporary coins (100-*litrai* coins and coins with the legend ΑΘΛΑ, which suggests their use as prizes).

[38] Castrizio (2004, 294–296) mentions Dionysian coinage found in fortresses and acropoleis, including Castiglioni di Paludi.

[39] Pope (2009, 133–134) ties these images to mercenary settlements and the legend on coins from Kephaloidion (ΕΚ ΚΕΦΑΛΙΟΔΙΟΥ on the obverse and ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΩΤΑΝ on the reverse) to Lucanian mercenary settlement in the area (Diod. Sic. 14.78.7).

[40] Arist. *Oec.* 2.1349a.

[41] Ar. *Oec.* 2.1349a and Poll. *Onom.* 9.79. Caccamo Caltabiano *et al.* (2006) analyse these bronze issues and their areas of circulation, while Schmitz (1986, 75–78) discusses minting in tin.

[42] See Mele 1993, 23–25 for further discussion.

[43] Arist. *Pol.* 5.1313b and Arist. *Oec.* 2.1349a–b describe taxation policies of Dionysius (*e.g.* taxes on animals), while Diod. Sic. 14.106.2 notes *eisphorai*.

[44] Those sold into slavery include the inhabitants of Naxos and Catane (Diod. Sic. 14.15), Motya (Diod. Sic. 14.53.2–4), and Rhegium (Arist. *Oec.* 2.1349b). Dionysius 'borrowed' from the temple of Artemis (Arist. *Oec.* 2.1349a) and coined borrowed money from his citizens (Arist. *Oec.* 2.1349b). The sale of jewellery appears in Arist. *Oec.* 2.1349a, while the sale of his furniture (which he then ordered returned) and the use of orphans' property appear in Arist. *Oec.* 2.1349b.

[45] See Diod. Sic. 15.14.3–4, Arist. *Oec.* 2.1349b, Ath. 15.693e, Livy 24.3.8 and Cic. *Nat. D.* 3.83–84 for these raids. Diod. Sic. 15.13.1 suggests that he wished to invade Greece to plunder Delphi. For analysis of this sacrilege, see Scarpa Bonazza Buora 1984, 62–65.

[46] Normally, 'barbarians' pillaged temples, as the Carthaginians did at

Selinunte in 409 (Diod. Sic. 13.59.1–2), Acragas in 405 (Diod. Sic. 13.108.2), and Syracuse in 396 (Diod. Sic. 14.63).

47 Pl. *Phd.* 109b (ὥσπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους περὶ τὴν θάλατταν οἰκοῦντας).

48 Osborne (1991) analyses the difficulty of tracing Greek mobility due to lack of ancient sources (only Athens, with its deme registers, provides limited information about individual movements). Garland (2014, 6–10) notes the constraints of literary sources, as any instances of mobility (which mention no logistics) are told from an elite perspective.

49 Moatti (2006) argues that historians have avoided mobility as part of the human experience and that migration must be studied as a historical object with laws and effects. For the concept of fixity, see Purcell 2004.

50 For the speech of Alcibiades, see Thuc. 6.17.2–4 (ὄχλοις τε γὰρ ξυμμείκτοις πολυανδροῦσιν αἱ πόλεις καὶ ῥᾳδίας ἔχουσι τῶν πολιτῶν τὰς μεταβολὰς καὶ ἐπιδοχάς). Constantakopoulou (2007, 14–15) notes that Sicily is called an island by Thucydides only twice, while Seibert (1982–1983) evaluates migration in Sicily and its sociopolitical effects.

51 See Vlassopoulos 2009a for the usefulness of network theory and Cline 2012 for social network theory.

52 Vlassopoulos (2007a; 2007b) argues for the use of world-system theory in analysing the sociopolitical interactions of the Greeks, due to the multiple political units and constant processes of goods, people, and ideas.

53 For the relationship between networks of mobility and reciprocity across regions, see Horden and Purcell 2000, 377–400.

54 Purcell (1990, 54–58) notes the importance of mobility in ancient Greece and Greeks as ‘purveyors of people’. Gallant (1991, 133–137) analyses migration as a solution to crises in Greek history and the benefits of working abroad for Greek soldiers. Horden and Purcell (2000, 377–400) evaluate the solution of population redistribution in antiquity to alleviate demographic problems, including under-population.

55 One famous of example of a general and *xenologos* in Sicily was Dexippus the Spartan, who had been the head of mercenaries at the beginning of Dionysius I’s reign and whose career is best described by Péré-Noguès (1996). For mercenary networks, see Trundle 1999, 30–31, who mentions Xen. *An.* 6.4.8, and Isoc. *Philip* 96 as 4th-century examples. Chaniotis (2004) speaks more generally about the relationship between warfare and mobility.

56 Braudel (1998, 32–34 and 251–254) describes Sicily as *un seuil*, where east meets west and north meets south, and a unifying location where people move but worlds are opposed. For Sicily as linking the two

Mediterranean basins and mediating between both, see Purcell 2013, 367–377. Bresson (2005, 95–104) analyses the various levels of connectivity in the Mediterranean, from micro-regions to the entire Mediterranean.

[57] See the ending of Xenophon’s *Hellenica*, where he bewails the total confusion and disorder after the Battle of Mantinea in 362 BC (ἀκρισία δὲ καὶ ταραχὴ ἔτι πλείων μετὰ τὴν μάχην ἐγένετο ἢ πρόσθεν ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι).

[58] For 4th-century poverty (*endeia*) in Greece, Isoc. *Paneg.* 168, who stresses the wandering of men abroad with wives and children and their conscription as mercenaries to make a living. For 4th-century agricultural challenges in Greece encouraging an increase in mercenaries, see Miller 1984, 153–155.

[59] Gallant (1991, 133–137) notes that sending people from the *polis* was a good option, as the labor market and opportunities for military service were constantly available.

[60] McKechnie (1989, 10–17) focuses on these outsiders, including the juxtaposition of *planômenoi* with citizens (*politeuomenoi*). Baslez (2007, 221–225) analyses the new 4th-century terminology, when mobile groups were divided into those transferring their polis (*metoikoi, paroikoi, katoikoi*) vs. those passing through (*parepidêmountes, epidêmountes, endêmountes*).

[61] For effects of wandering on Greek identity, Montiglio 2005, especially 35–37.

[62] In *Archid.* 64–67, Isocrates describes ravaged fields, sacked cities, people driven from their homes, constitutions overturned, and laws abolished, *cf.* Fuks 1972, 18–20.

[63] Mossé (1962) argues that the 4th-century rise in tyranny derived from sociopolitical factors (*i.e.* the poor and mercenaries sought new leadership).

[64] Miller (1984) notes that pay alone did not sufficiently attract mercenaries, as a four-obol-per-day salary only provided for necessities.

[65] For havoc caused by mercenaries, see Isoc. *Philip* 120–122 and Isoc. *Ep.* 9.8–9, *cf.* Marinovič 1988, 237–245 and Van Soesbergen 1982–1983, 132–135.

[66] *Philip* 120–123 discusses Isocrates’ colonising program, although the idea appears in *De pace* 24 (where Thrace is a possible area of colonisation) and *Panath.* 14, while Xenophon offers his solution in *An.* 3.2.26. Dillery (1995, 42–58) evaluates new 4th-century communities in the context of utopia and escape from present-day evils through panhellenism and *homonoia*, *cf.* Fuks 1972, 26–31 and Van Soesbergen 1982–1983, 141–142.

[67] Sordi (2004) suggests that the recipient was Dionysius I, with foreign

marriages (Xen. *Hier.* 1.28 vs. Diod. Sic. 14.44) and fear of overthrow (*Hier.* 6.15 and 7.12 vs. Diod. Sic. 14.8). His *nom de plume* as Themistogenes the Syracusan (*Hell.* 3.1.2) and reference to his sojourn at Syracuse (Ath. 10.427f–428a) provide ancient support.

[68] For the position of mercenaries over the citizenry, Xen. *Hier.* 5. For the trust of the tyrant in his military force, Xen. *Hier.* 6.5.

[69] Xen. *Hier.* 6.11 notes the unfaithfulness of guards, who can receive more pay by assassinating the tyrant.

[70] Xen. *Hier.* 8.10.

[71] Xen. *Hier.* 10. Sevieri (2004, 281–286) evaluates tyranny as the breakdown of traditional Greek reciprocity and the necessity for the conversion of the tyrant to benevolent king through the transfer of private goods to public coffers.

[72] Xen. *Hier.* 10.8. For positive roles for mercenaries in the burgeoning economy of successful tyrannical cities, see Gelenczey-Mihálcz 2000, 117–119. For this wider plan to transform tyrannies from tyrant-focused to polis-focused, see Gray 2011b, 164–177.

[73] Boëldieu-Trevet and Mataranga (2006, 24–31) analyse the focus of Aeneas on threats to *homonoia* in the city (referred to as *metabolê*, *epiboulê*, and *neoterismos*) encouraged by current (Aen. Tact. 23.6) or former citizens (Aen. Tact. 4.1) and by mercenaries or other *xenoi*.

[74] *Cf.* the ascension to power with the aid of mercenaries by Clearchus of Heraclea Pontica (Aen. Tact. 12.5), Temenos of Teos (Aen. Tact. 18.13–19), and Python of Clazomenae (Aen. Tact. 28.5). For tyrants and mercenaries in the *Poliorcetica*, see Marinovič 1988, 223–224 and 231–236.

[75] Aen. Tact. 12.2–3 notes that too many soldiers result in a *polis* controlled by mercenaries.

[76] Aen. Tact. 10.7.

[77] For mercenaries as deserters, see Aen. Tact. 10.19. For factions of mercenaries overthrowing existing regimes, see Aen. Tact. 11.7–10.

[78] Aen. Tact. 13 suggests that mercenary expenses should be divided between the state and élites, who each would fund and house several mercenaries.

[79] This partially foreign identity is noted by Schenk 1994, 3–5, who notes the preponderance of vocabulary in Aeneas Tacticus with the root ξεν- for mercenaries and resident aliens, both categories of suspicious characters.

[80] For mercenaries (especially Campanians) as a disjunctive force that should be kept from the citizens, see Tagliamonte 1999, 552–554.

[81] Diod. Sic. 11.72.3 (τοῦ γὰρ Γέλωνος πλείονας τῶν μυρίων πολιτογραφήσαντος ξένους μισθοφό-ρους, ἐκ τοϭτων περιελείποντο πλείους τῶν ἑπτακισχιλίων κατὰ τοὺς ὑποκειμένους καιροϭς), *cf.*

Poll. *Onom.* 3.56 (= Philistus *FGrH* 556 F74). For an overview of Deinomenid politics due to mass migrations and mercenary migrations, see Luraghi 1994, 368–373.

[82] Berger (1989, 304–306; 1992, 65–66) evaluates divisions between old and new citizens, different ethnic groups, or citizens and non-citizens during *stasis*, *cf.* Lintott 1982, 187–189 and Arist. *Pol.* 5.1303b. For the later status of *xenoi* and *misthophoroi* of Gelon, see Raffone 2004, 65–68.

[83] See Moretti *Olympionikai* 186–187, 196–198, and 219 for Astylus, Paus. 5.27.2 (Φόρμις ἀνέθη-κεν|Ἀρκὰς Μαινάλιος, νῦν δὲ Συρακόσιος) for Phormis, Dittenberger, *Syll.*^{3} 266 for Praxiteles, and Pind. *Ol.* 6.6 (συνοικιστήρ τε τᾶν κλεινᾶν Συρακοσσᾶν) for Agesias. For discussion of Astylus of Croton, see especially Nicholson 2016, 161–167.

[84] For their status as new elites, see Millino 2001, 144–146.

[85] For the identification of these new colonists, see Diod. Sic. 11.49.1, Strabo 6.2.3, and the scholium to Pind. *Pyth.* 1.120b, cf. Luraghi 1994, 335–338, Millino 2001, 151–153, and Raffone 2004, 68–71. Strabo 6.2.3 describes this foundation with the term *katoikizein* (to re-found on an existing site, *cf.* Costanzi 2010, 101–104).

[86] Pind. *Pyth.* 1.61–65.

[87] For discussion of Aeschylus in Sicily and his composition of the *Aetnaeae*, see Bosher 2012. For the *Aetnaeae*, see Fraenkel 1954; Cataudella 1963; Dougherty 1993, 85–98; Corbato 1996, 65–72; Basta Donzelli 1996, 88–95.

[88] Smith (2012, 129–133) analyses the various locations within the drama and focuses on the figure of Xuthus, the Ionian founder whose identity was shared here with the Dorians.

[89] For discussion of the imagery of Aetna’s coins, see Morgan 2015, 66–69.

[90] See Morgan 2015, 310–313 for Hieron as agent of Zeus and 333–335 for the Dorian-ness of Hieron. For Aetna within *Pythian* 1, see Basta Donzelli 1996, 73–79. For the relationship between Pindar and Sicilian tyrants, see Antonaccio 2007, 265–273.

[91] See Diod. Sic. 14.7.4–5 for land redistribution (διέδωκε δὲ καὶ τὰς οἰκίας τοῖς ὄχλοις πλὴν τῶν ἐν τῇ Νήσῳ: ταϭτας δὲ τοῖς φίλοις καὶ τοῖς μισθοφόροις ἐδωρήσατο), *cf.* Asheri 1977, 23–25.

[92] For the use of the term *neopolitai* elsewhere, see Grace 1974, 357–358.

[93] Within the speech of Theodorus, citizens are portrayed as *douloi* (Diod. Sic. 14.65–66). For liberty under the control of tyrants and mercenaries, see Scarpo Bonazza Buora 1984, especially 25–28. Regarding slaves, Dionysius freed many to serve in his navy (Diod. Sic. 14.58.1).

[94] For permanent relocation, see Prestianni Giallombardo 2006. Fantasia (2006, 494–497) argues that the arrival of Campanian soldiers recruited by Dionysius in 404 with their *aposkeuê* (Diod. Sic. 14.9.2) suggests their permanence in Dionysius' forces.

[95] For the definition of *phrouria*, see Nielsen 2002. Tréziny (1999, 262–263) discusses *phrouria* in the Sicilian countryside.

[96] See Lefèvre 2004 for use of *phrouria* for the control of migrants and checks against threats.

[97] Aetna was founded as a *polis* under Hieron I but appears as a mercenary fortress under Dionysius I (*e.g.* Diod. Sic. 14.14.2, 14.58.2, and 14.61.4). Mylae is called both a *phrourion* and a *polis* (Diod. Sic. 12.54.4–5 vs. 14.87.3). Kephaloidion minted coinage but is termed a *phrourion* in Diod. Sic. 14.56.2, *cf.* Nielsen 2002, 54–58 for analysis.

[98] For this complicated history of Leontinoi, see Vanotti 1995; Moggi 1976; 206–210 and 238–241; chapter 4 of Rizza 2000; Frasca in this volume.

[99] Dionysius also had assembled his army at Leontinoi before seizing power. Diodorus referred to it as an *oikêtêrion* for refugees and a *phrourion* for exiles (Diod. Sic. 13.95.3), *cf.* Péré-Noguès 2009, 112–113 and Berger 1991, 139.

[100] Diod. Sic. 14.78.1–3.

[101] Diod. Sic. 14.15.3 and 14.68.3. For archaeological evidence from the time of Dionysius, see Lentini 2002. For the general theme of enslavement of populations in Sicily, see Souza in this volume.

[102] Diod. Sic. 14.96.4, *cf.* Péré-Noguès 2004, 150–152 for these movements.

[103] For the vocabulary of these settlements, see Costanzi 2010, 101–104. For the phenomenon of foundations and re-foundations of cities across Sicily under the tyrants, see Costanzi in this volume.

[104] For mass migrations under the tyrants, see Giuliani 1995; Lomas 2006; Harris 2018.

[105] For the most thorough discussion of mercenaries under Carthage, see Fariselli 2002.

[106] For Carthaginian mercenaries in 409, see Diod. Sic. 13.44.1–2. For their presence in 406/5, see Diod. Sic. 13.80.2–5. Bourdin and Crouzet (2009, 478–482) provide a brief history of Carthaginian mercenaries in Sicily. For foreign mercenaries under the Carthaginians in Sicily, see Diod. Sic. 14.54.5, 14.95.1, and 15.15.2. For the multi-ethnicity of the army, see Griffith 1935, 208–212.

[107] Diod. Sic. 14.53.4, *cf.* Polyaenus, *Strat.* 5.2.17.

[108] Diod. Sic. 14.61.5.

[109] Regarding the growth of the Carthaginian *epikrateia* on Sicily, Anello 1986 discusses increased Punic influence and garrisons in its interior

(170–172) and new coin issues with legends that suggest mercenary payment (174–177).

[110] De La Genière (1999, 126–129) discusses links from pottery discovered in mercenary tombs with Italy.

[111] Tagliamonte (1994, 157–164) details the recruitment processes for Italian mercenaries (*e.g.* alliances, *xenologoi*, and recruitment centers). Péré-Noguès (1999, especially 114–115), discusses Peloponnesian mercenary networks, *cf*. Diod. Sic. 14.44.2.

[112] For Iberians in Dionysius' army, see Diod. Sic. 14.75.8–9 and Diod. Sic. 15.70.1.

[113] The Celts sought *amicitia* and *societas* from Dionysius in the 370s after they had burned Rome, *cf*. Just. *Epit.* 20.5.4–6. Sinatra (1996, 373–381) argues that Celtic mercenaries were part of Dionysius' attacks on Rhegium and Caere in the mid-380s. These Celts (and Iberians) also were deployed by Dionysius to Corinth in 369 BC (Diod. Sic. 15.70.1 and Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.20).

[114] For the Sicels' arrival from Italy, see Thuc. 6.2.4–6, Diod. Sic. 5.6.3–4, and Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.12.3 (= Antiochus *FGrH* 555 F2), 1.22.3 (= Hellanicus *FGrH* 4 F79b), and 1.22.4 (= Philistus *FGrH* 556 F46). For future Sicel cultural links with Greeks, see De Vido 1997b, 7–14; Poccetti 2012.

[115] See Pope in this volume for developments under the Sicels and Shepherd 2005 for Sicel acculturation. Dench (2003, 298–304), while evaluating assimilation in Italy and Sicily, focuses on the continuity and agency of these processes. Willi (2008, 45–49) discusses linguistic changes in Sicily and the disappearance of indigenous languages.

[116] The rebellion was quickly quashed, with Ducetius shipped off to Corinth. Diod. Sic. 11.92.4 narrates his exile to Corinth, while Diod. Sic. 12.29.1 recounts his foundation of Kale Acte in northern Sicily in 446 or 440 BC. For Ducetius and his actions, see Jackman 2006. For the collective identity of the Sicels, especially under Ducetius, see Péré-Noguès 2011.

[117] This alliance with the Sicel leader Archonides (*IG* I^3 32) is preserved in a decree, dating to the period of 435–415, *cf*. Thuc. 7.1.4.

[118] Thuc. 7.57.11 and 7.77.6, although 7.58.3 notes that some Sicels were allied to Syracuse.

[119] For the treaty, see Diod. Sic. 13.114.1 (καὶ Σικελοὺς ἅπαντας αὐτονόμους εἶναι). For the relationship between the Sicels and Dionysius, see Miccichè 2008.

[120] This propaganda, likely created by Philistus or the scholarly court, is preserved in Cic. *Div.* 1.20.39 and Val. Max. 1.7 ext.7. In this myth, Dionysius' mother dreams of giving birth to a satyr and seeks out the Galeotae, local Sicel seers, who foretell his birth, *cf*. Steph. Byz. *s.v.*

Γαλεῶται, Catturini 1987 and Sammartano 2010, 165–167. Such identity narratives appeared during Dionysius' lifetime (*e.g.* the Himeran woman who correctly identifes the tyrant as the future *alastôr* of Sicily in Val. Max. 1.7 ext.6). See Lewis 2000, 99–101 for the use of these stories as propaganda.

[121] Cic. *Div.* 1.33.73, Ael. *VH* 12.46, and Plin. *HN* 8.64. Sammartano (2010) discusses this myth as representing new political order with a harmonious society and analyzes the significance of the portent at Leontinoi, an outpost of exiles and mercenaries, over whom he would rule. For analysis of the history of Leontinoi, see Vanotti 1995.

[122] Ancient sources suggest that Adranus was a chthonic deity worshiped across Sicily (*cf.* Ael. *NA* 11.3 and 11.20, and Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Ἀδρανός). For analysis of Adranus, see Cusumano 1992, 151–163; Morawiecki 1995. Hesychius links Adranus to the Palici and to Hephaestus, whose site at Aetna had sacred dogs. Cusumano (1992, 163–185), who links these myths to the founding of Aitna, argues that Hesychius' ideas may derive from Philistus.

[123] For his peace treaty with Herbita, see Diod. Sic. 14.15.1. For the episode at Enna, see Diod. Sic. 14.14.6–8, where Diodorus stresses that Dionysius treated these cities kindly to gain their trust.

[124] Diod. Sic. 14.15.2–3. For discussion of the events of 403 BC, see Micciché 2008, 124–125.

[125] Diod. Sic. 14.37.5.

[126] Diod. Sic. 14.53.5.

[127] For Sicel hatred of and revolt from Dionysius, see Diod. Sic. 14.58.1. The terms of the second treaty appear in Diod. Sic. 14.96.4 (Σικελοὺς δὲ δεῖν ὑπὸ Διονϭσιον τετάχθαι).

[128] For example, the Sicel leader Archonides later founded his own settlement at Halaesa Archonidea with a *summiktos ochlos* that included mercenaries (Diod. Sic. 14.16.1–2). The re-inscription of a previous proxeny decree (*IG* I^3 228), dated securely to 385/384 BC provides Athenian honors to him and his brother Demon, leader of Centoripe, *cf.* Walbank 1978, 354–358; De Vido 1997b; Franco 2008, 172–174.

[129] Diod. Sic. 14.96.4.

[130] Diod. Sic. 13.44. These mercenaries likely remained after the Athenian campaigns of 414/413 (*cf.* Diod. Sic. 13.43–44) and perhaps were hired by Chalcidian cities for protection against Syracuse, *cf.* Fantasia 2006, 491–494 and Tagliamonte 1994, 124–131. For the complete list of ancient passages where Italian mercenaries in Sicily appear, see Appendix A of Tagliamonte 1994. For discussion of the importance of Campanians, see also Péré-Noguès 2006.

[131] Campanian mercenaries at the sieges of Selinus (Diod. Sic. 13.55.7, *cf.* 13.62.5) and Acragas (Diod. Sic. 13.85.4, *cf.* 13.80.4) complained

about their payment and *sitos* under the Carthaginians and threatened to defect (Diod. Sic. 13.88.2). See Castrizio 2000, 19–20 for early Campanian campaigns on the island.

[132] Diod. Sic. 14.7–10, Plut. *Vit. Dion* 35.6 (= Philistus *FGrH* 556 F59), Isoc. *Archid.* 44–45, and Ael. *VH* 4.8.

[133] Diod. Sic. 14.9.8–9. After paying the troops, Dionysius feared their fickleness and sent them away (ὑφορώμενος αὐτῶν τὴν ἀβεβαιότητα). For the *topos* of the dangerous Italian mercenary and fear of Italian *ekbarbarôsis*, see Tagliamonte 1999, 556–560.

[134] For analysis of Campanian integration, see Zambon 2001, 249–252.

[135] See Diod. Sic. 14.15.2–3 for their takeover of Naxos and Diod. Sic. 14.58.2 and 14.61.4 for their presence at Aetna. For Campanian economic stability, see Cutroni Tusa 1970; Rouveret 2000.

[136] Pl. *Ep.* 8.353e (Φοινίκων ἢ Ὀπικῶν μεταβαλοῦσα εἴς τινα δυναστείαν καὶ κράτος). See Sironen 1995, 187–188 for the status of Italic languages in Sicily, while Pope (2009) discusses new coins issued after the re-peopling of Naxos and Catane. At Catane, coins with the legend ΚΑΤΑΝΑΙΩΝ and a butting-bull suggest occupation by Sicel mercenaries, while silver *litrai* stamped with ΝΕΑΠΟΛΙ[ΤΑΝ] found at Naxos indicate new populations of Campanians. For the numismatics of Naxos especially, see Lentini *et al.* 2018; *cf*. Puglisi 2018, 150–152 for general discussion of Campanian coinage.

[137] De la Genière (1999, 126–130; 2001, 25–36), as well as De Cesare (2006), discuss the prevalence of Italian wares (*e.g.* red-figure *stamnoi* popular in Etruria and Campania that portray myths popular in Italy) in early 5th-century tombs of Gela, Agrigento and smaller sites (*e.g.* Vassallaggi) that suggest the presence of Italian mercenaries in these *necropoleis*. Guglielmino (2006) notes that tombs 149 and 150 at Entella (dating from ca. 375 BC) contain Oscan grave goods but are located amongst Greek burials, a sign of integration.

[138] For the mention of *Alkipos Markou*, who likely was a Campanian *eques*, see *IG* IV^2 95 ll.71–72. Mamercus had a minor political role in the mid-4th century as a local tyrant, wrote an epigram in Greek (Plut. *Vit. Tim.* 31.1), and defended himself in Greek before the Syracusan assembly (Plut. *Vit. Tim.* 34.3–4), *cf*. Talbert 1974, 199–201. Poccetti (1989, 116–125) evaluates the acculturation of Italian elites into Sicilian society.

[139] For the treatment of Carthage as the stereotypical enemy under Dionysius, see Prag 2010b.

[140] For this new ethnic model under Dionysius, see Harris 2018, 144–151.

[141] See chapter 9 of Gat 2008 for the relationship between these factors.

[142] Dincecco and Onorato 2018, especially 11–51, and Dincecco and

Onorato 2016, by charting the development of cities and states within Europe from Charlemagne to the Industrial Revolution, demonstrate through econometric analysis how zones with the most conflict also experienced the most socioeconomic development.

[143] Caferro 2008 discusses in detail the relationship between warfare and economic development (especially in Renaissance Italy).

[144] Dincecco and Onorato 2018, 31–41.

[145] For comprehensive analysis of these processes, see Dincecco and Onorato 2018, 43–51.

[146] For the tunnel construction and other works under Polycrates, see Hdt. 3.60 and Arist. *Pol.* 5.1313b. For naval developments, see Hdt. 3.45, and Plut. *Vit. Per.* 26. For dating debates and further analysis, see Shipley 1987 and White 1954.

[147] Moggi 2006 mentions widespread use of mercenaries, constant warfare with *barbaroi*, the destruction of cities, and mass migration.

[148] For urbanisation under Gelon, see Mertens 2006, 310–315.

[149] For discussion of the size, population, development, and costs of these new building projects, see De Angelis 2016, 101–105 and 183–187.

[150] Mafodda (2002) analyses links between Gelon and Dionysius. For urbanisation under Dionysius, see Diod. Sic. 14.7 and 14.41, *cf.* De Angelis 2016, 124–129 and 212–216.

[151] For overall developments in Syracuse at this time, see Mignosa in this volume. Polacco and Mirisola (1999) and Aiosa (2001) evaluate these developments on Ortygia. Many new constructions appear during later periods of warfare (*e.g.* between Dionysius II and Dion). See Diod. Sic. 14.7.2–3, 14.10.4, and 16.11.5 for these extra walls and Diod. Sic. 15.74.5 for the Royal Gate. Aiosa (2001, 97–102) suggests that the palace showed Persian influence, due to strong relations between Syracuse and Persia.

[152] For this fleet, see Corretti 2006, who argues that Ionians with knowledge of trade (Samians and Dionysius of Phocaea) aided its construction. For general development of the Syracusan navy, see Fantasia forthcoming.

[153] For the *emplekton* wall, previously used by Hermocrates when rebuilding Selinus in 409, see Vitr. *De arch.* 2.8.7. For 4th-century fortification development, see Tréziny 1999, 251–255; Pope 2014.

[154] Diod. Sic. 14.18 and Strabo 6.2.4. Mertens (2002; 2006, 424–433) analyses the calculation of men needed for wall construction. Dionysius would later finish the circuit wall in 385 (Diod. Sic. 15.13.5), *cf.* Beste 1999 for overview of structure and function.

[155] A parallel case to Syracuse occurred in Cyprus, where Evagoras improves economic/military infrastructure and invites artisans and

craftsmen, *cf*. Isoc. *Archid*. 9.51 and Costa 1974, especially 43–45.

[156] For use of the catapult, see Diod. Sic 14.42.1 (*cf*. 14.43.3 and 14.50.4) and Campbell 2011, 678–680. *IG* II^2 1422, an inscription from catapult bolts, is dated by Cole (1981) perhaps to the end of Dionysius I's reign. For Zopyrus, see Vlassopoulos 2007a, 179.

[157] Polacco and Mirasola (1999, 181–184) discuss the navy building projects of Dionysius and suggests that 160 double shipsheds provided for 320 ships.

[158] For the use of the quinquereme, see Diod. Sic. 14.42.1–2, who also notes large-scale movement of workers to Italy to harvest timber for these fleets. For Syracusan innovation with the *embolos* during the Athenian expedition, see Thuc. 7.40.5. For analysis of navy innovation, see Castagnino Berlinghieri 2000.

[159] Krasilnikoff (1995, 177–179) discusses the war machine of Dionysius, the need for massive amounts of workers, and their ability to migrate due to 4th-century economic crises on the mainland. For discussion of engineers and others who later similarly travelled to the 4th-century court of Philip II, see Marsden 1977.

[160] *IG* II^2 18 (393 BC), II^2 103 (369/8 BC), and II^2 105 (368/367 BC) state that the *dêmos* had decided to praise Διονύσιον τὸν Σικελίας ἄρχοντα.

Chapter 10

Dawn of the mercenaries, twilight of the Sikels?[*]

Spencer Pope

L'affermazione del regno di Dionisio nel periodo tardo-classico rappresenta un momento fondamentale nella storia politica della Sicilia antica. Tale centralizzazione avvenne in parte a spese del territorio siculo e determinò l'affermazione di due poteri in accesa rivalità: l'eparchia greca sotto l'egemonia di Siracusa e l'epicrazia cartaginese localizzata nella parte occidentale dell'isola. L'incremento territoriale di Siracusa, in particolare, modificò radicalmente le dinamiche insediative attive nella Sicilia orientale, provocando la fondazione di nuove apoikiai e la distruzione degli insediamenti più antichi. Questi cambiamenti dipesero dall'introduzione nell'isola da parte di Dionisio di gruppi di mercenari di etnie diverse. Tale circostanza richiese complesse strategie politiche, volte al mantenimento del permanente insediamento di tali compagini, e determinò una ristrutturazione del territorio indigeno che ha reso difficile identificare, dal punto di vista archeologico, i Siculi come un distinto gruppo culturale. Questo contributo intende esaminare le evidenze archeologiche relative alle dinamiche insediative nella Sicilia orientale nel tardo periodo classico e i fattori che ne determinarono lo sviluppo.

This paper discusses two developments in late Classical Sicily and considers their co-terminality: the first is the twilight of discrete Sikel identity in Sicily in the late Classical period and the second is the settlement of mercenaries in eastern Sicily under Dionysius and his successors in Syracuse. The indigenous population of central and eastern Sicily are called ‘Sikeloi’ by ancient sources; Thucydides discusses the arrival of three population groups in Sicily before the Greeks: the first were the Sikans, followed by refugees from the Trojan War who became known as Elymians, then the Sikels, who crossed over from Southern Italy. The Sikels pushed the Sikans to the south and west of the island and held the north and east of the island. The Greek author places the arrival of the Sikels 300 years before the foundation of the Greek *apoikiai*.[1] The term ‘Sikel’ is an historical one and applied by subsequent settlers on the island, but there is reason to see it as an emic term.[2] The inhabitants of eastern Sicily that Greek settlers identify as ‘Sikels’ may be associated archaeologically with the *facies* Ausonian II, Cassibile, Pantalica Sud and Finocchito. These are population groups that principally practised inhumation in rock cut chamber tombs, produced a wide repertoire of bronze objects including both fibulae and weapons and lived in longhouses characterised by the use of wooden poles with waddle and daub walls and thatch roofs.[3] Epigraphic evidence for the language of the Sikels is limited but an inscription from Mendolito appears to refer to a public body and an armed component of the community.[4] Taken together with the appearance of arms in both hoards and in tombs, it is possible to reconstruct Sikel society as broadly egalitarian with a warrior elite class.[5]

The indigenous population came into ever greater focus across the archaic and classical periods. Through prolonged contact and expansive dissemination of Greek material culture, discrete indigenous traditions subsided in the high classical period, but a coherent Sikel identity and concept of Sikel territory extended into the 4th century BC. The significance of the Sikels at this point is exemplified by the federation of Ducetius and the flourishing of the Sanctuary of Palikoi, which saw the construction of a monumental *hestiatorion* in this period.[6] Centred on the Valley of the Margi River, the King Ducetius brought the communities of the common ethne into a federation and undertook military campaigns against the Sicilian Greeks.[7] The appeal to the Sikel *ethne* seems to be reinforced through his association with the Sanctuary of the Palikoi, which imbued a religious dimension to his call for ethnic unity. But even in the period following the death of Ducetius, indigenous identity and territorial holdings were still significant. In 426 BC, Sikels aligned with Athenians in an attack on Inessa and later aided an Athenian expedition at Himera, in which they moved from the interior to the coast to meet the Athenians.[8] The following year Naxos was backed by a contingent of Sikels against a siege by Messenians, allies of Syracuse.[9]



c. a. 415 *a*

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[– – – .] παρὰ Ναχσ[ίον– – –] ΣΤΟΙΧ.
[– – – . .]ΤΧΗΗΗΓ– – – –
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[– – – . .]Ι παρὰ – – –
5 [– – – . .]ΧΧΧ𐅅– – – –
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lacuna

b

Col. I

– – –
– – –
[– – Ἀθ]ηναίοις
10 [– – τ]ạ́δε
– – –
– – – – v
– – – –
– – – –

Col. II

15 Κα̣[ταναῖοι – – – –]
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Σικε[λοὶ – – – – –]
𐅋𐅊𐅉 – – – – – –
῾Ρεγῖ[νοι – – – –]
20 𐅊ΧΧΓ̣ – – – – – –
Σικε[λοὶ – – – – –]
γίγν̣[εται – – – – –]

lacuna

c

𐅊Χ – – – – –
Δ'⋚ – – – – –
25 Η[. . .]ΙΙ – – – –
γίγνε[ται – – – –]
hοι δὲ Σι̣[κελοὶ – – – ἐπέδοσαν]
[.]𐅉Τ *vacat*
[κεφά]λαι[ον σύμπαντος – – –]
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Figure 10.1. IG I³ 291, ll. 1–29.

An Athenian inscription, IG I^3 291 records payments to Athens for the first expedition in Sicily (Fig. 10.1). Naxos, Katane and Rhegion make contributions of 1, 30 and 50 Talents, respectively (lines 1–2, 15–16, 19–20). Line 17 reads 'SIKE' and is followed by a contribution of 160 Talents. The restoration generally accepted is 'Sikeloi'.[10] This restoration indicates that the Sikels participated in the funding of the Athenian expedition along with the Chalcidian cities of Western Greece.[11] The use of the ethnic, instead of city names, suggests a collective political body with a common treasury, and provides evidence that the Sikel Federation continued at least through the third quarter of the century.[12] Significantly, the reconstructed payment to the Athenian expedition is 160 T, which is greater than the contribution of the Sikeliot cities put together, and nearly three times the amount from Segesta in 415 BC.[13] The Sikels were still unified politically and had significant wealth, financial organisation, and continued to control strategic territory into the fourth quarter of the 5th century BC.

Both Athens and Syracuse sought out alliances with the Sikels during the invasion of 415–413 BC, with a greater number siding with the Attic city.[14] Thucydides reports that the Sikels of the lowland/plains (καὶ οἱ μὲν πρὸς τὰ πεδία) sided with the Syracusans, while those of the interior (τῶν δὲ τὴν μεσόγειαν), who had always been independent, with few exceptions, at once joined the Athenians.[15] The Sikels held a particularly high profile even into the reign of Dionysius I, as the peace treaty of 405 BC stipulated that they were to be autonomous.[16] Their prominence is attested by a number of events, including that the territory that would later be home to Taormenion was turned over to the Sikels; Archonides, tyrant of Herbita founded a sub-colony, Halaisa Archonidea, on the north coast, in 403 BC; and Agyris of Agyrion is noted by Diodorus as the second most powerful tyrant of Sicily. Notably Dionysius sought a peace treaty with Agyris rather than engage in battle with his army[17]. Dionysius's selection of a Sikel name, Adranon, for his new foundation on the slopes of Mt Etna demonstrates that the Sikels still had cultural weight at the opening of the 4th century.[18] The Greek foundation utilised the name and the cult to legitimise the new foundation in a territory that had been steadfastly Sikel. The pivotal moment for their political dissolution came quickly after this brief resurgence.

Syracuse's expansion under Dionysius required new strategies for land management which was largely carried out through the consolidation of Greek populations at Syracuse (such as the landowners at Leontinoi) and population relocations, most of which focused on mercenaries. The arrival of mercenaries presented Dionysius with a situation that required ever-increasing urgency: the first concern is remuneration and the second is long-term housing.[19] The *misthos* came first from the treasury of the city, which was soon overburdened. Dionysius filled the state coffers with the expropriation of wealth from Geloans and extracted indemnity in a few instances, the first of which was 300 Talents from the Carthaginians following their plague-stricken attempt on Syracuse.[20] Funds came from spoils taken from defeated enemies and the sale of prisoners at such as at Naxos in 403/2 BC, and then from Motya in 398 BC. Sikels had served as mercenaries under Hippocrates (Polienus 5.6), and soldiers for pay were brought to the island in significant numbers under the Deinomenids: Hieron brought a group of 5000 mercenaries from the Peloponnese to Syracuse and a total of 10,000 were recorded at Aitna, a quantity that grew to 15,000 under Thrasybulus.[21] Ex-soldiers were settled at indigenous sites Kakyron (likely Monte Saraceno di Ravanusa), and Montagna di Marzo.[22] Mercenaries were employed *en masse* by the Carthaginians in 480 BC, but also in greater numbers in the Classical period, with an abundance used in the assaults 409–406/5 BC.[23]



Figure 10.2. Bronze Hemilitron, Obverse: head of Demeter, ΕΝΤΕΛΛΑΣ; *Reverse: Pegasos above a helmet,* ΚΑΜΠΑΝΩΝ *(type: CNS 1, 318, no. 4).*

It was incumbent upon Dionysius to remove mercenaries from the general population: in addition to the need to re-occupy territory, the legendary unruliness of mercenaries necessitated a separation from the citizen body.[24] Multiple groups of mercenaries and ex-mercenaries settled and were settled across the island at both new and preexisting foundations. Herein lies the praxis of mercenary settlement. The treatment of mercenary groups under Dionysius and his followers can be grouped into four categories: 1) fully autonomous, 2) mercenaries who were given land in lieu of payment where they were given the opportunity to settle permanently as a community 3) settled with the expectation that soldiers could be pulled back into service if necessary, forming essentially a reserve pool of soldiers for Syracuse 4) military stationing in a *phrourion*: these soldiers were still in service and were dependent upon Syracuse. The result is a range of civic structures that dotted the Sicilian landscape with communities suited both to the place and to the defense of Syracusan territory.

Let us examine each of four types of settlement. The leading example of the first type is Entella. Dionysius employed 1200 Campanian *equites* to put down the revolt of the aristocrats at Syracuse.[25] Following the victory, Dionysius awarded them gifts and then dispatched them from the Syracusan on account of their fickleness.[26] The Campanian presence at Entella is visible in the numismatic record with silver *drachma* and *hemidrachma* issues overstruck on Sicilian coins with the obverse legend ΕΝΤΕΛΛΑΣ and reverse inscribed ΚΑΜΠΑΝΩΝ[27] (Fig. 10.2). A set of similar coins was issued from Nakone: obverse types included a female head and reverse Silenus on a donkey. A double ethnic appears on these coins, too: legends ΚΑΜΠΑΝΩΝ/ ΝΑΚΟΝΑΙΩΝ and ΚΑΜΠΑΝΩΝ/ ΝΑΚΩΝΕΣ[28] (Fig. 10.3). Although this site is not known archaeologically, its history must mirror that of Entella: a pre-existing community (without a previous numismatic output) was overrun by Campanian mercenaries who preserved the settlement name on one side of the coin and added their ethnic identity to the other.



Figure 10.3. Bronze Hemilitron, Obverse: female head (Demeter?) ΚΑΜΠΑΝΩΝ; *Reverse: Pegasos above a helmet,* ΝΑΚΩΝΕΣ *(type: CNS 1, 325, no. 3).*



Figure 10.4. Silver Litra of Katane, Obverse: female head within circle of dots; Reverse: butting bull, shrimp in exergue, ΚΑΤΑΝΑΙΩΝ *(type: SNG ANS 1270).*

The second type of settlement is land given expressly as compensation. Diodorus records that 10,000 mercenaries were settled at Leontinoi in lieu of their payment; an act that was well received among them because of the fertility of the land.[29] The intent, presumably, was long-term stability for the ex-soldiers as they became landowners: soldiers into farmers. Other mercenary groups were settled within the territory of Syracuse and occupied both depopulated centres and new foundations. In these cases, it is not certain whether the land was received in lieu of payment, as part of compensation, or in addition to other payments. The key to the settlement seems to be that the mercenaries were kept together as a body and were given land within the dominion of Syracuse. An example of this treatment is the group of Campanians that were brought to Katane in 403 BC (Diod. Sic. 14.15.3), the same group was moved *en mass* to Aitna-Inessa in 396 BC (Diod. Sic. 14.58.2), possibly identified with Poggio Cocola near Paternò.[30] As the mercenaries were moved a second time, it appears that they remained under the control of Dionysius, *i.e.* they were not fully autonomous. It is likely that the mercenaries remained loyal and could be called back into service if necessary, so that these groups formed a type of reserve for the tyrant. This is how Diodorus describes Thrasybulus assembling an army that included the ex-mercenaries settled at Aitna-Katane by Hieron.[31] In broad terms, these mercenaries conform to Garlan's '*vocation politique*', by integrating with a community or forming a new one.[32]

New coin types produced at Katane provide evidence for the new residents: the reverse now featured a butting bull, with head lowered to the ground, both sets of legs crossed and its tail looping in the air. The style and composition closely emulate coins of Thurii[33] (Fig. 10.4). The butting-bull type appears at Kephaloidion at the same time, (ca. 400 BC) with a double ethnic. The silver litra has the head of Herakles with lionskin on the obverse, r., ΕΚ ΚΕΦΑΛΟΙΔΙΟΥ, reverse: Butting bull, r., with fish in exergue, ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΩΤΑΝ. The legend should be read as 'Herakleans living at Kephaloidion'. The reference is likely to mercenaries from Herakleia in Lucania settled at Kephaloidion, which was taken by Dionysius ca. 400 BC (Diod. Sic. 14.78.7). The adoption of the same reverse type for the short-lived coinage of the city (butting bull, fish in ex.)

may have the same inspiration as the Katane types, if not the work of the same die engraver.[34] Similar placements of mercenaries occurred at Galaria, Halaisa, Adranon and Tyndaris.[35] From the rule of Dionysius through that of Timoleon, mercenary coinage, identified primarily by issuing on overstrikes, is also recognised from Agyrion, Henna, Herbessos, Kentoripe, Mytistratos, Petra, Sergetion, Tauromenion and from groups named Sileraioi and Tyrrhenoi.[36]

The fourth category of settlement is a *phrourio*n occupied by mercenaries, with soldiers are employed by Dionysius and serving as an active part of the army. Their presence does not constitute a political community *per se*, and their inhabitation is prioritised for defence, rather than for agricultural exploitation of terrain.[37] The military outposts constituted a line of protection of Syracusan territory and were an expedient solution to occupying territory and therein created ownership. The *phrouria* adhere to a model of 'military colonisation': Diodorus mentions πολλὰ τῶν φρουρίων in eastern Sicily before the arrival of Timoleon, and also notes that Dionysius established forts as far away as the Adriatic Sea in order to retain control of the tip of the Italian peninsula.[38]



Figure 10.5. Fortification wall at Monte San Basilio (© Jonasch).

The nature of this fourth type of settlement is distinct from the others, but diagnostically more difficult to identify archaeologically.[39] To date, the greater part of these outposts have been identified through numismatic finds, site typology (*i.e.* walls) or by the presence of Campanian burials; the most prominent example is Monte San Basilio (Fig. 10.5) – often identified as Brikinniai – at which the *Tomba del Duce Ignoto* yielded rich grave goods including lances, a sword, a full set of armour including breastplate, belt and greaves.[40] The belt, with *ganci a corpo di cicala e terminali a punta di freccia* (clasps in the form of cicadas with arrow-head tips), is similar to Campanian styles and suggests that the origin of the owner may be sought in Southern Italy; the *duce ignoto* may have been an *eques Campanus* and perhaps the leader of a mercenary faction stationed at the *phrourion.*[41] Other potential sites identified through archaeological excavation include Paliké, Monte Saraceno di Ravanusa and Piano dei Casazzi.[42]



Figure 10.6. Fortification wall at Monte Saraceno di Ravanusa (© Jonasch).

Monte Saraceno di Ravanusa is situated on the Salso River Valley ca. 20 km from the south coast of the island; this indigenous site came under Greek influence shortly after the foundation of Gela and later was brought under control of Akragas, perhaps during the reign of Phalaris.[43] The settlement was abandoned in the last decades of the 5th century BC, perhaps following a violent invasion.

A later reoccupation took the form of a more restricted settlement concentrated on the acropolis, indicated by a new portion of fortification wall on the summit that protected a densely packed settlement within (Fig. 10.6). Coins of Dionysius excavated from the acropolis indicate that the site entered into the Syracusan *epikrateia*, perhaps as a border *phrourion* during the reign of Dionysius.[44]



Figure 10.7. View of fortification wall at Piano dei Casazzi (© Jonasch).



Figure 10.8. Line drawing of bronze belt from Paliké (Gentili 1962).

Sites in the Valley of the Margi River are worth discussing. Piano Dei Casazzi is home to a small settlement on a sloping plain 8 km from Caltagirone and 12 km from Mineo on the north side of the River valley. The site was occupied from the Late Bronze Age through the Early Iron Age, and subsequently re-inhabited after the 7th century BC.[45] Activity during the first half of the 4th century is documented by the discovery of two KAINON type coins.[46] Further excavation at the site is welcome as it may be another late classical *phrourion* (Fig. 10.7).

Located at the head of the Valley of the Margi River and adjacent to the Plain of Catania, the venerable Sikel Sanctuary of the Divine

Palikoi, contemporary Rocchicella di Mineo, had long been a focal point for the religious and civic lives of the surrounding indigenous communities. This site, too, was brought into the sphere of Syracuse with the establishment of an outpost placed atop Rocchicella. The nature of this settlement is not immediately clear. Pottery and coin finds from the site date to the first quarter of the 4th century BC, so it is difficult to reconstruct the hand of Ducetius at the settlement. One find in particular from the site supports an identification as related to mercenary movements: a bronze belt recovered along the city wall contains an inscription reading: ΦΑΙΚΩΝ ΑΠΟ ΚΕΝΤΟΡΙΠΙΝΩΝ ΑΝΕΘΗΚΕ ΠΑΣΙ ΘΕΟΙΣ ‘Phaikon dedicates [this belt taken] from the [men] of Kentoripe to all the gods’. The belt, along with its inscription, dates to the middle years of the 4th century BC and has been identified as a product of Sabellian region of central Italy based on its *a cicala* closure (Fig. 10.8).[47]



Figure 10.9. Eastern fortification wall at Paliké (© Diego Barucco).

The settlement was enclosed within a fortification wall consisting of two discrete constructions: the first is a large wall (up to 2.40 m wide) built of roughly coursed large fieldstones (up to 0.40 × 1.00 m) and preserved to a maximum height of 1.86 m that extended for nearly 23 m. Built up against it is an exterior facing composed of small, mostly unworked fieldstones placed between larger, calcarenite orthostate blocks (Fig. 10.9). Seven large roughly rectangular blocks are arranged at irregular intervals (2.0–6.5 m) along the 17 m length of the facing.[48] Traces of *anathyrosis* visible on the calcarenite blocks indicate that they are reused in the context of the fortifications of a new settlement after their initial use in an architectural context. The blocks most likely originally belonged to an archaic sacellum at the summit.[49]

The settlement at Rocchicella extends across a gently sloping terrace on the N side of the hill for ca. 250 m east–west and no farther than 150 m north–south, enclosing an area not greater than 2 hectares. A central *plateia*, 6 m wide, runs east–west across the site has two sequential pavement levels, suggesting a rebuilding of the street during its existence. The second pavement level is raised ca. 40 cm above the first, and a coin of the KAINON type recovered on the lower pavement level provides a *terminus post quem* in the second quarter of the 4th century for the rebuilding of the street.[50]

Three *stenopoi*, each 2.60 m wide and running perpendicular to the *plateia*, have been excavated; their positioning allows for three more to the east, for a maximum of six *stenopoi* arranged at intervals of 14.5 m. This interval is less than half of the median size in Sicily for the Classical period (Fig. 10.10).[51] The only arrangement in Sicily comparable to Paliké is the lower terrace of Monte Saraceno di Ravanusa at 24 m.[52] The grid at Paliké yields correspondingly small houses. Two houses, each 6.8 m wide and separated by an *ambitus* of 0.60 m, are arranged ‘back to back’ within this space. Each was two rooms deep, the back rooms communicating with a larger, narrower room at the front. Due to extensive damage from clandestine excavations, no single house was excavated to its original extent, with the result that neither its total size nor a clear sense of the architectural form can be given, but a reconstructed house at Paliké having three rooms would cover ca.102 m^2, approximately one-third of the average house size at Kamarina or Agrigento in the Classical period. Again, houses on the lower terrace at Monte Saraceno di Ravanusa, at ca. 100–120 m^2, are closely comparable to those at Paliké.



Figure 10.10. Site plan of settlement at Paliké (© Spencer Pope).

This relatively small dimension may have been implemented for reasons of expediency: to allow a set number of houses to be built on the terrace, which in turn would house a pre-established quota of settlers, likely mercenaries removed from Syracuse itself. The small *stenopos* intervals befit the overall small dimensions of the city, but, perhaps more importantly, they speak to a modest settlement designed to house numerous settlers in an expedient and perhaps egalitarian manner. The settlement at Paliké has all of the attributes expected of a mercenary settlement and may be understood as a *phrourion* of Dionysius I.[53] A Syracusan military presence is felt even at the most significant indigenous sanctuary.

In conclusion, the expansionist policies of Dionyius necessitated a sizable army and the tyrant filled those ranks with mercenaries that included soldiers from the Italian mainland as well as from Greece. Many of these mercenaries remained in Sicily either forming a new community at an existing polis, as at Entella, settling on land given in lieu of payment as at Leontinoi, or stationed in *phrouria* across the Kingdom of Syracuse. One by-product of this arrangement was that settlement distribution was transformed along with the ethnic make-up of eastern Sicily, so that ethnic divisions in Sicily no longer hinged on a Greek-indigenous distinction, but were balanced between Sikel, Sikeliot and *xenoi*, namely Campanian and Italic mercenaries. Sikel territory was either repopulated with ex-mercenaries or became home to *phrouria* forming a defensive perimeter against Carthaginians. Following massive relocations, a diluted population and widespread uprooting, it is difficult to discern a discrete Sikel identity in the third quarter of the 4th century BC, and even when it is noticed, it does not resonate as a longer-lived culture but as one of many marginalised population groups within Sicily.

Paliké and other sites that once formed the heartland of the indigenous ethnicity at this point were no more than strategic outposts that ensured Syracusan presence in the mountains and valleys of eastern Sicily. Already shorn of discrete material culture, following these transformations, the term 'Sikel' was useful only for describing hinterland areas, rather than a population group.

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* The author would like to thank Dr Melanie Jonasch for the invitation to participate in the WASICS conference; thanks to the conference participants especially Giulio Amaro, Michela Costanzi, Jason Harris, Valentina Mignosa, and Randall Sousa for insightful discussion. Thanks also to the reviewers. All mistakes are my own.

[1] Thuc. 6.2.1–5. The earliest appearance of a form of Sikel (Σικελοὺς) is found in Homer *Ody*. 20.383; it seems the term refers broadly to the inhabitants of the island rather than indicating one population group. The term is also used by Herodotos (7.155.1), in which Hippocrates of Gela campaigns against the Sikels [ἐπὶ τοὺς Σικελοὺς]), where it may refer to the indigenous population of the southeast corner of the island.

[2] The appearance of the term SIKE[LOI] in IG 1^3 291 marking the collection of a payment seems to indicate that this is the name by which they were known to the Athenians. Pope 2017, 416 and below.

[3] La Rosa 1989, 18–40;

[4] Pelagatti 1964/65, 250–252, Mignosa 2017/18, 217–218.

[5] La Rosa 1989, 40; 1996, 523.

[6] Excavations at the Sanctuary of the Palikoi are discussed thoroughly in

Maniscalco and McConnell 2003 and Maniscalco 2008.

[7] Diodorus introduces Ducetius as the commander of the Sikels (Δουκέτιος μὲν ὁ τῶν Σικελῶν ἡγεμών) (11.76.3), and subsequently describes him as king of the Sikels (ὁ τῶν Σικελῶν βασιλεὺς) (11.78.5), and finally refers to him as leader of the Sikels (Δουκέτιος ὁ τῶν Σικελῶν ἀφηγοϭμενος) (11.88.6). He is not identified as the head of a single city-state, but of the population group. The only other early historical reference to a king (βασιλεὺς) in indigenous context is Hyblon, whose concession of territory permitted the foundation of Megara Hyblaia in the 8th century BC (Thuc. 6.4.1). Significantly, Hyblon is presented as a Sikel king, not king of the Sikels.

[8] Sikel assault on Inessa: Thuc. 3.103.1; Sikel aid at Himera: Thuc. 3.115.1.

[9] Thuc. 4.25.7–9.

[10] 'Sikeloi' would be unique in the corpus of inscriptions, Pope 2017, 403–404.

[11] Ampolo 1987.

[12] Pope 2017; Miccichè 2010, 81: 'Le testimonianze tucididee… acquistano inoltre un grande significativo storico, poiché attestano che quella 'coesione sicula', diligentemente costruita da Ducezio, non fu certamente effimera …'

[13] Cataldi 2007, 443; Galvagno 2000, 99–101.

[14] In addition to IG I^3 291, which preserves the text of a pact between Athens and the Sikels, a decree in honour of Archonides found at Athens (IG I^3 228) provides evidence for close contact between the groups: Culasso Gastaldi 1995; De Vido 1997b, 22–23.

[15] Thuc. 6.88.3–5. The distinction of areas of the plain and the *mesogheia* by Thucydides is a valuable one. The plain may be the area of the Plain of Catania, the realm of Ducetius. Galvagno takes this reference to include the area around Inessa, which was assaulted during the first Athenian expedition, see Galvagno 2000, 90–92. Nicias, in 413 BC, rallies the Athenians by raising the possibility of reaching the territory of the Sikels, who feared the Syracusans and would receive the army, Thuc. 7.77.6, Sikels are listed among other Italiot allies of Athens, Thuc. 7.58.11.

[16] Diod. Sic. 13.114.1, Consolo-Langher 2016, 18–19.

[17] Dionysius' concession of Naxian territory to the Sikels: Diod. Sic. 14.15.3; Archonides' foundation of Halaisa: Diod. Sic. 14.16.1–4; Peace treaty with Agyris: 14.95.4–7.

[18] Diod. Sic. 14.37.5.

[19] See Harris in this volume.

[20] Carthaginian indemnity: Diod. Sic. 14.75.2. also 14.105.4; 106.3; 111.4, 15.15.4. Polyaenus *Strat.* 5.2.17.

[21] Diod. Sic. 11.67.7

[22] Pap. Oxyrh. 4.665, l. 1–7, see also below, note 44 on Monte Saraceno di Ravanusa.

[23] De La Geniere 2001. Diod. Sic. 11.72.3.

[24] Tagliamonte 1994; 1999.

[25] Diod. Sic. 14.9.2.

[26] Diod. Sic. 14.9.8.

[27] De Vido 2001; Garraffo 1978, 29, n. 1, 2., *cf*. Garraffo 1987, 218. The practice of overstriking these coins demonstrates the provisionary nature of the issues. Cutroni Tusa 1970, 254–256.

[28] Fantasia 2001; Frey-Kupper and Weiss 2010, 92–93; Frey-Kupper 2016.

[29] Diod. 14.78.1–3, Caven (1990, 86) suggests that displaced landowners at Leontinoi may have been relocated to confiscated Sikel territory. See also Frasca in this volume.

[30] McConnell 1997/98; Puglisi 2018, 151.

[31] Diod. Sic. 11.67.7.

[32] Garlan 1989.

[33] SNG ANS 1270; see also Pope 2009.

[34] The coin of Piakos is of the same type as well. The relationship between the legend and the image on the reverse is the same as at Katane: ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΩΤΑΝ unambiguously refers to the issuing body – Herakleans – and is unrelated to the coin type.

[35] On Galaria: Tagliamonte 1994, 145; Fantasia 2003, 475–479; For Halaisa: Diod. Sic. 14.16.1; at Adranon: Cusumano 1992, 157, n. 28; Sordi 1980b, 29; Lamagna 1994, 173; 1997/98, 75. On population relocations by Dionyius at Tyndaris: Diod. Sic. 14.78.5–6.

[36] Castrizio 2000, 33–57.

[37] Castrizio 2000, 22. Definition of *phrourion*: Nielsen 2002; Trèziny 2010. See also Jonasch in this volume.

[38] Diod. 16.69.3–4. Castrizio (2000, 21–24), Franco (2008, 190) and Péré Noguès (2006, 485–487) all reconstruct a system of satellite settlements orchestrated by Dionysius. The relationship between ex-mercenary settlement and *phrourion*, inhabited by soldiers – likely mercenaries – of Syracuse is still the subject of speculation. It has been proposed, however, that there is an overlap of the two groups: Castrizio 2000, 22.

[39] Péré Noguès 2006, 484–485.

[40] Orsi 1922.

[41] Tagliamonte 1994, 149–150; 1999, 568–569.

[42] The identification of a *phrourion* on the basis of archaeological evidence is discussed by Fischer-Hansen 2002, 175. The discovery of KAINON issues at Piano dei Casazzi indicates revived activity in the first

half of the 4th century BC: Belfiore 2000.

[43] See also Jonasch in this volume.

[44] Monte Saraceno has long been identified with the indigenous city Kakyron, a site that received mercenaries after the fall of the Deinomenids. Mercenaries of the Deinomenids took flight following the fall of the tyrants and sought refuge at Omphake, Kakyron and Krastos (Pap. Oxyrh. IV, 665, 1–7). See also de Waele, 1971, 45–47. The majority of coins found on the acropolis of Monte Saraceno date to the first quarter of the 4th century BC, including Corinthian *pegasoi* and coins of the KAINON type: Caccamo Caltabiano 1996, 186–189; 2003, 178; Siracusano 1996, 13. Ceramic finds also attest to activity at this time: for example, vano 22 of Casa B2 yielded a black glaze skyphos dated to the first quarter of the 4th century, see Calderone 2002, 21. The fortification wall was first identified in Mingazzini 1937, 623–628. The series with legend KAINON included a griffin on the obverse and free horse on the obverse can now be dated to the short rule of Dionysius II; see Holloway 2007.

[45] Dunbabin 1948, 265; Belfiore 2000.

[46] Belfiore 2000, 272.

[47] Gentili 1962; Tagliamonte 1994, 148; Maniscalco and McConnell 2003, 147.

[48] Pelagatti (1962) first made this connection.

[49] Maniscalco and McConnell 2003, 153–155; Pope 2006, 224–225.

[50] The coin displays a horse on the obverse and Pegasus on the reverse (no legend). The type is the same as that with the legend KAINON.

[51] Among Greek foundations of the Archaic and Classical periods, *stenopoi* appear at intervals ranging between 28 and 41 m. The larger city blocks are found in Archaic foundations at Himera Bassa (41 m), at Gela and Akragas (35 m), and at Himera Alta, Herakleia Minoa and Selinous (32 m). Classical-period foundations include Naxos and Morgantina (39 m), Syracuse–Neapolis (38 m) and Tyndaris (28.5 m). For a summary of the various urban grids in Sicily, see Pope 2006, 103–148.

[52] Calderone 1996, 57. Recent investigation at Monte Catalfaro (Mineo, Catania province) has opened the possibility of a *per strigas* plan with stenopoi at 21 m intervals: Arcidiacono 2010, 32–33.

[53] Pope 2006, 230–234.

Chapter 11

La fondazione di città in Sicilia nel V ed all'inizio del IV sec. a.C. (492-396 a.C.): tra passato e futuro[1]

Michela Costanzi

Foundations and refoundations of cities already existed in Sicily during the Archaic period for reasons of territorial strategy and within the context of tensions and conflicts. These processes are more thoroughly documented on the island from the beginning of the 5th century to the middle of the 4th century BC, when political leaders, Greek or Sicilian, utilised foundations or refoundations to occupy territories and tactical positions, to transfer populations and to station mercenaries. By studying these foundations and refoundations, we discern characteristics that both created new realities compared to earlier Archaic colonies and anticipated those of the Hellenistic period. The study of these foundations and refoundations in Sicily allow us to conclude that they could not have formed the basis for the construction, in ancient sources, of the phenomenon of Archaic colonisation, as claimed by scholars who have analysed this phenomenon. Far from inspiring the procedures of foundations in the past, they rather connect to new situations, give rise to novel procedures, and foreshadow foundations in the future.

La fondazione (*ex novo*) o la rifondazione di città (già esistenti) per delle ragioni di strategia territoriale ed in contesti di tensioni o di conflitti[2] sono attestate in Sicilia già fin dall'epoca arcaica. A titolo di esempio, si possono ricordare le fondazioni siracusane di Akrai,[3] Kasmenai[4] e Kamarina[5] (Thuc. 6.5.2) che hanno, tra gli altri scopi, quello di controllare i territori e le popolazioni nel triangolo sud-orientale della Sicilia.[6] E la rifondazione da parte dei Greci di Gela dei centri siculi di Omphake[7] (Paus. 8.46.2) e di Maktorion[8] (Hdt. 7.153 parla della città; Stefano di Bizanzio, *s.v.* Μακτώριον, menziona la fondazione e l'ecista) entra chiaramente in un quadro di espansione territoriale della città rodio-cretese e di scontri con le popolazioni presenti nella zona.


Solus
Thermai
Himera
Halaesa
Kalè Akté
Tyndaris
Zancle/Messana
Tauromenion
Naxos
Adranon
Inessa/Aitna 2
Katane/Aitna 1
Paliké
Leontinoi
Menai Menaion
Syrakousai
Kamarina
Le città fondate e rifondate
in Sicilia tra il 492 e il 396 a.C.
■ Fondazione greca di V sec. (abitanti di Katane/Aitna 1)
□ Fondazioni di Dionisio I (400-396 a.C.)
□ Fondazioni sicule di V sec. (Ducezio e Archonides II)
○ Fondazione cartaginese di V sec.
★ Rifondazioni greche di V sec. (Ippocrate di Gela, Gelone e Ierone di Siracusa, Anaxilas di Rhegion)
☆ Rifondazioni di Dionisio I (396-392)

Figure 11.1. Le città fondate e rifondate in Sicilia tra 492 e 396 a.C. (© Costanzi).

Queste pratiche sono ancora meglio documentate nel V sec. a.C. ed all'inizio del IV sec. a.C.,[9] periodo caratterizzato da particolari situazioni politiche e sociali, legate alla presenza di tiranni nelle maggiori città greche, e dalle guerre[10] delle città greche fra di loro (ad esempio, Siracusa contro le città calcidesi della costa orientale), delle città greche con le popolazioni locali (ad esempio, Ducezio contro Siracusa e gli alleati, e Siracusa contro Halaesa) e delle città greche con i Cartaginesi. A tali situazioni corrispondono fenomeni che hanno luogo per la prima volta proprio in Sicilia in questo periodo e sembrano anticipare eventi che si manifesteranno in seguito in Grecia e nel resto del mondo greco. La nascita delle città secondo delle nuove modalità ci sembra uno di questi fenomeni precorritori.

Lo scopo del presente lavoro è di tracciare un quadro delle fondazioni *ex novo* di città o delle rifondazioni di antichi centri, per tentare di capire se tali fondazioni, che gli studiosi moderni definiscono generalmente come ‘colonie’,[11] possono ancora essere considerate come tali[12] o se, invece, viste le loro particolarità, dovrebbero essere definite diversamente; e di tentare di capire se questa loro origine abbia avuto un effetto sulla loro forma (urbana e politica) e sul loro destino (effimero o no), dovendo perciò spingere la riflessione al di là del momento della loro nascita e considerarne lo sviluppo su una più *longue durée*.

Per tali ragioni, nella prima parte di questo lavoro si farà un quadro delle fondazioni e rifondazioni del V sec. e dell’inizio del IV sec. (per tutte le città menzionate, vedi la carta delle città fondate e rifondate in Sicilia; Fig. 11.1). Tale panoramica sarà certamente incompleta, ma permetterà di considerare alcuni esempi particolari e di capire chi sia all’origine di tali imprese, quali ne siano le ragioni e le modalità, ed in quale zona della Sicilia si collochino.

In una seconda parte, sarà presentato il caso di Halaesa Archonidea, perché esso ci sembra particolarmente significativo per cercare di capire se il contesto della fondazione può conferire al centro fondato un aspetto ed una sorte particolari. Halaesa, come le altre città nate in un contesto di tensioni e di guerra, era destinata a diventare quello che sarebbe diventata?

In una terza parte, si tenterà di dedurre delle riflessioni generali sulle cause, le modalità e le conseguenze della creazione di tali città, mettendo in evidenza che esse rappresentano, nel periodo considerato, un momento da collocare tra le colonie di epoca arcaica e le nuove fondazioni della successiva epoca ellenistica.

1. Rifondazioni e fondazioni[13]

Le fondazioni sono delle nuove città caratterizzate dall’arrivo di una nuova popolazione e dalla realizzazione di una serie di atti ben precisi attraverso i quali la nuova comunità politica è istituita e la nuova città comincia ad esistere. Esse non sono sempre completamente nuove perché spesso nascono su siti precedenti (*vd.*

Inessa/Aitna 2, Adranon).

Le rifondazioni sono invece soprattutto antiche città greche (ma ci sono anche centri siculi rifondati) che ricevono una nuova fondazione greca, con l'arrivo di nuovi abitanti ai quali si concede la cittadinanza, con una nuova ripartizione di terre, con dei nuovi *nomima*, con delle nuove istituzioni, senza tuttavia, quasi mai, cambiare di nome (tranne il caso di Aitna-ex Katane).

Si comincerà con una breve presentazione da questa seconda categoria, della quale si approfondiranno soltanto alcuni casi.

a) Rifondazioni: qualche caso particolare

Le più antiche rifondazioni del V sec. sono quelle di Kamarina, Zancle/Messana, Syrakousai e Katane, che si collocano tra il 492 ed il 476.

Kamarina è rifondata (*katoikizein*[14]) nel 492 da Ippocrate di Gela (Thuc. 6.5.3), dopo averne ottenuto il controllo da Syrakousai in cambio dei prigionieri siracusani della battaglia dell'Eloro, grazie all'intervento di Corinto e Corcira.[15] Ippocrate deve occuparsi di inserire nel corpo civico già esistente una nuova popolazione, non molto grande, certamente costituita da suoi mercenari. E, poiché Tucidide lo definisce come ecista (*oikistes*), è probabilmente lui che si occupa dell'attribuzione di lotti di terra e anche di trasmettere i nuovi *nomima* che sembrano essere geloi.

La rifondazione di **Zancle** che prende il nome di **Messana** è raccontata da Erodoto (Hdt. 6.22–23) e Tucidide (Thuc. 6.4.6), con delle versioni leggermente diverse. Essa ha luogo nel 488/87, al tempo della rivolta ionica, quando gli Zanclei inviano un appello in Ionia domandando dei coloni per fondare Kalè Akté ed occupare una nuova posizione sulla costa settentrionale della Sicila. Dei Samii arrivano allora con dei Milesii e si fermano a Rhegion. Qui, il tiranno Anaxilas approfitta del fatto che il tiranno di Zancle fosse occupato in una guerra contro i Siculi, per convincere questi Ioni a non andare a fondare Kalè Akté, ma ad occupare Zancle. Anaxilas installa in seguito nella città una popolazione mista e gli dà il nome di Messana, dalla sua città di origine. Sembra trattarsi, dunque, di una rifondazione legata ad una conquista violenta, con un raro cambio di nome.

Più tardi, nel 395, **Zancle/Messana**, dopo essere finita sotto il controllo di Cartagine, è ripopolata (*katoikizein*) da Dionisio I con 1000 Locresi, 4000 Medmei e 600 Messeni del Peloponneso, subendo una nuova fondazione. La città diviene allora una colonia siracusana di stampo militare (Diod. Sic. 14.78.5).

La rifondazione di **Syrakousai** nel 484 comporta un importante spostamento di popolazioni. Erodoto (7.156) racconta che Gelone rifonda la città trasferendovi, insieme ai *gamoroi* siracusani che, cacciati dai *kyllirioi*, si erano rifugiati a Casmene, anche la metà della popolazione di Gela, tutta quella di Kamarina (che viene distrutta e che poi sarà rifondata ancora una volta da Gela), i ricchi di Megara Hyblea (di cui annette il territorio) e di Euboia, ed i suoi mercenari, concedendo a tutti la cittadinanza. Il nuovo corpo civico è dunque composto di gente proveniente da città diverse, che ottengono tutti la cittadinanza siracusana. È certamente Gelone che la concede, essendo lui l'autorità che decide l'azione e l'*oikistes*. In realtà, nessuna fonte lo definisce come tale, ma Pindaro (*Ol.* 6, 6) parla del *synoikister* Agesia, che implica la presenza di un altro ecista; ed è facile immaginare che Gelone abbia provveduto all'organizzazione di questo corpo civico totalmente eterogeneo, alla distribuzione di lotti nella città e nel territorio che s'ingrandiscono in maniera importante.

Con questa rifondazione Gelone vuole costituire una città dalla popolazione facile da dominare: vuole certamente avere dei sostenitori – i Geloi – e controllare direttamente le persone ostili – i Camarinesi e i Megaresi –; ma vuole anche trovare un luogo stabile per i suoi mercenari.[16]

Nel 476/5, Ierone,[17] dopo aver trasferito in maniera forzata gli abitanti di Naxos e Katane a **Leontinoi** (e si tratta di un'altra rifondazione), decide d'installare sullo stesso luogo di **Katane**, in parte distrutta da un terremoto nello stesso anno, 10,000 *oiketores*, dei quali 5000 Peloponnesiaci (dei mercenari) e 5000 Siracusani. Diodoro (11.49.1–2) racconta che Ierone cambia il nome della città chiamandola Aitna (1); e Strabone (6.2.3) cita Pindaro che descrive Ierone come fondatore, *pater ktístor*. Ierone si mostra subito un ecista particolare perché rimane a Syrakousai. Tuttavia, è certamente lui che si occupa della scelta dei nuovi abitanti, che distribuisce i territori, che conferisce la cittadinanza, che fa battere moneta. Ed anche se installa ad Aitna suo figlio Deinomene ancora minorenne nelle vesti di re, suo delegato (Pind., *Pyth.* 1, 60–61), e Chromios figlio di Agesidamos nelle vesti di *epitropos*, cioè tutore di Deinomene (*Schol. Pind. Nem.* 9.10),[18] Ierone stesso è proclamato vincitore, nelle sue vittorie ad Olimpia e a Delfi, come cittadino di Aitna, (*Schol.* Pind., *Nem.* 1, 1 = Tim. *FrGrHist* 566, 142A). Infine, Ierone si sposta ad Aitna per morire, nel 466: viene allora seppellito nella città da lui rifondata ed ottiene così il culto, desiderato da sempre, degli abitanti. Questi ultimi, poi, dopo essere stati cacciati dalla città dagli antichi abitanti di Katane e da Ducezio, si stabiliscono ad Inessa/Aitna (2) dove lo proclamano, benché morto, ecista (*vd.* sotto 1.c).

Conquistata nel 403, Katane è rifondata anche da Dionisio I che ne vende parte degli abitanti e la ripopola con mercenari campani (Diod. Sic. 14.15.1; 58.2; 87.1–3).

L'archeologia permette di vedere qualche indizio di una rifondazione, come, ad esempio, l'allargamento dei limiti della città di Syrakousai e la monumentalizzazione della città[19] o la realizzazione di un nuovo teatro a Katane. Normalmente, tuttavia, la rifondazione non lascia tracce particolari.

b) Le altre rifondazioni dei tiranni siracusani

Ci si limita qui a richiamare le altre rifondazioni, evocando soltanto le cause e le date, in una lista che non può che essere incompleta. **Naxos** è rifondata nel 476 da Ierone, con nuovi coloni, dopo averne deportato a Leontinoi gli antichi abitanti (Diod. Sic. 11.49.1–2).[20] Lo stesso anno, **Himera** è rifondata da Terone di Agrigento (Diod. Sic. 11.49.3–4): dopo il massacro degli abitanti della città, infatti, Terone fa venire tutti quelli che vogliono stabilircisi (*sunōikizein*, un verbo molto usato per le rifondazioni, indicandone il carattere misto). Himera diventa allora importante ed arriva ad una popolazione di 20,000 abitanti, prima di essere distrutta dai Cartaginesi nel 409.

Leontinoi, già rifondata da Ierone che vi installa gli abitanti di Naxos e Katane deportati nel 476, è rifondata di nuovo da Dionisio I nel 396.[21] Lo scopo, secondo Diodoro (14.78.1–7), è di ricompensare 10,000 mercenari in attesa del soldo.

Tauromenion, rioccupata dai Siculi, è assediata da Dionisio I che la fa capitolare nel 392 e stabilisce qui dei mercenari campani

(Diod. Sic. 14.96.4). La vera rifondazione avviene, tuttavia, solo nel 358, quando Andromaco raccoglie i cittadini superstiti di Naxos distrutta da Dionisio I e fonda qui una nuova città (Diod. Sic. 16.7.1).

A parte le città greche rifondate, anche **Solus** deve essere stata rifondata dopo la distruzione della città da parte di Dionisio I ed il trattato di pace firmato da quest'ultimo con le città puniche (Diod. Sic. 14.48), ma niente è detto nelle fonti letterarie a tal proposito. La rifondazione si può desumere dal fatto che la città è costruita in un'altra posizione.

c) Fondazioni greche

Le fondazioni di nuove città avvengono per cause differenti e con specifiche modalità. La più antica fondazione è quella che ha luogo, con un ecista defunto, Ierone, nel 461. Si tratta di **Inessa/Aitna 2**. Di questa città non si conosce la posizione precisa, ma doveva trovarsi a ca. 15 km ad ovest di Catania (forse Civita di Paternò?), in un sito siculo in cui i Greci cittadini di Katane/Aitna 1, espulsi dai precedenti abitanti di Katane che ritornano, decidono di fondare una comunità (*oikizein*) che chiamano di nuovo Aitna. Per compiere questa fondazione scelgono Ierone morto come ecista (Strab. 6.2.3). Questa necessità talmente importante di avere un ecista che se ne proclama addirittura uno defunto può forse essere spiegata con il bisogno di uomini di origini diverse, che probabilmente non avevano ancora potuto elaborare delle tradizioni proprie, di unirsi intorno ad un culto comune. Inessa/Aitna 2, dunque, nasce come una fondazione spontanea di un gruppo di persone (all'origine dei Siracusani e dei mercenari), che hanno perduto la loro patria e sono capaci di organizzarsi da soli, senza l'iniziativa di una *polis* e senza la guida di un vero capo, in una nuova entità politica.

Le altre fondazioni greche, Adranon e Tyndaris, datano dell'epoca di Dionisio I (405–367). **Adranon** (attuale Mendolito) è fondata (*ktizein*) da Dionisio I nel 400 ca. (Diod. Sic. 14.37.5) sotto la sommità dell'Etna. Il suo nome è dovuto al santuario consacrato al dio Adranos, padre dei Palici, divinità legate alla terra ed al vulcano. Si tratta, dunque, di un'altra fondazione su un luogo occupato dai Siculi ed oggi completamente coperta dalla città moderna. Restano di questa fase le mura e qualche elemento delle abitazioni, nonché la struttura viaria con una *plateia* N/S.

Tyndaris è fondata da Dionisio I nel 396, togliendo una parte del territorio alla sicula Abakainon (attuale Tripi). La città è popolata con 600 Messeni del Peloponneso cacciati da Zacinto e Naupacto, installati in un primo tempo a Messana e, poi, spostati per evitare gelosie (Diod. Sic. 14.78.5). Quando nel 393 le truppe cartaginesi di Magone sono battute da Dionisio I si rifugiano ad Abakainon, il territorio della città crebbe e si passò a 5000 cittadini (Diod. Sic. 14.78.6). Il nome è scelto dai Messeni dal culto per i Tindaridi. Tyndaris è dunque un centro siculo che Dionisio occupa, e di questo periodo data il muro di fortificazione con torri, porte e bastioni. Per il resto, la forma della città visibile è romana, ma degli elementi della ricostruzione timoleontea sono presenti, e la base potrebbe essere quella della fondazione di IV secolo.[22]

Senza parlare delle fondazioni adriatiche dei Dionisii che ci farebbero uscire dal nostro quadro geografico, saranno qui di seguito ricordate altre fondazioni che non sono dovute ai Greci.

d) Altre fondazioni non greche

Secondo Diodoro (13.79.8), dopo la distruzione di Himera da parte dei Cartaginesi, nel 409, l'insediamento è ricostruito, nel 407, dagli stessi Cartaginesi con apporti libici a 12 km ad ovest, a **Thermai**; tale nome sarebbe legato all'esistenza, nei paraggi, di fonti di acque calde. Cicerone (*Verr.* II, 2.86), però, dice che gli abitanti di Thermai erano i Greci superstiti di Himera. L'archeologia non mostra per ora nessun impianto punico stabile a Termini Imerese e, addirittura, restituisce materiali che non sono anteriori al IV/III secolo.[23]

Se esistono molte incertezze sulle fondazioni puniche di questo periodo (*vd. infra* par. 2, la tradizione punica della fondazione di Halaesa Archonidea), più sicura sembra la tradizione che fa dei Siculi i fondatori di città. In particolare, l'iniziativa di queste fondazioni sicule spetta ad alcuni capi, primo fra tutti Ducezio, ricordato come 're dei Siculi' tra il 460 e il 450, poi esiliato a Corinto e di ritorno in Sicilia, dove muore nel 440. La prima città fondata (*ktizein*) da Ducezio nel 459/8 è **Menaion** (odierna Mineo). Diodoro (11.78.5) racconta che Ducezio distribuisce le terre circostanti ai coloni qui installati (*katoikizein*). Poi fonderebbe forse **Menai**,[24] se bisogna considerare i due nomi come due realtà territoriali e politiche distinte, mentre **Palike** (= Trinakie?) è fondata (*ktizein*) dallo stesso re siculo nel 453, nei pressi della moderna Palagonia (sulla collinetta detta la Rocchitella, presso il lago Naftia) (Diod. Sic. 11.88.6 e 11.90.1).

Dopo il suo esilio a Corinto, Ducezio ritorna in patria con un programma coloniario di più vasto respiro, fondando **Kalè Akté** sulla costa settentrionale della Sicilia. All'inizio del V sec. c'era già stato un tentativo di fondazione dalla parte di Zancle, che aveva fatto un appello ai Greci della Ionia, come già ricordato sopra (*vd. supra* 1.a). Se questa fondazione, secondo il racconto delle fonti, sembra non essere stata realizzata, dei materiali che sono riferibili addirittura alla seconda metà del VII sec. mostrano che uno stanziamento greco, forse un *emporion* zancleo, doveva esistere da lungo tempo nel luogo in cui Kalè Akté sarà fondata nel 446.[25] A questa data il sito viene occupato da Ducezio (Diod. Sic. 12.8.2 e 12.29.1) che fonda (*ktizein, oikizein*) la città, dopo la consultazione dell'oracolo,[26] con la partecipazione di Corinzi, di Siculi ed, in particolare, di Archonides I di Herbita. Alcuni ammettono anche la presenza di Siracusani,[27] che avrebbero favorito quest'impresa, approfittando del ritorno di Ducezio per occupare la posizione.[28] La presenza siracusana sembra, invece, impossibile ad altri, secondo i quali questa fondazione dovrebbe piuttosto essere messa in relazione con la presenza di Atene in questa regione: solo Atene, infatti, avrebbe potuto aiutare Ducezio a partire da Corinto; secondo quest'ultima teoria, la partecipazione di Archonides I di Herbita, amico degli Ateniesi (*vd. infra*), confermerebbe il carattere pro-ateniese e ostile a Syrakousai di questa fondazione.[29]

Per il momento, è impossibile scegliere una delle due teorie, anche se l'aiuto dei Siracusani non ci sembra totalmente da escludere, considerando che l'amicizia con Atene del co-fondatore Archonides I è successiva (attestata solo nel 426, *vd. infra* par. 2), che i rapporti di amicizia possono cambiare velocemente, che per questo periodo le relazioni tra Atene e le altre città di Sicilia contro Siracusa non sono certe e che il ritorno di Ducezio potrebbe essere piuttosto stato patteggiato da Siracusa, visti i suoi legami con Corinto. Ciò che è sicuro è, invece, che il dinasta Ducezio sembra comportarsi come i tiranni greci che fondano città e distribuiscono terre. Non si sa, dalle rare indicazioni di Diodoro, se egli si considerasse un ecista, ma tutto indica che è lui all'origine delle fondazioni, lui che si occupa degli aspetti pratici di organizzare le nuove città e, forse, lui a conferire la cittadinanaza agli abitanti (per Kalè Akté si parla della comunità di Caleactini).

Nonostante la nascita in un contesto di tensioni regionali e la creazione da parte di un contingente guidato da un capo siculo, questa città fondata in altura (odierna Caronia) si sviluppa e, tra il I sec. a.C. ed il I sec. d.C., raggiunge la sua massima espansione. Il centro marittimo, dopo l'*emporion* del VII sec., si sviluppa in epoca imperiale. I due centri hanno continuato ad esistere ininterrottamente, provando che le modalità di fondazione non sembrano avere un impatto sul carattere e lo sviluppo della città.

Ci sono anche altri sovrani siculi che partecipano a questo movimento di fondazione delle città. Oltre Archonides I di Herbita che aveva partecipato con Ducezio alla fondazione di Kalè Akté nel 446, forse dandogli anche il territorio su cui fondare la città, c'è un suo discendente, forse suo figlio o suo nipote, Archonides II che fonda Halaesa Archonidea.

2. Studio di un caso particolare: Halaesa Archonidea

Diodoro trasmette due tradizioni sulla fondazione di Halaesa.[30] Secondo una prima versione, la città sarebbe stata fondata (*ktizein*) a 8 stadi dal mare dall'*epistates* di Herbita, Archonides II, nel 403 dopo la pace con Dionisio I. Il suo scopo era quello di sistemare i mercenari, una folla mista che la guerra contro il tiranno siracusano aveva portato in città ed anche i più poveri cittadini di Herbita: tutte queste persone prendono parte alla colonizzazione (*apoikia*) (14.16.1–2). Ma una seconda versione, che Diodoro non approfondisce, dice che la città fu fondata dai Punici nel 405 (Diod. Sic. 14.16.4).

Se questa seconda tradizione è poco seguita, probabilmente a causa del fatto che Diodoro stesso non dà alcun dettaglio, quella sulla fondazione da parte di Archonides II è generalmente accettata, anche se essa solleva un certo numero di questioni.

Prima di tutto quella dell'identità di questo Archonides II che sembra essere il figlio (o il nipote) dell'Archonides I menzionato come co-fondatore di Ducezio per Kalè Akté.[31] Archonides I doveva far parte di quei Siculi che sono ricordati per aver versato degli aiuti ad Atene nel 426 (IG 1 291); a quest'allenza è da collegare il decreto ateniese (IG 1 228), reinciso nel 385, che conferisce la prossenia ad Archonides I e a suo fratello Demon. Secondo Antonino Facella,[32] questa attitudine favorevole agli Ateniesi avrebbe permesso a Archonides I di svincolarsi dalla subalternità da Syrakousai e di raggiungere un riconoscimento politico internazionale. Poi, nel 414/3 Archonides I muore; e Archonides II, che è anche l'ultimo conosciuto, sembra prendere il potere a Herbita e nel 403/2 è lui che fonda Halaesa.

La seconda questione riguarda Herbita stessa, che sembra essere la capitale di un regno comprendente un vasto territorio, anche se non se ne conosce la localizzazione esatta (probabilmente da ricercare nei siti di altura dell'entroterra di Halaesa).[33] Sulla costa nord della Sicilia sembrano quindi esistere, a quest'epoca, due « stati » siculi, dovuti forse all'assenza nella zona di città greche:[34] uno sotto il controllo della dinastia degli Arconidei e, più ad est, quello di Abakainon, nel territorio del quale nel 396, Dionisio I fonda Tyndaris.

Un'altra questione è quella del 'titolo' di Archonides II. Diodoro lo definisce come un *epistates*, mentre Archonides I era definito come un *basileus*. Se, come lo fâ A. Facella, si ipotizzasse il carattere filo-ateniese di Archonides I, si mettesse in relazione questa fondazione con la presenza ateniese nella zona e si desse un carattere anti-siracusano alla fondazione di Halaesa, Diodoro potrebbe aver utilizzato il nome *epistates* come una variante del nome *basileus*, ma nascondendo dietro questo sinonimo anche una nuova situazione politica in cui, tra questo dinasta di Herbita, anche lui filo-ateniese, e la sua città si sarebbero create delle tensioni in seguito alla pace che questa avrebbe fatto con Dionisio. Per questa ragione, sarebbe stato costretto ad allontanarsi ed i cittadini di Herbita gli avrebbero conferito un potere particolare per andare a fondare Halaesa.[35]

Tuttavia, la teoria di un titolo attribuito dagli abitanti di Herbita al re che decide di andarsene per dei disaccordi con la città stessa dopo la firma della pace con Dionisio I (poi chi all'interno della città sicula avrebbe potuto prendere la decisione di firmare tale pace se non il re?) ci sembra difficile da accettare. Niente, invece, esclude in maniera definitiva, anche se niente lo prova con certezza, che, come secondo alcuni per la fondazione di Kalè Akté, anche per quella di Halaesa, i Siracusani possano averla favorita ed essere stati presenti. Archonides II potrebbe aver accettato le condizioni di pace e aver fatto un accordo con Dionisio I. Quest'accordo e la fondazione di Halaesa sarebbero serviti ad Archonides II ed a Herbita per liberarsi di una parte della popolazione e forse dei mercenari,[36] oltre che per avere un'apertura e un controllo sul mare, dopo Kalè Akté; e a Dionisio I per crearsi un varco verso il Tirreno, dopo Kalè Akté e Tyndaris. Potrebbe quindi trattarsi non di una fondazione controllata da Syrakousai in funzione anti-agrigentina,[37] ma di una fondazione mista che interveniva nel quadro di varie azioni dei Siculi di apertura verso il Tirreno, e che, al tempo stesso, era utile a Syrakousai.

Il titolo di *epistates* potrebbe allora essere stato attribuito ad Archonides II nel nuovo assetto della città sotto il controllo di Syrakousai, che avrebbe lasciato il governo ad Archonides II, che non poteva più essere *basileus*. Ed Archonides II diventa naturalmente l'*oikistes* dell'impresa coloniale, prima di divenirne *epistates*.

Da nessuna parte è detto se Archonides II fosse andato ad abitare a Halaesa, se avesse ricevuto qui un culto eroico, o se, come i tiranni siciliani fondatori di città, sia restato piuttosto nella sua città. Non si può arrivare a una risposta definitiva neanche per quanto riguarda la composizione del gruppo coloniale,[38] ma ciò che bisogna ritenere è che si tratta di una popolazione mista, costretta dalla situazione di guerra a ritrovarsi in una stessa fondazione. Tuttavia, la fondazione in questo contesto di relazioni tese tra Syrakousai ed Herbita ed il carattere eteroclita del gruppo di abitanti non impedisce a questa nuova città di diventare una delle più importanti di Sicilia.

Non sappiamo niente dei primi tempi di vita di Halaesa: essa faceva parte della *symmachia* di Timoleonte come lo mostano le monete della *symmachia* (*vd.* anche Diod. Sic. 16, 73, 2), e Apollo detto *Archegetes* (nelle monete di bronzo della *symmachia*) è una divintà importante della città che è sede di un *koinon* dei sacerdoti di Apollo della regione. Anche il suo più antico impianto urbano è per ora sconosciuto, quello visibile essendo probabilmente di epoca romana. La sola cosa che sappiamo è che questa città, sebbene nata in un contesto di tensioni ed alla fine della guerra contro Siracusa, diventa uno dei centri maggiori della Sicilia settentrionale nel III–II sec., soprattutto dopo aver ottenuto il privilegio di essere una delle cinque *civitates liberae atque immunes* della Sicilia, nel 241 (Cic., *In Verrem*, III, 6, 13).

L'archeologia mostra una città ricca e con importanti monumenti: il foro, le abitazioni, ma anche il santuario di Apollo con almeno tre templi (*vd.* gli attuali lavori della Missione italo-inglese delle Università di Messina e di Oxford), e il teatro della città che aveva delle dimensioni importanti con almeno 77 m di diametro e con un impressionante impianto costituente un *trait d'union* scenografico tra le due colline su cui la città si adagiava (*vd.* gli attuali lavori della Missione Francese dell'Università di Amiens).[39]

Siamo ancora una volta davanti a una città nata in delle circostanze di tensioni e conflitti; ed anche in questo caso le situazioni della nascita, che forse non avrebbero lasciato presagire il suo destino, non hanno impedito a questa città di diventare una delle più belle della Sicilia.[40]

3. Qualche riflessione sulle fondazioni siciliane del V e della prima metà del IV sec. a.C.

Si può, dunque, notare che, per quanto riguarda le rifondazioni del periodo preso in considerazione, un vocabolario specifico non esiste. Normalmente è il racconto degli eventi che fa capire che si è di fronte ad una nuova fondazione di una città già esistente. Nel caso di Kamarina rifondata da Ippocrate di Gela o di Zancle rifondata da Dionisio, è usato il verbo *katoikizein*, che indica l'azione di installare di nuovo, in una città già abitata, ed è il verbo caratteristico di questa situazione. Nel caso della nuova fondazione di Himera da parte di Terone di Agrigento, il verbo *sunōikizein* indica il carattere misto di questa rifondazione, carattere tipico, in realtà, di tutte le rifondazioni. Ma negli altri casi, verbi specifici non vengono utilizzati.

Tali rifondazioni si realizzano con l' installazione di un numero importante di nuovi cittadini di origini diverse, una redistribuzione delle terre, a volte una vera e propria riorganizzazione dell'impianto urbano e una nuova costituzione. Esse sono opera di tiranni greci, che sono spesso chiamati ecisti dalle fonti, come Ippocrate a Kamarina, Gelone a Syrakousai e Ierone a Katane/Aitna 1 ed a Inessa/Aitna 2. Comunque, sono sempre i tiranni che mettono insieme il gruppo coloniale, costituito da cittadini di varie origini, che procedono alla distribuzione delle terre e che si occupano di dare *nomima* alla città. Tali rifondazioni hanno per lo più lo scopo di controllare un territorio, di spostare popolazioni[41] che disturbano e/o di creare nuove popolazioni più facili da controllare, e di sistemare i mercenari.

Per le nuove fondazioni, che poi spesso avvengono su centri siculi già esistenti, Diodoro utilizza solo due volte la parola *apoikia*; ed essa non ha più il significato originario di 'fondazione lontano dalla propria casa', 'oltre-mare'. Diodoro l'impiega, in un caso, per la fondazione di Tauromenion, tuttavia non per la fondazione greca, ma per la fondazione romana! E in un secondo caso, per la fondazione di Halaesa da parte di Archonides II di Herbita che si sposa solo di pochi km! Il termine *apoikia*, banalizzato, diventa dunque sinonimo del sostantivo *ktisma* o del verbo *ktizein*, che sono le espressioni più usate per indicare le nuove fondazioni, come per esempio per Inessa/Aitna 2 e Adranon da parte di Dionisio I, o per tutte le fondazioni sicule (come Menaion, Palike, Kalè Akté e Halaesa).

Per la fondazione di queste città non si ricorre mai all'oracolo di Delfi. L'unica consultazione registrata è quella per la fondazione di Kalè Akté da parte del capo siculo Ducezio, insieme al quale, però, operano dei Greci di Corinto. E se fossero stati loro a chiedere la consultazione? E se essa fosse più importante per i Greci di Grecia che per quelli di Sicilia?

L'iniziativa della fondazione non è mai di una *polis*, ma è sempre personale. Si tratta di tiranni di Gela, Agrigento e, soprattutto, Siracusa, ma anche di capi siculi, come Ducezio, Archonides I ed Archonides II. Non vengono qui considerate le tradizioni sulle fondazioni cartaginesi di Thermai e di Halaesa perché non soltanto Diodoro stesso che le trasmette non dà dettagli e resta evasivo, ma nessuna conferma si ha da altre fonti.

Questi capi greci o siculi che sono all'origine delle fondazioni si comportano come ecisti: si occupano di scegliere le persone da inviare nelle città, componendo sempre gruppi eterogenei.

Se sono chiaramente chiamati ecisti i tiranni che procedono alle rifondazioni, come Ippocrate a Kamarina, Gelone a Syrakousai e Ierone a Katane, negli altri casi Gelone e Dionisio I, o Ducezio ed Archonides II di Herbita, non sono mai definiti *oikistai*, ma si comportano come tali, occupandosi delle questioni pratiche legate alla fondazione.

Tuttavia, c'è da notare il caso particolare di Inessa/Aitna 2 che è fondata per iniziativa spontanea di Siracusani e mercenari che erano stati piazzati a Katane rifondata (Aitna 1) e che, costretti a partire in seguito al ritorno dei vecchi abitanti di Katane, sono capaci di organizzarsi da soli in un'entità politica, senza l'intervento da parte di una *polis* e senza la guida di un vero capo, visto che si danno un ecista morto.

Le cause delle fondazioni di queste città sono varie: in questi contesti di tensioni politiche e sociali e di conflitti, legati alla presenza di tiranni, si tratta di spostare popolazioni da controllare o da rendere docili, di sottomettere territori, ma anche di piazzare mercenari.

Le fondazioni sicule sembrano avvenire con le stesse modalità che le fondazioni greche, o almeno così sono descritte, ed hanno, per quanto riguarda Kalè Akté e Halaesa, un significato particolare: quello di costituire dei centri di controllo sulla costa, probabilmente non completamente autonomi, visto che essi permettono ai tiranni siracusani, che si possono immaginare dietro tali fondazioni, di guadagnare un'apertura sul mar Tirreno.

Un aspetto interessante è che la popolazione composita delle città fondate è una popolazione di cittadini: tutti ottengono il diritto di cittadinanza, si direbbe anche nei centri siculi. Quanto ai *nomima* di queste nuove fondazioni, il discorso non è molto semplice: quali *nomima* si può dare ad una comunità talmente eterogenea? Anche per le colonie arcaiche, è difficile sapere se i *nomima* fossero qualcosa di preparato che la metropoli consegnava facilmente alla nuova città fondata. Maurizio Giangiulio[42] rimette in questione la sistematicità della regola secondo la quale l'ecista è garante, attraverso la trasmissione alle colonie arcaiche dei *nomima*, dell'identità della metropoli. Se certamente una parte delle tradizioni e istituzioni sono trasmesse dalla metropoli principale, visto il carattere misto delle spedizioni coloniali messo sempre più in evidenza negli studi recenti, è possibile immaginare che i *nomima* si costruiscano nel tempo e siano il risultato della necessità di persone diverse di coabitare.

Il carattere composito di queste fondazioni appare anche nella scelta dei nomi: nel caso di Adranon e Tyndaris, i nomi di queste città sono uno siculo e l'altro greco, entrambi facenti riferimento a delle divinità. Dionisio I, per poter dare una sede fissa ai suoi mercenari ed allo stesso tempo occupare due posizioni importanti sull'Etna e sulla costa settentrionale, rende omaggio a delle tradizioni religiose diverse. Adranos, identificato con Efesto, è una divinità sicula molto onorata, mentre i Tindaridi rinviano alla regione del Peloponneso e di Sparta. I nomi di queste città ci possono dire qualcosa di più sui loro *nomima*? Si può immaginare che i diversi tiranni abbiano voluto, per riuscire a controllare questi nuovi centri, imporre i *nomima* delle loro città (ma d'altra parte, Gelone che arriva a Syrakousai e prende il potere, dà *nomima* geloi o lascia i *nomima* siracusani?); ma la questione sarebbe da approfondire in altra sede.

Ciò che, invece, è sicuro è che, nonostante la diversità delle origini e delle provenienze degli abitanti, tutti questi centri hanno potuto costituirsi e diventare delle città, in alcuni casi, molto importanti.

Neanche l'occasione delle fondazioni, legata a delle situazioni di tensioni e di conflitti, sembra aver influito sulla loro forma e sul loro destino. Per quanto riguarda il sito e la forma urbana, si può notare che alcune di queste fondazioni sono in altura (ad esempio, Kalè Akté, Adranon, Tyndaris, Halaesa); le mura di fortificazione e gli impianti regolari, che non datano, nelle fasi conosciute, del momento della fondazione, devono essere messi in relazione non con il carattere militare di questi centri, ma con la conformazione fisica dei siti: le colline strette obbligano ad adottare un impianto regolare con un asse mediano più largo e degli assi perpendicolari più stretti e che seguono il pendio. In alcuni casi, come a Tyndaris, sembrerebbe che l'impianto di epoca romana possa rispettare una forma precedente, l'originaria.[43] Per Halaesa, gli indizi finora conosciuti, sembrano mostrare un'organizzazione monumentale soltanto a partire dal III–II sec. a.C.

In ogni caso, indipendentemente dalla loro forma iniziale, queste città si sviluppano in seguito come delle grandi città all'epoca ellenistica e romana e si dotano d'imponenti monumenti. Ad Halaesa, il III ed il II sec. sono i secoli d'oro della città, con l'organizzazione secondo assi stradali regolari, con la costruzione della zona pubblica centrale, e, sul versante nord, con l'immenso teatro e l'imponente santuario su una piattaforma ed un podio che sosteneva tre templi. Tali monumenti creavano certamente un effetto scenografico impressionante per chi vedeva la città dal mare. Non è facile pensare che Archonides II potesse aver già immaginato una tale messa in scena monumentale: bisogna già arrivare a far convivere cittadini molto diversi, in una città nata forse sotto la pressione di Syrakousai. Nonostante tutto, la nascita della città in un momento di tensione tra Herbita e Syrakousai, per la volontà di controllare un territorio e la costa, mettendo insieme una popolazione totalmente eterogenea ed eteroclita, non ha impedito ad Halaesa di diventare una delle più importanti e belle città di Sicilia.

Conclusioni

Per concludere, ci sembra che queste città fondate in Sicilia nel V e IV s., in contesti di tensioni sociali e di conflitti, definite normalmente 'colonie' dagli autori moderni, non assomigliano più alle 'colonie' precedenti per le cause, le modalità di organizzazione del gruppo coloniale, la figura dell'ecista, la mancanza di consultazione dell'oracolo di Delfi. Eppure, delle fondazioni che sembrano presentare molti elementi che caratterizzano le colonie colonie arcaiche, per di più in condizioni di conflitti, sono ancora realizzate in Grecia in questo stesso periodo.

Evidentemente, in Grecia, nel V sec., non si possono non ricordare le colonie ateniesi del periodo della *Pentekontaetia*, che, volute da Atene, sono caratterizzate da coloni esclusivamente Ateniesi ed ecisti che corrispondono a magistrati della città. Esse esplicitano la volontà imperialistica di Atene di controllare territori ed in generale non sono delle città autonome, quando non sono dissolte dopo la fine dell'imperialismo.[44]

Ma per il V sec., Tucidide (3.92.1–5) descrive le modalità di fondazione di una città non creata da Atene che sembra particolarmente interessante per le città delle quali si occupa il presente studio: Heracleia Trachinia è fondata nel 426. Oppressa dalla guerra, Trachis domanda aiuto a Sparta, che consulta l'oracolo, invia tre ecisti, Leon, Alcidas e Damagon, che guidano una popolazione scelta composta da etnie diverse: secondo Tucidide (3.92.5) si tratterebbe di Spartani, di perieci e di altri Greci, eccetto gli Achei e gli Ioni; secondo Diodoro (12.59.4), invece, di Lacedemoni, Peloponnesiaci ed altri Greci, dicendo che in tutto sono 10,000. La composizione della spedizione coloniaria spiegherebbe il bisogno di avere tre ecisti. La città (*apoikia*) è fondata con *nomima* spartani, restando legata alla metropoli, non soltanto per difendere gli abitanti di Trachis ed i Dori, ma anche per mettere insieme una flotta contro l'Eubea, utile nella guerra contro Atene, e per occupare una posizione favorevole lungo la rotta costiera verso la Tracia.

Il contesto è di guerra, ma non impedisce una fondazione secondo delle procedure che ritroviamo nelle colonie più antiche. Eppure, qualche decennio soltanto più tardi, in Grecia c'è un'altra fondazione che sembra ricordare di più quelle siciliane: la colonia di Filippi è fondata nel 356 da Filippo II sul luogo dell'antico centro tracio di Daton-Chrenides[45] (Strab. 7 frr. 41 e 43; Diod. Sic. 16.3.7 e 8.6; Artem. fr. 15 ricordano che Filippi ha rimpiazzato Chrenides; secondo Ephor. fr. 37; Philoch. fr. 44 Filippi ha sostituito Daton), per ragioni di strategie militari e di controllo di un territorio (per queste ragioni Filippo II fonda anche Philippopolis, mentre Alessandro fonda non lontano Alexandroupolis),[46] con delle modalità che assogliano più a quelle delle fondazioni di Sicilia, quanto a l'istituzione che decide la fondazione, le modalità e gli scopi.

Non è possibile in questa sede consacrarsi alle colonie di epoca ellenistica, di Alessandro o dei sovrani ellenistici, ma tra queste ci sarebbe da prendere in conto le cosiddette *katoikiai*, che, a volte, da piccoli centri nati per semplici scopi di strategia territoriale, si sviluppano e possono diventare delle città, com'è il caso di Toriaion in Frigia che, nel 188, si dota di uno statuto di città (*politeia*), che Eumene le accorda.[47]. In questo caso, queste fondazioni confermano quanto è stato osservato per le fondazioni siciliane del V e della prima metà del IV sec.: cioè che la loro origine non lascia presagire un futuro glorioso, ma non impedisce ad alcuni centri di evolvere e di divenire delle città importanti.

Le fondazioni siciliane di V e d'inizio IV s., quindi, più che assomigliare alle colonie di epoca arcaica sembrano anticipare per molti aspetti le fondazioni di Filippo,[48] e presagire alcune fondazioni di età ellenistica.

La Sicilia appare allora in questo periodo un laboratorio per esperienze di creazione di città che saranno delle realtà compiute nel mondo greco soltanto a partire dalla metà del IV s. E per certi aspetti, esse anticipano anche alcune esperienze del mondo romano: le fondazioni di Ducezio, ad esempio, sono definite città e battono moneta e fanno pensare all'unione delle città italiche che, in nome di un *ethnos* comune e contro il potere romano, battono, durante la guerra sociale, la moneta con il vitello che schiaccia la lupa.[49]

Ci sembra anche che l'analisi delle caratteristiche delle fondazioni di V sec. e inizio del IV sec. in Sicilia, invita a riconsiderare alcune basi del ragionamento revisionista della colonizzazione. Più che fornire un modello alle fonti classiche per descrivere le fondazioni arcaiche, come detto dagli studiosi che negano il modello apecistico, la colonizzazione di epoca classica dimostra che gli elementi attribuiti a questo modello arcaico non sono affatto regolari, sono spesso riprodotti stravolti, con modalità e risultati diversi. Essi non possono, dunque, costituire un esempio per la costruzione di un modello, ma piuttosto un contro-modello.[50]

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[1] Vorrei ringraziare Melanie Jonasch per l'invito a partecipare a questa interessante occasione di incontri e scambi sulla Sicilia. Grazie ad Aurelio Burgio, Luigi Gallo e François Lefèvre per le loro attente riletture ed i loro preziosi consigli.

[2] Guerre delle città greche fra di loro (Lombardo 2002; Costanzi 2009) o con le popolazioni locali.

[3] Garozzo *et al.* 1994, 189–190.

[4] Marotta d'Agata e Moreschini 1992, 289–290.

[5] Buongiovanni *et al.* 1985, 286-287. *Vd.* Maddoli 1980, 3.

[6] A tale proposito *vd.* anche Jonasch in questo volume.

[7] Forse da identificare con Butera. L'ecista è lo stesso Antifemo, fondatore di Gela. La fondazione sarebbe avvenuta alla fine dell'VII s. a.C. *Vd.* Gargini 1993, 462–463.

[8] Forse da identificare con Monte Bubbonia. Stefano di Bizanzio (*s.v.* Μακτώριον) citando Filisto *FGrH* 556, fr. 3, parla dell'ecista Memnon.

La fondazione dovrebbe essere datata all'inizio del VI s. *Vd.* Bejor 1991, 304–305.

[9] Tutte le date citate sono a.C. Non si prendono in conto in questo contributo le fondazioni della seconda metà del IV sec. attribuibili soprattutto a Timoleonte, la cui azione in Sicilia corrisponde a quella di Filippo II, con il quale comincia già, in Macedonia, una nuova epoca per quanto riguarda la fondazione di città.

[10] De Vido 2013.

[11] Per esempio, Bonanno (2010, 127) chiama 'colonia' Aitna; Collura (2016, 15) definisce Kalè Akté 'colonia mista'. Per le questioni riguardanti la terminologia coloniale, *vd.* alcuni dei numerosi contributi, per esempio Lepore 2000, 29–32; Costanzi 2010, 87–107; 2019, 21–25; Greco 2012, 36–39. Qui si adotta il termine con la consapevolezza di tutte le discussioni.

[12] Certamente, non è possibile definire una tipologia unica e precisa di colonie. È stato sottolineato che il modello delle colonie arcaiche elaborato a partire dalle fonti disponibili è una costruzione artificiosa, *vd.*, per esempio, Osborne 1998, 251–269 e Wilson 2006, 25–58; per una messa a punto sulla questione, *vd.* Tsetskhladze, Hargrave 2011, 161–182; Frisone 2016, 179–181. Il tipo tradizionale di fondazione apecistica è stato criticato, *vd.* Osborne 1998, 251–269; 2008, 281–284; Purcell 1997, 500–502. Ma, come se lo chiede Lombardo 2012, un modello di fondazione apecistica esiste veramente? In realtà, allo stato attuale della ricerca, è evidente che esistono diversi tipi di stabilimenti e che le cause della loro fondazione sono diverse, *vd.* già Lepore 1989; 2000 e le definizioni in Hansen e Nielsen 2004, *ad vv*. È evidente che il fenomeno coloniale è complesso e non si possono fare delle generalizzazioni. Per evitare tali generalizzazioni, non è tuttavia necessario di rimettere in questione alcuni elementi che sembrano accomunare molte fondazioni coloniali dall'VIII al VI sec. a.C: se l'iniziativa della fondazione sembra in generale essere della *polis*, non si deve per forza parlare di un modello fisso (*vd.* Morakis 2011, 460–494); il contingente coloniale è misto; gli ecisti, consigliati, ma non per forza, dall'oracolo di Delfi, conducono l'impresa, si occupano di distribuire le terre e probabilmente di dare i *nomima* (Malkin 1987; 2009; 2011 in particolare 189–197), ma non per forza di garantire la persistenza di antichi *nomima* metropolitani (*vd.* Giangiulio 2019, 103–128, secondo il quale i *nomima* sono una creazione della colonia stessa; *vd. infra*). Il risultato di tali azioni, che, pur nella loro ricorrenza nei vari racconti di fondazione, sono sempre diverse e particolari ad ogni colonia, è una nuova città generalmente definita 'colonia'. Questo nome, secondo Figueira (2008, 434), non può essere usato, ad esempio, per le fondazioni attiche di fine VI sec. a.C., perché non si tratta di nuove città.

[13] Per le fonti letterarie sulle fondazioni e rifondazioni, si rinvia ai volumi corrispondenti della *Bibliografia topografica della colonizzazione greca in Italia e nelle isole tirreniche* di G. Nenci e G. Vallet ed a Hansen e Nielsen 2004.

[14] Il verbo *katoikizein* significa 'fare abitare di nuovo, completamente' ed è il verbo tipicamente usato per indicare le rifondazioni, Casevitz 1985, 168–173.

[15] *Vd.* Hdt. 7.154.2–3; Phil. *FGrH* 555, F15; Tim. *FGrH* 566, F19; Pindaro, nella sua *Ol.* 5, 19°–c. Visti i necessari limiti di spazio di un articolo, i testi greci non saranno riportati e si rinvia alle varie edizioni.

[16] Sulla rifondazione di Siracusa, *vd.* Luraghi 1994, 288–304.

[17] Su Ierone e la fondazione di Aitna, *vd.* Bonanno 2010, 127–157.

[18] Bonanno 2010, 133–134: il gesto di Ierone che invia suo figlio ad Aitna ricorda vagamente quello dei tre figli illegittimi di Cipselo e del figlio di Periandro, Evagora, mandati a fondare rispettivamente Leucade, Anattorio, Ambracia e Potidea. La studiosa pensa che Ierone può aver conosciuto queste esperienze precedenti grazie agli intellettuali che frequentano la corte di Siracusa. Un'analisi dettagliata di tutte le fonti si trova in Sammartano 2018.

[19] De Angelis 2016, 102–106. Per Naxos, la rifondazione lascia tracce più evidenti, con un nuovo impianto urbano.

[20] Comincia qui una serie di citazioni del testo di Diodoro che, nonostante il carattere problematico della sua opera, resta, per il soggetto di cui si tratta in questo contributo, la fonte più importante ed, in alcuni casi, unica. Ai problemi suscitati dall'opera di Diodoro sono stati dedicati vari lavori, tra i quali Galvagno e Ventura 1991; Delfino 1995.

[21] Tucidide (5.4–5; 6.6.2) parla dell'abbandono della città tra la fondazione di Ierone e quella di Dionisio I.

[22] Spigo 2008, 101–115.

[23] Belvedere *et al.* 1993.

[24] Nonostante il verbo *katoizein* per Menaion (che, secondo alcuni, dunque, sarebbe una rifondazione di Menai), certi specialisti pensano che Menaion e Menai sono due fondazioni, vd. Simonetti Agostinetti 2012, 324–325. Contra Franco 2008, 144–146.

[25] Collura 2016, 14 e 27.

[26] Per Antonio 2008, 159–160, probabilmente quello di Dodona.

[27] Collura 2016, 15.

[28] Collura 2016, 28.

[29] Maddoli 1980, 67.

[30] Nonostante le difficoltà rappresentate da questa fonte, come detto *supra* (nota 20), Diodoro resta l'unico autore che trasmette informazioni, tra l'altro contrastanti, sulla fondazione di Halaesa.

[31] *Vd*. soprattutto De Vido 1997b.

[32] Facella 2006, 70.

[33] Burgio 2012, 223–231.

[34] Collura 2017, 2.

[35] Facella 2006, 131–132.

[36] In Facella (2006, 80–105) una lunga discussione è consacrata alla composizione del gruppo che parte per fondare Halaesa: i *mistophoroi*, il *symmiktos ochlos* che si era riversato su Herbita al tempo della guerra con Dionisio I e molti degli *aporoi* di Herbita. Quanto ai mercenari, non si conoscono altri esempi di re siculi che abbiano fatto ricorso a dei mercenari, ma qui, secondo A. Facella, potrebbe trattarsi dei mercenari che hanno combattuto per Archonides di Herbita contro Syrakousai. Tuttavia, niente permette di eslcudere che si tratti di mercenari siracusani per i quali Dionisio cerca una sistemazione.

[37] Maddoli 1980, 67.

[38] Rinvio ancora una volta a Facella 2006, 80–105.

[39] *Vd.* le relazioni finali delle campagne di scavi: Costanzi *et al*. 2019; Costanzi *et al*. 2018; Costanzi *et al*. 2017.

[40] Cic., *Verrines*, III, 6, 13.

[41] Sugli spostamenti di popolazioni, *vd*. da ultimo il contributo di Zizza 2019.

[42] Giangiulio 2019, 103–128.

[43] Spigo 2008, 102–103.

[44] *Vd.* lo studio completo e approfondito di Figueira 2008, 435–462.

[45] Loukopoulou 2004, 859–860: i due nomi indicano due fasi molto vicine oppure il nome greco e il nome tracio della stessa colonia.

[46] Consolo Langher 1996b, 643; Archibald 2004, 892, 894–895.

[47] Capdetrey 2012; Ma 2014, 270.

[48] Sordi (1980c, 211) notava che Diodoro definisce la signoria di Dionisio I (16.5.4) e di Filippo II (16.1.3) con la parola *dynasteia*. Il tiranno siracusano e il re di Macedonia avrebbero in comune una potenza che oltrepassa gli orizzonti ristretti della *polis*.

[49] Tataranni 2005, 291–292.

[50] Concordiamo con Moggi 2019, 25–27.

Chapter 12

The military landscape of Greek Sicily*

Melanie Jonasch

Il concetto del paesaggio militare fa riferimento alle tracce che la lotta organizzata per il potere, il territorio, o la sicurezza, lasciano sullo spazio naturale e antropico. Nella Sicilia preromana il paesaggio militare non si distingue nettamente da quello civile, ma è parte integrante di esso. Tale circostanza risiede in parte nel fatto che l'organizzazione dell'esercito e della guerra fosse intrinsecamente legata alle pratiche quotidiane della società civile. Anche se gli scontri armati non erano cosa di tutti i giorni e non coinvolgevano necessariamente tutta la popolazione, i conflitti per la sovranità territoriale e per le risorse influivano ugualmente sulla struttura di intere comunità. Allo steso modo la volontà politica incideva sulla forma fisica di insediamenti e paesaggi. Oltretutto, la memoria di una vittoria o di una sconfitta poteva segnare, anche a lungo, l'habitat umano e condizionarne le pratiche sociali associate. Attraverso l'analisi di alcuni 'case studies', questo contributo cerca di evidenziare quali possano essere state le conseguenze della violenza organizzata, della competizione politico-territoriale e dei concetti militari sul paesaggio naturale e antropico della Sicilia greca. Il presente contributo invita, tuttavia, anche a non utilizzare troppo facilmente l'argomento della strategia militare nella valutazione dello sviluppo insediativo e demografico nel corso della colonizzazione greca. Altrettanto importanti, infatti, sono gli aspetti economici e sociali, che

incidono in misura non minore sulla struttura dello spazio e sulla formazione delle comunità.

Similar to the word and concept of colonisation, the terms ‘military’ and ‘militarisation’ have no exact match in the ancient Greek language and its conceptual world.[1] Nevertheless, I will use this vocabulary in this chapter to discuss issues concerning the Greek armed forces, colonial geopolitical strategy, organised warfare by state and non-state actors and their physical appearance in the archaeological record. With regard to landscape, the attribute ‘military’ describes the natural or human environment, shaped by the struggle over and maintenance of power, territory or security.[2] Thus, military landscapes are not evident only in times of war, but whenever military considerations affect the use and configuration of physical space.

This transformation is best perceived on the battlefield, where the actual fighting occurred.[3] Reverberations of violent actions are transmitted in the narratives of ancient authors, as well as in the levels of destruction and the burials of the war-dead. More subtle is the impact of military interests on the design of human living space.[4] In Roman times, standing armies in permanent camps characterised the military landscape and even today provide valuable information about troops, their movements and tasks. Such camps were no common sight in the Greek world,[5] as the Greek citizen-soldier was expected to prepare for combat in the gymnasium and to live at home, unless called to arms.[6] Only few special forces appear in the sources, whose character and organisation are mostly unclear.[7] Mercenaries, hired as combatants for specific missions during many periods of Greek colonial history in Sicily, were expected to return home or to seek new employment as soon as battles were fought and wages paid.[8] It seems reasonable to assume that they were accommodated in temporary camps, just as the citizen army was during a campaign, although no archaeological record of such camps exists.[9] All in all, the physical imprint of the military personnel and their arrangement in the Greek landscape is remarkably weak. We also may consider, however, the occasional transformation of civil into military space, when groups of redundant mercenaries occupied or reused settlements for their own purposes,[10] just as the targeted establishment of mercenaries in existing or newly founded cities was one measure to organise space with the help of military personnel and according to military priorities.[11]

Despite the rareness of explicit military installations in Greek Sicily, strategic considerations can be detected behind the specific organisation of the civil space.[12] The foundation of a new city, the occupation of a certain hilltop site, or the updating of an urban infrastructure, may well have been guided by the intention to dominate and to control a particular geographic area. In fact, the argument of geopolitical strategy is sometimes all too willingly applied to explain the development of a settlement. Rarer, however, is a thorough investigation of these putative strategies and the particular role a specific place played in them. Thus, we should remember that no such intrinsic strategical value exists for a location. Strategic functions are always attributed through human action and bound to specific circumstances. If these circumstances change, places can lose their strategic value, while others can instantly gain significance. This assertion is particularly valid in a landscape with such unsettled political conditions as Greek Sicily, where the conceptual boundaries between major polities were in constant motion. The assignment of a military value to a place or installation of no explicit military purpose thus requires thorough argumentation.

Another way in which military activities affected the landscape are the reminders of victory and defeat in the public space.[13] In the Greek world, these are most evident in the monuments built from the spoils of war or in the remembrance of fallen warriors.

On the following pages, I will present a short panorama of the military landscape of Greek Sicily in all aspects cited above. By means of short case studies, I will discuss landscapes of war and destruction, landscapes of control, securitisation and appropriation and finally landscapes of commemoration. Although the intention is naturally to identify the imprint of military activity on the landscape of Greek Sicily, I will also argue against the over-emphasis of military considerations in the interpretation of the archaeological and historical records. This format certainly does not allow for a comprehensive treatment of the argument and can only be a point of departure for a closer analysis of the varieties of military landscapes in Greek Sicily. Although surely an important factor in Greek society, the role of the warrior and warfare within the system of Greek values also will not appear in this chapter.[14]

Landscapes of war and destruction

No more obvious imprint of military action exists on the landscape than in the layers of intentional destruction and the graves of the war-dead. Although literary sources speak of numerous battles, massive human losses, and property damage in Greek Sicily, the archaeological record offers surprisingly little evidence in this respect.[15] The intriguing tombs of the war-dead at Himera, presented by Stefano Vassallo in this volume, are so far an isolated case,[16] while the weapon finds from Selinous, described by Clemente Marconi, Andrew Ward, and Holger Baitinger, offer only circumstantial evidence for the catastrophic events of 409 BC.[17] The century-long reuse of the urban space affected by organised violence eventually eliminated most traces of aggression and devastation. While the drastic reorganisation of the settlement area in Selinous after the destruction by Hannibal Mago makes it indeed difficult to grasp the drama of the actual battle, excavations have continuously yielded its traces in the form of burnt layers and large quantities of offensive weaponry dispersed within the settlement area. In the Potter's Quarter the burning down of the production facilities has been dated to the end of the 5th century.[18] Similar observations already were made during the work of the German Archaeological Institute on the fortifications and agora.[19] The strong impact of fire on vast parts of the city also is suggested by geomagnetic measurements.[20] Since high-intensity fires increase the magnetic susceptibility of the soil, burnt layers and accumulation of ashes clearly stand out in the geomagnetic prospection.[21] In this way, the many pottery kilns along the city walls became clearly visible, as well as several areas likely affected by fire, within the residential quarters on the Manuzza hill.[22] Naturally, we cannot clearly link this fire to the catastrophic events of 409 BC without further investigation, especially since the area in question was still in use in the periods afterward. Parts of the destroyed city, however, were possibly cleared of reusable material and left lying fallow.

The focus of the measures that completely transformed the city after 409 BC was anyway located on the southern hill, where Hermocrates and his men built an impressive fortress and permanently altered the city footprint that had already existed for 200 years. With the concept of a massive bastion as a base camp for his violent raids into neighboring territory, he used this landscape of wartime destruction for the establishment of a military installation at its finest.[23]

At Himera, the inhabitants surviving the Carthaginian attack of 409 BC decided not to rebuild on the ruins of the Classical city.[24] Excavations have revealed many abandoned and ransacked houses with collapsed roofs and objects left behind by the displaced community.[25] Unmistakable evidence of violent destruction by enemy forces nevertheless is difficult to identify.[26] No weapons or tools testify so far to the human authorship of the devastation and only the shattered body of a man and a horse, buried beneath the roof of a house in the lower city, have converted the ruins of Himera from a decayed urban settlement into a theatre of war.[27] Unlike Selinous, Himera was not transformed on a social and urbanistic level.[28] Some individual groups or families continued to dwell among the ruins well into medieval times without recreating a population centre in the remains of the Classical city.[29]

The same likely is true for the island of Motya, widely destroyed by Dionysios I in 397 BC.[30] The sources vividly describe the events leading to the killing and enslavement of many, and the devastation and plundering of the city.[31] Excavations have exposed various traces of these catastrophic events, mainly along the fortification line and in the area of the north gate.[32] Unlike at Himera, the destruction layers of Motya are crowded with weaponry of various kinds. Large quantities of arrowheads, sling leads, and pebbles testify to the massive application of missiles. A single fragment of a boulder, a sporadic find from the eastern section of the fortification walls, may even indicate the use of a stone-throwing catapult.[33]

The Grand pitched battles, fought in the open countryside, are even more difficult to retrace than military events within archaeologically well-known sites. The search for possible locations, as well as the reconstruction of the course of the battle in the geographic landscape, is a traditional exercise of military historians.[34] In Greek Sicily, the most famous battles in the open field include the encounter of Timoleon and the Carthaginians at the Crimisus River, fought in 341 BC (Diod. Sic. 16.77–80), and the battle at Mount Eknomos between Agathocles and Hamilcar II in 310 (Diod. Sic. 19.108–109).[35] Needless to say, no material traces of these battles can be detected anymore in the current landscape.[36] More generous from an archaeological point of view, occasionally, are naval battles where parts of ships sunk in the thick of battle are still lying on the bottom of the sea. For Sicily, this is particularly true for the ships scuttled in the famous battle of the Aegadian Islands in 241 BC, where Rome eventually defeated Carthage.[37] A significant number of rams with inscriptions in Greek and Punic have been discovered in the area,[38] as well as some offensive and defensive weaponry.[39] An especially impressive testimony to the outcome of the battle is the Punic shipwreck of Punta Scario at Marsala, where the defeated Carthaginians sought sanctuary.[40]

Despite these and several other examples, landscapes of war and destruction in Greek Sicily reveal themselves only to a limited extent to the present-day observer. Much imagination is indeed needed to realise the actual damage to the people and their living space by military operations. The literary sources are more eloquent in this respect, though naturally always in need of careful assessment.

Landscapes of control, securitisation and appropriation

The most extensive section of this chapter regards the question of military strategy in the creation and conversion of the human living space. Since no clear distinction between civil and military existed in the Greek world, it is difficult to pinpoint where military priorities actually prevailed in the shaping of the environment. We should remember that social and economic motives generally were the main driving force behind the use and structuring of space.

In the following pages, I will discuss four aspects in the design of the human landscape commonly associated with military necessities or geopolitical strategies: the establishment of new colonial cities, the securitisation of settlement areas, the implementation of territorial control measures, and the occupation of existing settlements by Greek actors. Each aspect will be illustrated by selected case studies.

New cities in strategic places: civil and military perspectives

Location undoubtedly was always a central aspect in the foundation of a settlement. The Greek migrants coming to Sicily naturally chose the places of their new cities according to distinct factors of geographic, environmental, economic, social, political and military nature. The same is true for large parts of the sub-colonies and second-generation foundations built on the island throughout the period of major Greek influence. Successful examples from Archaic times are the flourishing *poleis* of Himera (648 BC), Selinous (628 BC) and Akragas (580 BC), which formed in the slowly tightening space of the island's coastline.

A special position in this early colonial landscape is held by the two Archaic branches of Syracuse, Akrai (663 BC) and Kasmenai (643 BC), both settlements in elevated locations within the Hyblaean Mountains (Fig. 12.1)[41] These two foundations have long been interpreted as prime examples for early colonial military outposts, with the purpose of controlling and defending the Syracusan sphere of influence against Greek rivals and indigenous threats.[42] This belief perhaps developed from the need to explain the unconventional position of the sites, as well as their structural peculiarities in the overall Greek colonial landscape. As such, they have served as important pieces in the mosaic of an early Syracusan strategy of expansion and are central in the discussion regarding a 7th-century geopolitical master plan for the southern tip of the island. In this section, I will summarise the current state of research and will review the significance of both sites in the military landscape of the Archaic period.


Kasmenai
Anapo
Akrai
Irminio
Tellaro
0 1 2 3 4 5 km

Figure 12.1. The position of Akrai and Kasmenai in the Hyblaean Mountains. The white line indicates the Roman roads, the dotted line the main modern streets (© Jonasch).


Hell.
Agora
Late archaic
temple
0 100 200 300 400 m

Figure 12.2. Aerial view of the settlement plateau of Akrai and position of the late Archaic temple (© Jonasch).

Akrai lies on a flat plateau at an altitude of ca. 700 m between the valleys of two important rivers: the Anapo, flowing towards Syracuse, and the Tellaro, flowing towards Heloron, another early Syracusan settlement on the southeastern coastline (Figs 12.2 and 12.3).[43] The walk to Akrai would take approximately 8–9 hours from either starting point. While this position at the very vertex of an early Syracusan 'triangle of power' is indeed rather suggestive, archaeological research has not detected any indications that justify an interpretation of the site as a military outpost. Only sparse traces of a potential fortification line remain, which are not sufficient to suggest an Archaic city wall.[44] The remains of installations for the accommodation and sustenance of a larger group of men in constant military service also are not recognisable. At the present, we can imagine nothing else than a poorly populated rural outpost with mainly ephemeral structures before the second half of the 6th century BC.[45] Only then does archaeology prove the installation of some permanent structures, such as a temple for Aphrodite (Fig. 12.4).[46] In consideration of the current state archaeological research, as well as the chronological and topographical context, Akrai likely was designed as a stopping-off point in a transport network between the east and the south coasts. The foundation of Gela only 25 years earlier had undoubtedly stimulated the exchange of goods and the movement of people in the region, with Syracuse requiring a direct road connection for maintaining business relations with Gela.[47] The establishment of such a route from Syracuse straight to the south coast was part of an economic network development strategy and Akrai, as a small road station, may have served for the management, facilitation and surveillance of human and freight traffic at the crossroads between Gela, Helorus and Syracuse. The accessibility of the spot from overland routes and waterways alike speaks in favour of this assumption.[48]


Licodia
Pantalica
Monte Casasia
Euryelos
Syrakousai
Kasmenai
Akrai
Akrillai
Castiglione
Monte Finocchito
Kamarina
Helorus
Cava d'Ispica
Contrada Maestro
0
7.5
15
22.5
30 km

Figure 12.3. Position of Akrai in the Iron Age/Archaic landscape of south-eastern Sicily and field of view from four observer points. The broken line indicates the Roman road-network, the solid line the main modern streets (© Jonasch).


Licodia
Pantalica
Monte Casasia
Euryelos
Syrakousai
Kasmenai
Akrai
Akrillai
Castiglione
Monte Finocchito
Kamarina
Helorus
Cava d'Ispica
Contrada Maestro
0
7.5
15
22.5
30 km

Figure 12.4. Position of Kasmenai in the Iron Age/Archaic landscape of south-eastern Sicily and field of view from four observer points. The broken line indicates the Roman road-network, the solid line the main modern streets (© Jonasch).

The foundation of Kasmenai, at only 2 hours' walking distance, 20 years after Akrai suggests that new demands unable to be satisfied by the first Syracusan branch in the area had arisen. The close proximity between both positions is indeed quite unusual in the colonial landscape of Sicily and points to the supplementary character of Kasmenai in a developing Syracusan sphere of influence. The clear southward orientation of Kasmenai's field of vision and action doubtlessly complements the capacities of Akrai and simultaneously excludes any connection to hilltop-sites further inland, such as Monte Casasìa or Licodia (Fig. 12.4).[49] The natural conditions at nearly 900 m above sea level, together with the strictly organised but seemingly frugal architecture, were key factors in the identification of Kasmenai as a prototype of a military colony.[50] Archaeological research over the last 100 years has indeed revealed a firm plan of regularly arranged streets and equally sized houses likely dating to the first half of the 6th century BC.[51] The positions of many houses and streets are still retraceable in large parts of the approximately 60 hectares (Fig. 12.5). The generous and rather flat surface is surrounded by the remains of a double-faced fortification wall, built of natural boulders with scattered hewn stone blocks randomly distributed over its course (Fig. 12.6).[52] The inner structures were made from the same material, easily available on location and in the neighboring hills. At first sight, the strict arrangement leaves no room for the showcasing of social status, the cultivation of a political community, or the maintenance of a functioning substance-economy. However, archaeological research has concerned only small parts of the plateau, which leaves much room for imagination and further study.[53]



Figure 12.5. Aerial view from the settlement plateau of Kasmenai, seen from the west. Several in situ walls are indicated in white to illustrate the regular street system (Aerial photograph by © Luigi Nifosì).

The geographical location and scarce archaeological data has been used to confirm the basic assumption that Kasmenai was a military colony. Very suggestive in this regard was also the discovery of a large amount of weapon-offerings in the *temenos* of the only known sanctuary on the plateau.[54] The material recovered by Paolo Orsi includes arms of local and Greek typology, as well as miniaturist weapons common to the Greek cultural sphere.[55] While we currently cannot place the deposition in a chronological, ritual or historical context, it clearly indicates the presence of a cult with explicit male connotation.[56] Although this sanctuary was possibly dedicated to a deity connected to warfare, such as Hera or Athena, the question remains whether this cult is sufficient to consider the whole settlement a purposive stationing of military personal and a mere necessity for the control of Syracusan territorial integrity.[57] Part of the response to this question lies in the analysis of the qualities of the location for the establishment of a civil settlement. To this end, we must not compare Kasmenai to Greek seaside cities, but rather put it in relation to the many prospering Archaic hilltop sites in similar geographic conditions. Contrary to many of these sites, Kasmenai offers an extremely comfortable flat plateau of an extraordinary size naturally protected yet perfectly practical as a vast residential area. The solid stone houses with terracotta roofs were able to safely accommodate a large community, estimated to be 7000–8000 inhabitants.[58] The settlement is surrounded by serviceable fields at an altitude of only 100–150 m below the city and by rolling hills ideal for pasture farming.[59] Like all hilltop settlements, its access is difficult, but compared to places such as Ietai, Henna and Monte Iudica, Kasmenai was situated in a rather inviting position.[60]



Figure 12.6. Section of the Archaic fortification wall at the western border of the settlement (© Jonasch).

Kasmenai offers the perfect spot for a sort of typological hybrid between a planned Greek city and a hilltop settlement shaped by natural conditions. As such, it was an excellent environment for establishing a decent sized and socially multifaceted community with justified ambitions. This community quite possibly included both inhabitants of Greek and local origin, which would explain both the size and the presence of local weapons in the sanctuary's deposition.[61] The uniformity of the street grid and the equal house sizes may not display a rigid military organisation, but rather an attempt to prevent social competition in a newly reassembled society.[62] The current lack of evidence for larger transversal streets and missing public spaces also is not an argument for the stronghold-character of the site, but rather for a deficit in research.[63] Finally, the average sized fortification is also not unique in the landscape of the Archaic period and a very popular feature in many civil settlements of the area.[64] Naturally, the adult male population of Kasmenai was deployable in case of conflict, as might have been the case during the revolt of Kamarina against Syracuse in the mid-6th century BC.[65]

Unfortunately, we know little about the legal status of the community during its phase of consolidation.[66] In the early 5th century, Kasmenai is called a *polis* by Herodotus (7.155.2), when the land-owning elite escaping from Syracuse found refuge there.[67] Unlike Akrai, Kasmenai did not experience new life in Hellenistic times and seems to have been abandoned by the end of the Classical period, just as many other hilltop settlements on the island.[68]

To sum up, no reason exists for either of these sites to be defined as military colonies. Naturally, their positioning is not coincidental within the Syracusan sphere of influence. Akrai may be best understood as a transition point in the newly established supra-regional transport-network. A proper settlement develops only in the Hellenistic period, while Kasmenai emerges as a large and well organised civil settlement already in the first half of the 6th century. Crucial factors for the choice of this place were surely the favourable geomorphological conditions, but also the passing of the transregional road and not least, the access to the valley of the Irminio River. The opening up of this valley down to the river's mouth at Contrada Maestro[69] actually expanded the Syracusan radius of action by roughly 1000 km^2, though it is not reasonable to assume that all people and places within this range were somehow under Syracusan control.[70] The foundations of Akrillai and

Kamarina, only a few decades later, added 400 km^2 more to this area, enclosed by the central traffic routes and the four settlements of Syracusan initiative. None of them, however, was designed for the control or defence of the entire region, and their only military function likely was the usual provision of manpower in case of war. Interestingly enough, the first known military confrontation in the area was caused by an internal conflict, when Kamarina revolted against Syracuse together with unknown local communities, with the participation of Akrai or Kasmenai uncertain.[71]

Nearly a century later, when the first generation of tyrants disappeared and other actors tried their luck on the regional political stage, we witness more new foundations of cities with possible geopolitical objectives.[72] One of these, Adranon on the south-western slope of Mt Etna, apparently was founded by Dionysios around 400 BC.[73] Just like Akrai and Kasmenai, Adranon often is regarded as a military settlement, this time for the relocation of mercenaries in the service of Dionysios I.[74] Situated on a flat plateau of ca. 60 hectares and approximately 500 m above sea level, its position offers a good panorama of the valley of the Simeto River (Fig. 12.7) by towering above the confluence of the Simeto with the Salso River (not to be confused with the eponymous Imera Meridionale). The regional overland transport from the Nebrodi Mountains and various neighbouring cities, such as Troina and Agyrion, necessarily went past the elevated position of Adranon. Although archaeological research has not yet proved the existence of a proper city in the early 4th century, historiography suggests that it was a noteworthy site by at least the mid-4th century BC, when it played a decisive role in the seizure of power by Timoleon.[75] A series of bronze coins minted at Adranon also dates to this period and is frequently associated with the payment of military personnel.[76] We may assume that Adranon was a regular civil settlement with a differentiated society, political institutions and a fully operational economy,[77] although its installation probably relates to military strategy.



Figure 12.7. Position of Adranon on the western flank of Mount Etna and field of view from four observer points. The broken line indicates the Roman road-network, the solid line the main modern streets (© Jonasch).

The area in question became rather unstable by the end of the 5th century and an object of interest for various actors in the region, as becomes clear already during Dionysi os' campaign to secure the eastern part of the island after the peace treaty of 405.[78] It was also the setting of Dionysi os' confrontations with Himilco, in the course of which Sicilian Greeks, Carthaginians, peoples of local origin, and Campanian mercenaries all pursued their own objectives.[79] In 392 BC, the Carthaginians tried their luck with an expedition overland that ended at Agyrion with a peace treaty between Dionysios I and Mago.[80] Timoleon also was very active in the region when he attacked the Campanian mercenaries at Aitna and defeated the tyrants Nicodemus of Centuripe and Apolloniades of Agyrion in the early second half of the 4th century.[81] The establishment and promotion of a loyal community with military potential at Adranon therefore would have been a smart move for the various leaders of Syracuse and a noteworthy contribution to the military landscape of eastern Sicily. The difference with Kasmenai is obvious: whereas the Archaic settlement was built for civilians that could serve temporarily as soldiers, the late Classical city was created to permanently establish standby soldiers in a civil context.

Defensive measures in the urban space: two generations of fortifications revisited

The building of walls that included some and excluded others always has been a method of securitisation, but also of distinction. The increase in town defences within Sicily during the Archaic period undoubtedly regarded both aspects. In defining the physical space of a settlement, city walls created a local identity for the community living within and protected the same community against potential risks from the outside.[82] Both effects were essential for the social and political consolidation of *poleis* and secondary settlements alike in this period of radical transformation.

The first sites to be fortified were the new colonial cities from the 7th century BC onwards,[83] all of which received more or less impressive wall circuits in the course of the 6th century (although the archaeological verification is sometimes difficult). In the second half of the century, the phenomenon extended to many secondary settlements in often naturally protected hilltop positions. This development is sometimes associated with an elevated need for security of the non-Greek population in a general atmosphere of territorial aggression, created by colonial hunger for land and power.[84] Thus, the increase in town-defences is depicted as the inevitable emergence of a military landscape shaped by hawkishness on one side and anxiety on the other. Without underestimating safety issues in this particular period, I wish to stress the community-building effect of a collective construction project, of a widely visible landmark of local identity, and of a demarcation line between the unified society within and outsiders.

The 7th and 6th centuries BC in Sicily were a period characterised by a nearly complete reorganisation of the human habitat, mass migration to/from and around the island, and by the negotiation of new power structures. In this unstable atmosphere, the construction of a firm central place could stabilise social coherence and could create the image of a strong community. Such is evident on Monte Saraceno di Ravanusa, where the Archaic wall enclosed only the highest point of the mountain, the acropolis, and excluded both residential areas of the 6th century (Fig. 12.8). The wall is of rather modest size and simple fabrication and is conserved only in small parts.[85] In case of an attack, the inhabitants could possibly have found refuge inside the enclosure, but they would have willingly sacrificed their houses and possessions to plunder and destruction. Since the people of Monte Saraceno are unlikely to have shied away from the extra work of a larger wall circuit, we must consider the possibility that the key concern of the reduced fortification was not a security issue. Instead, it may have been the definition of a physical centre of the local society, where political and sacred community life took place. The wall circuit appears, in fact, in a period when the settlement, for the first time, shows clear signs of cohabitation between local people and Greek migrants, as evident not only in the development of a second, detached residential area but also in the manifold equipment of the *necropoleis*.[86] At this time, noteworthy growth and reorganisation of the community of Monte Saraceno occurred, with a fortified centre of the hybrid collective at its highest point. Yet no signs of militarisation or even an elevated necessity for security measures are evident in the second half of the 6th century BC.



Figure 12.8. The hill system of Monte Saraceno di Ravanusa with the positions of the fortified acropolis and the residential quarters on the upper

and lower terrace. The solid line indicates the course of the Roman road, the dotted line the modern street (© Jonasch).

The same development seemingly was true for another prominent site in the wider area. Monte San Mauro di Caltagirone lies at a narrow passage between the plain of Gela and that of Catania. Large houses, well equipped *necropoleis* and monumental temples bear witness to a wealthy and distinguished community-life on a series of contiguous hills between the early 6th to the early 5th century BC (Fig. 12.9).[87] No traces of a defence system, however, have been found either on the top of the flat plateaus or near the residential areas on the slopes,[88] especially surprising since it is said to have marked the border between the competing spheres of influence of Leontinoi and Gela. A debate continues over the political affiliation of Monte San Mauro, its indigenous heritage, and its possible identification with Euboia, a Chalcidian city destroyed in the early 5th century by the tyrant Gelon.[89]

Regardless of the circumstances, it remains surprising to see this prosperous and favourably situated site completely unfortified. Thus, we must consider the possibility that Monte San Mauro was neither in need of a physical defence line nor of a symbol of a community identity. The settlement instead might have fulfilled a special function as a place of intraregional and intersocietal communication in the peripheral position of three major colonies and many unknown local actors. The various sacred and public areas in widely visible positions documented so far during the relatively limited archaeological investigations may indeed indicate the special significance of the site as a passageway and meeting point within the evolving social, political, and economic realities of the Archaic period (Fig. 12.10).[90] Naturally, a construct of this sort would have been among the first to be eliminated by an authoritarian regime with territorial claims, such as the tyranny of the Deinomenids. This site (whether or not Euboia) was useless for autocrats with aspirations to regional hegemony. The lack of a defence system, however, was not the cause of the destruction of the settlement, since well-fortified cities, such as Megara Hyblaia, also shared this fate in the early 5th century BC.[91]



Figure 12.9. Position of the settlement on Monte San Mauro di Caltagirone on five sequential hills. Temples were found on hills nos 1–2, the so-called anaktoron *on hill no. 3. The wide strips indicate the residential area, the narrow strips the two necropoleis (© Jonasch).*

While I have argued in favour of a more differentiated view on the building of city walls during the Archaic period,[92] the following section will more positively discuss military reasons for fortification measures in Sicily during the 4th and 3rd centuries BC. The process of upgrading Archaic and Classical town defences was stimulated not only by the Athenian siege of Syracuse in 415–413, but also by the conquest of Selinous, Himera and other sites by Hannibal Mago in the final decade of the 5th century. In his report of the Carthaginian attack on Selinous, Diodorus (13.55.7) explicitly refers to the outdated city walls that were easily overrun by the modern siege towers of the attackers.



Figure 12.10. In the foreground the longitudinal wall of the so called anaktoron *in a most prominent position on hill no. 3. In the background the circular enclosing wall of the Iron Age structures (© Diego Barucco).*

Interestingly enough, only months later a new generation of fortifications was developed in this very place under the leadership of the Syracusan exile Hermocrates.[93] The new wall circuit enclosed only the former acropolis of the city and functioned as a fortress for his troops, while civil life seems to have continued on the outside. Although Hermocrates soon left the city, the fortification remained an integral part of the revitalised town of the late Classical period and even received an elaborate remodel by the end of the 4th century, always in accordance with the latest developments in weaponry and siege warfare.[94]

Another exceptional example of military architecture was built in Syracuse, also starting from the end of the 5th century BC. The long walls around the Epipolai plateau owed their existence to the lesson learned from the catastrophic siege by the Athenians,[95] and the Euryalos fortress on its western tip served to enable both defense measures and offense strategies far away from the vulnerable core of the city.[96]

Both fortifications demonstrate a paradigm shift in the function and perception of town defenses during the late Classical period. The increasing popularity of siege warfare and the swift development of ever more powerful artillery widely required an updating of the wall circuits of the 6th and 5th centuries. The precarious situation, both in domestic and foreign policy, thus led to the reconstruction and upgrading of many town defenses in Sicily during the 4th and 3rd centuries BC.[97] Towers were added, platforms for the positioning of defensive weaponry installed, and *proteichismata* provided for counter attacks from the besieged. The curtain walls were strengthened with chains of headers that enhanced their stability against siege machines.[98] At the same time, theoretical interests in siege warfare and defensive measures swelled.[99]



Figure 12.11. The elongated hill of Monte Desusino with indications of sections of the 4th-century fortification wall and the position and floorplan of the military barracks (© Jonasch).

The militarisation of the Hellenistic landscape through the building of walls does not stop at the major cities of Greek Sicily,[100] as new fortification measures appeared in many secondary settlements of the hinterland. On Monte Saraceno di Ravanusa, the wall circuit of the acropolis was reconstructed and protective measures added to the east of the upper terrace, perhaps to guard the passage towards the river.[101] No less interesting was the installation of a large wall circuit with sophisticated doorways on Monte Desusino, where the existence of a proper settlement within ca. 60 hectares of fortified space has yet to appear.[102] Investigations of the 1980s revealed instead the presence of an oblong building within the course of the wall on the northern ridge of the hill (Fig. 12.11). This building consists of nine rather small-sized rooms, partially cut into the bedrock. Among the finds from the rooms were two spearheads, a knife, mostly coarse ware pottery, and some bronze coins of mainly Syracusan origin.[103] The typology of the building and the findings induced the excavators convincingly to argue for the rare case of military barracks, designed for the stationing of a small troop contingent in an unknown context. A similar conclusion was drawn for a building on Monte Bubbonia, where a reduced wall circuit was established on the former acropolis in the 4th century BC.[104] Here an oblong building seemingly was superimposed upon an Archaic structure of probable sacred nature, including a *bothros*.[105] Due to its position inside the new fortification and its peculiar form, it was also interpreted as army barracks (Fig. 12.12), although no findings have confirmed the military character of the building. Either way, the central part of the settlement on Monte Bubbonia was obviously completely restructured in the 4th century BC, even at the cost of former sacred spaces. While it is yet unclear whether a civil community was still living here during this time, we surely can identify the straightforward transformation of a public space into a tiny fortress with a potential military function.[106]



Figure 12.12. The compact hill of Monte Bubbonia. Highlighted is the position of the 4th-century fortification wall on the acropolis and the floorplan of the elongated building (© Jonasch).

Complex systems of territorial control: military outposts in the Sicilian landscape

The example from Monte Bubbonia leads to another type of fortification, different from the city walls of civil communities, namely fortified outposts outside of urban settlements with an exclusive or predominantly military purpose. Such installations, as the fortress on Monte Bubbonia may have been, likely appeared in Sicily only during the 4th century BC.[107] Literary sources refer to military camps already in various contexts of the 6th and 5th centuries BC. Most famous among these are the so-called *phrouria* of Phalaris, the first tyrant of Akragas, mentioned by Diodorus in the context of the battle at Mount Eknomos in 311 BC.[108] Scholars have argued elsewhere, however, that there is no reason to believe in fortified and permanently manned outposts anywhere in the Archaic landscape of Sicily.[109] Archaeologists indeed have not been able to find evidence for a single fortress predating Hermocrates' installation on the acropolis of Selinous as a permanent base for military operations.[110] The strategic stationing of smaller contingents of troops in isolated strongholds with the presumable purpose of territorial control seems, at least in Sicily, an invention of the late Classical period.[111]

Archaeological evidence comes again from the Eastern part of the island: a well-preserved example lies on the northern perimeter of the plain of Catania, in direct visual connection with the city of Adranon. The small fortress on Monte Turcisi was only recently the object of archaeological investigation and can be considered a textbook example for a military base of the 4th and 3rd centuries BC (Fig. 12.13).[112] With its inner space of roughly 0.35 hectares, it is comparable to similar outposts on the Greek mainland.[113] Based on the available space for accommodation and storage, the fortress on Monte Turcisi could have hosted comfortably around 100 soldiers on a permanent basis.[114] They likely were tasked with guarding the fertile plain of Catania and the valley of the River Dittaino and securing their surroundings against small scale-raids and brigandage (Fig. 12.14).[115] In the case of a greater invasion, they were in a perfect position to call for reinforcements while holding out inside the fortress' walls, well prepared for sieges.[116] During its lifetime, the stronghold on Monte Turcisi experienced various modifications, sometimes because of destructive events, other times to keep up to date with the current developments in weaponry.[117] In consideration of the repeated modifications, its position undoubtedly never lost its significance during times of conflict before the Roman conquest. During this entire period, the garrison on Monte Turcisi likely was under the command of Syracusan leaders and part of a larger control apparatus in eastern Sicily.[118] Other constituents were Adranon, as argued above, as well as outposts in Rocchicella di Minoa and perhaps Monte San Basilio.[119]



Figure 12.13. Side view of the entrance to the fortress on Monte Turcisi with remains of the northern tower and the eastern curtain wall (© Jonasch).

The situation outlined here for the larger plain of Catania is by no means an exception in late Classical and Hellenistic Sicily. Another good example for the militarisation of the landscape during the 4th century was recently studied in the greater area of modern Licata, where clear transformations of the geographic space into a sophisticated system of control can be observed.[120] Further research must be undertaken in this direction, since these often-remote locations and their fragmented evidence has received little attention to this day.



Figure 12.14. Position of Monte Turcisi in the Late Classical/Hellenistic landscape and field of view from four observer points. The broken line indicates the Roman road-network, the solid line the main modern streets (© Jonasch).

Commanding the Archaic hinterland: on the appropriation of indigenous hilltop-sites

In the absence of archaeological proof for Greek military outposts in Archaic Sicily, the question of territorial control and military stationing was often outsourced to the hilltop-settlements of mostly indigenous origin.[121] This idea is closely connected with the general conviction that the Greek migrants were forced to occupy and to secure their new position in a basically hostile atmosphere. The Greek actors thus have been perceived as a unified organism facing an equally homogeneous indigenous environment. In this simplified universe, the indigenous settlements within the reach of the colonial sphere of action were quickly transformed into colonial control-posts inside a geopolitical master plan of the respective Greek *polis*.[122] This traditional narrative has been challenged for some time, although not yet replaced by an assertive alternative.[123] Since this is not the place to elaborate on the highly complex issue of cultural encounters, I would instead like to investigate more closely the geopolitical strategy often considered a central aspect in the fate of secondary settlements in hilltop positions.

For the Archaic period, archaeological research has widely proven that the consolidation of the *poleis* did not lead to a massive thinning out of secondary sites in hilltop positions, but rather to an increase and a flourishing of such places.[124] In a generally hostile climate, however, one would rather expect the destruction of rival places and the incorporation of their inhabitants as workforce into the new cities, a radical process eventually chosen by autocrats of the Classical period.[125] Yet even if the settlements were successfully occupied and placed under the control of colonial forces, they still posed a potential risk, considering the rather instable character of Greek Sicilian power structures.

Thus, we should wonder why sites, such as Butera and Monte Bubbonia, at a walking distance of only 4–6 hours from the city of Gela, were experiencing such significant population growth at the same time as the colonial city.[126] Again, a supposed strategic position within the surveillance system of the colonial city has been invoked as an important reason for both sites.[127] Both settlements do enjoy excellent views over large parts of the Geloan *chora* and to other hilltop sites of the region. From Butera, a 400 m high plateau on the border of the plain of Gela, one can easily observe the whole coastline in a linear distance of ca. 10–15 km (Fig. 12.15).

Even from Monte Bubbonia, more than 20 km away, one can still monitor the course of the River Gela (Fig. 12.16). The question remains, however, as to how useful these sight lines were. No site offers a significant view over the mountainous hinterland and possible access routes to the plain. Monte Bubbonia is, in fact, embedded in a hilly landscape with tight mountain ranges to the north and east that hinder the view and any direct access towards the transregional route between the plain of Catania and Akragas, as well as towards the route that follows the Gela river in an eastern direction. Butera was equally blind to possible approaches from the north and west. Just as in the case of Monte Bubbonia, its position offers no particular advantages for rapid interventions or for the establishment of a first line of defence. For the monitoring of the plain of Gela and the stationing of military personnel, many options in the area were better, including a hill in the complex of the Monti

Dessueri to the north of Gela. Here, a major Bronze Age site was slowly abandoned between the 9th and 7th centuries BC and, despite its truly favourable conditions, was never considered a noteworthy position for a control post by the Geloans.[128]



Figure 12.15. Position of Butera in the Archaic landscape and field of view from four observer points. The broken line indicates the Roman road-network, the solid line the main modern streets (© Jonasch).

Thus, the strategy behind the development of the various secondary settlements within the sphere of colonial action likely was social and economic rather than military. As has been noted elsewhere, the growing *poleis* created an emerging market for foodstuffs, natural resources, craftwork and manpower.[129] Various actors of local origin and migrant background, in search of individual social advancement, could have capitalised on this situation by forming communities in positions with already-existing basic infrastructures on the borders of the Greek *chorai*. Here they performed with varied success until the late 6th or early 5th century, when many hilltop settlements in all parts of the island were abandoned. In this period of the rising autocracies, territorial policy changed significantly: after some generations concerned with the consolidation of the *polis* in harmony with neighbouring communities, the practice transformed into the creation of clear power relations.[130] This procedure began early in Butera, where burials at Piano della Fiera came to an end during the first half of the 6th century.[131] On Monte Bubbonia, a hiatus in the settlement history is recognisable only in the early 5th century, as is the case on Monte San Mauro, Lavanca Nera, and many more sites.[132] This widespread abandonment of secondary settlements in hilltop positions during this period validates the argument that they were originally not part of a colonial territorial expansionist strategy but that they clearly became an obstacle to it with the rising of the tyrants. As the often-cited strategic value of hilltop sites in a surveillance system of the *polis* was obviously of no value to them, they chose to completely dissolve these communities rather than to convert them into dependent *phrouria*. This basic attitude still prevailed when, after the fall of the Deinomenids, the major cities of the region were not willing to tolerate homeless mercenaries occupying these positions in their backyard,[133] Only during the 4th century through reoccupation and transformation into fortresses did they become part of a new military landscape under the control of the Syracusan leaders.[134]



Figure 12.16. Position of Monte Bubbonia in the Archaic landscape and field of view from four observer points. The broken line indicates the Roman road-network, the solid line the main modern streets (© M. Jonasch).

Landscapes of commemoration

The outcomes of military action, positive or negative, were certainly commemorated by the surviving elements of the involved communities,[135] although more evidence for the celebration of victories than for the mourning of a defeat obviously remains.[136] As military success was exploited to cement claims to power and the right to rule within and outside the community, various ways existed to make victories visible in a material form.

In addition to ephemeral trophies erected at the battle site,[137] votive offerings to the gods of various sanctuaries epitomised triumph over opponents and spread the news of successful military operations throughout the Greek world.[138] Famous examples are the dedications of Greek Sicilians to the gods of Panhellenic sanctuaries, such as the inscribed helmets from the spoils of the battle at Cuma conveyed by Hieron I to Olympia. A visible reminder of military success to the affected community was the victory-inscription on temple G in Selinous that recounted a successful military campaign of the 5th century, unknown to us but surely familiar to the inhabitants of the city.[139]

The booty from victorious battles also furnished the public space with glorious buildings that constantly reminded the population of past and present military achievements and their general power within the political and military landscape. Impressive examples are the building works undertaken in 5th- century Athens largely financed from the spoils from numerous wars of that period.[140] As for Sicily, Giulio Amara has discussed in this volume the case of the so-called temples of victory, built in several Greek cities of Sicily after the battle at Himera in 480 BC.[141]

Monumental tombs of the war-dead could also act as victory monuments, especially if the result of the battle in which they died was positive for the community.[142] If negative, they still could serve to commemorate fellow citizens who had bravely fought and died in the service of the community.[143] In Athens and several other *poleis* on the Greek mainland, state funerals were organised for the war-dead and casualty lists inscribed with the names of the fallen and the battle in which they perished.[144] This social practice was not primarily meant to remember the individual soldier but to showcase the collective trauma, resilience and commitment of the community.[145] Pausanias, in his description of the public cemetery, also mentions a casualty list with names of war-dead from Sicily, very possibly from the traumatic defeat of the Athenians in the Sicilian expedition of 415–413 BC.[146]

Nevertheless, no evidence remains for similar monuments or practices in Greek Sicily. The sources report events when the war-dead were retrieved after the battle, but they provide no indications regarding the burial or remembrance of these dead.[147]

The only exception appears in the account from Diodorus concerning the bones of the fallen Syracusan soldiers at Himera during the Carthaginian assault in 409 BC that Diocles had failed to return home.[148] The exiled warlord Hermocrates collected these bones and conveyed them to Syracuse in a theatrical procession to bury them properly according to custom.[149] Although his performance succeeded in having Diocles exiled, we learn nothing further about the burial of the bones, which may have been interred like those of Greek soldiers who died in the victory of 480 BC at Himera without special treatment or a memorial visible to the following generations.[150] Whether they received public honours in any other way also remains uncertain.[151]

To summarise, the remains of the landscape of commemoration in Greek Sicilian military history are rather poor regarding the acknowledgment of individual service for the community. Much more effort was invested, however, when victorious battles could serve the self-representation of autocrats in a supra-regional context, as clearly demonstrated by the various dedications in Panhellenic sanctuaries.

Conclusion

According to the definition introduced at the beginning of this chapter, we may define Greek Sicily as a militarised landscape. We also may determine the ways in which attention to the military in the organisation of the social and geographic landscape evolved over time and reached new importance, first with the ascendance of the autocratic regimes at the end of the 6th and beginning of the 5th century, and later with the efforts to consolidate a territorial state by the Syracusan leaders of the 4th and 3rd centuries BC.

The founding of colonies and the occupation of land during the 8th and 7th centuries BC might well have included violent action against locals or fellow colonists, but they remained sporadic and cannot be recognised as part of a geopolitical masterplan of single *poleis*. Neither the written sources nor the archeological record provides evidence for larger clashes or major war-induced destructions of the pre-colonial infrastructure. The first generations of Greek colonists in Sicily, including Syracuse, were more engaged in the development of the social and economic landscape and preoccupied with military considerations only in that very context.

During the 6th century, this picture changed: with the revolt of Kamarina and the rise of autocrats it became clear that political hegemony and territorial dominion ascended in the priority setting of several *poleis*. The town defences, mostly built during this century, provided sufficient defensive functions but were not decisive for the survival of a settlement. In many remote hilltop settlements, they likely provided a welcome occasion for the consolidation of young and hybrid communities and therefore answered social necessities rather than military. In the beginning of the 5th century, many of these communities suffered heavily under the new power politics of the autocratic regimes. The abandonment of these sites and the relocation of their communities made them part of a colonial military landscape of elimination.

In the 5th century we also witness the first major clashes with supra-regional powers that added a new dimension to the island's military landscape, especially in terms of large-scale battles with the involvement of multiple military branches. The fall of the tyrannies did not interrupt this increasing militarisation of Greek Sicily. On the contrary, the growing interference of Carthage and Athens led to several catastrophic war events that sustainably defined the military and political landscape of the island, while much internal dissent also contributed to the rise of organised societal violence.

This period of conflict encouraged a major period of militarization under the rulers of Syracuse in the 4th and 3rd centuries BC. A comprehensive landscape of control was created, composed of well-defended central places, strategically positioned secondary settlements, and military outposts in rural areas. A continuing series of minor military interventions and manipulations of local communities attempted to gain loyalties in a broader framework. The ongoing struggle with Carthage and a new Syracusan policy of expansion even extended the military landscape of Greek Sicily to regions far beyond the island.

With the involvement of Rome in the 3rd century, however, the Greek Sicilians suddenly became collateral damage within the Mediterranean-wide fight for power.[152] This surge in conflict led to the siege and fall of Syracuse and Akragas in 212 and 210 BC, events that eventually incorporated the island into the more extensive and organised Roman military landscape of the Republican period.

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[*] I want to thank Pier Giovanni Guzzo and Stefania De Vido for many useful suggestions and thought-provoking ideas. I would also like to thank Jason Harris for his revisions of the English text.

[1] As an adjective, 'military' derives from the Latin word *militaris* ('relating to soldiers'). The noun 'military' in the sense of armed forces dates back to 14th-century France. See also Bekker-Nielsen 2001, 15.

[2] The discussion of military landscapes has recently increased within the field of human geography. The author of this chapter was especially inspired by the writings of Rachel Woodward (*e.g.* Woodward, 2014a; 2014b; 2016; see also Pearson 2012 and Flint 2011). The difference of the archaeological/historical approach lies, however, in the perspective. Military geographers, who study 'landscapes which reflect in their constitution and expression the imprint of military activities, militarism and militarization…' (Woodward 2014b, 41) take unequivocal historical and material evidence of military presence and activity as a starting point and question the consequences. The body of evidence for archaeologists and historians, especially regarding the colonial period in Sicily, is much more fragmented. It is necessary to investigate the human and natural landscape in the first place to discuss if and how military activity and considerations may be responsible for their condition and development.

[3] Woodward 2014b, 5: 'It is in contexts of active armed conflict that we see most clearly the imprint of military power across landscape'.

[4] Woodward 2014a, 43: 'Military landscapes are also landscapes of construction where military priorities shape emergent urban forms, visible in spatial configuration of military domesticity (…) and urban morphologies…'

[5] For a general overview of Greek military forces and their organisation

see van Wees 2004, 89–113 and Hunt 2007, 137–145.

[6] This is a strongly generalised description of practices about which we know little. The institution of the gymnasium in the Greek West and its role in the preparation of the youth for combat is, *inter alia*, discussed in Cordiano 1997. Especially intriguing is the enhancement of the institution in the context of a military buildup under the lead of Hieron II, see Cordiano 1997, 95–112.

[7] Pritchett 1974a, 221–225. This is the case, for example, with the *epilektoi*, a group of 600 soldiers who drove out the mercenaries from Syracuse in 461 BC, as discussed in Alonso and Freitag (2001) and Vinci (2010). These men likely were recruited from the citizen board for special tasks and not employed on a permanent basis. The bodyguard of the various tyrants seem to have been on 24-hour guard. Polyaenus (*Strat.* 6.51) reports that Theron used the money provided for the building of a temple to employ a group of bodyguards who helped him to seize power in Akragas. Diodorus (13.95.5) recounts that, one century later, Dionysios I employed a bodyguard of 600 soldiers who likely were assigned housing on the island of Ortygia in close proximity to his own dwellings (Diod. Sic. 14.7.5).

[8] For the process of hiring, see Trundle 2004, 104–117, in particular 111–112.

[9] van Wees 2004, 107–108.

[10] One such episode is reported in P. Oxy 665 (*FGrH* 557). For a discussion of the event after the downfall of the Deinomenids and Emmenids in the hinterland of Gela, see Raffone 2004, 73–81. A prominent example for such an operation is also the occupation of Entella by Campanian mercenaries dismissed by Dionysios I, as recounted in Diod. Sic. 14.9.9.

[11] See also Harris and Costanzi in this volume. For the 5th century, see Raffone 2004, 68–73.

[12] Woodward 2016, 3: ‘The place-making practices of military power are also evident in the reproduction of urban and infrastructural forms and built environment around the globe…’.

[13] Woodward 2014a, 44: ‘Landscapes of mourning and remembrance for past military events can also be understood as military landscape’.

[14] Some recent thoughts on this topic are offered in Bettalli 2019, 395–404.

[15] A selection of violent events is provided in the two volumes of Ampolo and Vaggiolo 2006, as well as in Congiu *et al.* 2016. See De Vido 2016 for general analysis of wars in Sicily.

[16] See Vassallo 2018 and Vassallo in this volume. On mass burials from military action generally, see Pritchett 1985, 125–139. In Sicily, only one additional tomb with a larger group of bodies seems to have been

found in Akragas. Scant information available concerning this tomb makes it, however, impossible to draw any useful conclusions.

[17] See Marconi and Ward as well as Baitinger in this volume. For a narrative of the events, see Diod. Sic. 13.54–58 and Trundle 2017, 1–3.

[18] Bentz *et al.* 2013, 82–83.

[19] For the fire at the Eastern Gate, see Mertens *et al.* 2003a, 252.

[20] *Beilage 10* in Mertens *et al.* 2003a.

[21] For the geophysical prospections in general, see Stümpel in Mertens *et al.* 2003a, 485–488.

[22] This may be confirmed through the discovery of a burnt house in the back of the north-eastern *stoa*. The *insula* to the north of street NA was not investigated further but is represented pictorially in Mertens *et al.* 2012, 124–125, fig. 31.

[23] See also below.

[24] Cic. *Verr*. 2.35.86.

[25] Vassallo 2005, 40–42 and in this volume.

[26] Diodorus (13.62.4) recounts that 'Hannibal, after sacking the temples and dragging out the suppliants who had fled to them for safety, set them afire, and the city he razed to the ground, two hundred and forty years after its founding' (translation by C.H. Oldfather).

[27] Allegro *et al.* 1993/94, 1123; Vassallo 2018, 199. At Akragas, the third city to be attacked by the Carthaginians during this decisive expedition, ca. 50 arrowheads near a gate in the fortification wall are evidence of fighting, as noted in Trombi 2016.

[28] A discussion of minor numismatic activities of a *polis* by the name of Himera in the 4th century appears in Boehringer 1989.

[29] Boehringer 1989, 37–39; Vassallo 2005, 42.

[30] For Motya in the 4th and 3rd centuries BC, see Nigro 2015.

[31] Diod. Sic. 14.48–53 and Souza in this volume.

[32] For an overview, see Famà 2006 and Rihll 2007, 43–44. The area of the north gate is also the location of a hasty burial of two bodies, probable victims of the assault, as well as a deep pit from the plundering of the spoils from a shrine, as described in Isserlin, du Plat Taylor 1974, 75–76.

[33] For the general development of the catapult, see Rihll 2007. As Rihll (2007, 30 and 44) points out, the missiles of the first catapults, the *gastraphetes*, likely were not stones, but arrowheads. Clear evidence of the destructive force of stone-throwing catapults comes from the Carthaginian naval base at Lipari, conquered by the Romans in 252/51 BC. Close to a section of the 4th-century wall, the excavators discovered a dozen spherical stones, several iron blades and spear heads in what seems to be the *in situ* remains of the battle. For this discovery, see Bernabó-Brea and Cavalier 1998, 191–192.

[34] See Sabin 2009 for a recent example.

[35] For the Crimisus battle, see Gulletta 2003; 2012, 84–92; Trundle 2017, 10–11. For the battle at Mount Eknomos, see La Torre 2016; Trundle 2017, 11–12.

[36] Gulletta (2003, 771) mentions the Arabic toponym *Khandaq al-Silaḥ* (*Valle delle armi)* in the area of Entella, perhaps a reference to the presence of weaponry in the soil.

[37] Tusa and Royal 2018. For a reconstruction of the battle, see also Gulletta 2012, 77–84.

[38] Prag 2016. Since this publication, several more rams have been discovered.

[39] While a Roman helmet was already found earlier by a fisherman (Tusa and Royal 2018), the first sword and two more helmets were secured only in 2019.

[40] Frost 1983.

[41] Only Thucydides (6.5.2) accounts for the foundation of both sites.

[42] Di Vita 1956; Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 189–190, 205–206; Erdas 2006, 45–47; Domínguez 2010, 27; La Torre 2011a, 47. For a combination of military and civil functions, see Greco and Torelli 1983, 180–184. Copani (2009) suggests a control function for both sites with possible policing activities in the developing trade network. Lancaster (2018, 226–230) rejects the military aspect but argues in favour of a role of both settlements in a Syracusan geopolitical masterplan with a focus on the economic exploitation of the area.

[43] For Heloron, see Copani 2005; Lancaster 2017, 40–42; Frasca 2017, 191–195.

[44] Copani 2009, 14; Chowaniec 2015, 47; Lancaster 2018, 161–162.

[45] Tréziny 2009, 173–174; Chowaniec 2015, 43–78; Frasca 2017, 196–204.

[46] Even so, this location gained importance only in the mid-3rd century, when public construction increases and Akrai begins minting its own coins. In the context of a treaty between Rome and Syracuse in 263 BC, Diodorus (23.4.1) even calls the place a *polis*: Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 189–190; Chowaniec 2015, 47.

[47] The course of this road has been known for a while, as noted in Di Vita 1956, 184–185.

[48] Uggeri 2018.

[49] A hypothesis formulated by Di Vita 1956. A summary of the state of research is available in Collura 2012 and Frasca 2015, 126–127.

[50] Di Vita 1956, 189–190; Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 189; Erdas 2006, 45–46; Copani 2009, 15–16; Collura 2012, 3; Lancaster 2017, 227–230.

[51] The visible structures all likely date to the 6th and 5th centuries BC.

[52] A small portion of a wall, built with large ashlar blocks, was

documented by Giovanni Rizza in the 1950s and was interpreted as a possible doorway; *cf*. Tréziny 2009, 175. No thorough investigation into the wall-circuit, however, has been published to this point.

[53] Tréziny 2009, 174–176.

[54] A first installment of the temple is usually dated ca. 600 BC, as noted in Frasca 2017, 208. The most recent presentation of the complex is in Albanese Procelli 2013. The metal objects currently are being restudied by A. Scarci in the framework of a project at the Römisch-Germanisches Zentralmuseum in Mainz.

[55] Melfi 2000; Albanese Procelli 2013.

[56] A brief overview of weapon offerings in Sicily and Magna Grecia is provided by La Torre 2011b.

[57] Veronese 2006, 340; La Torre 2011b, 83; Albanese Procelli 2013, 234. For weapon offerings in sacred locations, see also Ward and Marconi in this volume.

[58] Collura 2012, 2.

[59] We have no precise information on the quality of the land around Monte Casale in ancient times. We should imagine a much denser forest cover that also could have been economically exploited. For the general possibilities, see De Angelis 2016, 230–240.

[60] Rough estimation for comparison: the settlement on Monte Iato lies at ca. 850 m above sea level, the surrounding valley at approximately 500 m; Monte Iudica reaches an altitude of more than 750 m, the surrounding fields, cultivated today, begin at roughly 450 m; the modern town of Enna is located at more than 900 m above sea level, the workable fields at ca. 600 m.

[61] Melfi 2000.

[62] On the issue of equality and inequality, see Fitzjohn 2007.

[63] Erdas 2006, 46; Tréziny (2009, 175–176) argues well for the reconstruction of a central *plateia*.

[64] The visible remains on the western side reach a thickness of ca. 2 m, an average size for this type of wall technique. For the development of fortifications in archaic Sicily, see Tréziny 2006; for the general increase in town-fortifications in the 6th century, see Frederiksen 2011, 111–112.

[65] Thuc. 6.5.3.

[66] There is little doubt that the city depended on Syracuse, though the nature of such relationships of dependence is not known. Herakleia Minoa, Mylai or hilltop settlements of indigenous origin, such as Maktorion, may have been in a similar situation.

[67] Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 205.

[68] In the surrounding area, the settlements on Monte Casasìa and Monte San Mauro also were abandoned in the 5th century. In Kasmenai, a

transversal fortification wall from the first half of the 4th century halves the vast residential area. This measure may indicate a short phase of reuse of the site, perhaps as part of a Syracusan strategy of greater control.

[69] This site was a small trading venue, as described by Frasca (2015, 106–107) and De Angelis (2016, 98) with further bibliography.

[70] See Lancaster 2018, 229 for an estimation of the population that could be agriculturally supported within these areas.

[71] A discussion about a possible participation of Kasmenai in the conflict on the basis of *FGrH* 556 F5 is found in De Luna 2009, 81.

[72] See Costanzi in this volume.

[73] Diod. Sic. 14.37.5.

[74] Pope 2014, 345.

[75] Diod. Sic. 16.68.9–11; Plut. *Vit. Tim.* 12. For the archaeological record, see Lamagna 2010.

[76] For the coinage of Adranon, see Mastelloni 2009. The relevance of bronze coinage for military matters is claimed by Puglisi 2005, 287. See also Puglisi 2018.

[77] Diodorus (14.37.5) calls Adranon a *polis* (Διονϭσιος … πόλιν ἔκτισεν); *cf*. Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 183 for further evidence of the city's status.

[78] Diod. Sic. 14.14–17; Caven 1990, 83–88; Lewis 1994, 140–141.

[79] Diod. Sic. 14.56–61; De Vido 2016, 42–43.

[80] Diod. Sic. 14.95–96; Lewis 1994, 145.

[81] Diod. Sic. 16.82.4–5.

[82] On the multiple functions of city walls, see Hölscher 1998, 67–73; Tréziny 2006, 260; Müth *et al.* 2016, 126–158.

[83] The archaeological evidence for 7th-century walls is best preserved at Megara Hyblaia. In Naxos, the first settlers reused an existing wall from the Bronze Age, as discussed by Tréziny 2010, 560–561.

[84] See Vassallo in this volume.

[85] The wall was about 1.20 m thick, and composed of two faces of worked rubble stone, as described by Calderone *et al.* 1996, 9 and Tav. VII. 3, 4.

[86] Calderone *et al.* 1996, 47–48.

[87] Frasca 2017, 116–127 with further bibliography.

[88] Orsi (1910b, 746–747) describes a 9 m long terrace wall on hill no. 3, whose purpose is unclear.

[89] Strabo 10.1.15: 'There was also a Euboea in Sicily, which was founded by the Chalcidians of Sicily, but they were driven out of it by Gelon; and it became a stronghold of the Syracusans' (trans. H.L. Jones); *cf*. Frasca 2017, 116–127; Frasca this volume; Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 191–192; Fitzjohn 2007; Domínguez 2010, 29; De Angelis 2016, 169.

[90] A synoptic description of the sacred places on Monte San Mauro is found in Frasca 2017, 120–121. Especially important were the hills nos 1–2. Hill no. 3 was instead occupied by a prominent building with presumably public function where fragments of legal texts also were found by Paolo Orsi; *cf.* Frasca 2017, 119. A further sanctuary might have been located on hill no. 4. For sanctuaries as places of intercultural encounter in general, see several relevant articles in Kistler *et al.* 2015.

[91] See Hdt. 7.156.2 on the fate of the Megarians.

[92] For the Greek *poleis*, Tréziny (2006, 259–260) has argued that 'dans un certain nombre de cas au moins, une clôture de l'espace urbain' was 'indispensable à sa définition'.

[93] Mertens *et al.* 2003a, 97–118.

[94] Mertens *et al.* 2003a, 256–258.

[95] See the contributions of Mignosa and Steinbock in this volume.

[96] Recently studied and published by Beste and Mertens 2015.

[97] For a short overview, see Miller 1995, 51–52.

[98] Karlsson 1992; Tréziny 1999, 251–255.

[99] Müth 2016, 178–179 with a critical overview; Marsden 1971 in particular for treatises on artillery.

[100] In addition to the aforementioned examples, we know of the renewal of the city walls of Leontinoi (see Frasca in this volume), Gela, Helorus, Megara Hyblaia and Morgantina, see Karlsson 1989.

[101] Mingazzini 1937, 623–628. Pope (2014, 347) suggests the stationing of mercenaries under Dionysios I. See also Pope in this volume with illustration.

[102] Torella 2014, 38–41 with further bibliography; Panvini 2003b, 103–109.

[103] Panvini 1994, 110–114.

[104] Pancucci and Narò 1992, 131–134.

[105] Pancucci 1977; Pancucci and Narò 1992, 137.

[106] Pope 2014, 347–348.

[107] On mainland Greece, rural fortifications appear on a larger scale towards the end of the 5th century BC; *cf.* van Wees 2004, 129.

[108] Diod. Sic. 19.108.1–2: 'The Carthaginians held the hill Ecnomus, which men say had been a stronghold of Phalaris … On the other side Agathocles held another of the strongholds that had belonged to Phalaris, the one which was called Phalarium after him.' See also La Torre 2010, 75–76; Lawrence 1979, 173. On the expansionist politics of Phalaris, see Miccichè 2006 with further bibliography. For an alternative interpretation, see Adornato 2012.

[109] Tréziny 2010, 560: 'Pour résumer ce rapide tour d'horizon, le terme φροȣριον n'apparaît dans la langue grecque qu'avec Thucydide, et ne se spécialise vraiment au sens de poste fortifié que dans la littérature

attique du IV^{e} s., sens qui se perpétue chez Polybe, ou, à l’époque impériale, chez Plutarque.’ In the sources of the 5th century, the term φροϭριον does not indicate a fortification but, as Tréziny 2010, 558 points out, the often-temporary stationing of a garrison. Such is, for example, the case during the Athenian attack on Syracuse, when the Syracusans stationed garrisons (φρουράς ἐσεκόμιζον) all around the city (Thuc. 6.45.1). For the term *phrourion* and its relation to the concept of the *polis*, see also Nielsen 2002 and Harris in this volume.

[110] For the territory of Licata and a short overview of its military and economic development from the 4th century onward, see Toscano Raffa 2017, 204–215.

[111] For the military outposts of the Greek mainland, see Fachard 2016; Lawrence 1979, 172–184; Munn 1993.

[112] Jonasch and Winterstein 2016; Jonasch *et al.* 2019.

[113] For example, Phyle or Aghios Nikolaos; *cf*. Fachard 2016, 216–218.

[114] Lawrence (1979, 176) estimates a crew of 260 men within the much larger 6th-century barracks in the fortress of Phylla (total size of 1.7 hectares). See also Fachard 2016, 218–219.

[115] Munn 1993, 26–29; van Wees 2004, 128–129.

[116] Four cisterns with a total storage capacity of ca. 100 m^3 would have allowed the soldiers to barricade themselves for quite a long time. The various *proteichismata* further kept potential aggressors at bay and provided the opportunity to conduct counter-attacks.

[117] For a detailed description of the excavations, see Jonasch *et al.* 2019. An interesting feature is the artillery platform on the western slope of the hill. We have argued elsewhere (Jonasch and Winterstein forthcoming) that the continuous evolution of catapult technology made the installation of a stable position for large calibre artillery worthwhile.

[118] The only coin found so far on the site is a bronze coin of the tyrant Hicetas (287–278 BC).

[119] For Rocchicella, see Pope 2014 and in this volume. Monte San Basilio is a smaller hilltop settlement of approximately 9 hectares with a large number of cave dwellings. A fortification was installed in the 6th century and rebuilt in the 4th; *cf*. Lagona 2001. On the site, Paolo Orsi discovered the burial of a warrior with pieces of armour dating to the 3rd century BC, as discussed in Orsi (1922) and Pope in this volume.

[120] Toscano Raffa 2017 with further bibliography.

[121] This narrative was developed and propagated mainly from the mid-20th century onwards (see Orlandini 1962). Decisive for the development of this perspective were the various accounts of hostile encounters between Greek migrants and local non-Greeks in the literary sources, as well as the need to explain the surprising success of Greek material culture and practices in many of the hilltop-settlements. On the

general problem, see also Fitzjohn 2007.

[122] Indigenous hilltop settlements become Greek *phrouria*, as argued by Fischer-Hansen 2002; Torrella 2014, 38–44; Panvini 2014.

[123] For a good overview, see Yntema 2000 and, more recently, Domínguez 2010.

[124] Although this certainly differs from region to region, a general increase in the visibility of hilltop sites may be noted; *cf*. Leighton 2000; Albanese Procelli 2003, 146; De Angelis 2016, 163–165.

[125] Zizza 2019.

[126] A significant demographic change happens in Butera towards the end of the 7th century BC, as discussed in Hoernes (forthcoming). For an analysis of Monte Bubbonia, whose monumental phase on the acropolis, dated to the advanced 6th century, implies a substantial development of the settlement in this period, see Pancucci and Narò 1992.

[127] Torella 2014, 41: 'Il Monte Bubbonia (…) occupa una posizione strategica a guardia della piana di Gela e dei territori orientali'. See also Panvini 2014, 377.

[128] Panvini 2003b, 43–50.

[129] Albanese Procelli 2003, 201–210; Domínguez 2010, 28–29.

[130] La Torre 2011a, 77; De Angelis 2016, 164–165.

[131] Hoernes forthcoming. We have no information, however, on the settlement area or other *necropoleis*.

[132] The pottery from the *necropoleis* and the acropolis of Monte Bubbonia shows a striking disruption between the end of the 5th and the 4th century BC, as discussed in Pancucci and Narò 1992.

[133] See note 10.

[134] See also Pope in this volume.

[135] A thorough discussion of the complex relationship between war and memory in the ancient world is presented in Franchi and Proietti 2015, 17–125. An overview of the variety of aspects in the material commemoration of war is given by Rice 1993 and Baitinger 2019.

[136] For thoughts on military defeat in ancient societies see Turner and Clark 2018.

[137] For a collection of evidence on the practice of setting up trophies on the battlefield, see Pritchett 1974a, 246–275. For the practice in general, see also Trundle 2013; Kinnee 2018.

[138] Baitinger 2013; 2019, 134–136.

[139] Antonetti and De Vido 2006.

[140] Shear 2016.

[141] See Amara in this volume and Adornato 2006.

[142] Rice 1993.

[143] As, for example, the tomb of Leonidas (Hdt. 7.225) or the mass burials of the Thebans at Chaironea (Paus. 9.40.10) noted in Rice (1993,

248) and Baitinger (2019, 132–133).

[144] Low 2003; Arrington 2011; Bérard 2014.

[145] Arrington 2011, 195: 'These lists and groups of lists are not humble stones, but defiant marks on the landscape that use defeat to signify strength and resilience by commemorating the event in monumental terms'.

[146] Paus. 1.29.22. See also Arrington 2011, 192.

[147] A particular case is the Athenian defeat in Syracuse, where the failure to bury the fallen comrades weighs heavily on the survivors' consciousness, as analysed by Steinbock in this volume.

[148] Diod. Sic. 13.61.6.

[149] Diod. Sic. 13.75.2–5.

[150] See Vassallo in this volume and Bérard 2014.

[151] One fascinating example is a pair of bronze greaves of an Iberic type that seems to have been neither grave goods nor a visible marker of a deliberate tomb, see Vassallo in this volume, Fig. 1.7. Vassallo (2014, 535) suggests them as part of a ritual celebration of the victory.

[152] Cirucci 2013, 134: '… the paradoxical concept of a conqueror conquered …'.

Chapter 13

Quanti templi per la vittoria di Himera? Nuove evidenze dall’Athenaion di Siracusa[1]

Giulio Amara

This paper investigates the impact that the battle of Himera had on the architectural culture of the main poleis *of Sicily, with particular attention to the archaeological context of the temple of Athena in Syracuse. The representation of victory and the affirmation of a new geopolitical order passes through material culture, through the reconfiguration of sacred spaces and the reworking of historical facts. The traditional identification of the Athenaion of Syracuse with one of the Temples of Victory erected by Gelon at the expense of the defeated is not based on any convincing literary reference. The excavations carried out a century ago around the temple of Athena identified a significant deposit of Panathenaic amphoras. The prize vases were discovered into the so-called Deinomenid backfill, an archaeological layer sealed during the Deinomenid tyranny in conjunction with the building of the temple of Athena. As for the* Perserschutt *on the Athenian Acropolis, the archaeological material from the backfill constitutes the* terminus post quem *for the building of the surviving temple of Athena. The investigation focuses on the following aspects: 1) (puzzling) identification of the temples of Victory between monumental remains and historiography; 2) reassessment of the historical, archaeological and* *architectural context of the Athenaion of Syracuse through material and monumental evidence; 3) assessment of the building programme promoted by the different* poleis *and tyrannies in order to celebrate the joint victory over the Carthaginians.*

Qualora si voglia indagare il contesto culturale e artistico della Sicilia tardo arcaica non si potrà eludere il ruolo fondamentale di un avvenimento militare: la vittoria sui Cartaginesi riportata da Siracusa e Agrigento. Il conflitto tra il blocco dorico e quello punico-calcidese[2] costituisce un punto di riferimento nella storiografia e nella ricerca archeologica. La vittoria di Himera rappresenta uno di quei casi esemplari in cui memoria e ideologia hanno condizionato la ricezione e la narrazione del fatto storico. Sin da subito il trionfo sui Cartaginesi viene celebrato *in pendant* con la vittoria dei Greci di madrepatria sui Persiani, rivendicando una lotta comune e panellenica per la libertà, così in Grecia come in Occidente.[3] Inoltre la storiografia antica ha ulteriormente avvalorato il parallelismo tra la vicenda siceliota e quella metropolitana: mentre la lega ellenica vinceva a Salamina e a Platea contro i Persiani, al contempo i Sicelioti respingevano il barbaro cartaginese a Himera.[4] La vittoria di Himera inoltre si inserisce in un periodo di profonde trasformazioni sociali, culturali e artistiche che accompagnano l'ascesa delle tirannidi tardo arcaiche in Sicilia. In questa prospettiva è opportuno riesaminare l'impatto che tale evento bellico ha avuto sulla cultura architettonica siceliota, con particolare attenzione agli interventi monumentali strettamente rivolti alla celebrazione della vittoria.[5] Fissato l'orizzonte cronologico del 480 a.C., l'architettura siceliota dell'età delle tirannidi è definita sulla base di analogie e differenze rispetto ai quei modelli architettonici che, si sostiene, siano stati realizzati all'indomani della celebre vittoria, tanto da indurre alla coniazione della consolidata espressione 'generazione di Himera'.[6] Quest'indirizzo di ricerca si è avvalso di due aspetti: da una parte la dimensione puramente storiografica, dall'altra l'evidenza materiale. Sebbene il rapporto tra questi due aspetti possa essere utile alla comprensione dei monumenti nella loro significatività storica, d'altro canto sembrano essere stati trascurati altri approcci altrettanto rilevanti. Due aspetti sono rimasti in secondo piano:

l'esame filologico sulla fonte e l'indagine sulle evidenze puramente archeologiche e stratigrafiche.[7] Lo sforzo di far convergere necessariamente il dato storiografico e l'evidenza archeologica ha prodotto modelli interpretativi spesso convincenti ma tuttavia parziali. Come vedremo innanzi, queste osservazioni varranno ancora di più qualora si vogliano individuare i cosiddetti templi della vittoria che la storiografia moderna attribuisce a Gelone e Terone e alla celebrazione del loro trionfo a Himera. L'identificazione dell'Athenaion di Siracusa con uno di questi monumenti può essere adesso esaminata anche alla luce di nuove evidenze materiali e considerazioni filologiche.

Tra storiografia e archeologia: alla ricerca dei templi della vittoria

Dopo il breve ma prezioso resoconto erodoteo,[8] il racconto di Diodoro Siculo costituisce la maggiore fonte storiografica in merito alla guerra imerese e alle opere celebrative promosse dai vincitori.[9] Interessante appare la digressione dedicata da Diodoro e dalle sue fonti alla situazione agrigentina all'indomani della battaglia. Il ruolo primario di Agrigento e di Terone viene confermato dai grandi benefici che la città trae dalla spartizione del bottino e degli schiavi:

> La maggior parte di questi diventarono schiavi pubblici, e furono costoro a cavare la pietra con cui non soltanto costruirono i più grandi templi per gli dei, ma anche condutture sotterranee per il deflusso delle acque dalla città, così imponenti che la loro struttura merita di essere vista nonostante si badi ben poco al fatto che sia stata costruita con pochissimo dispendio di risorse.[10]

Come è noto, la critica continua a dibattere su quale tempio agrigentino si nasconda dietro ai 'più grandi templi degli déi' menzionati da Diodoro. L'enigmatico tempio B di Agrigento, dedicato a Zeus Olympios,[11] costituisce l'indiziato principale. Se in termini generali si è concordi nell'attribuire la sua costruzione all'età della tirannide di Terone, il problema maggiore rimane se associarlo alla celebrazione di Himera. Sulla scorta di confronti stilistici interni, di accorgimenti architettonici e della grandiosa imponenza della struttura,[12] si è proposto di riconoscere nell'Olympieion il tempio colossale innalzato da Terone come monumento di vittoria sfruttando l'enorme manodopera servile.[13] In questa direzione, suggerita dalla lettura della fonte storiografica, ha contribuito anche l'esame delle valenze iconologiche e antibarbariche degli Atlanti e delle sculture frontonali.[14] D'altra parte la mancanza di evidenze risolutive ha condotto a letture che, escludendo una relazione diretta con la vittoria imerese, hanno riconosciuto nell'Olympieion e nel suo apparato figurativo uno strumento di legittimazione e consenso del potere tirannico,[15] anche attraverso l'esame dello spazio rituale.[16] Nel riscontrare la difficoltà di determinare un preciso movente politico all'origine del colossale edificio, sarà più opportuno essere prudenti nell'interpretazione della fonte storiografica,[17] ancor più se in assenza di dati stratigrafici. Perciò non si può escludere che la progettazione e l'avvio del cantiere si debbano alle esigenze politiche della tirannide appena insediatasi al potere. Questa prospettiva non esclude che la celebrazione della vittoria sui Cartaginesi, col conseguente impiego di abbondante manodopera, abbia contribuito in un secondo momento alla realizzazione dell'opera, conferendole ulteriori valenze ideologiche.[18]

Lasciando sullo sfondo l'Agrigento di Terone, spostiamoci nel territorio della Siracusa di Gelone, tentando di rintracciare le presunte realizzazioni promosse dal tiranno per celebrare la sua impresa. Di particolare interesse ancora una volta, il dialogo tra il racconto diodoreo e l'evidenza archeologica. All'indomani della battaglia, Gelone adorna i templi di Siracusa e Himera con la parte migliore del bottino;[19] successivamente costruisce[20] i templi illustri di Demetra e Kore e dà avvio all'erezione di un tempio di Demetra κατὰ τὴν Αἴτνην,[21] quando d'improvviso lo coglie la morte. Dove collocare questi monumenti? Il primo è stato spesso identificato con il santuario ctonio di Piazza della Vittoria a Siracusa,[22] sulla base di un passo successivo delle 'Storie'. Più avanti infatti, in concomitanza con l'assedio di Siracusa da parte del cartaginese Imilcone (396 a.C.), Diodoro menziona un santuario di Demetra e Kore in Acradina,[23] che la ricerca archeologica identifica con il *thesmophorion* rinvenuto in Piazza della Vittoria.[24] Tuttavia nulla prova che il presunto tempio costruito da Gelone col bottino della vittoria – la cui collocazione topografica non è specificata da Diodoro – coincida con lo stesso tempio di Acradina che sarà saccheggiato molto più tardi durante l'assedio di Imilcone.[25] Risulta evidente quanto può rivelarsi fuorviante il gioco combinatorio tra dato materiale e fonte letteraria.

Altrettanto controversa la menzione del tempio di Demetra κατὰ τὴν Αἴτνην: presso l'Etna,[26] o nella città di Etna? A fronte di un'indicazione topografica così enigmatica, convince maggiormente la collocazione del santuario nella città di Etna piuttosto che in un luogo indefinito nei pressi del vulcano. Se così fosse, potrebbe riferirsi soltanto alla città di Katane, rifondata da Ierone nel 477/6 a.C. con il nome di Aitna.[27] Saremmo così in presenza di un palese anacronismo che, tuttavia, si caricherebbe di interessanti significati storiografici: da una parte nasconderebbe il tentativo discreditare ulteriormente la figura negativa di Ierone negandogli la paternità del monumento e attribuendolo invece a Gelone;[28] oppure, al contrario, l'anacronismo intenderebbe legittimare il regime ieroniano attraverso un'opera già intrapresa dal fratello, esempio autorevole di *eusebeia.*[29]

Questo ci mette già in guardia dall'interpretare in maniera spesso disinvolta una tradizione storiografica tendente a celebrare la tirannide di Gelone in opposizione a quella del fratello. La scoperta del *thesmophorion* di Piazza San Francesco a Catania, con il suo ricco deposito votivo, ha spesso suggerito la sua identificazione con il tempio κατὰ τὴν Αἴτνην.[30] Alla luce della difficile interpretazione del passo diodoreo e in mancanza di una prova risolutiva, occorre ricordare che questa corrispondenza, pur suggestiva, risulta ipotetica.[31]

Consideriamo adesso il passo diodoreo più controverso. Dopo aver diviso il bottino tra gli alleati, Gelone riceve gli ambasciatori delle città sconfitte e infine anche la legazione punica:

> Dopo aver trattato con loro in maniera mite, strinse delle alleanze e mostrò umana benevolenza non soltanto verso costoro, ma anche verso i Cartaginesi suoi acerrimi nemici. Quando presso di lui giunsero gli ambasciatori mandati da Cartagine che in lacrime lo supplicavano di trattarli con umana benevolenza, egli assicurò loro la pace, esigette da loro la spesa che egli aveva sostenuto per affrontare la guerra, duemila talenti d'argento, e impose loro la costruzione di due templi in cui avrebbero collocato i trattati. I Cartaginesi, ottenendo inaspettatamente la salvezza, accettarono di rispettare queste condizioni e in aggiunta promisero una corona d'oro a Damarete, la

moglie di Gelone.[32]

Nel dibattito annoso su questo passo, è emerso immediatamente il problema della presunta localizzazione dei templi costruiti a spese degli sconfitti. I due edifici sono stati collocati genericamente uno a Cartagine, l'altro a Siracusa,[33] oppure entrambi a Cartagine[34] o entrambi a Siracusa.[35] Da ultimo è stata avanzata l'ipotesi che questi fossero da porre 'nelle due capitali delle rispettive tirannidi emmenide e dinomenide',[36] ossia Agrigento e Himera. Le ricerche condotte sul tempio dorico in contrada Buonfornello a Himera[37] (Fig. 13.1) diedero nuova materia di discussione: Pirro Marconi, riprendendo un'ipotesi avanzata prima da Salinas[38] e poi da Mauceri,[39] sostenne che il tempio fosse stato eretto per commemorare l'esito favorevole della battaglia di Himera.[40] Più specificamente il tempio – divenuto 'della Vittoria' – venne identificato proprio con uno dei due templi menzionati da Diodoro, innalzato dalle tirannidi proprio sul luogo della vittoria.[41] La svolta alla *vexata quaestio* è stata off erta dall'ipotesi di Pugliese Carratelli secondo cui, sulla scorta di Diodoro, Siracusa e Himera sarebbero state le sedi elette a ospitare i due monumenti di vittoria.[42] Dunque è bastato identificare il monumento siracusano più adatto ad affiancare il tempio imerese per convalidare così la testimonianza letteraria. Quale miglior candidato se non il cosiddetto Athenaion dorico di Siracusa, innalzato sull'acropoli isolana di Ortigia?[43] (Figs 13.1–13.2) Entrambi sembrano sperimentare simili soluzioni architettoniche: le proporzioni dello stilobate sono pressoché identiche; il numero delle colonne è il medesimo come simile è il loro diametro; i rapporti proporzionali tra metope e triglifi appare rispettato alla stessa maniera nei due edifici che, inoltre, mancano entrambi dell'*adyton*. Per la prima volta è realizzata la doppia contrazione angolare sui quattro lati, un momento decisivo verso la 'normalizzazione' dell'ordine dorico in Occidente. Le somiglianze planimetriche, dimensionali e progettuali tra i due templi hanno favorito la loro associazione al medesimo movente politico.



Figure 13.1. In alto: pianta del tempio di Atena a Siracusa (da Gullini 1985, tav. 12.5); in basso: pianta del tempio di contrada Buonfornello a Himera (da Gullini 1985, tav. 14.1).



*Figure 13.2. Siracusa, lato settentrionale dell'*Athenaion *inglobato dalle strutture del Duomo e l'adiacente piazza Minerva (© G. Amara).*

L'elaborazione di questo gemellaggio storico troverà la sua convalida nell'autorevolezza della fonte letteraria: la vittoria sui Cartaginesi sarebbe stata celebrata con la costruzione di due templi simili, uno in prossimità del luogo della battaglia, l'altro a Siracusa, il centro dell'*arché* dinomenide.[44] Questa doppia identificazione ha avuto una evidente ricaduta anche sulla cronologia del tempio siracusano. Domenico Lo Faso Pietrasanta, interpretando la notizia diodorea di un tale Agotocle costruttore di un Athenaion durante la reggenza dei *gamoroi*,[45] conclude ritenendo che 'è dunque fra il 500 ed il 495 che avvenne la edificazione del nostro tempio di Minerva; ed ove vogliasi questa ravvicinare all'ultimo termine, si vedrà com'ella risponda esattamente alla costruzione de'tempi più antichi di Selinunte'.[46] Secondo altri l'Athenaion commemorerebbe invece la caduta della tirannide dinomenide e, pertanto, la sua costruzione si collocherebbe tra il 466 e il 440 a.C.[47] Paolo Orsi, qualche decennio dopo, muovendo da considerazioni puramente archeologiche, rialzerà leggermente la cronologia al 474–460 a.C.[48] Facendo convergere dato archeologico e fonte storiografica, sarà la progressiva elaborazione del modello dei 'templi gemelli' a fissare la datazione dell'Athenaion siracusano al 480/70 a.C., agganciando l'evidenza materiale alla vittoria congiunta di Gelone e Terone.[49]

Nonostante sia stata infine prospettata l'impossibilità di identificare i due templi destinati a custodire i trattati di pace,[50] il gemellaggio politico, ideologico e architettonico tra il tempio imerese e quello siracusano risulta largamente condiviso in letteratura.[51] Il modello dei 'templi gemelli', malgrado i tentativi di svincolarlo dal riferimento al racconto diodoreo, continua a rimanere sostanzialmente orientato dalla lettura della fonte storiografica e dallo sforzo di associarle un'evidenza archeologica.[52]

Come vedremo, una disamina sgombra da pregiudizi mostra i punti deboli di un metodo che ha subordinato l'indagine archeologica a una premessa storiografica. Per tentare di sottrarci a questo gioco combinatorio tra evidenza architettonica e fonte scritta, risulta fruttuoso tornare a Diodoro e al passo già citato in merito alle condizioni di pace imposte da Gelone ai Cartaginesi.[53] Occorre considerare uno scolio alla Pitica II di Pindaro che, per via indiretta, offre preziose informazioni:

> Nell'opera Περὶ Τυρρηνῶν Teofrasto dichiara che loro [i Cartaginesi] cessarono di compiere sacrifici umani dopo che Gelone glielo aveva imposto; invece Timeo nel quattordicesimo libro scrisse che egli ordinò loro l'esazione di un risarcimento.[54]

È chiaro che la situazione a cui si riferiscono i *prostàgmata* di Gelone è quella successiva alla battaglia di Himera. Tralasciando ulteriori problematiche,[55] anche lo storico Timeo registra il pagamento di *chrémata* ai Siracusani, mentre non vi è traccia dei due famosi templi che saranno menzionati più tardi da Diodoro. In verità non sappiamo se la precedente versione di Timeo letta dallo scoliaste accogliesse ulteriori condizioni di pace, tuttavia non è da escludere che l'altra clausola del trattato tramandataci da Diodoro – costruire due templi in cui deporre i trattati[56] – fosse semplicemente assente. Per quale motivo lo scoliaste avrebbe taciuto di questa utile notizia, volendo opporre Timeo a Teofrasto, se egli ne fosse stato davvero al corrente? D'altro canto la notizia dei due monumenti da costruire a spese dei vinti non è presente in nessun'altra fonte antica. Se allarghiamo le nostre indagini al più ampio racconto offertoci da Diodoro, sorgono ulteriori sospetti. L'offerta di una corona d'oro a

Damarete da parte dei Cartaginesi e la conseguente coniazione del Damareteion, sono apparse notizie infondate,[57] eppure sono presentate nel medesimo passo in esame.[58] Rileggendo l'intera narrazione delle vicende siceliote e della battaglia di Himera emerge chiaramente la volontà storiografica di restituire un ritratto virtuoso del tiranno Gelone.[59] La sua grande capacità militare, il suo carisma e la sua astuzia emergono come qualità determinanti per l'esito positivo della guerra,[60] esaltate in maniera tanto iperbolica da oscurare il ruolo pur importante che Terone e il fratello Ierone dovevano aver svolto. Gelone è mosso da clemenza (ἐπιείκεια), generosità (εὔνοια) e benevolenza (ἀνθρωπίνη εὐτυχία), tutte virtù espresse nei riguardi degli alleati, dei Siracusani e soprattutto dei vinti. Più avanti, nei passi già esaminati, il ritratto storiografico si arricchisce di nuovi caratteri: la costruzione dei santuari *ctonii*, la dedica del tripode delfico e l'abbellimento di templi introducono, infatti, una dimensione religiosa. Insomma, la notizia dell'edificazione dei due templi per la custodia dei trattati si spiegherebbe meglio in questa prospettiva storiografica: elaborare e offrire un paradigma morale e politico che possa orientare l'agire umano. L'insistenza su questi caratteri risponderebbe alla volontà di plasmare il modello del tiranno pio verso i sudditi, verso i vinti e verso gli dei, costruttore e fondatore di un nuovo ordine.[61] Inoltre, la presunta costruzione dei due templi, segno monumentale della grande vittoria, sarebbe stata adeguatamente enfatizzata dalla storiografia filosiracusana. Eppure non è così: al contrario la notizia, non tramandata da nessun'altra fonte, risulta vaga, reticente, priva di qualsiasi dettaglio. Questo quadro così sospetto induce a dubitare della storicità stessa della notizia. Non si può escludere dunque che l'annosa ricerca dei due presunti monumenti di vittoria sia vana perché questi non furono mai costruiti.

Nuove evidenze archeologiche dall'Athenaion di Siracusa

Valutati i limiti di una lettura troppo positivistica della fonte storiografica attraverso cui è stata filtrata l'evidenza monumentale, occorre tornare a Siracusa e riconsiderare il contesto archeologico del tempio di Atena a Ortigia. È opportuno mettere in luce un aspetto che non ha goduto adeguata attenzione: a differenza di altri contesti, qui abbiamo preziose informazioni stratigrafiche e un ricco deposito di materiali archeologici.[62]

Le indagini condotte da Paolo Orsi (1910; 1912–17) nelle adiacenze del tempio dorico di Ortigia hanno permesso di riconoscere le fasi di frequentazione del sito a partire dal periodo pre-ellenico sino ai giorni nostri (Fig. 13.3)[63] Sia sul lato settentrionale (piazza Minerva) che su quello meridionale del tempio (Cortile dell'Arcivescovado), vennero alla luce le strutture di un vasto santuario arcaico, in uso già a partire dalla fine dell'VIII secolo a.C. (Fig. 13.4).[64]

Superiormente al livello greco arcaico, gli scavi individuarono un grande strato di riempimento e un livellamento di breccia calcarea[65] dovuto a una radicale riorganizzazione del *temenos*. Questa riforma edilizia deve aver comportato il seppellimento del santuario arcaico, il riempimento dell'area e la costruzione del nuovo tempio dorico.[66] Prezioso è il dato materiale proveniente da questa colmata – cosiddetta dinomenide – sigillata al di sotto dell'Athenaion. Oltre a pochi esemplari di ceramica attica a figure nere,[67] dagli scavi sul lato meridionale provengono al momento i materiali i più recenti della colmata e dunque più utili a determinare la cronologia

dello strato.[68] Si tratta di una concentrazione di frammenti di anfore panatenaiche e pseudopanatenaiche[69] riconducibili a un ricco deposito raccolto sotto il piano di calpestio coevo all'edificazione del tempio dorico (Fig. 13.5). Una stima quantitativa dell'intero deposito basata sul confronto degli esemplari figurati ha determinato un numero minimo di tredici e un massimo di quarantadue anfore differenti,[70] Non potendo in questa sede entrare nel merito di ciascun frammento, mi limiterò a esaminare un campione significativo.[71]


Tempio Ionico
A
B
Piazza Duomo
Piazza Minerva
Athenaion
D
C
Cortile Arcivescovado
N
0
10
40 m

Figure 13.3. Planimetria generale del santuario nell'area di piazza Duomo a Ortigia. A nord (Piazza Minerva) e a sud (Cortile Arcivescovado) dell'Athenaion: scavi Orsi. A est (Piazza Duomo): scavi Voza (rielaborato da Voza 1999, tavv. 1; 4).



Figure 13.4. Siracusa, gli scavi lungo Piazza Minerva: il santuario arcaico

visto da est (da Orsi 1918, tav. 5).

L’esemplare 01[72] appartiene al lato principale di un’anfora panatenaica (Fig. 13.5, 1). Esso conserva il busto di Atena incedente verso sinistra; il braccio sinistro, sovraddipinto in bianco, è sollevato a brandire la lancia; appena visibili il collo, l’acconciatura ricadente, il bordo dello scudo e, sulla destra, una delle due colonne che ne incorniciano la scena. La dea indossa un’egida accuratamente decorata: l’intera superficie a squame è ricoperta da minute incisioni a uncino. La scollatura è segnata da tre linee: le prime due delimitano una fascia con un’unica fila di incisioni a uncino, mentre la terza forma un’ulteriore bordura ornata da perline sovraddipinte di colore bianco. L’egida è similmente delimitata da tre fasce accostate: le due più strette e laterali sono ornate da perline bianche, mentre la fascia centrale più larga è risparmiata da ornamento. Come di consueto al tipo iconografico, alcuni serpenti cingono esternamente l’egida intrecciandosi l’uno con l’altro sino a formare cinque cerchi dai quali vengono fuori altrettante teste;[73] un altro serpente, di cui rimane solo una piccola porzione, s’innalza superiormente alla spalla sinistra. Inferiormente si conserva soltanto il chitone all’altezza dei glutei, con due pieghe ondulate ricadenti obliquamente verso il basso e qualche semplice decorazione a rosette sovraddipinte. L’esemplare, pur essendo parzialmente noto,[74] merita qualche puntualizzazione. La corpulenza della figura, la particolare resa dell’egida a squame e il vistoso motivo a perline richiamano la maniera del Pittore di Eucharides (Figs 13.6 e 13.7);[75] al contrario altri elementi – tra i quali l’assenza di cintura, il chitone smanicato privo di spalline, il bordo dell’egida priva dell’incisione ondulata – divergono dalla consuetudine di questa bottega.[76] La particolare resa delle teste dei serpentelli non trova al momento nessun confronto. Lo stile, pur nella sua peculiarità, è riconducibile a una bottega in attività tra il 500 e il 480/75 a.C., prossima all’esperienze dei pittori di Eucharides e di Kleophrades.


01
04
02
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0 1 2 3 4 5 cm

Figure 13.5. Anfore panatenaiche e pseudopanatenaiche dall'Athenaion di Siracusa, frammenti 1–12 (© Siracusa, Museo Archeologico Regionale)



Figure 13.6. Frammento di anfora pseudopanatenaica attribuita al Pittore di Eucharides. Atene, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Acropoli 932a (©D-DAI-ATH-AKROPOLIS-VASEN-0516).

Il frammento 02[77] presenta una porzione dello scudo di Atena (Fig. 13.5, 2). A sinistra si conserva un tratto del margine decorato da una sequenza di borchie rosse e minute, accostate all'unica incisione circolare interna. A destra rimane un avanzo dell'episema di colore bianco: due zampe anteriori equine, forse di Pegaso. La tipologia dell'episema, unitamente alla rifinitura a margine dello scudo, rimanda a un vaso che, sebbene attribuito alla cerchia del pittore Kleophrades,[78] mostra al contempo delle affinità con lo stile del Pittore di Berlino, la cui produzione si pone a partire dal 480 a.C.[79] Al medesimo artista rimanda anche il confronto con un frammento dall'acropoli ateniese (Fig. 13.8) attribuito al celebre ceramografo.[80] Nonostante l'assenza del suo consueto episema a *gorgoneion*, la rifinitura dello scudo è familiare con la maniera del Pittore di Berlino.[81]



Figure 13.7. Frammenti di anfore pseudopanatenaiche attribuite al Pittore di Eucharides. Atene, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, a sinistra: Acropoli 938; a destra: Acropoli 935 (©D-DAI-ATH-AKROPOLIS-VASEN-0213/0521).

Il frammento 03[82] presenta la porzione centrale della dea incedente, secondo il motivo del tipo panatenaico (Fig. 13.5, 3). L'egida ha una superficie squamata con minute incisioni a uncino; l'orlo consta di una fascia interna ornata da perline bianche, mentre lungo la fascia esterna corre una linea ondulata. Lo scudo conserva delle borchie rosse sovraddipinte lungo il margine esterno, mentre all'interno presenta un episema a forma di serpente. Il chitone ricadente e stretto da una cintura; il panneggio è lineare, con semplici decorazioni a piccole macchie rosse sovraddipinte. Alcuni caratteri distintivi permettono un'attribuzione alla bottega del Pittore di Eucharides (Figs 13.6, 13.8 e 13.9): l'episema, la decorazione dell'orlo e della superficie dell'egida, l'articolazione dei serpentelli.[83]

L'esemplare 04[84] mostra l'orlo inferiore del chitone della dea Atena (Fig. 13.5, 4): il motivo a girali delimitato da una bordura di perline bianche sovraddipinte[85] richiamano puntualmente due esemplari dall'acropoli ateniese ricondotti all'*atelier* del Pittore di Eucharides [86]

L'esemplare 05[87] appartiene al lato principale di un'anfora di tipo panatenaico (Fig. 13.5, 5). La dea brandisce uno scudo delimitato da borchie rosse; l'orlo dell'egida è tripartito da due fasce laterali con perline bianche e da una banda laterale lungo cui corre una linea ondulata. La dea indossa una cintura rossa e un chitone decorato: rosette con sovraddipinture bianche, croci uncinate ricurve, semplici incisioni arcuate. I migliori confronti risultano alcuni frammenti dall'acropoli ateniese attribuiti tutti al Pittore di Eucharides,[88] ove ricorre la medesima e peculiare decorazione dell'orlo dell'egida, del chitone e la presenza della cintura (Figs 13.6 e 13.7).

Il piccolo frammento 06[89] conserva un avanzo dello scudo di Atena di cui è ancora visibile il bordo e una porzione dell'episema con serpente bianco sovraddipinto (Fig. 13.5, 6). Due perline bianche sono ciò che rimane dell'orlo dell'egida, appena visibile in basso. Il motivo del serpente, oltre ad essere molto comune durante i primi decenni del V secolo a.C., risulta una peculiarità associata generalmente alla maniera del Pittore di Eucharides.[90] In questo senso indirizzano anche la doppia incisione circolare lungo il bordo interno dello scudo e il motivo decorativo dell'orlo dell'egida.[91] Al lato secondario del medesimo vaso potrebbe appartenere, sulla base dello spessore della parete e dello stile, anche un altro piccolo frammento[92] con la mano di un auriga stretta alle redini (Fig. 13.5, 7).



Figure 13.8. Frammento di anfora panatenaica attribuita al Pittore di Berlino. Atene, MAN, Acropoli 981 (D-DAI-ATH-AKROPOLIS-VASEN-0223).

Il meraviglioso frammento 08[93] conserva una testa maschile barbuta (Fig. 13.5, 8). I capelli sono tirati indietro dal vento ed è ancora visibile la porzione del lungo chitone bianco. La figura è riconoscibile come un auriga. Un confronto stringente è costituito da un esemplare dall'Acropoli di Atene attribuito al Pittore di Eucharides (Fig. 13.11).[94] Non soltanto l'occhio, ma soprattutto l'orecchio è identico nei due esemplari a confronto. Queste ultime rientrano nello stile di questo pittore: due cerchi concentrici e due parentesi chiuse a formare il lobo.[95] Sulla base dello spessore, dello stile e della particolare colorazione del corpo ceramico ritengo di poter associare al medesimo vaso anche i frammenti 09–12 (Fig. 13.5, 9–12).[96] Perciò questo potrebbe essere il lato secondario di una panatenaica del Pittore di Eucharides con la scena di una quadriga in corsa (Fig. 13.12). Quest'attribuzione risulta ancora più preziosa dal momento che dallo stesso atelier sembra provenire solamente un altro esemplare con la medesima raffigurazione, anch'esso dall'acropoli di Atene.[97]



*Figure 13.9. Frammento di anfora panatenaica attribuita al Pittore di Eucharides dall’*Heraion *di Samo. Vathi, Museo Archeologico K 7443 (©D-DAI-ATH-1998-0013, Foto: K.-V. von Eickstedt).*

Quali informazioni possiamo trarre dall’evidenza materiale? Anzitutto l’eccezionalità del deposito panatenaico siracusano costituisce un indizio a favore della tradizionale dedica del tempio alla dea Atena.[98] Per quanto concerne il processo deposizionale, non sappiamo quando queste anfore siano state deposte, né tanto meno il momento esatto in cui lo strato di riempimento sia stato sigillato; tuttavia ci è nota la cronologia della loro produzione. Considerando i numerosi frammenti figurati, le anfore siracusane sono state prodotte in un arco temporale che va dalla fine del VI secolo a.C. al

480/75 a.C., con una concentrazione delle attestazioni durante il primo quarto del V secolo a.C.[99] Dall'indagine condotta sull'intero deposito, emerge una considerazione: la presenza significativa di anfore prodotte dal medesimo *atelier*, quello ascritto al cosiddetto Pittore di Eucharides.[100] Questo ceramografo, attivo tra il 500 e il 475 a.C., costituisce uno degli ultimi pittori così versatili da padroneggiare con risultati felici sia la tradizionale tecnica a figure nere che la nuova a figure rosse. In termini generali, il maggiore sbocco della sua produzione non è la Sicilia, bensì l'Etruria tirrenica e padana.[101] Sulla base di queste considerazioni, la sua presenza in Sicilia e in un contesto così peculiare appare un fatto significativo. Inoltre, non sembra casuale che i confronti più adeguati per gli esemplari siracusani provengano dall'acropoli di Atene ove si registra la massima concentrazione di esemplari attribuiti a questa bottega: si tratta di frammenti tutti pertinenti ad anfore 'pseudopanatenaiche', ossia di dimensioni minori e prive della consueta iscrizione sul lato principale.[102] Sulla base di considerazioni storiche, stilistiche e contestuali è stata avanzata l'ipotesi secondo cui la bottega del Pittore di Eucharides abbia portato a termine un'unica commissione di anfore panatenaiche durante i difficili anni dell'invasione persiana.[103] La particolare ricorrenza sull'acropoli ateniese di panatenaiche prive della consueta iscrizione e di dimensioni ridotte risponderebbe così alle gravi difficoltà e pressioni a cui far fronte durante questo periodo.[104] Dunque, l'omogeneità formale degli esemplari superstiti ha indotto a collocare intorno al 480 a.C. l'intera produzione panatenaica di questo *atelier*.[105] È possibile dunque che anche le anfore siracusane siano state prodotte nei medesimi anni e nelle stesse circostanze storiche ed economiche? Stando a questi presupposti, si può ipotizzare con cautela che questi vasi siano giunti in Occidente e deposti ben dopo le Grandi Panatenee del 478/7 a.C.,[106] prima che l'area sacra venisse riconfigurata e colmata per la fondazione del nuovo tempio siracusano. È interessante notare che i frammenti panatenaici ateniesi non provengono da un vero *Perserschutt*, bensì da una colmata – quella del lato sud del Partenone – considerata ben posteriore al sacco persiano.[107] Pertanto, sebbene la provenienza esatta dei frammenti ateniesi non sia determinabile, il loro ampio contesto archeologico non esclude che il Pittore di Eucharides sia stato ancora attivo tra il 480 e il 470 a.C.[108] Inoltre, è da ricordare che il frammento 02 (Fig. 13.5, 2) – attribuito alla maniera del Pittore di Kleophrades – presenta forti affinità con le panatenaiche del Pittore di Berlino, successive al 480 a.C.



Figure 13.10. Frammenti di anfora pseudopanatenaica attribuita al Pittore di Eucharides. Atene, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Acropoli 932b-c (©D-DAI-ATH-AKROPOLIS-VASEN-0516).



Figure 13.11. Frammento di anfora panatenaica attribuita al Pittore di Eucharides. Atene, MAN, Acropoli 958 (©D-DAI-ATH-AKROPOLIS-VASEN-0214).

Un ultimo punto merita una riflessione. I numerosi frammenti di anfore panatenaiche[109] dal riempimento dinomenide sottostante all'Athenaion siracusano arricchiscono sensibilmente il quadro delle evidenze siceliote e magnogreche. Sebbene il quadro della diffusione sia destinato ad ampliarsi, non sono affatto numerose le aree di culto in Sicilia[110] e Magna Grecia[111] ad aver restituito frammenti di anfore premiali. Alla luce di questo quadro preliminare, il deposito siracusano assume una rilevanza ancora maggiore: al momento l'Athenaion di Siracusa, insieme al santuario della sorgente di Saturo, costituisce l'area cultuale in Magna Grecia e in Sicilia in cui l'evidenza di anfore panatenaiche e pseudopanatenaiche risulta massiccia. In via preliminare è opportuno proporre qualche possibile interpretazione del deposito siracusano. Si può pensare che questi vasi siano stati dedicati in un lungo periodo di tempo per poi essere raccolti e deposti al momento dello sgombero del santuario arcaico.[112] D'altra parte si potrebbe anche ritenere, per la grande concentrazione e l'eccezionalità degli esemplari, che si tratti di un vero e proprio deposito di fondazione del tempio, forse in relazione diretta con l'attività della tirannide dinomenide.



Figure 13.12. Anfora panatenaica, ricostruzione del lato secondario dai frr. 8–12. Elaborazione grafica a cura dell'autore.



Figure 13.13. In alto a sinistra: Himera, Antiquarium, protome leonina A dal tempio di contrada Buonfornello (lato sud). In alto a destra: Himera, Antiquarium, protome leonina M dal tempio di contrada Buonfornello (lato nord). In basso a sinistra: Agrigento, Museo Archeologico Regionale, protome leonina dal tempio C (da Mertens-Horn 1988, tavv. 22, 29, 35, Foto: D. Mertens). In basso a destra: Siracusa, Museo Archeologico Regionale, protome leonina A dal tempio di Atena in Ortigia (da Marconi 1926/27, fig. 9).

Riconsiderare la 'generazione di Himera'

A fronte di un quadro spesso presentato in maniera troppo omogenea, risulterebbe più proficuo tentare di rintracciare il contesto artigianale e artistico in cui si colloca il monumento siracusano, espressione eloquente di una stagione di profonde sperimentazioni for-mali. Accanto alle assonanze progettuali, più volte e autorevolmente sono state messe in luce le considerevoli divergenze esecutive tra i due peripteri siracusano e imerese.[113] A queste differenze si aggiungerebbe un elemento sin ora trascurato: l'Athenaion siracusano doveva essere ipetro, come dimostrerebbe la presenza di un foro di scarico nelle fondazioni e di un grande canale di deflusso delle acque intercettato da Orsi.[114] Peraltro il monumento siracusano era dotato di sime, di acroteri e di una copertura in marmo pario – a fronte del calcare locale per l'edificio imerese – una straordinaria peculiarità che tradisce probabilmente l'intervento di maestranze cicladiche.[115]



Figure 13.14. A sinistra: Agrigento, Museo Archeologico Regionale, grondaia a protome leonina (da Mertens-Horn 1988, nr. 15, tav. 24C, Foto: D. Mertens). A destra: Gela, Museo Archeologico Regionale, grondaia a protome leonina da Butera (da Mertens-Horn 1988, nr. 22, tav. 28, Foto: D. Mertens).

L'esame comparato dei sette doccioni leonini della sima marmorea dell'Athenaion siracusano potrà offrire nuove prospettive di riflessione. La loro affinità formale con le protomi leonine della sima meridionale del tempio di Himera è stata esibita a ulteriore sostegno dell'affinità tra i due edifici sacri (Fig. 13.13).[116] A un esame più accurato, sebbene entrambi i tipi ricalchino il medesimo schema decorativo, emergono alcuni differenze: le protomi leonine siracusane sono più piccole e sporgenti; la giubba è appiattita e flessuosa; il solco sulla fronte e l'estremità del muso sono più marcate; gli occhi sono più allungati e superficiali; gli effetti chiaroscurali sono attenuati a favore di un modellato più morbido e meno stilizzato; l'intento decorativo sembra cedere il passo al naturalismo.[117] Anche dal confronto con i doccioni del tempio C di Agrigento, datato generalmente tra il 490 e il 470 a.C.,[118] emergono le specificità delle protomi siracusane (Fig. 13.13). Al contempo la testa leonina inedita da Agrigento e la protome rinvenuta a Butera, presso Gela,[119] forniscono dei confronti altrettanto interessanti e puntuali (Fig. 13.14). Insomma, i leoni siracusani, pur nella loro peculiarità, rispondono a un linguaggio locale e diffuso che non è riconducibile esclusivamente all'esperienza agrigentino-imerese. Al contrario, la morbidezza plastica del modellato, la resa più naturale dei dettagli e l'atteggiamento più ponderato dei leoni siracusani potrebbero suggerire una cronologia più recente rispetto sia alle grondaie del tempio di Himera che a quelle del tempio C di Agrigento.

Così come per i doccioni a protome leonina, altrove sono state riconosciute simili analogie formali e progettuali. Anche il tempio C di Gela, i templi agrigentini C ed E presentano rapporti proporzionali assimilabili a quelli dei due templi gemelli, quello siracusano e quello imerese.[120] Di recente si è ancora affermato che la vittoria di Himera è stata celebrata 'con la costruzione di quattro templi gemelli, tutti dedicati ad Atena: uno sul luogo della vittoria e gli altri tre sulle acropoli delle tre città protagoniste dell'impresa: Siracusa, Gela, Agrigento'.[121] Da ultimo, l'Athenaion di Siracusa ha trovato nell'Heraion crotoniate di Capo Lacinio un gemello ancora più stretto in molteplici accorgimenti progettuali ed esecutivi che, al contempo, rinviano a modelli metropolitani mediati da maestranze itineranti.[122] Da tale approccio rivolto agli apporti esterni rimarrebbero però in secondo piano le modalità di trasmissione del presunto modello siracusano a quella rete di edifici templari appena menzionati e, dunque, anche al tempio imerese. D'innanzi a un quadro così complesso, sarebbe più opportuno riconsiderare il contributo eterogeneo delle tradizioni architettoniche siceliote le quali, parallelamente all'apporto metropolitano, hanno favorito una stagione di sperimentazioni formali di cui l'Athenaion siracusano costituisce una delle espressioni più eloquenti. Il tempio A di Apollo ad Agrigento,[123] datato tra la fine del VI e i primi decenni del V secolo a.C., si qualifica – lungi dal seguire una linea evolutiva – come anello di congiunzione tra il protodorico selinuntino, il periptero imerese[124] e l'Athenaion siracusano. Accanto a soluzioni retrospettive di tradizione arcaica, esso anticipa alcune sperimentazioni architettoniche che matureranno successivamente: le pareti laterali del *naos* risultano allineati con gli assi delle seconde colonne della fronte, secondo un principio che troviamo rispettato a Siracusa e non a Himera; si riscontrano correzioni ottiche nell'inclinazione dello stilobate,[125] presenti a Siracusa e assenti a Himera; è applicata la contrazione angolare solo sulle fronti; l'*adyton* viene già sostituito dall'*opisthodomos* mentre il *naos* viene allargato a svantaggio delle peristasi laterali; l'echino dei capitelli, teso e saliente, prelude già a quello del tempio siracusano mentre la sima presenta i primi gocciolatoi leonini in pietra noti in Sicilia. Alla luce di queste considerazioni, sarà metodologicamente opportuno indagare le sperimentazioni formali dell'Athenaion siracusano nella maturazione graduale di un linguaggio condiviso e locale al quale appartiene. Tale tradizione di cantiere aveva già elaborato consapevolmente, certamente stimolata e arricchita da modelli allogeni, nuove soluzioni architettoniche secondo forme, materiali e tempi differenti. Altrimenti risulterebbe difficilmente spiegabile l'ampio spettro di varianti esecutive riferibili al medesimo paradigma architettonico: l'Athenaion di Siracusa, il tempio C di Gela, il tempio dorico di Himera, il tempio C e il tempio E di Agrigento, il tempio di Hera Lacinia a Crotone.

A ben vedere il vincolo progettuale e storico tra i due templi di Siracusa e di Himera risulta opinabile,[126] mentre la ricerca di un paradigma architettonico unico si dissolve in un quadro ben più articolato che non può essere appiattito né su un unico evento politico né sulla adozione passiva di un unico modello importato dalla madrepatria.

Conclusioni

Dall'esame comparato di evidenza archeologica, monumentale e storiografica possiamo dunque avanzare un bilancio dei programmi edilizi promossi dalle rispettive *poleis* e tirannidi a celebrazione della vittoria congiunta sui Cartaginesi. Insomma, stando alla dettagliata digressione diodorea e alle emergenze archeologiche, gli agrigentini investono i proventi della vittoria per adornare la loro città e la loro *chora*, interessandosi soprattutto a grandi opere di edilizia pubblica.[127] L'idea che il tempio di Zeus Olimpio costituisca uno di questi monumenti di vittoria rimane un'ipotesi probabile, ma non priva di dubbi. L'esplosione edilizia attestata durante la reggenza emmenide – cui sembra appartenere anche l'Olympieion – è l'espressione di un più ampio periodo di ricchezza. Agrigento non soltanto espande il suo dominio verso la limitrofa Selinunte ma, con il mantenimento di Himera, realizza infine quella proiezione territoriale verso il Tirreno già espressa da Falaride.[128] Si registra senza dubbio un momento di grande benessere per Agrigento: da una parte la città si assicura lo sbocco commerciale sul Tirreno, d'altra impiega le risorse per lo sfruttamento della sua fertile *chora* attraverso la costruzione di grandi infrastrutture idrauliche. Il resoconto diodoreo, intento a presentare Siracusa come assoluta protagonista del conflitto e unica risolutrice della pace,[129] ridimensiona l'effettivo ruolo che Agrigento deve avere svolto. In questa prospettiva anche il quadro di prosperità appena delineato andrebbe adeguatamente rivalutato positivamente.[130]

La Siracusa di Gelone sembra aver risposto in un'altra maniera alla vittoria imerese. La prima necessità del tiranno deve essere stata quella di retribuire il grande numero di mercenari, una forza che, se non adeguatamente ricompensata, avrebbe potuto costituire un grave pericolo. Gli ex-mercenari dell'esercito geloniano non sono gli unici a necessitare di una sistemazione:[131] il tiranno aveva già realizzato un grande piano di allargamento e rincalzo del corpo civico mediante il trapianto a Siracusa di popolazione da alcuni centri limitrofi.[132] La rifondazione di Siracusa, iniziata a partire dal 485 a.C., non richiedeva soltanto una riforma istituzionale, ma anche un piano graduale di ampliamento dello spazio insediativo e di costruzione di infrastrutture in grado di servire una maggiore popolazione. Dunque, all'indomani dello scontro con Cartagine, la riorganizzazione urbana e della *chora* doveva essere ancora una delle esigenze prioritarie. L'evidenza raccolta dal materiale archeologico dell'Athenaion offre nuovi motivi di riflessione: se da una parte essa consente di attribuire con sicurezza il monumento alla tirannide dinomenide, d'altro canto lascia praticabile la possibilità che l'avvio della sua costruzione non sia connessa né a Gelone né alla celebrazione della vittoria di Himera.[133] Riabilitando una proposta di Orsi, sosteniamo che la costruzione del tempio e la riconfigurazione edilizia dell'area siano avvenuti ben dopo il 478 a.C., durante gli anni della reggenza del secondo dinomenide.[134] Le recenti indagini archeologiche condotte presso il limitrofo tempio ionico – collocato immediatamente a nord di Piazza Minerva (Fig. 13.3) – rendono opportuna e preferibile tale revisione archeologica e cronologica dell'Athenaion.[135] Inoltre, pur riconoscendone l'esecuzione effettiva sotto Ierone, non ci sarebbe alcuna ragione per ricondurre forzatamente il momento della sua progettazione a Gelone e alla commemorazione della vittoria di Himera. La politica estera di Siracusa avverte un netto cambio di passo proprio durante l'*arché* ieroniana:[136] gli interventi di Ierone prima in difesa della Locride e dopo della Sibaritide, ma soprattutto la vittoria navale di Cuma riportata sulla flotta etrusca (474/3 a.C.), impongono Siracusa come la maggiore potenza del Tirreno meridionale.[137] Qualora si accogliesse la cronologia bassa per la cosiddetta 'Massenprägung' delle emissioni monetali siracusane,[138] si farebbe ancora più nitida la cifra dell'opulenza della Siracusa ieroniana. L'impiego del prezioso marmo insulare per la copertura,[139] gli acroteri e le sime con doccioni a protome leonina si spiega meglio in questa temperie, successiva al trionfo sugli Etruschi. La riorganizzazione del santuario arcaico e la costruzione del nuovo tempio dorico costituiscono un elemento assai dirompente nel paesaggio urbano dell'acropoli siracusana. Se da una parte questo intervento è reso possibile dall'ampia disponibilità di risorse materiali e artigianali, d'altra parte esso rivela ancora una volta l'impegno di Ierone, *basilèus Syrakòsios*,[140] nel celebrare la propria grandezza e la magnificenza di Siracusa.[141] Quanti templi per la vittoria di Himera? La ricerca di un paradigma unico si dissolve in un quadro geo-politico e monumentale ben più articolato di quello desumibile dal racconto diodoreo, le cui ragioni non possono appiattirsi sulla celebrazione contemporanea del medesimo evento. Sembra arbitrario associare meccanicamente alla celebrazione della vittoria su Cartagine quella presunta rete di templi gemelli; al contrario essa testimonia l'elaborazione di un linguaggio architettonico condiviso il quale, certamente arricchito e favorito da apporti allogeni, si esprime sotto forme e tempi differenti. Le osservazioni sui gocciolatoi figurati e le divergenze architettoniche tra i due templi di Siracusa e Himera – qui presentate in via preliminare – rivelano la loro appartenenza a una tradizione artistico-artigianale ampia e diffusa che supera e risolve il dualismo siracusano-imerese. Le evidenti corrispondenze tra i due edifici non necessitano di essere spiegate né con un vincolo progettuale, né tanto meno con un gemellaggio politico e ideologico. L'assenza di qualsiasi evidenza archeologica induce ad accantonare definitivamente sia la ricerca dei due templi innalzati a spese dei Cartaginesi, sia la cosiddetta teoria dei 'templi gemelli'. Di conseguenza sarà anche possibile sganciare il tempio di Ortigia dal racconto di Diodoro, il quale presenta una sequenza troppo compressa di avvenimenti e realizzazioni. Questa ipotesi sostiene la proposta convincente di dissociare dalla vittoria imerese anche la base e il tripode dedicati da Gelone a Delfi.[142] Allo stesso tempo va ribadito che al momento i templi di Demetra a Siracusa e di Demetra e Kore κατὰ τὴν Αἴτνην, menzionati dallo storiografo, non trovano nessuna verifica archeologica sicura. Più probabile invece che 'Gelone e i Siracusani' abbiano innalzato un *thesauros* a Olimpia, a celebrazione panellenica del trionfo sui Cartaginesi.[143] Questa revisione del contesto politico e sociale dell'Athenaion siracusano, suffragata dall'evidenza stratigrafica e archeologica, offre nuovi spunti di riflessione sull'età delle tirannidi tardo arcaiche, un momento cruciale per la storia culturale, artistica e sociale dell'Occidente greco. Emerge così la possibilità di svincolare questi monumenti da un'unica e rigida finalità ideologica, di riscattarli da una tradizione che, in ossequio a una durevole storiografia filogeloniana, li ha appiattiti nella celebrazione di un unico evento luminoso, quello della vittoria ellenica sul barbaro 'lungo la sponda salubre dell'Imera'.[144]

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[1] Il presente contributo scaturisce dallo studio condotto per il conseguimento del Diploma di licenza presso la Scuola Superiore dell’Università degli Studi di Catania nel mese di giugno 2017: vorrei ringraziare sentitamente G. Adornato, D. Malfitana, J. Neils per il sostegno e le preziose indicazioni. Ringrazio inoltre M. Musumeci e A.M. Manenti per avermi permesso di studiare i materiali qui presentati. La mia riconoscenza va inoltre verso coloro con cui ho avuto la possibilità preziosa di discutere di tematiche siracusane: R. Amato, N. Bookidis, G. Cacciaguerra, C. Ciurcina, A. Corretti, M. Costanzi, F. D’Andrea, F. De Angelis, J. Harris, M. Jonasch, C. Michelini, C. Pfaff, S. Pope, G. Rignanese, D. Scahill, I. Tzonou, S. Vassallo, G. Voza, A. Ward, A. Ziskowski. Infine un ringraziamento particolare a P. Sapirstein per aver contribuito con preziosi suggerimenti alla revisione di questo articolo.

[2] Tra gli alleati di Cartagine sono annoverati i Reggini di Anassilao in Hdt. 7.165, e i Selinuntini in Diod. Sic. 11.21.

[3] Pind. *Pyth.* 1.71–80; Hdt. 7, 165–166; Arist. *Po*. 1459a; Diod. Sic. 11.20–26. Le motivazioni di questa operazione ideologica, confluita nella storiografia antica, sono da ricercare nell’esigenza di legittimare il potere tirannico e il nuovo equilibrio politico stabilitosi all’indomani della battaglia. Dunbabin 1945, 422–423; Gauthier 1966; Bruno 1972/74; Asheri 1988; 1991/92, 57–60; Sartori 1992, 90–93; Bravo 1993; Luraghi1994, 362–368; Musti 1995, 7–8; Adornato 2006; Consoli 2008, 48–50; Evans 2016, 24–46.

[4] La cronologia della battaglia di Imera risulta controversa. Per una cronologia di qualche anno precedente al 480 a.C. si rimanda a Holm 1870, 416–417; Beloch 1914, 72; Mazzarino 1955, 60; Lo Cascio 1973/74, 227. Al contrario la maggior parte della critica propende per la cronologia tradizionale o solo di poco più recente: Freeman 1891, 514–515; Pareti 1914, 120–122; Bravo 1993, 61–63; Luraghi 1994, 367.

[5] Quest’ambito d’indagine è stato sin ora variamente affrontata da alcuni studiosi, i quali hanno calato il fenomeno in politica urbanistica delle tirannidi: Van Compernolle 1989; Gras 1990; Van Compernolle 1992. Per quanto riguarda il rapporto tra regime tirannico, architettura e sviluppo urbano: Ampolo 1973; Martin 1974; Shapiro1989.

[6] Gullini 1985, 455.

[7] Adornato 2006.

[8] Hdt. 7.153–166.

[9] Diod. Sic. 11.20–26.

[10] Diod. Sic. 11.25.3–4: Πλείστων δὲ εἰς τὸ δημόσιον ἀνενεχθέντων, οὗτοι μὲν τοὺς λίθους ἔτεμνον, ἐξ ὧν οὐ μόνον οἱ μέγιστοι τῶν θεῶν ναοὶ κατεσκευάσθησαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὑδάτων ἐκτῆς πόλεως ἐκροὰς ὑπόνομοι κατεσκευάσθησαν τηλικοῦτοι τὸ μέγεθος, ὥστε ἀξιοθέατον εἶναι τὸ κατασκεδασμα, καίπερ διὰ τὴν εὐτέλειαν

καταφρονοϭμενον. ἐπιστάτης δὲ γενόμενος τοϭτων τῶν ἔργων ὁ προσαγορευόμενος Φαίαξ διὰ τὴν δόξαν τοῦ κατασκευάσματος ἐποίησεν ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ κληθῆναι τοὺς ὑπονόμους φαίακας. Κατεσκεϭασαν δὲ οἱ Ἀκραγαντῖνοι καὶ κολυμβήθραν πολυτελῆ, τὴν περί μετρον ἔχουσαν σταδίων ἑπτά, τὸ δὲ βάθος πηχῶν εἴκοσι. εἰς δὲ ταϭτην ἐπαγομένων ποταμίων καὶ κρηναίων ὑδάτων ἰχθυοτροφεῖον ἐγένετο πολλοὺς παρεχόμενον ἰχθῦς εἰς τροφὴν καὶ ἀπόλαυσιν.

[11] L’attribuzione è condotta sulla descrizione dettagliata offerta da Diod. Sic. 13.82 e Polyb. 9.27. Sul tempio B di Agrigento si veda: Koldewey e Puchstein 1899, 153–166; Marconi 1929b; Dinsmoor 1950, 101–105; Holloway 1991, 117–119; Broucke 1996; Vonderstein 2000; Mertens 2006, 261–266; Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 398–401.

[12] Diod. Sic. 13.82.

[13] Koldewey e Puchstein 1899, 153–166; Pace 1922, 178–180; Marconi 1929a, 154; Drerup 1940, 379–387; Dunbabin 1948, 429–430; De Waele 1971, 187–188; 1980, 202; Van Compernolle 1989; 1992; Broucke 1996, 318–324; Mertens 2006, 261–266; Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 398–401; Consoli 2008, 47; Miles 2013, 149–150.

[14] Griffo 1982; Marconi 1997; Vonderstein 2000; 2006; Adornato 2011, 114. *Contra*: Holloway 1991, 119.

[15] Bell 1980, 371–372. Vonderstein (2000, 72; 2006, 178–179) propongono per l’inizio del cantiere una cronologia anteriore alla battaglia di Himera e in corrispondenza con i primi anni della reggenza di Terone. Dinsmoor (1950, 101) suggerisce una datazione ben più alta, alla fine del VI secolo a.C.

[16] Marconi 2012.

[17] Diod. Sic. 11.25.3.

[18] Bell 1980; Marconi 1997; De Angelis 2016, 106.

[19] Diod. Sic. 11.25.1.

[20] Diodoro utilizza il verbo κατασκευάζειν in riferimento a entrambi i templi. Gras (1990, 59) interpreta questo verbo non nel significato di ‘construire’ ma in quello di ‘équiper’. Convincenti risultano le obiezioni mosse da Bravo (1991/94, 165) e Luraghi (1994, 318) per cui si dovrà accogliere il tradizionale significato di ‘costruire’, così come risulta evidente in McDougall 1983, s.v. κατασκευάζειν.

[21] Diod. Sic. 11.26.7. Il santuario, forse soltanto progettato da Gelone, dovette essere realizzato infine dal fratello Ierone. Galvagno 2001, 474–476.

[22] Voza 1976/77, 557–559; 1984/85, 674; Gras 1990, 60; Van Compernolle 1992, 67–68; Luraghi 1994, 318; Hinz 1998, 102–107; Mertens 2006, 312.

[23] Diod. Sic. 14.63.1: Κατελάβετο δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς προάστειον, καὶ τοὺς νεὼς τῆς τε Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ἐσϭλησεν.

Diod. Sic. 14.70.4: Καρχηδονίοις δὲ μετὰ τὴν κατάληψιν τοῦ προαστείου καὶ τὴν σϭλησιν τοῦ τε τῆς Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ἱεροῦ ἐν έπεσεν εἰς τὸ στράτευμα νόσος.

[24] Tale ipotesi è stata rigettata da alcuni: l’area sacra di Piazza della Vittoria doveva essere all’interno delle mura, dunque al riparo dall’assedio di Imilcone; ne seguirebbe così che il santuario citato da Diodoro dovesse essere, secondo Coarelli, Torelli (1984, 247): ‘uno dei tanti *thesmophoria* che erano dislocati un po’ ovunque nella città’. Polacco 1986, 36–37.

[25] L’uguaglianza tra i templi di Demetra e Kore menzionati nei passi Diod. Sic. 11.25, Diod. Sic. 14.63, Diod. Sic. 14.70 è presente già in Freeman 1891, 524: ‘The building of the temples of the two goddesses by Gelon is recorded by Diodoros (11.26); … The position is fixed by a later passage (14.63)’. Allo stesso modo anche Pugliese Carratelli (1932, 443), dunque ben prima del rinvenimento archeologico del santuario di Piazza della Vittoria. Galvagno (2001, 474, nota 8) avanza qualche perplessità: ‘Bisognerebbe pensare non soltanto al tempio di Demetra e Kore rinvenuto nei pressi di Piazza della Vittoria …, ma anche alla costruzione di altri templi in altre località al momento di impossibile identificazione’.

[26] Holm 1896, 404, nota 31; Ciaceri 1911, 191, nota 1; Pugliese Carratelli 1932, 443; Gras 1990, 60, nota 6; Bravo 1991/94, 166.

[27] Dunbabin 1948, 180; White 1964, 265–266; Galvagno 2001, 477; Adornato 2006, 450. Freeman (1891, 525) la identifica con Aitna-Inessa in riferimento a Diod. Sic. 11.76.3. Van Compernolle (1992, 31) propone l’insediamento di Aitne-Ergetine. Per quanto riguarda la deportazione dei Katanaioi e dei Naxioi e la conseguente rifondazione di Katane con il toponimo di Aitna: Diod. Sic. 11.49.

[28] Galvagno 2001, 483.

[29] Luraghi 1994; Adornato 2006.

[30] Galvagno (2001, 479), in cui si sostiene che il *thesmophorion* di Piazza San Francesco sia da identificare con il tempio di Demetra κατὰ τὴν Αἴτνην progettato da Gelone ma realizzato dal fratello. Si veda anche Frasca (2017, 79). Sul santuario di Piazza San Francesco a Catania: Rizza 1960; Hinz 1998, 161–162.

[31] Sebbene il deposito votivo presenti una significativa cesura tra VI e V secolo a.C. collocabile nel periodo di rifondazione ieroniana di Aitna-Katane, questo non esclude che vi siano stati altri *thesmophoria* a noi ignoti. La nostra conoscenza archeologica delle aree urbane risulta limitata e parziale, perciò ogni sovrapposizione meccanica con le indicazioni letterarie può rivelarsi fuorviante. Sul culto di Demetra e Kore in Sicilia nell’età delle tirannidi: Van Compernolle 1957; White 1964; Privitera 1980; Hinz 1998, 21–25.

[32] Diod. Sic. 11.26.1–3: Ὁ δὲ πᾶσιν ἐπιεικῶς χρησάμενος συμμαχίαν συνετίθετο, καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν ἀνθρωπίνως ἔφερεν οὐκ ἐπὶ τούτων μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πολεμιωτάτων Καρχηδονίων. Παραγενομένων γὰρ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς Καρχηδόνος τῶν ἀπεσταλμένων πρέσβεων καὶ μετὰ δακρύων δεομένων ἀνθρωπίνως αὐτοῖς χρήσασθαι, συνεχώρησετὴν εἰρήνην, ἐπράξατο δὲ παρ’αὐτῶντὰς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον γεγενημένας δαπάνας, ἀργυρίου δισχίλια τάλαντα, καὶ δύο ναοὺς προσέταξεν οἰκοδομῆσαι, καθ’οὓς ἔδει τὰς συνθήκας ἀνατεθῆναι. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι παραδόξως τῆς σωτηρίας τετευχότες ταῦτά τε δώσειν προσεδέξαντο καὶ στέφανον χρυσοῦν τῇ γυναικὶ τοῦ Γέλωνος Δαμαρέτῃ προσωμολόγησαν. Bengtson 1962, nota 131.

[33] Holm 1870, 207–208; Meltzer 1879, 221; Gsell 1913, 438; Pareti 1914, 164. Maddoli (1979, 47): ‘Verosimilmente l’uno in Sicilia, a Siracusa, l’altro forse a Cartagine o comunque, se anch’esso in Sicilia, o in zona di influenza cartaginese o ad Agrigento, l’alleata vittoriosa’.

[34] Freeman (1891, 210, 521–522) ritiene siano dedicati entrambi a Demetra e Kore, ‘special patronesses of Gelôn and his house’ e che entrambi siano a Cartagine.

[35] Plass 1852, 294.

[36] Consoli (2008, 52) sulle ipotesi già di Maddoli 1979, 47.

[37] Sul cosiddetto tempio ‘della Vittoria’ in località Buonfornello a Himera si veda: Koldewey e Puchstein 1899, 51–52; Marconi 1931; Pace 1938, 228–230; Dinsmoor 1950, 108–109; De Waele 1982, 2–7; Van Compernolle 1989, 48–51; 1992, 55–58; Mertens 1996, 330; 2006, 267–268; Bonacasa 2005; Miles 2013, 147–148; Marconi 2016, 84.

[38] Salinas 1877, 11: ‘Fu quel tempio spettatore dell’eccidio degli Affricani, o pure fu uno di quelli innalzati poscia da’ Greci a celebrare il loro trionfo che gli abitatori d’Imera vollero eternare sulle loro monete scolpendovi l’immagine della dea della Vittoria …?’.

[39] Mauceri 1907, 419–421: ‘Questa ricerca doveva dipendere dal fatto che il tempio dovesse assolutamente essere costruito in quel dato sito, e che le condizioni politiche ed economiche della città, permettessero di ricavare il materiale di costruzione, verso occidente, in punti molto distanti …. Siffatte condizioni non potevano realizzarsi che poco dopo il 480 av. Cr. cioè in conseguenza della grande disfatta dei Cartaginesi. Tutto sommato anche la questione della provenienza del materiale può indurre a credere che il tempio sia stato innalzato in quel sito per commemorare l’esito della grande battaglia …’.

[40] Marconi 1931; Dunbabin 1948, 429.

[41] Accanto a Himera, Cartagine è diventato l’altro luogo designato per la collocazione del secondo tempio: Marconi 1931; Pace 1938, 230; Bonacasa 1982, 295, nota 22; Asheri 1988, 774.

[42] Pugliese Carratelli 1932, 435: 'Non è detto ove dovessero sorgere i due templi: ma certo uno di essi fu costruito in Siracusa, l'altro, molto probabilmente, ad Imera, in prossimità della zona sottoposta all'influenza cartaginese'.

[43] Sul tempio di Atena, inglobato nell'odierna Cattedrale di Siracusa si veda: Koldewey e Puchstein 1899, 68–70; Orsi 1918; Pace 1935, 230–236; Dinsmoor 1950, 108; De Waele 1982, 22–25; Coarelli e Torelli 1984, 232–233; Mertens 1988, 68–78, 191–195; 1996, 331; 2005, 5–54; 2006, 268–273, 315; Van Compernolle 1989, 45–48; 1992, 51–55; Miles 2013, 148–149; Marconi 2016, 84.

[44] Gras 1990, 61–62: 'Ces deux temples sont bien connus. A Himère, il s'agit du grand temple dorique situé dans la périphérie de la ville basse et souvent appelé par les Modernes le 'temple de la Victoire'. A Syracuse il s'agit du temple d'Athéna dans Ortygie'. Si veda anche Bonacasa 1992, 144.

[45] Diod. Sic. 8.11.

[46] Lo Faso Pietrasanta 1840, IV, 117.

[47] Koldewey e Puchstein 1899, 233.

[48] Orsi 1918, 753–754.

[49] Mauceri 1907, 420–421; Marconi 1931; Pace 1938, 230.Compernolle (1989, 51): La très grande similitude entre les éléments fondamentaux des plans du Temple dit de la Victoire à Himère et de l'Athènaion dorique de Syracuse … fait que, depuis les fouilles de P. Marconi, les avis sont presque unanimes pour considérer ces deux temples comme contemporains et pour situer le début de leur construction peu après 480 av. n. ère'.

[50] Van Compernolle 1992, 61; Luraghi 1994, 318–319; Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 397. Contradditorie e arbitrarie le conclusioni annotate da Evans (2016, 42, nota 52): 'Diod. Sic. 11.25.2 does not record to which deities these temples were constructed or where they were situated, but shrines to Eirene (Peace) or Nemesis (Retribution) are certainly possible'.

[51] Mauceri 1907, 420–421; Pace 1938, 230; Dinsmoor 1950, 108; Bonacasa 1980, 265; 1982, 295; 1992, 144; 2005, 58–59; De Waele 1982; Gullini 1985, 457; Mertens 1988, 195–198; 1996, 330–332; 2005, 53; Van Compernolle 1989; 1992;; Gras 1990; Luraghi 1994, 318–320; Veronese 2006, 290; Lippolis *et al.* 2007; Stewart 2008, 596; Marconi 2013, 84; Miles 2016, 148–149; Frasca 2017, 170–171. *Contra*: Adornato 2006. Più cauto: De Angelis 2016, 103.

[52] Van Compernolle 1992, 61; Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 397. Consoli (2008, 52–53) finisce per identificare i due templi nell'Olympieion di Agrigento e nell'Athenaion di Siracusa. Subito dopo però, in maniera contradditoria, osserva che dei templi di grande mole mal si adatterebbero alla custodia di un trattato. Così anche Luraghi 1994,

319.

[53] Diod. Sic. 11.26.1–3. Bengtson 1962, n. 131.

[54] Schol. Pind. Pyth. 2.3: Τὸ γοῦν ἀνθρωποθυτεῖν φησιν ὁ Θεόφραστος ἐντῷ περὶ Τυρρηνῶν παδσασθαι αὐτοὺς [Καρχήδονοι] Γέλωνος προστάξαντος. Ὅτιδὲ καὶ ἐκέλευσεν αὐτοὺς χρήματα εἰσφέρειν, Τίμαιος διὰ τῆς τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτης ἀνέγραψε.

[55] Sulla proibizione di compiere sacrifici umani: Plut., *Mor. Reg. et imp. apophth.* 175 a; Plut. *Mor. De sera*, 552a. Vedi anche Freeman 1891, 207; Bravo 1993, 80–81.

[56] Diod. Sic. 11.26.2.

[57] Rutter 1993, 182: ‘We can take it is certain that the offer of a gold crown Damarete by the Carthaginians in 480 BC is wholly unhistorical’.

[58] Diod. Sic. 11.26.3: Στεφανωθεῖσα ὑπ’αὐτῶν ἑκατὸν ταλάντοις χρυσίου, νόμισμα ἐξέκοψε τὸ κληθὲν ἀπ’ἐκείνης Δαμαρέτειον· τοῦτο δ’εἶχεμὲν Ἀττικὰς δραχμὰς δέκα, ἐκλήθη δὲ παρὰ τοῖς Σικελιώταις ἀπὸ τοῦ σταθμοῦ πεντηκοντάλιτρον.

[59] Per quanto riguarda il resoconto delle vicende imeresi, è bene non sottovalutare la ‘Quellenforschung’ in Diodoro: Brown 1952; Bruno 1972–74; Pearson 1987, 134–135; Gras 1990; Sacks 1990, 123–125; Zahrnt 1993; Bravo 1993,78–88; Ambaglio *et al.* 2008, 20–34. Sul ritratto di Gelone: Manganaro 1974–75; Sartori 1984, Bearzot 1991; Rutter 1993; Galvagno 2001; Palazzo 2009, 221–224; Trifirò 2014.

[60] Vedi anche Diod. Sic. 11.22–23.

[61] Privitera 1980; Sartori 1984, 501–503; Pearson 1987; Devillers 1991, 158–159.

[62] A nutrire nuovo interesse su questi aspetti già Adornato 2006, 449.

[63] Orsi 1910a; 1915; 1918; Van Compernolle 1992, 52; Adornato 2006, 449; Mertens 2006, 112; Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 841–842; Ampolo 2011, 166. In merito alle più recenti indagini archeologiche nell’area del tempio di Atena in Ortigia si veda Voza 1999 e Guzzardi 2012.

[64] Il contesto archeologico del santuario arcaico e i depositi votivi a esso pertinenti sono in corso di studio da parte dell’autore.

[65] Orsi (1918, 474 in riferimento agli scavi meridionali): ‘Segue un banco … che io chiamerei colmata dinomenidica, caratterizzata dalla presenza di copiose scaglie in calcare bianco, relitti di lavorazione; altre erano invece di giuggiulena …. In tutto ciò io vedo i relitti della fabbricazione del tempio nuovo, mescolati a detriti di fabbriche arcaiche. Di ceramiche questo banco racchiudeva assai scarsi saggi di vasellame attico del sec. VI fine e dei primi del V, il che appunto parmi giustificare la designazione di colmata dinomenidica’.

[66] Orsi 1918, 753: ‘I numerosissimi diagrammi che io ho presentato convengono tutti nel dimostrare un arresto ed una grande livellazione del suolo, in coincidenza con una vasta riforma edilizia del temenos, la

quale viene a cadere in circa nel secondo quarto del sec. V a. C. Il contenuto degli strati sottostanti a codesto nuovo livello è tutto arcaico ed arcaicissimo, e non scende oltre l'età surriferita'.

[67] Qualche piccolo frammento di *pelikai* e uno *skyphos* attico a figure nere. Orsi 1918, 492–493.

[68] Orsi 1918, 491: 'Mentre lo strato paleogreco viene caratterizzato dalle ceramiche protocorinzie, è soltanto nello strato superiore, formato dalla colmata dinomenidica, che appariscono i prodotti dell' industria attica a f. n., e per dir vero scarsi, ma tuttavia nettamente distinti dalle ceramiche più antiche'. Orsi individua la stessa configurazione stratigrafica in entrambi i settori di scavo. A conferma della genuinità del contesto, lo studioso segnala più volte l'omogeneità del materiale rinvenuto nello strato di riempimento e la distinzione evidente di quest'ultimo dal livello inferiore. Inoltre va detto che Orsi è ben consapevole degli eventuali disturbi post-deposizionali, identificandoli e tenendoli in adeguata considerazione sia per gli scavi. Orsi 1918, 373; 473.

[69] Sulle anfore panatenaiche e pseudopanatenaiche si veda: Beazley 1943; 1951, 75–100; Neils 1992; 1996; Bentz 1998; 2001a; Bentz e Eschbach 2001; Palagia *et al.* 2007.

[70] Siracusa, Museo Archeologico Regionale 'Paolo Orsi'. Scavi meridionali (cortile del palazzo arcivescovile): 39 frr. figurati (24 frr. pertinenti al lato principale, 14 frr. al lato secondario), sette frr. di collo, 13 frr. di orlo, sei frr. di base, un coperchio, 19 frr. e numerosi frammenti di parete privi di figurazione. Scavi settentrionali (piazza Minerva): due frr. figurati (un fr. pertinente al lato principale, un fr. al lato secondario). Per l'esame complessivo del deposito e di ciascun frammento si rimanda allo studio sull'intero deposito in corso di pubblicazione da parte di chi scrive.

[71] La maggior parte dei frammenti risulta inedita. Per quanto riguarda gli unici esemplari già noti: Bentz 1998, n. 5.065; n. 5.066; n. 5.111; n. 5.207, Bentz 2001b, 194, n. 307. Per l'esame complessivo del deposito e di ciascun frammento si rimanda allo studio in corso di pubblicazione da parte di chi scrive.

[72] Siracusa, MAR, inv. 38322B; anfora panatenaica, due frammenti di parete congiunti. Alt. mass. 14,3 cm; largh. mass. 9,6 cm; spess. 0,8–1,0 cm; diam. mass. int. 48 cm ca. 500–480/75 a.C. Orsi 1918, 492, fig. 84; Caruso 1990, 147; Bentz 1998, 148, n. 5.111.

[73] Una delle teste non è più visibile a causa della frattura.

[74] Bentz 1998, 148, n. 5.111.

[75] Londra, British Museum B133: Beazley 1956, 395.1; Langridge 1993, E52; Bentz 1998, tav. 56; Toronto, Royal Ontario Museum 350: Beazley 1956, 395.2; Langridge 1993, E53; Bentz 1998, tav. 57; New York,

Metropolitan Museum 56.171.3: Beazley 1956, 395.3; Langridge 1993, E54; Monaco, Antikensammlungen 8746: Beazley 1956, 397; Langridge 1993, E55; Atene, MAN, Acropoli 932: Graef e Langlotz 1909–1933, I.932, tav. 60; Beazley 1956, 396.13; Langridge 1993, E64; Bentz 2001b, n. 29.

[76] Si vedano per esempio le anfore attribuite al pittore di Kleophrades: Malibu, The J. Paul Getty Museum 77.AE.9: Matheson 1989, fig. 1; Bentz 1998, n. 5.024, tavv. 50–51; New York, Metropolitan Museum 7.286.79: Beazley 1956, 404.6; Matheson 1989, fig. 4; Bentz 1998, n. 5.008, tav. 41.

[77] Siracusa, MAR, senza inv.; anfora panatenaica, frammento di parete. Alt. mass. 7,1 cm; largh. mass. 5,6 cm; spess. 0,9 cm. Maniera del pittore di Kleophrades, 490–475 a.C. Si veda Orsi 1918, 492.

[78] Toledo, Museum of Art 61.24: Bentz 1998, n. 5.026, tav. 50–51: quest'anfora è associata alla maniera del pittore di Kleophrades dal momento che alcuni caratteri formali sembrano divergere dal canone di questo ceramografo; tali peculiarità sarebbero prossime al pittore di Berlino, la cui produzione panatenaica è generalmente collocata dopo il 480 a.C. Si veda Matheson 1989, 99, 102. Si vedano anche l'anfora Leiden, Rijksmuseum van Oudheden PC6: Beazley 1956, 404.9; Matheson 1989, fig. 2; Bentz 1998, n. 5.002, tavv. 39–40.

[79] Beazley 1951, 94–95.

[80] Atene, MAN, Acropoli 981: Graef e Langlotz 1909–1933, I.981, tav. 58; Beazley 1956, 408.6.

[81] Altrettanto puntuale appare il confronto con un'anfora panatenaica a firma di Sikelòs, datata al 495/80 a.C. Napoli, MAN 112848: Beazley 1943, 445; 1956, 403; Bentz 1998, tav. 34. Si consideri che anche alcuni vasi attribuiti al Pittore di Eucharides recano Pegaso come episema, tuttavia il bordo dello scudo risulta molto differente: Atene, MAN, Acropoli 938: Graef e Langlotz 1909–1933, I.938, tav. 56; Langridge 1992, E70; Bentz 2001b, n. 35.

[82] Siracusa, MAR, inv. 38322C; anfora panatenaica, due frammenti di parete congiunti. Alt. mass. 6,3 cm; largh. mass. 9,5 cm; spess. 0,7 cm; diam. mass. int. 42,2 cm. Pittore di Eucharides, 480 a.C. ca. Orsi 1918, 494, fig. 84; Caruso 1990, 147; Bentz 1998, 144, n. 5.065.

[83] Si conferma l'attribuzione già condotta da Bentz 1998, 144, n. 5.065. I confronti più interessanti sono rappresentati da alcuni frammenti dall'acropoli di Atene: Atene, MAN, Acropoli 932a: Beazley 1956, 396.13; Graef e Langlotz 1909–1933, I.932a, tav. 60; Langridge 1993, E64; Bentz 2001b, n. 29; Atene, MAN, Acropoli 935: Beazley 1956, 396.15, Graef e Langlotz 1909–1933, I.935, tav. 60; Langridge 1993, E67; Bentz 2001b, n. 32; Atene, MAN, Acropoli 938: Beazley 1956, 396.17, Graef e Langlotz 1909–1933, I.938, tav. 56; Langridge 1993,

E70; Bentz 2001b, n. 35; Atene, MAN, Acropoli 939a: Beazley 1956, 396.11, Graef e Langlotz 1909–1933, I.939a, tav. 58; Langridge 1993, E71; Bentz 2001b, n. 36. Dall'Heraion di Samo: Vathi, Museo Archeologico K7443: Kreuzer 2017, tav. 19.

[84] Siracusa, MAR, inv. 38322L; anfora pseudopanatenaica, frammento di parete. Alt. mass. 4,3 cm; largh. mass. 4,4 cm; spess. 0,7 cm. Pittore di Eucharides, 480 a.C. ca.

[85] Atene, MAN, Acropoli 932b–c: Graef e Langlotz 1909–1933, I.932b–c, tav. 60; Beazley 1956, 396.13; Frel 1969, 378; Bentz 2001b, n. 29. Anche un frammento dall'Heraion di Samo attribuito al pittore 'der samischen Preisamphoren', pur presentando una decorazione simile, si differenzia per il tratto più corsivo dei girali: Vathi, Museo Archeologico K7431: Kreuzer 2017, tav. 7.

[86] Langridge 1993, 54: 'The decorative border that accentuates both the neckline and the lower hem of garments occurs frequently. It is formed of two close parallel lines often with added white dots in the center, a horizontal row of hooks, and another line. This patterns forms … the bottom border for Athena's dress'.

[87] Siracusa, MAR, inv. 38322M; anfora panatenaica o pseudopanatenaica, frammento di parete. Alt. mass. 3,9 cm; largh. mass. 4,1 cm; spess. 0,6 cm. Pittore di Eucharides, 480 a.C. ca. Si veda Orsi 1918, 494.

[88] Atene, MAN, Acropoli 932a: Graef e Langlotz 1909–1933, I.932a, tav. 60; Beazley 1956, 396.13; Frel 1969, 378; Langridge 1993, 368, E64; Bentz 2001b, n. 29; Atene, MAN, Acropoli 935: Beazley 1956, 396.15; Graef e Langlotz 1909–1933, I.935, tav. 60; Langridge 1993, E67; Bentz 2001b, n. 32; Atene, MAN, Acropoli 938: Beazley 1956, 396.17; Graef, eLanglotz 1909–1933, I.938, tav. 56; Langridge 1993, E70; Bentz 2001b, n. 35. Vedi anche New York, Metropolitan Museum 56.171.3: Beazley 1956, 395.3; Langridge 1993, E54. Su questo motivo decorativo: Langridge 1993, 57.

[89] Siracusa, MAR, senza inv.; anfora pseudopanatenaica, frammento di parete. Alt. mass. 5,2 cm; largh. mass. 2,9 cm; spess. 0,5 cm. Vicino al Pittore di Eucharides. 480 a.C. ca. Si veda Orsi 1918, 492.

[90] New York, Metropolitan Museum 56.171; Beazley 1956, 395.3; Langridge 1993, E54. Si segnala tuttavia che anche il pittore di Berlino 1833, al quale sono attribuiti pochi esemplari, presenta caratteri formali molto vicini alla maniera del pittore di Eucharides al quale infatti è associato. Beazley 1956, 407; Bentz 1998, nn. 5.067–5.070.

[91] Il tipo dell'episema non è da solo determinante ma necessita di essere interpretato insieme ad altre peculiarità formali.

[92] Siracusa, MAR, senza inv.; frammento di parete. Alt. mass. 3,6 cm; largh. mass. 4,6 cm; spess. 0,5 cm. Vicino al Pittore di Eucharides. 480

a.C. ca.

[93] Siracusa, MAR, senza inv.; frammento di parete. Alt. mass. 5,6 cm; largh. mass. 4,1 cm; spess. 0,6 cm. Pittore di Eucharides. 480 a.C. ca. Orsi 1918, 492.

[94] Atene, MAN, Acropoli 958: Graef e Langlotz 1909–1933, I.958, tav. 57; Beazley 1956, 396; Frel 1969, 378; Langridge 1993, 373, E85.

[95] Langridge 1993, 53: 'Ears are formed by a double circle, often with a divided lobe, similar to those on the red-figure vases'. Langridge 1993, 55: 'The ears with a circle within a circle and, underneath this, the parentheses with a small line in between is common for the men'.

[96] Siracusa, MAR, senza inv.; anfora panatenaica, quattro frammenti di parete. Fr. 08: Alt. mass. 8,9 cm; largh. mass. 11,8 cm; spess. 0,6–0,8 cm; diam. mass. int. 36 cm ca. Fr. 09: Alt. mass. 8,9 cm; largh. mass. 8,5 cm; spess. 0,6–0,7 cm; diam. mass. int. 40–42 cm ca. Fr. 10: Alt. mass. 5,7 cm; largh. mass. 6,6 cm; spess. 0,6–0,7 cm. Fr. 11: Alt. mass. 4,5 cm; largh. mass. 5,5 cm; spess. 0,6 cm; diam. mass. int. 36–37 cm ca. Pittore di Eucharides. 480 a.C. ca.

[97] Accanto all'esemplare già citato, è da considerare il frammento Atene, MAN, Acropoli 959: Langridge 1993, E86.

[98] Cic. *Verr.* II, 4, 118; Cic. *Verr.* II, 4, 122; Athen. XI, 462.

[99] Pala 2012, 58 in cui si evidenzia una simile distribuzione anche per le attestazione di anfore di tipo panatenaico sull'acropoli di Atene.

[100] Al momento risultano dodici i frammenti riconducibili all'atelier del pittore di Eucharides.

[101] Giudice *et al.* 1991.

[102] Beazley 1956, 396 e Frel 1969, 377–386 in cui 25 frammenti dall'acropoli ateniese sono stati attribuiti alla bottega del cosiddetto pittore di Eucharides. Si veda anche: Vos 1981, 43; Langridge 1992; 1993, 368–374; Pala 2012, 68–71. In merito alle anfore 'pseudopanatenaiche' (panathenaic-shaped amphoras) si veda: Neils 1992, 42; Bentz 1998, 19; 2001a; Tiverios 2007, 17–18.

[103] Graef e Langlotz (1909–1933, I, tavv. 56–57), in cui si registra per i frammenti 938, 941 e 952, attribuiti al pittore di Eucharides, una provenienza dal 'Perserschutt'. Langridge (1993, 15) prende in considerazione questo dato a ulteriore sostegno della cronologia assegnata alle panatenaiche del pittore di Eucharides, una proposta cronologica peraltro già sviluppata indipendentemente da altri presupposti. Tuttavia è stato dimostrato che la maggior parte dei depositi archeologici dell'acropoli ateniese interpretati originariamente come 'Perserschutt' sono in realtà riempimenti realizzati nei decenni successivi al sacco persiano. In merito si veda: Lindenlauf 1997; Stewart 2008, 377–412.

[104] Langridge (1992; 1993; 56–57) e Langridge-Noti (2001, 77–78), in

cui si sostiene che queste possano essere state dedicate sull'acropoli oppure che siano state lì stipate prima dei Giochi, negli anni dell'invasione persiana.

[105] Langridge 1993, 60, nota 133: 'If the Panathenaic amphorae are executed by a single painter according to a commission, this would suggest tha most of the other Panathenaic amphorae assigned to the Eucharides Painter are done later also. In view of other attributed Panathenaic amphorae, it is unlikely that the Eucharides Painter would have had more than a single commission'.

[106] Sui giochi panatenaici del 478/7 si veda anche: Vos 1981, 43–44; Bentz 1998, 37; Langridge-Noti 2001; Shear 2001, 537–538.

[107] Lindenlauf 1997; Stewart 2008, 395–405.

[108] A ulteriore conferma di una possibile cronologia più bassa è il frammento Acropoli 910, attribuito da J. Beazley alla produzione a figure rosse del pittore di Eucharides. Esso proviene da uno strato di riempimento lungo il muro meridionale dell'acropoli ateniese che probabilmente fu chiuso intorno al 450 a.C. Sul frammento ceramico: Graef e Langlotz 1909–1933, II.738; Beazley AQ: 1956?, ARV^2, 227, nr. 15. Sul contesto archeologico: Langridge 1993, 14–15; Stewart 2008, 405.

[109] Con questo termine indichiamo sia le anfore panatenaiche propriamente intese che le 'panathenaic-shaped amphoras', ossia vasi di dimensioni inferiore che generalmente mancano dell'iscrizione.

[110] Morgantina: un frammento (inv. 90–156) dal presunto santuario arcaico, Neils 2001, 125, nota 2. Agrigento: tre frammenti dall'area del tempio di Zeus; Museo Archeologico Regionale, inv. AG 13384–7036: Trombi 2009, Todisco 2009, 528. Gela: un frammento dall'acropoli; Museo Archeologico Regionale, inv. 73/18: Todisco 2009, 528.

[111] Posidonia: sei frammenti dall'Athenaion e quattro per l'Heraion appartenenti ad almeno tre anfore differenti; Museo Archeologico Nazionale, senza inv.: Todisco 2009, 528–529. Metaponto: due frammenti pertinenti a un'unica anfora panatenaica dal tempio di Apollo; Museo Archeologico Nazionale, inv. 29994: Todisco 2009, 529. Francavilla Marittima: un esemplare dall'Athenaion; Sibari, Museo Archeologico Nazionale, senza inv.: Todisco 2009, 532. Taranto: tre frammenti e un'ansa di discussa identificazione dal santuario del Pizzone; Museo Archeologico Nazionale, senza inv.: Todisco 2009, 531. Saturo: numerosi frammenti dal santuario della sorgente; Taranto, Museo Archeologico Nazionale: Todisco 2008; 2009.

[112] I dedicanti non coincidono necessariamente con i vincitori delle Grandi Panatenee. Si ipotizza infatti che i vasi premiali potessero essere oggetto di un mercato secondario in cui l'olio sacro e il prestigioso contenitore potessero essere esportati e acquistati. Inoltre si sostiene che

solo ai vincitori fosse lecito vendere l'olio ricevuto in premio. Si veda Valavanis 1984; Kyle 1996, 36, nota 100; Bentz 2003, 113. Al contrario si è ipotizzato che le anfore panatenaiche non avessero mai contenuto olio d'oliva, vedi: Themelis 2007, 27–28.

113 A Siracusa sembrano assenti i vani scalari all'interno della cella, presenti invece a Himera e ben diffusi ad Agrigento; a Siracusa le colonne dell'*opisthodomos* e quelle della peristasi hanno stesse dimensioni, un'anomalia non presente a Himera ma evidente nel tempio di Poseidon a Paestum; la cella è più lunga e le sue pareti laterali si allineano con le colonne della fronte; differente è il valore del piede dorico adottato; poco vincolanti, come vedremo, le affinità dei doccioni a protome leonina delle rispettive sime; lo *pteron* frontale è più stretto a Siracusa dove si assiste inoltre a una maggiore curvatura dello stilobate. Bonacasa 1982, 295–297; Mertens 1988, 197; 2006, 270; Van Compernolle 1992, 59–61; Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 404.

114 Orsi 1918, 380–391; Pace 1938, 234–235.

115 Rocco 2010, 160–161.

116 Willemsen (1959, 34–35) e Mertens-Horn (1988, 100–101, 168–169), in cui, in particolare, si sostiene che le protomi siracusane presentano affinità le corrispettive del lato meridionale del tempio imerese, entrambe dunque realizzate subito dopo il 480 a.C.

117 Marconi (1931, 106–107), in cui, pur riconoscendone la contemporaneità, si sostiene che la loro somiglianza non risiede nei tratti formali quanto nel 'modo di sentire e di rappresentare il felino conservando tutta la sua latente animalità; in un'analogia di intuizione di sostanza piuttosto che nell'espressione delle forma'; Mertens-Horn (1988, 100), in cui le differenze nel modellato sono imputate al differente materiale impiegato senza alcuna conseguenza sul loro sostanziale legame tipologico.

118 Dinsmoor 1950, 109; Gullini 1985, 458; Van Compernolle 1989, 59–60; 1992, 70; Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 804–805. *Contra*: Mertens (1984, 196), in cui si sostiene una cronologia più alta, al primo decennio del V secolo a.C.

119 Agrigento, Museo Archeologico Regionale: Mertens-Horn 1988, nr. 15, tav. 24C. Gela, Museo Archeologico Regionale: Adamesteanu 1954; Mertens-Horn1988, nr. 22, tav. 28. Entrambe in calcare, entrambe pertinenti alle sime di due strutture ignote.

120 Sul tempio C di Gela: Van Compernolle 1989, 68–69; 1992, 58; Mertens 2006, 274–275; Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 813–814; Marconi 2016, 84. Sul tempio C di Agrigento: Dinsmoor 1950, 109; Van Compernolle 1989, 58–60; 1992, 68–70; Mertens 2006, 239–240; Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 804–805. Sul tempio E di Agrigento: Dinsmoor 1950, 109; Van Compernolle 1989, 57–58; Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 805–806; De Miro e La

Torre 2012.

[121] De Miro e La Torre, 2008, 93.

[122] Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 406–407; Belli Pasqua 2009; 2010; Rocco 2007; 2010. Sul tempio di Hera al Capo Lacinio: Mertens 2006, 276–278; Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 779–780; Rocco 2008; 2009; 2010; Marconi 2016, 85.

[123] Sul tempio A di Agrigento si veda: Koldewey e Puchstein 1899, 145; Dinsmoor 1950, 105; Gullini 1985, 456; Van Compernolle 1989, 51; Mertens 2006, 236; Lippolis *et al.* 2007; Adornato 2011, 103.

[124] Lo stretto rapporto con la tradizione architettonica di Agrigento ha indotto a riconoscere per il tempio imerese l'intervento di maestranze acragantine operanti su un comune progetto siracusano. Si veda Marconi 1931, 106–108; Dinsmoor 1950, 110; Bonacasa 1982, 296; Gullini 1985, 457; Bonacasa 1992, 145; Van Compernolle 1992, 58–59; Adornato 2006, 449; Mertens 2006, 268; Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 403–404. Consoli (2008, 54) ritiene che da Agrigento provenisse non soltanto la manodopera specializzata ma anche il progetto architettonico.

[125] Gullini 1985, 445–455; Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 404.

[126] Pur dubitando, a volte, di un effettivo collegamento tra i due templi, non si è negato una sostanziale sincronia di interventi a partire dal medesimo movente bellico. Bonacasa 1980, 265–266: 'Il rapporto tra codesti edifici è stato tradizionalmente fondato, com'è noto, sull'ipotetica sincronia di interventi a Himera ed a Siracusa, originati da un unico movente politico. Questo fu concreto e vero. […] Del tutto arbitrario è il vincolo progettuale-esecutivo tra i due edifici sacri, che sono assai diversi tra di loro'. Si veda anche Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 404; Consoli 2008, 53–56.

[127] Maddoli 1979, 47–48; De Miro 1992; Van Compernolle 1992, 74–74; Di Vita 1996, 294–296; Collin Bouffier 2000; Adornato 2006, 452; 2011, 103–120; Mertens 2006, 315–323; Lippolis *et al.* 2007, 400–401.

[128] Bonacasa 1992; Luraghi 1994, 231–255; Consolo Langher 1996a, 19–34; Adornato 2012.

[129] Luraghi 1994, 258–260; Adornato 2006, 452; Consoli 2008.

[130] Diod. Sic. 11.25; Sic. 13.81; Diog. Laert. 8.63.

[131] L'occasione per la concessione della cittadinanza siracusana a mercenari potrebbe essere avvenuta già con il trasferimento di Gelone a Siracusa e la conseguente rifondazione della città. Pugliese Carratelli 1932, 21; Luraghi 1994, 290; Consolo Langher 1996a, 218–227; Adornato 2006; De Angelis 2016, 180–184.

[132] Hdt. 7.156; Thuc. 6.4.1–2; Polyaenus *Strat.* 1.27.3.

[133] Tanto più perché a nostro avviso il conflitto anticiperebbe di qualche anno la data tradizionale del 480 a.C. Mazzarino 1955, 60; Lo Cascio 1973/74, 227.

[134] Orsi 1918; Adornato 2006; De Angelis 2016, 188.

[135] Guzzardi (2012, 173, nota 58), in cui si propone un abbassamento della cronologia dell'Athenaion. Proponendo per la cella del vicino tempio ionico una cronologia al periodo di Gelone (490–480 a.C.) si conclude che 'sarebbe ragionevole ricondurre la costruzione del vicino tempio di Athena all'epoca di Ierone o della democrazia'. Tale conclusione scaturisce da evidenze archeologiche diverse e indipendenti da quelle discusse nel presente contributo.

[136] Luraghi 1994, 335–354; Bonanno 2010, 127–209; De Angelis 2016, 187–188.

[137] Diod. Sic. 11.51.

[138] Knoepfler 1992; De Angelis 2016, 275.

[139] Belli Pasqua 2009; 149–152; Basile e Lazzarini 2012.

[140] Pind. *Ol.* 1.35–36

[141] Luraghi 1994, 354–368; Bonanno 2010, 181–209.

[142] Adornato 2005; 2006.

[143] Paus. 6.19.7. Si veda: Mallwitz 1972, 169; Luraghi 1994, 317–318; Adornato 2013, 82–83.

[144] Pind. *Pyth.* 1.79.

Chapter 14

When war changes a city. Fortifications and urban landscapes in tyrant-ruled Syracuse*

Valentina Mignosa

La storia della città di Siracusa greca è caratterizzata da una numerosa serie di conflitti che ne condizionano l'evoluzione politica sociale e demografica. Le conseguenze della guerra si possono leggere anche nel paesaggio della polis: i conflitti, direttamente e indirettamente, ridisegnano confini, spazi pubblici, spazi fruibili, vie di comunicazione e di accesso della città, oltre a modificare la stessa percezione del paesaggio da parte degli abitanti. Gli studi sulla topografia di Siracusa hanno permesso di delineare con una certa sicurezza l'articolazione della città greca. Risulta per questa ragione possibile, a partire da essi, approfondire il modo in cui la città – intesa come 'paesaggio geografico' abitato e come comunità civica – sia stata condizionata dalla guerra. In questo contributo ci proponiamo di rileggere i conflitti che caratterizzano la città durante il periodo storico compreso tra la presa di potere di Gelone e la tirannide dionigiana facendo 'reagire' le due componenti fondative della polis, gli uomini e il loro territorio, con la 'componente esterna' della guerra, evidenziando, di volta in volta, cause e conseguenze dei cambiamenti del volto della città, leggibili tanto sul terreno quanto nelle fonti letterarie.

On fortifications and landscape

The episodes that see Syracuse armed in defense of its urban territory are well known, as are the stories from historical sources that have painted their contours. Interest in its urban landscape during the most famous wars that engulfed the city begins to grow in the pre-scientific era:[1] an *Essai critique sur la topographie de Syracuse pour servir à l'intelligence du siège de cette ville rapporté par Thucydide*, by the 25 year old Jean-Antoine Letronne, published in the 1810s, draws the data used to analyse the dynamics of the 414 Athenian Siege of Syracuse from information about the Syracuse area gleaned from historical sources. Shortly after Letronne's contribution, M. Leake[2] and G. Grote[3] return to the topic extensively with the same goal in mind. Similarly, the reverse process, *i.e.*, trying to learn more about the territory of the *polis* starting from information on the wars, has a famous precedent in the work by F. Cavallari and A. Holm on the *Topografia archeologica di Siracusa*, whose section edited by Holm revisits the history of the *polis* by tapping into literary sources that provide information on the urban topography across a chronological span comprising the whole history of the Greek city, from its foundation 'up to the time of Cicero'.[4] Both approaches, which helped clarify the dynamics of the Athenian Siege on the one hand and the territory of the city on the other, rely on literary sources to reconstruct a landscape of which only fragments were visible in the modern age. What we aim to conduct here is an analysis of the landscape which, based on literary sources, will make the two central components of *war* and *landscape* 'interact', starting from a different question, *i.e.*, *if* and *how* the war brought about substantial changes in the landscape of the *polis*, and if this occurred, how it changed the usability of the urban space during the various battles being scrutinised.


Zeichenerklärung :
Orte mit archäologischen Belegen für die Brückenkopf-Gründung
alte Brückenkopf-Stadt
archaische Stadterweiterung des 7. und 6. Jh.
Nekropolen
Steinbrüche
60m
55m-Senke
60m
62m
60m
50m
40m
30m
20m
Kalkplateau
Contr. Palazzo
C. Ottone
[Gehöfte]
[Gehöfte]
Epipolai
Sc. Due Fratelli
Mazzarona-Küste
70m
60m
50m
50m
Piana d'Ambra
Cozzo Romito
+0m
30m
40m
30m
20m
KARTENBEREICH ABB. 9
KARTENBEREICH ABB. 10
70m
60m
50m
Canalicchio
Portella del Fusco
1
2
3
20m
Giardino Spagna
10m
S. Lucia
Sc. a Pizzo
10m
Fusco
5m
5m
ACHRADINA
Kleiner Hafen
4
SYRAKUSA
Lysimeleia
Mass. Monterosso
Contr. Pantanelli
5 APOLLONION
ARTEMISION
ORTYGIA
Sc. dei Cani
6
ATHENAION
C. Cutreri
C. Bucceri
Großer Hafen
1 km
Mass. Santannera
Qu. Arethusa
Anapos
10m
OLYMPIEION
POLICHNA
10m
Wasserläufe, Sumpf
antike
heutige
Küste
Ansatz des „ursprünglichen Isthmos" nach Cavallari-Holm-Lupus
Achradina-Mauer
antike Straßen und Wege
1: Heiligtum des Apollon Temenites 2: Schautreppe 3: Theater
4: Agora seit d. 6. Jh. 5: Verbindungsdamm 6: ionischer Tempel

Figure 14.1. Map of archaic Syracuse (Drögemüller 1969, 42 Abb. 8).

Syracuse, originally founded on the small island known as Ὀρτυγία, was soon to be extended as far as the coast and in the immediate hinterland (Fig. 14.1). The most notable transformations that the *polis* would face since its foundation fall under the time period between 485, the conquest of the *polis* by Gelon and 367, the end of the Dionysian tyranny or, in other words, between the battle against Hamilcar's Carthaginians and the battle against Himilcon II and his army.[5]

While the theme of war has been the subject of a number of studies over the last couple of decades,[6] less attention has been paid to the specific topic of the political, social and economic ramifications of the war on the *polis* and, in particular, to the two events that have affected the urban landscape the most, *i.e.*, the siege and the *stasis*. Furthermore, poliorcetics has been one of the most neglected aspects in the history of war studies in the ancient world,[7] while studies on *stasis* have recently been greatly favoured.[8]

In this work we aim to observe the urban territory through a number of stages that proved to be decisive for its structure in the classical age, while placing emphasis on two aspects: the 'modes' of conflict, *i.e.*, the techniques and structures used, and the consequences of the conflict, *i.e.*, the effects – whether direct or indirect – of the various war events on the urban landscape.

Before embarking on our investigation, we need to define the two key terms which are the object of our analysis, namely the landscape and the fortification. In defining the agrarian landscape of ancient Italy, E. Sereni stresses the importance of analysing, as historians, the landscape element as a historiographical source, not as a mere historical fact, though, but as the 'making of those living people', who 'consciously and systematically imprint' a certain *shape* in the natural landscape.[9]

Similarly, the urban landscape is to the historian a fundamental historiographical source that, more than the natural landscape shows the *conscious* and *systemic* traces of humankind. However, if the urban landscape seems to possess a certain fixity and immobility due to its being circumscribed and characterised by structures, for this very reason, it is a landscape in which the 'natural' element is generally less visible to us, but whose physical characteristics (rivers, fertile fields, presence of harbours, *etc*.) have been the very condition for the establishment of an *apoikia* and have determined (in different and unforeseeable ways) the dynamics of population and organisation. The urban landscape is 'superimposed' on the natural landscape and it is enjoyed by citizens according to social customs that rely on its spatial organisation.

The presence or absence of certain infrastructures such as bridges, walls, public spaces, also determines the perception of those living in the *polis* and, consequently, the use – free or otherwise – of spaces, as well as the mobility of citizens from or to the *polis* and within its boundaries. The landscape is both a historical *fact* and a historiographical *source*. As such, it is determined by the social and political structure of a city and, conversely, it can also determine its sociopolitical balance (a case in point being the presence of fortifications or walls restricting access to parts of the city) in a relationship of mutual causality.

The fortifications, and in particular their genesis, structure and functionality – as has been extensively noted in the last 20 years[10] – are connoting elements of the urban landscape that affect not only the image, but also the economic, social and political aspects of the city.

The most recurrent term in literary sources in reference to the city walls or to a more complex system of fortifications is τεῖχος, which is first found in the *Iliad* to designate the Trojan walls.[11] The term, which: 'does not imply any particular monumentality, construction, or choice of material'[12], is used to refer to different types of fortifications: it can designate the walls of a city,[13] the walls of a camp,[14] and it often indicates the walls surrounding the acropolis.[15] Similarly used in lieu of τεῖχος, starting from the classical age, are σχοινιά,[16] κϭκλος,[17] περίβολος,[18] ὀχϭρωμα.[19] Further alternatives to designate a fortification are derivatives and compounds of some derivatives of *teichos*, also recurrent starting from classical sources and used with more specific meanings:[20] τείχισμα (wall or fort[21]); ἀντιτείχισμα (counter-fortification[22]); ἀποτείχισμα (lines of blockade[23]); διατείχισμα (place walled off and fortified[24]); παρατείχισμα (cross-wall[25]); περιτείχισμα (wall of circumvallation, blockading wall[26]); προτείχισμα (advanced fortification, outwork[27]); ὑποτείχισμα (cross-wall[28]).[29]

As we will see with Syracuse, the presence or absence of fortifications around the perimeter of the city or part of it, has implications not only for the urban fabric but also for the way the territory has been occupied by the population and therefore for the life of the community itself.

During a seminal conference held in Valbonne in 1982 and organised by Leriche, Tréziny and Garlan,[30] the latter, while summarizing the functions of defensive structures, underlined, among other things,[31] the close connection between fortifications and the urban structure; P. Ducrey, discussing the *rôle, fonction, efficacité* of Greek fortifications, laid emphasis on three main aims of defensive structures: military reasons, the need for security and the need for independence.[32] Although these are seemingly the three main functions, it has nevertheless been established by now that these are not the only ones. As Müth, Laufer and Brasse recently pointed out:

> Hinsichtlich des Gesamtkonzeptes mögen etwa Überdimensionierung oder Inszenierung von Mauerpartien einen gesteigerten Macht- und Prestigeanspruch kommunizieren, während Unterdimensionierung des Mauerrings im Vergleich zum zu schützenden Objekt signalisieren kann, dass es weniger um dessen Sicherheit ging als um die Kommunikation anderer mit Befestigungen verbundener Aussagen wie etwa die Demonstration städtischer Kultur oder herrschaftlichen Repräsentations-, Macht- oder Legitimitätsanspruchs.[33]

All these functions can therefore be grouped under the label of ‘symbolic functions’ or ‘semantic aspects’.[34] Aspects that are only apparently ‘secondary’, linked to the implications that the structures have on the urban landscape and on the structure of the city: I am referring to the political, economic and social aspects surrounding the presence of a border structure between the internal and external parts of the city, which shapes the relationships between those who live inside and those living in the *chora* outside the walls; similarly, fortified gates determine the direction toward certain communication routes and the existence of business activities linked to fortifications, which is an aspect that still needs to be further investigated.[35]

The Syracusan scenario between Gelon and Dionysius I

Based on an assessment on Syracuse conducted by S. Berger, the city experienced a third of all the *staseis* documented for the whole of Magna Graecia.[36] To compound matters, it is common knowledge that the centrality of Sicily and Syracuse in the Mediterranean political scenario makes the Corinthian *polis* the heart of frequent and significant war zones.

Gelon strengthens the defences of the city

We have few literary testimonies of the archaic fortification of the city, while there is no archeological evidence to date of any archaic structures that could indicate the presence of walls in the area of Ortygia or Achradine. Thucydides thus writes about the foundation of the city:

> Συρακοϭσας δὲ τοῦ ἐχομένου ἔτους Ἀρχίας τῶν Ἡρακλειδῶν ἐκ Κορίνθου ᾤκισε, Σικελοὺς ἐξελάσας πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς νήσου ἐν ᾗ νῦν οὐκέτι περικλυζομένῃ ἡ πόλις ἡ ἐντός ἐστιν ·ὕστερον δὲ χρόνῳ καὶ ἡ ἔξω προστειχισθεῖσα πολυάνθρωπος ἐγένετο.[37]

The process that Thucydides describes is a gradual growth of the city that, having been founded on the island, would soon extend to the mainland, on the *epeiros* (the ‘outer city’ in Thucydides, Ἀχραδινή in Diodorus) (Fig. 14.2).


1 Hieron des Apollon Temenites
2 Schautreppe
3 Theater
4 Agora
5 Apollonion - Artemision
6 Athenaion
Kalkplateau
Epipolai
Cava S. Panagia
[Gehöfte]
B
e
Bereich Abb. 12
Piana d'Ambra
Cozzo Romito
Portella
Bereich Abb. 14
1 3
2
b
c
d
TEMENITES
ACHRADINA-VORSTADT
ACHRADINA
4
Kl. Hafen
5
6
ORTYGIA
Fusco
a
Anapos
Lysimeleia
0 0,5 1 2 km
Olympieion
POLICHNA
Helorinischer Weg
Großer Hafen
Daskon
Plemmyrion
eigentliches Stadt= gebiet innerhalb der Mauer
Vorstädte
antike Straßen (hier nur Ausfallstraßen, vgl. Abb. 12 und 14)
sumpfiges Gelände
Nekropolen: a Fusco, b Viale Orsi, c Giardino Spagna, d S. Lucia, e Contr. Palazzo, C. Ottone
Latomien
B Felsböschung Contr. Palazzo

Figure 14.2. Map of Syracuse 485 415 BC (Drögemüller 1969, 55 Abb. 11).

However, according to the above-mentioned passage, even before the time when it became populous, the *polis* had been surrounded by fortifications. In this case, the Thucydidean reference does not allow us to deduce a precise historical period for this fortification, of which we know of no other literary references – except for a mention by Ovid[38] – nor archeological evidence.[39]

The first to mention a Syracusan fortification would seem to be Herodotus, in connection with Gelon's coming to power in Syracuse. In the Herodotean account we learn that Gelon, after subjugating Syracuse under his rule, leaving Gela to his brother Hiero, ὁ δὲ τὰς Συρηκοϭσας ἐκράτυνε, καὶ ἦσάν οἱ πάντα αἱ Συρήκουσαι.[40] The verb from which a fortification operation by Gelon has been inferred is κρατϭνω,[41] usually rendered in English as 'fortify', although it actually means 'strengthen' (the city), 'make (the city) stronger' (or more secure).[42] Ultimately, this operation is certainly also meant to put in place (or improve) these fortifications around the city. Even so, other military operations carried out by Gelon could have been aimed in the same direction, such us building a fleet (or upgrade an existing one), build arsenals and the like. This being the case, the verb should be translated, in a bid to dispel any ambiguity, in a more general way, *i.e.*, 'make stronger', 'consolidate',[43] and Herodotus's passage would not be the first explicit mention of the existence of fortifications during the age of Gelon but, even more interesting, it would stand for a general military operation aimed at bolstering the *polis*.

During the period in which Syracuse was ruled by Gelon – from 485 to 478/477 – the city was founded again and in the years between 483 and 482: 'for not only did Gelon bring all the people of Camarina to Syracuse and give them its citizenship, razing the township of Camarina, but he did the same thing to more than half of the townsmen of Gela, and when the Megarians in Sicily surrendered to him on terms after a siege, he took the wealthier of them, who had made war on him and expected to be put to death for this, and brought them to Syracuse to be citizens there'.[44] This event was the first significant change in the city demographics as well as being a milestone in Gelon's politics. A sizeable number of ‘immigrants’ was made up of the *pacheis* from the cities of Megara and Euboea, who later became new citizens and landowners thanks to Gelon. Meanwhile, the ‘relocation’ of the aristocracy was followed by a revolution in the land distribution on the *Nesos*, Ortygia, which, combined with the arrival of new settlers from Camarina and from Gela, redefined the urban space. Additionally, a considerable number of slaves were taken from the city to populate the Syracusan hinterland.

Gelon likely separated the new heterogeneous population from the city’s upper class to better control both. He created new residential districts with public buildings and aqueducts to meet the needs of the population, while adapting the urban landscape to the expanding citizenry[45]. Under his rule, the city boundaries grew to cover about 100/120 hectares (its population being estimated at approximately 100,000 individuals).[46]

Consequences of the battle of Himera on the landascape

We can also assume that Gelon built a new seaport and new shelters for the ships as part of his urban overhaul. We know from Diodorus that, after the battle of Himera, Gelon built ‘two temples in which they [Syracusans] should place copies of the treaty [with Carthage]’[47] and ‘[Gelon] built noteworthy temples to Demeter and Core out of the spoils’.[48] Gelon is said to have planned the construction of an aqueduct system.[49] By contrast, we have little archeological evidence of the seaport and no evidence (at all) of new arsenals[50] built during his tyranny. Herodotus relates that, during the war against the Persians in 481, Gelon could have supplied the Hellenic League with 200 triremes, which would suggest the presence of a sizeable fleet in Syracuse.[51] This information does not seem to be backed up by other sources and, as many have claimed, it would be unlikely.[52] In particular, A. Corretti has highlighted how Syracuse would have had the sufficient political and economic conditions to deploy a fleet of this size only in the Hieronian age, when several factors, such as the availability of timber through the control of the Aetnean territory and the favourable relationship with Locri, in addition to the wealth derived from the acquisition of the area around the Strait, would have enabled its realization and, above all, its maintenance. On the other hand, we agree with Fantasia that, although the reliability of the Herodotean data must be reconsidered on account of its importance, various factors concur to contextualise the presence of a powerful navy as early as the Gelon rule, not least the finding in the area south of the small port of Syracuse (known as *Lakkios*)[53] of wall structures thought to be the remains of a complex system of shipsheds (*neosoikoi*),[54] which can be dated back to the end of the Archaic Age.[55] This would explain the theory whereby, as early as Gelon's times, there were structures that could have sheltered many ships, possibly complete with an arsenal that would later be bolstered in the Deinomenid era.[56] The battle of Himera changed the political order of Sicily as the Greek cities of Sicily voluntarily granted the hegemony of the island to Syracuse, thus affecting first and foremost the economy of the *polis*. We have little information on the expansion or the construction of arsenals and fortifications during this period. Literary sources recount how the city's wealth grew, how monuments were erected and how the urban infrastructures were improved. Even so, little can be gleaned from the archeological evidence, with the notable exception of the temple of Athena, built on the highest point of Ortygia and visible to those approaching the island by sea from the west.[57]

New and old citizens vying for the city

Following Gelon's demographic policy and the battle of Himera, Syracuse became, as we learn from Thucydides,[58] quite populous (πολυάνθρωπος). The πολυανθρωπία was, as F. Mattaliano wrote: '*l'implicito corollario di una espansione oltre i confini della polis, a causa della rottura del delicato equilibrio che regola la fissità della corrispondenza tra* oikos, kleros e polites'.[59] This *polis polyanthropos* was either destined to spill over into the surrounding territory or to implode through *staseis*. Syracuse experienced both these events and both the internecine war and the uprisings caused substantial changes in the city and its urban landscape.

As Diodorus relates, the end of the Deinomenids, which was marked by the banishment of Thrasybulus in 466, after a 10 month government, provides vital details on the change of the urban landscape after this initial period of tyranny, while reporting that the island of Ortygia was fortified (ὀχυράν).[60] Diodorus goes on to report that the mercenaries found their current status as part of the community of citizens hardly tolerable after being excluded from the magistracies (τῆς ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαιρεσιῶν τιμῆς ἀπελαυνόμενοι), and, as a result of this, they unanimously rebelled (ἀπέστησαν) against the Syracusans, by occupying Achradine and the *Nesos*, 'both these places having their own well-built fortifications'.[61] The city thus plunged back into civil unrest (Diodorus used the term ταραχή) and the Syracusans countered the uprising by occupying the rest of the city 'and that part of it which faced Epipolae they blocked off by a wall'.[62] Their uprising (likely of *all* citizens) apparently had little effect on the urban layout, except for a wall (possibly a temporary one?)[63] erected to blockade an area northwest of the city that looked onto the Epipolae plateau.

Thus, during the Deinomenid period, the city already had two fortifications, one built around the *Nesos* and another one that surrounded Achradine. Thucydides differentiates[64] between two walls, dividing the inner part of the city, the *Nesos*, περικλυζομένη ('washed all around', 'surrounded' by the sea), from the coast, which in its reconstruction is peripheral to the *Nesos* and is described as προστειχισθεῖσα (included within the walls). The uprisings mentioned earlier also provide information about this state of affairs, *i.e.*, that the two areas of Ortygia and Achradine each had a *diateichisma*, a fortification wall that divided them from the rest of the city. The 'spatial' division was certainly not only such, since both Thrasybulus and the rebellious mercenaries occupied the two areas to oppose the citizenry, who we can safely assume had settled for the most part in the other two city districts, Tyche and Neapolis, whose spaces had by then been clearly 'separated' from the seats of power. This gives us two elements on the history of the urban topography of the city. On the one hand, it demonstrates that the policy of radical division between the 'spaces of power' and 'the spaces of citizenry' subsequently drawn by Dionysus was simply the evolution (and the radicalisation) of a process that had already been under way during the Deinomenid period and, in particular, with Gelon. It is not – as some sources often seem to point out – a trait exclusive to Dionysius's politics. On the other hand, the spatial division also allows us to read beyond our sources to appreciate the extent of the change that must have taken place – both in the *chora* and, especially, in the city – as mercenaries were banished and as their lands and possessions were reallocated among the first citizens, namely the heirs to the original core group of founders of the *polis* to which new members were added with various reinforcements.[65]

'Applied' poliorcetics: life in the city under siege

The Syracusan landscape changed dramatically during the Athenian invasion following the 415 expedition.[66] As Thucydides recounts, the city was fortified as soon as the first signs of the imminent war emerged in the winter of 415:

> During the winter the Syracusans built a wall (ἐτείχιζον) on to the city, so as to take in the statue of Apollo Temenites, all along the side looking towards Epipolae, to make the task of circumvallation longer and more difficult, in case of their being defeated (ὅπως μὴ δι' ἐλάσσονος εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν), and also erected a fort at Megara (τὰ Μέγαρα φροϭριον) and another in the Olympieion, and stuck palisades along the sea wherever there was a landing place.[67]

The Athenians and the Syracusans built several fortifications near Epipolae, the large area to the northwest of the *polis*, which had previously been left without walls[68]. Following is a summary of the various stages of the Athenian Siege and, more specifically, of the different structures deployed in Epipolae and Temenites areas[69] (Fig. 14.3):

1. Summer 415: The Athenians erect a stakewall (σταϭρωμα) along the ships and near the Dascon *Akron*;[70] they build a bulwark (λίθοις λογάδην καὶ ξϭλοις διὰ ταχέων ὤρθωσαν; in the area where the enemy could easily attack them; they divert the course of the Anapo (Thuc. 6.66.2–3);
2. Winter 415–414: the Syracusans erect walls in Megara (τὰ Μέγαρα φροϭριον), by the *Olympieion*;[71] they build palisades in the sea near the Great Harbour; they build a fortification that 'closes off' the Temenites (Thuc. 6.75.1);
3. Summer 414: The Athenians build a fort (φροϭριον) near Labdalon (Thuc. 6.97.5);
4. The Athenians build the κϭκλος, a fortified area on the Epipolae plateau by Συκῆ (the southern rim of the plateau)

(Thuc. 6.99.1);[72]

5. The Athenians build a siege wall (ἀποτείχισμα[73]) north of the circular wall (Thuc. 6.99.1);


N
Epipolai
Temenite
Troghilo
Fusco
XXX
Palude Lisimelia
Anapos Palaios
Cocola Palude
Agorà
Lakkios
Syrakoi
Porto Piccolo
Apollonion
Artemision
Athenaion
Fonte Aretusa
Porto Grande
Mare Jonio
0
500m
SIRACUSA DURANTE LA SPEDIZIONE ATENIESE
Acradina e Nesos pretucididee
Mura siracusane del 463 a.C.
" siracusane del 415/414 a.C.
" siracusane trasverse
Kyklos: Muro ateniese semplice (1) e doppio (2)
Kyklos: Campo ateniese (1) e fortificazioni(2)
arsenali
porte
strade
teatro antico
linea di costa: antica (1), attuale (2)

Figure 14.3. Map of Syracuse during the Athenian siege (after Polacco, Mirisola 1999, 211 tav. II).

6. The Syracusans erect a wall (ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος) diagonally from the Athenian one (Thuc. 6.99.3);

7. During the first clash, the Athenians destroy Syracuse's ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος (Thuc. 6.100.3);

8. The Athenians erect a fortification south of the *kyklos*, toward the Lysimeleia swamp (Thuc. 6.101.1);

9. The Syracusans build a second transverse structure (not so much a wall as a palisade: Thucydides uses the verb ἀποσταυρόω)[74] across the swamp (*i.e.*, south of the Athenian wall) and dig a ditch to prevent the Athenians from closing them off to the south while building the fortification as far as the Great Harbour (μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης ἀποτειχίσαι) (Thuc. 6.101.2), but fail to do so;

10. The Athenians stop the Syracusans with a 7–8 stadium-long double wall which reaches as far as the Great Harbour (ἀρξάμενοι ἀπετείχιζον μέχρι τῆς θαλάσσης τείχει διπλῷ) (Thuc. 6.103.1);

11. The Syracusans and their allies build a single transverse

wall across Epipolae (ἀρξάμενοι ἄνω πρὸς τὸ ἐγκάρσιον τεῖχος ἁπλοῦν) (Thuc. 7.4.1);
12. Nicias decides to fortify the Plemmirio area by erecting three forts (τρία φροϭρια) (Thuc. 7.4.4–5)[75];
13. SUMMER 413: the Athenians build a transverse wall near the Great Harbour (Thuc. 7.60.2).

These various military operations give us a clear picture of the areas pertaining to the two armaments.[76] For a period between the winter of 415 and the beginning of the summer of 414, the city remained barricaded by the Athenian fortifications and with limited access by sea to the acropolis from the south due to the *phrouria* at Plemmirio. This condition not only isolated the *polis* from the rest of the eastern coastline but also cut it off for a lengthy stretch of time (about half of the solar year) from Syracuse, from its *chora* and from the rest of Sicily.[77] The Siege certainly put the *polis* to the test, by inflicting not only losses in terms of men and resources for the construction of the various walls, but also economic 'losses' due to the difficulty in transporting resources from the hinterland to the *polis*, as well as from the sea to the *polis*. Thucydides' narration of the battle reveals few clues as to the consequences of the Siege: we know that during the naval battle that took place in the summer of 413, the Syracusans strove to move the market supplies to the beach, forcing those who had edible goods to sell them to feed the crews quickly in time for the next battle.[78] From Thucydides we also learn that during the last year of the Siege, maintaining the mercenary troops and the fleet as well as the garrisons had been weighing on the city for over a year, which fueled Nicias and his army's hope that, if the Siege were to continue for much longer, it would have caused the *polis* to collapse.[79] An economic 'crisis' must have certainly arisen after 3 years of clashes, with an enormous deployment of resources necessary to bear the costs of the war. Nevertheless, the lack of information from the sources on this aspect of the Siege makes any argument on the topic merely speculative.

The use of urban spaces can be investigated more accurately. As shown by the progressive closing off by the Athenians, a number of areas of the city were made inaccessible to the population. From some passages found in Thucydides and an excerpt from Plutarch's *Life of Nicias*, we can gather that in the Epipolae area, near the

Athenian camp, there was a *temenos* dedicated to Heracles, located between the area where the Athenian walls stood and the Syracusan *periteichisma*, the city walls that ran from north to south which, built starting from Epipolae, ended at the Great Harbour.[80] During the fighting, in the summer of 413, as Thucydides and Plutarch inform us, a celebration used to take place in honour of Heracles. Both accounts complement one another. While Thucydides recounts that the celebration lasted for the entire day, Plutarch provides more insights into the backstory: since Nicias and his army had abandoned τὸ μέγα στρατόπεδον καὶ τὰ τείχη τὰ συνάπτοντα πρὸς τὸ Ἡράκλειον ('his main camp and the walls which connected it with the Heracleum'), and since, before then, because of the enemy presence, the Syracusans were unable to perform τὴν εἰθισμένην θυσίαν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ (their customary sacrifice before the battle), θῦσαι τότε τοὺς ἱερεῖς καὶ στρατηγοὺς ἀναβάντας, ἤδη πληρουμένων τῶν τριήρων.[81] While in the case of the *Herakleion*, accessibility to the temple was soon restored (it was also a place dedicated to military sacrifices), other out-of-town sacred places remained inaccessible.[82]

However, this was not the case with the temple of Zeus Olympius, the *polis's* most important out-of-town shrine located west of the Great Harbour (see Fig. 14.1). From *Life of Nicias*[83] we learn that the temple guarded the tablets, which were used for military drafting, engraved with the names of the Syracusans divided by tribe. When the Syracusans fortified Megara, they ensured, as we have seen earlier, that even the *Olympieion* area was made into a *phrourion.*[84] In October of 415, after the Athenians had landed near the *Olympieion* and after the ensuing battle, won by the besiegers, the Syracusans, despite the defeat, ἔς τε τὸ Ὀλυμπιεῖον ὅμως σφῶν αὐτῶν παρέπεμψαν φυλακήν, δείσαντες μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τῶν χρημάτων ἃ ἦν αὐτόθι κινήσωσι ('sent a garrison of their own citizens to the Olympieion, since they were afraid that the Athenians might make off with some of the treasure there').[85] The main sacred area out of town was thus safe and it would be so until the end of the conflict because it was guarded by the Syracusans in addition to being girthed by defensive walls.

To be sure, the Syracusan territory must have included sacred areas, *temene*, sacella, altars devoted to deities or nymphs, to

Demeter and Kore. Diodorus relates an etiological account of a cult held at the Cyane spring, probably from the Thesmophoria, and which supposedly saw Heracles as the founder.[86] After making the rounds of Sicily, Heracles stopped in Syracuse, where he was told about the rape of Kore (which had taken place in Syracuse) and where he instructed the inhabitants of the city to pay homage to the two divinites by celebrating them and by practising sacrifices. Again, Diodorus[87] recalls the origin of the annual celebration held by the Syracusans at the Cyane spring and, in another passage,[88] while relating the incident of the 396 attack against Himilcon's Carthaginian camp by Dionysius's troops, the area where these troops had been lurking overnight is described as ἐπὶ τὸ τῆς Κυάνης ἱερόν. We know of temples dedicated to the two goddesses from one of Diodorus's excerpts, which mentions ναοὺς ἀξιολόγους Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης[89] built with the remains of the battle of Himera and which supposedly stood not in Achradine,[90] but to the west of the city, on the plain of the Anapo river, in an area between the Dionysian walls and the course of the river. This hypothesis, advanced by Polacco, is based on Diodorus's passage (14.63.1), in which he recounts Himilcon's looting of the temples of Demeter and Kore. By placing the area in which the temples were located (τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδινῆς προάστειον, according to Diodorus) outside the city walls and in the area of the Cyane spring, the story of the Carthagininian looting fits perfectly the framework of actions carried out by the Carthaginians in the *Olympieion* area.[91] Furthermore, the distance of the suburb from the *polis*, however great (about an hour's walk), is not unusual if we look at the *proasteia* of other *poleis*, reported by the sources with reference to shrines and tombs.[92]

These are areas which, on account of the fact that they were located outside the fortified area of the city, must have suffered from the Siege and must have become, albeit briefly, deserted places.

The tyrant and the polis: public spaces and the seats of power under Dionysius I

We know from Diodorus that Dionysius, after laying the foundations of his tyranny, left the city to lead his army against the Sicels, who had played – as is common knowledge – a central role in the various alliances during the Athenian Siege and, later, during the 405 Carthaginian attack. While Dionysius besieged Herbessos, one of the Sicel settlements he wanted to subjugate, the Syracusans took advantage of his absence and tried to dethrone him. The tyrant, forced to suspend the siege, hastily returned to Syracuse, barricading himself in the besieged *Nesos*, though he first hired, according to sources, 1200 Campanians and 300 mercenaries.[93] The sedition ended with the defeat of the tyrant's enemies, many of whom were exiled to Aetna. For various reasons, the sedition had significant repercussions on the city. In fact, it caused the introduction of new citizens in the matrix of the community, with the simultaneous expulsion of others. Similarly, it caused the tyrant to react strongly.[94]

We have no further information regarding the reformed community of citizens, other than some of them, who, now exiles in Aetna, had left their families in Syracuse, reluctantly agreed to return to the city at the behest of Dionysius as they were forced to come to terms with the tyrant.

Much better documented are those military operations that changed the face of the city under his rule. Diodorus recounts the first fortification erected in the citadel (ἕτερον τεῖχος ᾠκοδόμει περὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν).[95] Based on the passage and the urban topography it seems quite natural that the acropolis the historian speaks about is the area of Ortygia and that is precisely the island that has been surrounded. Nevertheless, Polacco and Mirisola,[96] while comparing the various excerpts in which the reference to the acropolis of Syracuse appears, have noted how sources have used the binomial ἀκρόπολις (or ἀκροπόλεις) – νῆσος (or *arx/arces* – *insula*) inconsistently. In particular, the recurring use in the sources of such expressions as εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν καὶ τὴν καλουμένην Νῆσον,[97] which seem to refer to a non-correspondence between acropolis and island, could indicate that the acropolis was not the entire island but only part of it (according to the authors this would coincide with the isthmus between the *Nesos* and Achradine) and that later sources are said to have caused the misunderstanding. However, the alternation in the use of one or the other does not give us any hard evidence to prove this theory. Thucydides never uses the term acropolis for Syracuse, while always referring to Ortygia as the *Nesos*, instead. Plato (who has not been considered by scholars) seems more convincing as he mentions the acropolis of the city in letters III and VII regarding his stays in Syracuse: two excerpts provide clues as to its situation. In Pl. *Ep*. 7.349 c–350 a he writes:

> τὸ δὴ μετὰ τοῦτο ἡ πάλαι ἐπιβουλὴ Διονυσίῳ τοῦ μὴ ἀποδοῦναι τὰ Δίωνος χρήματα ἔδοξεν ἔχθρας λόγον ἔχειν ἂν πρός με πιθανόν, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως ἐκπέμπει με, εὑρὼν πρόφασιν ὡς τὰς γυναῖκας ἐν τῷ κήπῳ, ἐν ᾧ κατῴκουν ἐγώ, δέοι θῦσαι θυσίαν τινὰ δεχήμερον· ἔξω δή με παρ᾽ Ἀρχεδήμῳ προσέταττεν τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον μεῖναι. [...] ᾤκουν δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἔξω τῆς ἀκροπόλεως ἐν τοῖς μισθοφόροις· προσιόντες δέ μοι ἄλλοι τε καὶ οἱ τῶν ὑπηρεσιῶν ὄντες Ἀθήνηθεν, ἐμοὶ πολῖται ...[98]


N
Epipolae
Temenite
Fusco
Troghilo
Lakkios
Syrakos
Porto Piccolo
Agora
Acropoli
Apollonion
Artemision
Athenaion
Fonte Aretusa
Palude Lisimelia
Anapos Palaios
Piccola Palude
Porto Grande
Mare Jonio
500m
SIRACUSA IN ETA' DIONIGIANA
Akradina e Nesos pretucididee
Mura siracusane del 415/414 a.C.
" dionigiane certe (1) e presunte (2)
arsenali
porte
strade
teatro antico
linea di costa: attuale (1), antica (2)

Figure 14.4. Map of Syracuse during the tyranny of Dionysius I (after Polacco and Mirisola 1999, 211 tav. III).

The two places quoted in the passage in which the philospher mentions the acropolis are not unambiguous per se with reference to the exact situation of the area. However, they suggest a non-correspondence between island and acropolis: it is indeed unlikely that Plato was sent away from the Island during the rites, while it is more credible that he temporarily stayed in an area of the Island situated away from the tyrant's residence and the nearby sacred sites. Moreover, both the house of Archedemus[99] and the mercenaries’ dwellings are likely to have been situated within the *Nesos*, on account of the tyrant’s policy to keep both the *philoi* and the mercenaries within the confines of the Island. Accessibility to the island was interrupted and the connection between the island and the mainland is said to have ultimately come to a halt. A few years later the military infrastructure of the city of Syracuse underwent significant renovation and development. Its arsenals were boosted reaching their apex. The tyrant, as Diodorus writes, fearing internal as well as external attacks:

> θεωρῶν δὲ τῆς πόλεως τὴν Νῆσον ὀχυρωτάτην οὖσαν καὶ δυναμένην ῥᾳδίως φυλάττεσθαι, ταστην μὲν διῳκοδόμησεν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως τείχει πολυτελεῖ, καὶ πϭργους ὑψηλοὺς καὶ πυκνοὺς ἐνῳκοδόμησε, καὶ πρὸ αὐτῆς χρηματιστήρια καὶ στοὰς δυναμένας ὄχλων ἐπιδέχεσθαι πλῆθος.[100]


N
Tremilia
Epipole
Temenite
Fusco
SYRAKO
Lakkios
Porto Piccolo
Agorà
Apollonion
Athenaion
Fonte Aretusa
Anapo
Via Acrense
Ponte
Tempio di Anapo?
PALUDE LISIMELIA
Anapos Palaios
PICCOLA PALUDE
Olympieion
Porto Grande
MARE JONIO
Torr. Cavalino
Via Elorina
Ciane
Torr. Mortilla
Cozzo Pantano
GRANDE PALUDE
Anapos Kyaneos
Punta Calderini
DASKON
Plemmirio
Punta della Mola
Cavadonna
0
1 km
IDROGRAFIA, LINEA DI COSTA E PALUDI PRINCIPALI NEI PRESSI DI SIRACUSA NELL'VIII–V SEC. A.C.
Porta
" su mura dionigiane
Paludi
Acquitrini
Spiagge
Rete idrografica certa (1) o presunta (2)
1
2
Bordo di pianura alluvionale
Linea di costa attuale
Idrografia attuale, in parte artificiale

Figure 14.5. The paleogeography of the area of the Great Harbour and the Small Harbour according to Polacco and Mirisola (Polacco and Mirisola 1996, tav. III).

Dionysius thus barricaded the *Nesos* within a single fortification, transforming it into a fortress, while protecting its access to the sea and the Small Harbour arsenals (Fig. 14.4). The *Lakkios* became a fortified port:

> ᾠκοδόμησε δ’ἐν αὐτῇ πολυτελῶς ὠχυρωμένην ἀκρόπολιν πρὸς τὰς αἰφνιδίους καταφυγάς, καὶ συμπεριέλαβε τῷ ταστης τείχει τὰ πρὸς τῷ μικρῷ λιμένι τῷ Λακκίῳ καλουμένῳ νεώρια· ταῦτα δ’ ἑξήκοντα τριήρεις χωροῦντα πσλην εἶχε κλειομένην, δι’ ἧς κατὰ μίαν τῶν νεῶν εἰσπλεῖν συνέβαινεν.[101]

The reason why Dionysius strengthened the port becomes clear if we take a look at its supposed original morphology. According to a paleogeographic reconstruction of the area supplied by Polacco and Mirisola, the Small Harbour lay much farther west (and therefore much more ‘inside’ the city) than it does today, since it comprised part of the marshland (the *Syrako*[102]) west of it in addition to the normal area occupied by the port itself (Fig. 14.5).

The consequences of the new defense system can also be noticed in the residential area of Syracuse. An archaic quarry, on which a residential area rose in the classical period, features many wells which Orsi dated, based on their fills, to the end of the 5th century, hypothesising that these wells had been sealed as the area was being redeveloped with the construction of the arsenals and thus turned from a residential to a ‘military’ area.[103] In this case, as B. Basile points out:

> … riusciamo a vedere la testimonianza materiale dello stravolgimento operato da Dionisio sul tessuto urbano; laddove si era già esteso il tessuto abitativo, il tiranno requisisce le aree e le destina al suo progetto, piegando parte dell’assetto urbanistico della città al disegno delle difese interne.[104]

Furthermore, it is legitimate to suppose that Dionysius’s defense politics also aimed to ensure that militarised spaces were not situated near residential areas and that, more importantly, could be easily controlled. These structures were put in place as Dionysius’s tyranny became increasingly exacerbated and as a reaction to the attempts by the Syracusans (particularly its upper class) to oust the tyrant. At the same time, Dionysius started an extensive ‘power construction’ project, which included the erection of his residence, possibly near the isthmus, near the Small Harbour arsenals[105] – or, in other words, the safest area of the island. The place, where the tyrant was presumably based, barred entry to the island from the outside – *i.e.*, from the hinterland and from the areas inhabited by the citizenry – and was linked to the *Lakkios* arsenals, the port which, as we have seen, had been made impregnable. Nonetheless, there is no archeological evidence of the structure.[106] The literary sources mention Dionysius II's 'palace' (which is likely to have been erected by his father). The palace had many rooms, some with 30 beds each, as well as some classrooms and gardens. This was supposedly the place where Plato stayed during his third journey to Syracuse. Forced to stay by the tyrant's hospitality, though eager to leave Sicily and outraged by Dionysius II's treatment of Dion, thus he writes in his seventh letter:

> … πρὸς δὲ καὶ τοστοισιν ἔτι μηδ' ἐθέλῃ με ἐκπέμπειν, αὐτὸς τῶν ναυκλήρων μηδενὶ προστάττων, ἐνδείξηται δὲ πᾶσιν ῥᾳδίως ὡς ἀβουλῶν ἐμὲ ἐκπλεῖν, ἆρά τις ἐθελήσει με ἄγειν ναστην ὁρμώμενον ἐκ τῆς Διονυσίου οἰκίας; – ᾤκουν γὰρ πρὸς τοῖς ἄλλοισιν κακοῖς ἐν τῷ κήπῳ τῷ περὶ τὴν οἰκίαν, ὅθεν οὐδ' ἂν ὁ θυρωρὸς ἤθελέν με ἀφεῖναι μὴ πεμφθείσης αὐτῷ τινος ἐντολῆς παρὰ Διονυσίου.[107]

Most of the information on Dionysius's *tyranneia* is provided by Plato, Diodorus and Plutarch.[108] It is clear that Dionysius had a two-fold aim when he decided to erect his palace right on the isthmus, near the bridge and the embankment that connected Ortygia to Achradine: in fact, this position allowed the tyrant to enter or leave the citadel, while also being clearly visible from Achradine, thus acting as a tangible sign of his power.[109] This fortified island, inhabited only by the tyrant's trusted men, was also the heart of the city's sacred ceremonies and welcomed the most important temples in the history of the city, including the mighty temple of Apollo (the oldest Greek peripteros entirely built in stone, together with that of Artemis), as well as the temples dedicated to Athena and (possibly) Artemis.[110] The sources, as we have seen, provide an account of a barricaded and inaccessible place under the rule of Dionysius. Still, urban places of worship were present in those years. This means that the places of worship must have been accessible at least for the rituals taking place in the *temene*. To be sure, it is true that the only ritual mentioned in relation to Ortygia in those years and performed soon after his tyranny had ended was his funeral, which was conducted by his heir Dionysius II.[111] However, it is unlikely that the religious life of the citizens who had been relegated to the outside of the Island as non-*philoi* of the tyrant took place only outside the walls of Ortygia. We know from Diodorus that, although the island had become a fortress, the tyrant allowed part of it to be used also as a public space. In particular, we know that:

> περὶ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἀμφοτέρας γήμας συνεχεῖς ἑστιάσεις ἐποιεῖτο τῶν στρατιωτῶν καὶ τῶν πλείστων πολιτῶν· ἀπετίθετο γὰρ ἤδη τὸ πικρὸν τῆς τυραννίδος, καὶ μεταβαλλόμενος εἰς ἐπιείκειαν φιλανθρωπότερον ἦρχε τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, οὔτε φονεϭων οὔτε φυγάδας ποιῶν, καθάπερ εἰώθει.[112]

With reference to these banquets, we can perhaps imagine a situation similar to the *basileia* feasts in the Hellenic age.[113] *i.e.*, contexts where a certain degree of accessibility to the *temenos* must have been possible, despite it being regulated and allowed only on certain occasions.[114] The tyrant certainly established new traditions, as is apparent, for example, from his decision to place his own sepulcher inside the Ortygia fortress. Plutarch relates its description in *Life of Dion*. The exceptional nature of an *intra moenia* tomb is confirmed by the presence of the tombs of the tyrants in the *Olympieion* area, which were destroyed by Himilcon ca. 397/6, including the tombs of Gelon and his wife Damarete.[115] Dionysius's choice to place his tomb inside the citadel is obviously related to his use of the *Nesos* as his personal fortress, in addition to his desire to place the funeral monument in an impregnable location as well as having it erected in the heart of the sacred life of the city, thus crowning his political career through his heroization, like a fledgling oecist.

The year after the *Nesos* fortification plan, in 402, Dionysius began his impressive project to close off the *chora* of the *polis* and, more specifically, the part of the city dominated by the Temenite massif by means of a long fortification.[116] This would be the greatest Greek defense system, remembered in ancient historiography for its magnificence as well as for how quickly it was built, which culminated with the erection of the Euryalus Fortress, a sophisticated defensive structure serving as the gateway to the north-western fortifications and standing about 9 km away from the acropolis.


Targetta
Hexapylon
Scala Greca
Cast. Eurialo
Porta VIII
Porta IX (Dionisio)
EPIPOLAI
Porta X
Tremilia
Anapo
F. Ciane

Figure 14.6. The plateau of Epipolai (© D-DAI-ROM-SYR-Pläne by M. Schützenberger).

Chora and fortifications: changes in the rural landscape under Dionysius I

The Athenian Siege of 414 famously ended with the victory of Syracuse. However, it left the Syracusans with a heavy burden to carry due to the unexpected strategy adopted by the enemies, who isolated the *polis* from its *chora* and the Epipolae area.[117] Dionysius:

> εἰδὼς οὖν κατὰ τὸν Ἀττικὸν πόλεμον τὴν πόλιν ἐκ θαλάττης εἰς θάλατταν ἀποτετειχισμένην, εὐλαβεῖτο μήποτε παραπλησίοις ἐλαττώμασι περιπεσὼν ἀποκλεισθῇ τῆς εἰς τὴν χώραν ἐξόδου· εὐφυῶς γὰρ ἑώρα κειμένας τὰς καλουμένας Ἐπιπολὰς κατὰ τῆς πόλεως τῶν Συρακοσίων.[118]

The Epipolae area (Fig. 14.6) was uninhabited throughout the history of the city. Nonetheless, this area was important because it provided a connection between Syracuse and the hinterland, and after 402, with the construction of approximately ten gates and the impressive Euryalus Fortress, it took on new functions. Around the end of the 5th century, the political situation changed profoundly: the Syracusans had indeed foiled the attack by Athens, but they had also been subjected to a lengthy and costly war, which – although our sources do not cover this aspect extensively – must have hit them hard, especially financially, so much so that the threat of a fresh attack, this time by the Carthaginians, loomed ominously over the *polis*. This led to the subsequent military operations, orchestrated by Dionysius I, aimed at boosting the city's weaponry and defense system.[119] The Dionysian walls are also located within this broad defensive plan.[120] Besides its monumental scale and sophisticated implementation,[121] what must be stressed here are the ramifications that the fortification had on the city. As Beste and Mertens have aptly pointed out with regard to the meaning of the Dionysian fortifications in the tyrant's defensive strategy, the entire structure is: 'a peri-urban or "countryside" defense system', a *Landschaftsfestung*,[122] which played different roles: act as a boundary of an '*area di rispetto*' – to use a felicitous expression by G. Nenci – that is to say, to act as a boundary of an area designated to welcome the population of the *chora* in case of danger; ward off enemies from an area that could have been used to create a circular wall; lastly, secure a space to conduct retaliatory military operations.[123] To be sure, the grandeur of this defensive system, combined with the fortifications of the *Nesos* and the structures erected under the rule of Dionysius, both during their construction (due to the deployment of men) and afterwards, had a considerable impact outside the city as well as inside. The roles and the ramifications that led to the construction of this defense system cannot however be narrowed down to military reasons only. Nor to the representation of the tyrant's power. Their implementation was possible thanks to the resources available to the city, both in terms of agricultural production and workforce. However, the waste of resources due to the construction work does not seem to affect the city after its completion, since we know that the city became even more powerful and prosperous following Dionysius's tyrannical rule.[124] On the other hand, the use of labour had several consequences on the territory and on the social and economic structure of the city. If Diodorus's estimate that about 60,000 men had been employed in the construction work is a hyperbolic figure, about half that number, or slightly less, should nonetheless be taken into account when considering such an enterprise. Such a number of individuals, coming not only from the *polis* but also from the surrounding areas and even further afield,[125] meant a considerable overhaul of the economic resources as well as, it is safe to surmise, the erection of a number of 'living/building sites' along the walls. The Dionysian fortification study case is a *unicum* among documented Greek fortifications. In fact, Diodorus takes on the role of an exceptional narrator, who 'documents', or rather weaves a narrative surrounding the construction of the walls, the organisation of the works, by even providing figures (albeit unlikely ones) on the workforce and the time spent to complete the works. Admittedly, the distance separating him from the events and the echo from the various traditional sources funneled into his account[126] do not make the Agyrion historian always reliable. Nevertheless, the information he collects about this structure is much more than we have (or that we can glean) for other Greek defensive structures. A fact which, unfortunately, cannot be traced in his account, and which instead we believe can be of great interest for the history of the city under Dionysius's rule and subsequent periods, is the economic factor, which would complete the 'time-cost-workforce-materials-techniques' equation within the *building experience*,[127] *i.e.*, the number of elements necessary for the historical definition of fortifications. However, starting from the data supplied by Diodorus on the work-force and on the estimates of time required to complete the construction, a similar calculation has been performed by H. Tréziny, who has calculated the overall costs of the fortification project.[128]

Closing such a vast territory to the outside world was certainly a great change for the population living in the Syracusan countryside, both for those living within the walls and for those on the outside. The presence of a dozen (certainly guarded) doors along the entire defensive perimeter and placed at the junction of the main communication routes and the rest of the *chora* enabled the exchange of goods and the movement of people. The Dionysian fortifications thus created a dividing line between one side of the *chora* and the other, affecting their socioeconomic balance while increasing control over some areas and closing off others to the outside. Conversely, these doors failed to affect the urban landscape *sensu stricto*, *i.e.*, the landscape closed off by the city's fortifications.[129]

As is common knowledge, Dionysius's defensive system lost its military function after Syracuse was seized by Marcellus in 212. Before then, however, when the structure was still 'operative', the *polis* was no longer attacked via the Epipolae access area. Under Dionysius's tyrannical rule, Himilcon II's Carthaginians entered the city via the Great Harbour, then the only area 'exposed' to enemy attacks.[130] While this confirms the importance of the defensive strategy put in place by Dionysius, it also allows us to subsequently observe a change in the city itself, with a surge in settlements in areas previously uninhabited, such as the one close to the Euryalus Fortress, where a settlement dates back to the 4th century, which could be only an example of a series of rural 'villages' built within the fortifications after (or during, to then continue to be lived in) their erection and which could provide clues as to the population living in this part of the Syracusan *chora*, a fact which, to this day, remains completely obscure.[131]

Conclusions

The wars, sieges, seditions and the short-lived battles that afflicted the *polis* of Syracuse changed its landscape in different manners, often compromising the public life in specific areas of the city while affecting their demographic development. The major consequences the war had on Syracuse were often related to the varying number of its citizens or to internal changes and the vertical mobility within its citizenry. The city's architecture, too, changed in the time span being scrutinised, following the internal political changes and, more specifically, during the tyrannical rule of Gelon and Dionysius. While under Gelon the monumental extent of public buildings was curbed, prioritising infrastructures instead (*e.g.*, new living quarters and large acqueducts), under Dionysius the architecture of power becomes a fully emblematic expression of the history of the *polis*; Syracuse changes its appearance, both in the eyes of its citizens and of the rest of Sicily and the Greek world, by flaunting its weaponry, arsenals and the fortified port with its likely permanent fleet, its walls, the Euryalus Fortress, the *tyranneia* and the fortified island, the symbols of power whose echo would reach from one end of the Mediterranean to the other.

If we look at the different elements of the landscape based on their roles *vis-àvis* one another, it is clear how the whole complex of Dionysian structures emerges, especially according to Diodorus's account, as a 'system' within which the various aspects of Dionysius's politics materialise in the structures the tyrant erects inside and outside the urban landscape over a short period of time and by investing large resources. In this sense, the city changes its face: according to an evolution that had begun as early as Gelon, Ortygia and the acropolis (which, as a certain interpretation of the sources seems to indicate, ought not to be superimposed) become the political linchpin of the *polis*; according to the sources and the echo that has reverberated since, the tyrant's residence becomes a key topographical element in the urban landscape (take the case of its gardens and its halls, where hospitality was offered and religious celebrations performed). The fulcrum of the *polis* at this stage of history is not the *agora*, but the Ortygia stronghold and the *tyranneia* (and in this sense, Syracuse's topography could resemble the topography of Alexandria in Egypt, or, rather, that of Mausolus's Halicarnassus).

While the evolution of the urban landscape within the city from Gelon to Dionysius is defined in these terms, Dionysius's work on the *chora* is altogether novel compared to Deinomenid politics: the closing off of the portion of territory within the walls, the result of a policy aimed at strengthening the military in view of the clash with the Carthaginians, also puts in place a new strategy as far as the surrounding territory is concerned. A strategy that wields more control but, quite realistically, also improves the communication routes both inside and outside the fortification walls. The existence of a 'protection barrier' against the outside would have certainly been conducive to the development of small settlements, wherever the terrain allowed it, which could have grown out of smaller assemblages during the construction of the walls and which have tentatively been defined as 'living/building sites'. These villages could have in part modified the way people settled in the area both within the walls and outside as well as in its immediate surroundings.[132] By this we do not mean to deny what has already been established by Drögemüller, *i.e.*, that the Epipolae area was not part of city proper and was not densely populated. Rather, we wish to put forward the hypothesis that there were some forms of settlement in that part of the *chora*, in connection with the economic activities in the territory and that these were affected first by the deployment of forces and resources used for the construction of the walls and later by the presence of the *Landschaftsfestung*, which stood between the two sides of the *chora*.[133]

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[*] This paper is the result of a research project conducted at the University of British Columbia. I want to thank Dr M. Jonasch, Prof. F. De Angelis, Prof. S. De Vido and Prof. M. Frasca for their precious and helpful suggestions. Any errors or omissions are my sole responsibility. All the dates that have been quoted, unless expressly stated otherwise, are to be understood as BC.

[1] Given the continuity of settlement of the city and the presence of ruins of the ancient city in the subsequent building phases, Syracuse was constantly the subject of studies that attempted to reconstruct its ancient cityscape, often starting from the (not always reliable) Ciceronian description of some of the places found in the city. Thus, from the work by Tommaso Fazello until around the start of the 19th century, the criterion for analysing the cityscape was exclusively based

on the information drawn from literary evidence used as a sort of tour guide to the city (*cf.* Zirone in Ampolo *et al.* 2011, 145–147). Only the work by Cavallari and Holm, published in 1883, combines the analysis of literary sources carried out by Holm with the topographical reconstruction by Cavallari (which in part no longer holds true today based on new findings), who conducted archeological research in various areas of the city. Before this time, we go by Zirone's definition of a 'pre-scientific' era (Zirone in Ampolo *et al.* 2011, 145).

[2] Leake 1850.

[3] Grote 1851–1866, 12 voll. *passim*.

[4] Thus Holm (Cavallari and Holm 1883, 320).

[5] To be sure, Syracuse was also engaged in wars that took place outside its walls. The latter, however, will not be the object of this investigation, not because they influenced the fate of the *polis* to a lesser extent, but because they were concerned with the urban landscape indirectly. I am referring, for example, to the indirect consequences that the victory of the battle of Himera had on Syracuse: thanks to the spoils of war, the city went through a new and important building and monumentalisation phase. In this regard see, among the most recent publications: Adornato 2006; Mertens 2006, 313–314.

[6] There are numerous studies of war in the ancient world. For and in-depth review of the works published in the 1998–2009 decade, see the comprehensive review by Bettalli (2011). For an updated bibliography on what has been published in the last decade, see *e.g.*: Masseria and Loscalzo 2011; Payen 2012a; 2012b; Bettalli 2013; Brouwers 2013; Campbell and Tritle 2013; De Vido 2013b; Contamine *et al.* 2015; Fabre-Serris and Keith 2015; Franchi and Proietti 2015; Pritchard 2015; Connolly *et al.* 2016; Payen 2018; Bettalli 2019.

[7] Bettalli (2011, 252–253), who rightly points out how important the implications of a siege can be for the political, social and economic life of the city, by speculating that the lack of historio-graphical interest that has prevented scholars from delving into the topic (which is not a mere description of the war event *per se*) may derive, on the one hand, from the technical challenge posed by the subject and, on the other hand, from the difficulty in interpreting and dating the structures. In the last decade (Bettalli's review was last updated in 2009), much has been written about fortifications in the ancient world, a subject that has enjoyed a renewed historical and archeological interest (see bibliography for an updated list); while less attention has been paid to poliorcetics. The following studies are worth mentioning among the most recent ones: Whitehead 2010; Pimouguet-Pédarros 2012; Labarre 2012. Despite the remarkable in-depth study of fortifications and, more specifically, of the relationship between fortifications and urban

landscape, the theme of the economic and social implications linked to individual sieges remains to be investigated (while the relationship between fortification and politics between the Archaic Period and the 3rd century has been masterfully investigated by Garlan (1974), although his work would deserve to be updated).

[8] In this regard see among the most recent studies: Gehrke 1985; Loraux 1995; Moggi 1999; Radici Colace and Sergi 2000; Bearzot 2001; Intrieri 2002; Weed 2007; Van Wees 2008; Vitali 2010; Daverio Rocchi 2013; Gray 2015; Aloni 2016; Driscoll 2016; Rocher 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; Grote 2017.

[9] *Cf.* Sereni 1961, 29.

[10] While today they represent a vibrant field of study, fortifications have been an element of the urban landscape that had been rather neglected in archeological studies, ancient architecture and history before the 20th century. However, the field of study on the fortifications of the ancient world is mainly dominated by archeology and architecture, a condition that, in many cases, has led historians to show little interest in this field. While the architecture and archeology studies on fortifications began as early as the 1980s, it was only with the 21st century that the works on the theme of fortifications began to contemplate – as part of the architectural and archeological structural analysis of individual cases – a social, historical and political analysis that interprets fortifications ‘as complex results and mirrors of the interaction between the natural environment and social, political and cultural systems’ (Müth *et al.* 2016, x). However, this field of study – as is the case with Syracuse – remains the domain of archeological studies, although increasingly accompanied by historical interpretations (see, among others: Bejor 2007; Frederiksen 2011; Müth *et al.* 2016; Ballmer *et al.* 2018 and, as for Syracuse, Beste and Mertens 2015). The reason behind this myopic vision displayed by historians regarding the theme of fortifications is likely due, to this very day, to the specialized nature of the evidence being scrutinised as well as to the publications on the subject, in which a focus on the architectural features of the structures seemed to prevail up to a decade ago.

[11] *Cf.* Frederiksen 2011, 20–22. The etymology of the word goes back to τεϭχω, meaning ‘produce by work or art; esp. of material things, make, build’, LSJ *s.v.* τεϭχω. The term can also mean ‘fortress’ or ‘fort’, though it recurs more frequently with the meaning of ‘walls’, ‘fortification’. See also Maier 1961, 78.

[12] Frederiksen 2011, 22. This work is a landmark study for the investigation of ancient terminology concerning poliorcetics.

[13] *e.g.* Hom. *Il.* 6.388; IG XII.3 86 (*cf.* SEG 19.546; Maier 1959, n. 47; Frederiksen 2011, 22).

[14] *e.g.* Hom. *Il.* 7.436.

[15] *e.g.* Hdt. 5.77.3. For the use of the term to designate the walls of the acropolis *cf.* Frederiksen 2011, 22–23. There are sporadic and particular cases in which *teichos* is not used to designate walls relating to fortifications. For an in-depth discussion of the subject see Frederiksen 2011, 23, n. 40.

[16] 'The wall of a city or part thereof', LSJ s.v. σχοινιά (II), which mentions Strabo's example 8.6.21.

[17] Among its different meanings, the term also has that of 'circular fortress' and this is the meaning, as we shall see, in Thuc. 6.99 regarding the Athenian fortifications built during the Syracusan Siege in the city *chora*. It is, however, a more specific term than *teichos* as it designates fortifications clearly characterised by a marked circular shape. The meaning remains ambiguous: Frederiksen relates the use of this term in Dem. *De cor.* 300.2 with reference to the walls around Piraeus and in Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.11 with reference to the walls surrounding Corinth. *Cf.* Frederiksen 2011, 25, n. 59; *cf. infra* and n. 72 for the Syracusan example.

[18] 'Area enclosed, enclosure', LSJ *s.v.* περίβολος (II, 2). According to a procedure similar to the one concerning the *kyklos*, the term is used to refer to any space enclosed by walls.

[19] The term, reported by, among others, Frederiksen *et al.* (2016, 179) recurs with the meaning of 'fortress' and sometimes as 'fortification' (from the verb ὀχυρόω, 'fortify', LSJ *s.v.*) *e.g.* in Polyb. 4.6.3 or in Diod. Sic. 14.7.3 (ὠχυρωμένην ἀκρόπολιν: with reference to the fortifications built by Dionysius around the citadel) and is used in later sources. Besides ὀχϭρωμα, the authors also mention the term φροϭριον, which, however, turns out to be synonymous with *teichos* only in its sense of 'fortress', and not in the sense of 'fortification' (*cf.* Frederiksen 2011, 20, n. 3; Nielsen 2002, 49–64).

[20] *Cf.* Buck 1945, words in –μα.

[21] LSJ *s.v.* τείχισμα.

[22] LSJ *s.v.* ἀντιτείχισμα.

[23] LSJ *s.v.* ἀποτείχισμα (recurring with reference to fortifications built by the Athenians during the 414 Siege of Syracuse, Thuc. 6.99).

[24] LSJ *s.v.* διατείχισμα.

[25] LSJ *s.v.* παρατείχισμα.

[26] LSJ *s.v.* περιτείχισμα.

[27] LSJ *s.v.* προτείχισμα.

[28] LSJ *s.v.* ὑποτείχισμα (also recurring with reference to the erection of Syracusan 'transverse' fortifications during the Siege of Syracuse, Thuc. 6.99).

[29] Among the various terms listed, διατείχισμα is of considerable

interest: the word indicates a wall built within the city perimeter in addition to external fortification. The best-known structures of this type are certainly the walls of the acropolis. Built to encircle a particular area of the city, these are conceived as a further security measure and as a partition between areas of the city with a greater or lesser need for protection; hence, they divide the urban space according to a ‘spatial hierarchy’. *Cf.* Sokolicek 2009, 33. Although the functions of the *diateichismata* generally concern defense, these structures nonetheless embody, perhaps more than others, different functions within the urban space: *e.g.* separating different social or ethnic groups within the *polis* (Thuc. 3.34.2; Strabo 3.4.8; *cf.* Sokolicek 2009, 31 and cat. no. 39); dividing spaces with different functions and a with a different politically strategic importance. Although even in the case of Syracuse the term seems fit to describe the walls dividing the acropolis from the rest of the *polis*, it is necessary to stress that this is never found in other sources on the city.

30 Garlan 1986.

31 At that time great interest was expressed to understand the evolution of defensive structures also in relation to warfare, *i.e.*, to the inventions that changed poliorcetics, in particular in the period between the 8th and 3rd centuries. See Garlan 1986.

32 Ducrey 1986, 141–142.

33 Müth *et al.* 2016b, 131.

34 Müth 2016, 185.

35 Consider for example the need, mentioned by Aristotle, to set up communal canteens in areas close to the fortifications where military stations were located: ‘And since the multitude of citizens must be distributed in separate messes, and the city walls must be divided up by guard-posts and towers in suitable places [τὰ δὲ τείχη διειλῆφθαι φυλακτηρίοις καὶ πϭργοις κατὰ τόπους ἐπικαίρους], it is clear that these facts themselves call for some of the messes to be organized at these guard-posts’ (Arist. *Pol.* 1331a, 19–23; trans. H. Rackham). Both the preparation and the organisation of the canteens and other economic activities tied to the presence of men stationed near the walls were part of the economic activities of the *polis*.

36 Berger 1992, 34.

37 Thuc. 6.3.2: ‘Syracuse was founded the year afterwards by Archias, one of the Heraclids from Corinth, who began by driving out the Sicels from the island upon which the inner city now stands, though it is no longer surrounded by water: in process of time the outer town also was taken within the walls and became populous’ (trans. J.M. Dent and E.P. Dutton).

38 Ovid seems to have been the first to mention the Syracusan

fortifications in *The Metamorphoses* (Ov. *Met.* 5, vv. 407–408: *et qua Bacchiadae, bimari gens orta Corintho, inter inaequales posuerunt moenia portus*). However, the subsequence of the excerpt makes this piece of information quite unreliable.

[39] *Cf.* Polacco 1990, 41; Polacco and Mirisola 1998, 16; Beste and Mertens 2015, 246–247.

[40] Hdt. 7.156.1.

[41] ‘Strengthen’, LSJ *s.v.* κρατύνω. The lexicon features Herodotus’s very passage as the first example.

[42] Thus, *e.g.*, Legrand in the 1963 edition of *Les Belles Lettres* (*lui-même fortifia Syracuse*); F. Bevilacqua in the 1996 UTET edition (*lui stesso invece fortificava Siracusa*). Erroneously A.D. Godley, in the 1922 Loeb edition, in which the verb is translated as ‘reign’ (‘over Syracuse he reigned’): although the verb may mean ‘rule, govern’, in this context it would be tautological, since, shortly before, the historian writes that Gelon supposedly conquered Syracuse while renouncing to reign (ἐπικρατέω) over Gela. The ambiguity derived from the translation of this term is certainly connected with the most common meaning of the verb both in Italian and in French (unlike English where ‘strengthen’ does not have the same ambiguity as ‘fortify’) of ‘providing a given place with a defensive system’ rather than ‘making it stronger’.

[43] Although both Rocci 1990, *s.v.* κρατύνω and Bailly 1966, *s.v.* κρατύνω use the Herodotean passage to illustrate the meaning of the verb when referred to a *polis* by translating it into ‘fortificare’ (*fortifier*), Nenci (ed. Lorenzo Valla 2017) translated the passage more accurately: ‘*Egli, occupata Siracusa, considerò di minor conto comandare su Gela, che affidò a suo fratello Ierone,* e rendeva più forte *Siracusa: Siracusa era tutto per lui*’.

[44] Hdt. 7.156. Sources regarding the events narrated by Herodotus also include: Thuc. 6.4.2; 6.5.3; 6.94.1; Philist. *FGrH* 556 F 15, *ap. schol. Pind., Ol.* 5.19 c; Tim. *FGrH* 566 F 19, *ap. schol. Pind., Ol.* 5.19 a–b; Strabo 10.1.15; Polyaenus, *Strat.* 1.27.3.

[45] One of the new areas created as a result of the entry of new citizens could be the residential area found in the area where the shrine of the Madonna delle Lacrime is located (west of via Piave and up to the Hellenistic theatre), which grew following the demographic surge of the 4th and 5th centuries. The urban layout of this area was documented thanks to the 1987 excavation to the east of the Amphitheater (near the intersection between Corso Gelone, viale P. Orsi and viale Teracati; *cf.* Voza 1998).

[46] *Cf.* De Angelis 2016, 184. Two new areas were probably built in the pre-existing area of the cemeteries and to the north of them.

[47] Diod. Sic. 11.26.2.

[48] Diod. Sic. 11.26.7.

[49] This hypothesis has also been shared by Bouffier (1987, 682). A Thucydidean excerpt relating to the Athenian Siege recalls the destruction by the Athenians in 414 of Syracuse’s drinking water canals, which had been built underground (Thuc. 6.100.1: οἳ ἐς τὴν πόλιν ὑπονομηδὸν ποτοῦ ὕδατος ἠγμένοι ἦσαν). However, according to Wilson and Mertens, the aqueducts ought to be placed in a Hellenistic-Roman context. Thus Mertens 2006, 313: ‘Alle diese Anlagen sind aber von einem Aufwand und einer technischen Fortschrittlichkeit, wie sie im 5. Jh. nicht denkbar sind, zumal die konkreten Befundumstände fur eine Entstehung in hellenistischer, ja möglicherweise erst römischer Zeit sprechen‘. See also Wilson 1996, 12–15.

[50] *Cf.* Cavallari and Holm, 1883, 254–257; Basile 2002, 147–175; Blackman *et al.* 2013, 535–541.

[51] Gelon declared his willingness to travel to Greece with 200 triremes, 20,000 hoplites, 2000 light cavalrymen, 2000 heavily armoured cavalrymen, 2000 archers and 2000 slingers (Hdt. 7.158.4: ἀλλ’ ἑτοῖμός εἰμι βοηθέειν παρεχόμενος διηκοσίας τε τριήρεας καὶ δισμυρίους ὁπλίτας καὶ δισχιλίην ἵππον καὶ δισχιλίους τοξότας καὶ δισχιλίους σφενδονήτας καὶ δισχιλίους ἱπποδρόμους ψιλοσς).

[52] *Cf.* Galvagno 2000, 33-35; Cataldi 2005, 142; Corretti 2006, 419–421; Fantasia forthcoming.

[53] Diod. Sic. 14.7.3.

[54] *Cf.* Basile 2002, 150–159.

[55] Based on the presence of ceramic fragments found at the lower levels of the structures and datable to before the 6th century.

[56] Fantasia notes how the beginning of the 5th century is a plausible historical context for the dissemination of the necessary technology and craftsmanship required to set up an arsenal and a fleet of triremes. On the one hand, the presence of similar structures in Naxos documented by the end of the 6th century – early 5th century – would provide the evidence (Blackman and Lentini 2010); on the other hand: *‘il trasferimento in Occidente, all’indomani del fallimento della rivolta ionica, di comunità e di individui come i Sami che andarono ad occupare Zancle e Dionisio di Focea, colui che aveva invano cercato di insegnare i rudimenti della guerra navale agli Ioni e che dopo Lade si diede a praticare la pirateria a danno di Cartaginesi ed Etruschi usando probabilmente come base Lipari’*, Fantasia forthcoming.

[57] While it is clear that the construction of the temple of Athena had to follow the victorious battle won by Gelon (see Amara in this volume), far less obvious are the reasons why it was decided (during the reorganisation of the sacred area around Ortygia on which the cathedral stands today) to interrupt or not complete the erection of the other

temple, the temple of Artemis, of which some material was supposedly reused for the adjacent temple of Athena. For a brief overview of the issue *cf.* Mertens 2006, 314; Gullini 1985, 471.

58 Thuc. 6.3.2.

59 Mattaliano 2012, 130.

60 Diod. Sic. 11.67.7–8: Θρασϭβουλος δὲ ὁρῶν τὴν πόλιν ὅλην ἐπ'αὐτὸν στρατευομένην, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπεχείρει λόγῳ καταπαϭειν τὴν στάσιν· ὡς δ'ἑώρα τὴν ὁρμὴν τῶν Συρακοσίων ἀκατάπαυστον οὖσαν, συνήγαγεν ἔκ τε τῆς Κατάνης τοὺς κατοικισθέντας ὑφ' Ἱέρωνος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συμμάχους, ἔτι δὲ [καὶ] μισθοφόρων πλῆθος, ὥστε τοὺς ἅπαντας γενέσθαι σχεδὸν περὶ τοὺς μυρίους πεντακισχιλίους. οὗτος μὲν οὖν τῆς πόλεως κατειληφὼς τὴν ὀνομαζομένην Ἀχραδινὴν καὶ τὴν Νῆσον ὀχυρὰν οὖσαν, καὶ ἐκ τοϭτων ὁρμώμενος, διεπολέμει πρὸς τοὺς ἀφεστῶτας. 'When Thrasybulus saw that the whole city was in arms against him, he at first attempted to stop the revolt by persuasion; but after he observed that the movement of the Syracusans could not be halted, he gathered together both the colonists whom Hieron had settled in Catana and his other allies, as well as a multitude of mercenaries, so that his army numbered all told almost fifteen thousand men. Then, seizing Achradine, as it is called, and the Island, *which was fortified*, and using them as bases, he began a war upon the revolting citizens' (trans. C.H. Oldfather).

61 Diod. Sic. 11.73.1: ἀμφοτέρων τῶν τόπων τοϭτων ἐχόντων ἴδιον τεῖχος καλῶς κατεσκευασμένον.

62 Diod. Sic. 11.73.2.

63 Diodorus uses the term τοῖχος (wall of a house or enclosure; wall of a temple, LSJ *s.v.* τοῖχος), previously used by Homer and which often appears to indicate house walls or internal walls. *Cf.* Chantraine 1984, vol. II, *s.v.* τοῖχος for the use and etymology of the term.

64 Thuc. 6.3.2.

65 Arist. *Pol.* 5.3.1303 a–b; Diod. Sic. 11.72.3–73; 11.76.1–2; *POxy.* 665 = *FGrH* 577 F 1. On the subject of land reallocation in the Siceliot colonial context, see Asheri 1980; Consolo Langher 2005; Cecchet 2009.

66 The siege took place between April and June of 414 according to Dover's reconstruction (*cf.* Dover 1965a, 95). However, the first stages and the erection of the earliest structures took place starting from the winter of 415 (Thuc. 6.71.2 and 75.1).

67 Thuc. 6.75.1.

68 Several reconstructions have been carried out based on the information supplied by Thucydides on the various stages of the Siege. In particular, see the book VI edited by Dover (1965a, VIII); the appendix to Polacco 1990; the geomorphological reconstruction by

Polacco and Mirisola is more accurate (Polacco and Mirisola 1999, tav. II). On the Athenian expedition and the various stages of the battle, see: Cavallari and Holm 1883, 198–239; Polacco 1990; Giangiulio 1997; Polacco 1998.

69 Here we will focus only briefly on the different types of fortifications put in place by the Syracusans and the Athenians during the conflict, given both the extensive bibliography on the subject and the extent required to cover such a topic.

70 This is a rocky outcrop of no particular altitude in the bay of the Great Harbour.

71 In the area of the Temple of Olympian Zeus, lying on a plateau south of the Anapo river, about 1 km away from the current coastline and from the beach located halfway from the Great Harbour: the sacred area was part of a wider inhabited area referred to as ἐπὶ τῇ ἐν τῷ Ὀλυμπιείῳ πολίχνῃ (*i.e.*, small town, village) in Thuc. 7.4.6 and which Diodorus refers to as Πολίχνη.

72 The area was supposed to be a section of the plateau that the Athenians had chosen to fortify to make room for a safe haven throughout the siege. Thus Dover: '… it was not necessarily circular; the *kyklos* is used of a perimeter enclosing an area on any shape' (Dover 1965a, 97). Dover also notes how Thucydides ordinarily defines the structure as '*the* Circle', as though his readers were aware that such a structure played a central role during the Syracusan Siege.

73 The term ἀποτείχιζειν, just like περιτείχιζειν, generally means to surround the city with defensive walls. However, as Garlan brilliantly noted, both in Thucydides and in the description of the Syracusan Siege, the two verbs (or the nouns and the adjective derived from them) are systematically used to varyingly indicate the two siege perspectives: the Syracusan one and the Athenian one. While ἀποτείχισμα stresses that '*l'obstacle qu'il constitue pour des assiégés de plus en plus coupés du reste de la Sicile'* and it is thus used to point to the Syracusan standpoint, in fact, it '*concrétise le craintes des Syracusains'*; the term περιτείχισμα '*servent exclusivement aux Athéniens das leurs discours ou à Thucydide exposant la situation d'un point de vue athénien. Le préfixe définit ce vers quoi tendent tous leurs efforts. … Par une simple substitution de préfixe, Thucydide revêt donc le fait brut que constitue le mur athénien d'une signification qui varie en fonction de l'observateur; de l'ambiguïté de la terminologie, il tire des effects dramatiques qui concourent à l'intelligence des faits'*. The semantic pregnancy of the use of the two prefixes in this context is not found in Diodorus, who uses only ἀποτειχίζειν and derived terms, whereas it is found in Plutarch's *Life of Nicias* excerpt, where the corresponding event is mentioned. This may be explained by filiation of Plutarch's narration by way of Thucydides' passage (see Gomme 1966, I, 71 in this regard).

Cf. Garlan 1974, 109–111.

[74] ‘Fence off with a palisade’, LSJ *s.v.* ἀποσταυρόω.

[75] The promontory closing off the Great Harbour to the south.

[76] *Cf*. Dover 1965a, tab. I; Polacco and Mirisola 1999, tav. II.

[77] For data about Syracuse’s *chora* in the classical age, see Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 225–226, n. 47; De Angelis 2016, 143. As regards the perception of the Athenian fortifications by the Syracusans, see Garlan on the Thucydidean use of ἀποτειχίζειν (*cf*. *supra* note 73).

[78] Thuc. 7.39–40.

[79] Thuc. 7.48–49.

[80] For *Herakleion* see: Thuc. 7.73.2; Plut. *Vit. Nic*. 24.6.

[81] Plut. *Vit. Nic*. 24.6: ‘Then he stationed the remainder of his army along the shore of the harbor, abandoning his main camp and the walls which connected it with the Heracleum. And so it was that the Syracusans, who had so long been unable to offer their customary sacrifice to Heracles, offered it then priests and generals going up to the temple for this purpose while their triremes were a-manning’ (trans. B. Perrin).

[82] Little has been published recently on the temples and shrines located near Syracuse in the classical age. In this respect, see the research conducted by Annibaletto 2001/02.

[83] Plut. *Vit. Nic*. 14.6–7.

[84] Thuc. 6.75.1. *Cf*. *supra* point (2) of the summary of the Siege.

[85] Thuc. 6.70.4: ‘The Syracusans rallied together again at the road to Helorus, formed up as well as they could under circumstances, and even sent a garrison of their own citizens to the Olympieion, since they were afraid that the Athenians might make off with some of the treasure there’ (trans. R. Warner). Plutarch, too, relates the incident, emphasising, more so than Thucydides, that it was the Athenians’ precise desire to conquer the shrine for the many ἀναθήματα in silver and gold kept in the temple and recounting how the looting would have earned Nicias the badge of impiety (Plut. *Vit. Nic*. 16.7).

[86] Diod. Sic. 4.23.4.

[87] Diod. Sic. 5.2–6.

[88] Diod. Sic. 14.72.1.

[89] Diod. Sic. 11.26.7.

[90] As an erroneous interpretation of the Thucydidean text had led us to believe: vd. Cavallari and Holm 1883; Mauceri 1921; Drögemüller 1969 and lastly Voza 1993–1994, 1287.

[91] See Polacco 1986, 23, n. 6.

[92] *Cf*. *e.g.* the example of the out-of-town temple of Zeus *Eleutherios* in Samos in Hdt. 3.142; the temple of Poseidon in Potidaea in Hdt. 8.129. Nonetheless, the archeological evidence, as Polacco points out (1986,

27), does not offer any definite findings in the area near the Cyane spring: Cavallari (1887), following the discovery of a fragment of sima and lion-headed waterspout, conducted an investigation at Cozzo di Scandurra, near the Cyane spring, finding the remains of a square-shaped structure near whose foundations were found numerous aligned vases, while mosaic tesserae and fluted columns were found in crop fields. Although at that time the building was interpreted as the temple dedicated to the Cyane nymph, mentioned by Diodorus, the archeological evidence is not so clear as to determine to which deity the temple had been dedicated. The remains of a temple dedicated to Demeter in Piazza della Vittoria have instead been determined and can be read clearly, as they have yielded a considerable number of terracotta female statuettes, the foundations of a temple and an altar dating from the 5th–early 4th centuries (see Voza 1972–1973; 1976–1977; 1980–1981). The presence of several Demeterian temples in the city and in the *chora* and especially the existence of a shrine near the Cyane spring are very likely.

[93] Isoc. 6.44–45; Diod. Sic. 14.7.5–9.8; 20.78; Plut. *Mor*. 175 d; 783 d; Ael. *VH* 4.8.

[94] The story is emphatically told by Diodorus (14.10.4): Διονύσιος δὲ τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἐπὶ τὸν θερισμὸν ἀποστείλας ἐπῆλθε τὰς οἰκίας, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅπλα πάντων ἀφείλετο, μετὰ δὲ ταῦθ’ ἕτερον τεῖχος ᾠκοδόμει περὶ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ ναῦς τε κατεσκευάζετο, συνῆγε δὲ καὶ μισθοφόρων πλῆθος, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παρεσκευάζετο πρὸς τὴν ἀσφάλειαν τῆς τυραννίδος, ὡς ἂν ἔργοις ἤδη πεῖραν εἰληφὼς ὅτι πᾶν ὑπομένουσιν οἱ Συρακόσιοι χάριν τοῦ μὴ δουλεύειν. ‘Dionysius, sending the Syracusans out to harvest their crops, entered their homes and carried off the arms of them all; after this he built a second wall about the acropolis, constructed war vessels, and also collected a great number of mercenaries; and he made every other provision to safeguard the tyranny, since he had learned by experience that the Syracusans would endure anything to escape slavery’ (trans. C.H. Oldfather).

[95] ‘He built a second wall about the acropolis’.

[96] See Polacco and Mirisola 1999, *passim*.

[97] Plut. *Vit. Tim*. 9.3: Hicetas, after defeating Dionysius II, drives him away from the acropolis and the Island.

[98] Pl. *Epin*. 7.349 c–350 a: ‘Now after this Dionysius decided that his previous plot of refusing to pay over Dion’s money would furnish him with a plausible ground for a quarrel with me; and, as a first step, he sent me out of the citadel inventing the excuse that the women had to perform a sacrifice of ten days’ duration in the garden where I was lodging; so during this period he gave orders that I should stay outside with Archedemus. … Thereafter I was residing outside the citadel,

among the mercenaries: and amongst others some of the servants who were from Athens, fellow-citizens of my own …' (trans. R.G. Bury).

[99] Archedemus was disciple of Archytas from Sicily, possibly from Syracuse, mentioned in letter II as a member of the tyrant's entourage.

[100] Diod. Sic. 14.7.2: 'And, perceiving that the Island was the strongest section of the city and could be easily defended, he divided it from the rest of the city by an expensive wall, and in this he set high towers at close intervals, while before it he built places of business and stoas capable of accommodating a multitude of the populace' (trans. C.H. Oldfather).

[101] Diod. Sic. 14.7.3: 'He also constructed on the Island at great expense a fortified acropolis as a place of refuge in case of immediate need, and within its wall he enclosed the dockyards which are connected with the small harbour that is known as Laccium. The dockyards could accommodate sixty triremes and had an entrance that was closed off, through which only one ship could enter at a time' (trans. C.H. Oldfather). For the verb ὀχυρόω see *supra* note 19. The remains of a wall built from large blocks found on via Iceta could belong to the Dionysian walls that fenced off the arsenals. *Cf*. Guzzardi 1993/94, 1311; 2011, 358–359.

[102] As to the paleogeography of the area see Polacco and Mirisola 1996.

[103] Orsi 1891, 377–416.

[104] Basile 2012, 196.

[105] Diod. Sic. 13.96.2.

[106] This despite the fact that the isthmus area has been investigated in several places. After Timoleon, any 'traces' left in the urban landscape by the tyranny were definitely erased and this could explain the complete lack of tangible evidence of such structures.

[107] Plat. *Ep*. 7.347a: '… suppose that he is no longer willing to send me away by giving his own personal order to one of the shipmasters, but makes it plain to them all that he has no wish for me to sail away in comfort – in this case would any of them consent to convey me as a passenger, starting off from the residence of Dionysius? For, in addition to my other misfortunes, I was lodging in the garden adjoining his residence, and out of this not even the doorkeeper would have allowed me to pass without a permit sent him from Dionysius' (trans. R.G. Bury). In a passage from *De Rebus Siculis* by Tommaso Fazello, which is worth mentioning, the historian recalls that: '*Stabat in hac Insula etiam ad angustias utriusque portus arx Dionysii, caeterorumque Tyrannorum, loci pulchritudine, structuraeque opulentia et magnificentia incomparabili longe praestantissima. … Quod autem haec Dionysii arx in angustiis huius Insulae fuerit, … aperte testatur Plutarchus, … Huius arcis porta marmorea, quae septentrionem respiciebat, ac septem ex marmore statuae et caput hominis*

marmoreum cum hac graeca, latinaque inscriptione: Extinctori tyranniae: dum ad propugnacula urbis ibidem excitanda fundamenta foderent, anno sal. 1530 sunt reperta' (Fazellus 1558, *Prioris decadis, liber quartus, De urbe Syracusarum*). This quotation is certainly worth investigating further, though it is probably the result of the well-known traditions concerning the 'tyrant's palace' projected on ruins discovered in the Ortygia isthmus area, which could date back to a different historical period.

[108] The term τυραννεῖον is Late Greek. In fact, it first appears in a fragment by Posidonius (*FGrH* 87 F 70) and it mostly recurs in Strabo and Plutarch. In Plato the 'tyrant's residence' is instead defined as οἰκία.

[109] See Aiosa 2001.

[110] As regards the Ionic temple in Piazza Duomo see, among the most recent, Guzzardi 2012; Voza 2013, both including a useful bibliography on previous excavations. As regards the architecture 'of power' under Gelon and Dionysius I, see Mertens 2004.

[111] Diod. Sic. 15.74.5.

[112] Diod. Sic. 14.45.1: 'After Dionysius had taken in marriage both maidens at the same time, he gave a series of public dinners for the soldiers and the larger part of the citizens; for he now renounced the oppressive aspect of his tyranny, and changing to a course of equitable dealing, he ruled over his subjects in more humane fashion, no more putting them to death or banishing them, as had been his practice' (trans. C.H. Oldfather).

[113] To contrast and further investigate the filiation between *tyranneia* and *basileia*, see: Aiosa 2001, 107–110; Pensabene 2007, 183. Likewise, the Dionysian *tyranneia* could have had an Oriental model: '*Come ad Alessandria, sembra avvertibile nei* Tyranneia *di Dionisio I una suddivisione per aree all'interno di un vasto dominio regio: tale modello urbanistico non può che essere derivato da esempi orientali e particolarmente dai* paradeisoi *orientali e persiani'*, thus Pensabene 2007, 184.

[114] Theocritus's *Idyll* 15 immediately comes to mind (see also Aiosa 2001 on the comparison, in particular, between Alexandria and Syracuse), due to the coincidence of the title ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΑΙ Η ΑΔΩΝΙΑΖΟΥΣΑΙ, and the adventures of Gorgo and Praxinoa – originally from Syracuse but citizens of Alexandria, Egypt – as they try to sneak into the palace to take part in the celebration in honor of Adonis sumptuously organized by Queen Arsinoe.

[115] Diod. Sic. 14.63.3; see also 11.38.4–5; 76.2. Even so, Diodorus in 11.38.4, while describing Gelon's funeral, recounts how the tomb was located in the area 'of the nine towers', 200 stadiums away from the city. This figure, as is often the case in Diodorus, is disproportionate. The area of the sepulcher, as we can gather from its destruction at the hands of Himilcon, was supposedly located in proximity to *Olympieion*,

where the population could have actually followed the bier, since it was about an hour's walk from the acropolis, *i.e.*, 5 km (by via Elorina). Several attempts have been made to rectify this figure (*cf.* Cavallari and Holm 1883, 185; Leake AQ: 1950?, 264).

[116] The extent of the fortification would have been 180 stadiums according to Strabo (Strabo 6.2.4), *i.e.*, approximately 34 km. However, the length of the walls is about half that indicated by the geographer (still, an equally remarkable figure).

[117] As suggested by B. Steinbock in this volume, the Athenian soldiers too, especially during the final phase of the Sicilian Expedition, had shattering war experiences that caused, in some of the survivors, what is called today 'combat or war-induced trauma'.

[118] Diod. Sic. 14.18.2: 'And realizing that in the war with Athens the city had been blocked off by a wall that ran from the sea to the sea, he took care that he should never, where caught at a similar disadvantage, be cut off from contact with the countryside; for he saw that the site of Epipolae, as it is called, naturally commanded the city of the Syracusans' (trans. H.C. Oldfather).

[119] The invention of the catapult (καταπελτικόν) can be traced back to this context of great investments in artillery. *Cf.* Diod. Sic. 14.42.1.

[120] As to the Dionysian fortification system and the Euryalus Fortress, see the seminal work by Beste and Mertens (2015; with bibliography), which provides an architectural study of the defensive complex considered in its historical and topographical context.

[121] The construction of the long fortification, despite not being carried out in 20 days, must still have been carried out in a short time. The distribution of the gates – virtually equidistant from one another – along with the traces of facilities for farmers on the plateau and near the entrances are in fact – despite the state of preservation of the structure – the fragments of a perfectly planned engineering work (Beste and Mertens 2015, 255–259). To build this public structure, the tyrant could certainly rely on the population: in this sense, according to Mertens (2004, 31–32), the large number of peasants busy at work based on Diodorus's estimate must be put in perspective, since the 60,000 figure is certainly meant to be read as a hyperbole aimed to emphasise the scope of this project. Diodorus informs us that the 30 stadium-long walls were supposedly built under the Dionysius's supervision in only 20 days. This is certainly a hyperbole. However, the analyses conducted on the walls by Beste and Mertens have made it possible to arrive at more accurate estimates. It emerged that the walls were divided into equal construction lots (probably assigned to groups of workers) and that there were stone quarries all along the wall path. This is an organisational model that Diodorus, too, describes in detail as part of

the exaltation of the tyrant's design (Diod. Sic. 14.18.5: καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν στάδιον ἀρχιτέκτονας ἐπέστησε, κατὰ δὲ πλέθρον ἐπέταξεν οἰκοδόμους). It should also be pointed out that the walls were built in stages. The first stage, which was also the main one, occurred in the Dionysian age. The subsequent stages (likely more than one) occurred in the Hellenistic age.

[122] Beste and Mertens 2015, 15. The first scholar that described the Dyonisian walls as a *Landschaftsfestung* was Drögemüller (1969, 97).

[123] Masturzo (2017) rightly points out that this space could in part have been destined for the cavalry (whose role for Syracuse was fundamental: see, among the various excerpts, the speech given by Nicia in Thuc. 6.20.4), which would also have required a large space for grazing.

[124] There is no need to emphasize how prosperous Syracuse was throughout most of its history (under Gelon: Hdt. 7.156.2; under Hiero: Pind. *Ol.* 6.97; under Dionysius and Agathocles: Polyb. 15.35.3; Cic. *Tusc*. 5.57; *Nat. D*. 3.81; and through to 212: Livy 25.25.9; 25.31.11; Plut. *Vit. Marc*. 19.6). For an estimate of the city's agricultural resources and the relationship between resources and population, see De Angelis 2000, 122–124; 2016, *passim*.

[125] Diod. Sic. 14.18.4–5.

[126] The prevailing dominance of the XI–XVI books of the *Bibliotheca Historica* by Ephorus has been already determined (although some events, such as the Athenian expedition to Sicily, have suffered from a contamination with Ephorus and Timaeus and, indirectly – it is now an established fact – from the contamination with the accounts by Thucydides and Philistus used by the Tauromenion historian). For Diodorus sources, see Ambaglio *et al.* 2008, *i.e.* 20–28.

[127] De Staebler 2016b, 74; see also De Staebler 2016a.

[128] Tréziny (2001, 373–376) has put forward a cost of 1700 talents for the Epipolae fortifications. As for the cost of the fortifications and the various Dionysian campaigns, see also De Angelis 2016, 126–127.

[129] The urban fortifications were connected to the Dionysian walls, forming a single complementary system. However, the way in which they were integrated is still somewhat unclear due to a general lack of data on urban fortifications, about which most information can be inferred from literary sources. See Beste and Mertens 2015.

[130] Diod. Sic. 14.49.1.

[131] Both because of the presence – in some cases – of modern settlements, and because of the difficulty (and the resources) that an investigation into the Syracusan hinterland would entail, a systematic survey of the city's territory still remains a *desideratum*.

[132] Modern cities, for example, show a tendency to develop suburbs that are connected with the city's economic activities in proximity to the

walls.

[133] The considerations expressed here are a working hypothesis, which still relies on weak footing before it can be proved. However, is it still incumbent on us to take up the question of the Syracusan *chora* starting from problematic approaches that may shed some light on one of the most pressing questions about Greek Syracuse.

Chapter 15

War and society in Greek Leontinoi

Massimo Frasca

L'articolo esamina le ricadute politiche, sociali ed economiche che gli eventi bellici hanno avuto sul paesaggio della polis leontina, in comparazione con il saggio di Valentina Mignosa su Siracusa. Le conoscenze su Leontinoi e sul suo territorio non sono paragonabili a quelle su Siracusa e solo raramente l'indagine archeologica ha toccato l'interno della città. Poco si conosce, infatti, dell'organizzazione urbana di una città complessa dal punto di vista orografico, ubicata su due alture scoscese e una valle mediana, nella quale si trovavano l'agorà e gli edifici pubblici, secondo la descrizione dello storico Polibio. Anche a Leontinoi, come a Siracusa, è possibile cogliere gli effetti dei cambiamenti politici attuati dai Dinomenidi prima, con la pianificazione di nuovi quartieri abitativi (Neapolis), e in seguito da Dionisio I, al quale si deve la realizzazione di un complesso sistema difensivo articolato su più linee e la costruzione di granai all'interno della città, che ha certamente comportato anche una nuova organizzazione del territorio. Gli interventi dei Dinomenidi, di Dionisio I, e in seguito di Ierone II, confermano l'importanza strategica di Leontinoi per il controllo e lo sfruttamento della fertilissima chora, che è stata all'origine stessa della sua fondazione ai margini della Piana di Catania.

Syracuse and Leontinoi. Two different stories compared

The aim of this article is both to verify, as Valentina Mignosa does in her contribution on Syracuse in this volume, if and how events of organised violence (wars, sieges, *staseis*) have affected the fruition of the urban and territorial space of Leontinoi and to examine the political, social and economic impact these events had on the landscape of the *polis*. The study is, therefore, conducted in comparison with the paper by V. Mignosa concerning the effects of the war on Syracuse's urban landscape, over a period of about three generations: between 485 BC, the conquest of the *polis* by Gelon, and 367 BC, which marks the end of the Dionysian tyranny.

First, however, we should note that the literary documentation on Leontinoi is not comparable with that on Syracuse, since the latter, in the period examined, assumed a 'centrality in the Mediterranean political scenario' that Leontinoi certainly did not reach, except for very limited periods. Besides, our knowledge of Leontinoi and its territory is also not comparable to that of Syracuse. In fact, we do not have a comprehensive topographical study of Leontinoi, similar to the *Topografia archeologica di Siracusa* by F.S. Cavallari and A. Holm,[1] whose importance as a starting point for modern scientific investigation Mignosa rightly underlines. Seldom has the archaeological investigation in Leontinoi touched the inner part of the town and, compared to Syracuse and other Greek cities in Sicily, very little is known of its urban organisation. Leontinoi is a very difficult *polis* from an orographic point of view. In fact, unlike the other primary foundations of Sicily, Leontinoi was located on two steep hills with a central valley (Fig. 15.1).


TIRONE
PORTA NORD
VALLE S. ELIGIO
VALLE RUCCI
VALLE SAN MAURO
SAN MAURO
PORTA SUD
METAPICCOLA
0
100

Figure 15.1. Plan of the settlement area of the Greek city of Leontinoi (Rizza 2000, 15 fig. 1).

The particular shape of the city has certainly prompted the historian Polybius to provide its detailed description, which, unfortunately, is preserved only in an incomplete passage.[2] In it, Polybius states that the city of Leontinoi was situated on two steep north-facing hills. Between the hills, whose tops were covered with houses and temples, was a flat valley where the agora was located. The city had two gates: one at the end of the valley facing south toward Syracuse and the other in the north, leading toward the fields called *leontini* and the region suitable for cultivation.


Valle
San Mauro
Colle San Mauro
Colle Tirone
Fortificazioni
settentrionali

Figure 15.2. The position of the northern fortifications between the surrounding hills (Camera 2018, 115, fig. 2).



Figure 15.3. Aerial view of the south gate of Leontinoi (Frasca 2009, Tav. V).

The starting point of the archaeological research in Leontinoi coincides with the activity of Paolo Orsi, who carried out the first excavations at the beginning of the 20th century.[3] Before that time, the investigation had been absorbed almost exclusively by the search for the city's exact location, according to the description by Polybius. Its location in the hills of San Mauro and Metapiccola was correctly identified by Julius Schubring (Fig. 15.2),[4] but later questioned by Gaetano Columba.[5] The problem was eventually solved by the annual excavation campaigns conducted between 1950 and 1960 by Giovanni Rizza, who brought to light the necropolis and the southern fortifications of the city (Fig. 15.3).[6]

Wars, sieges, and *staseis*

Although ancient sources did not hand down much on the history of violence of Leontinoi, some authors, such as Thucydides and Diodorus Siculus, mention that the *polis* was involved in several episodes of war.[7] This starts with the foundation of the *apoikia* by the Chalcidians of Naxos led by Theokles, which, according to Thucydides, involved violent action against the Sikels living in the place.[8]

Theokles and the Sikels

The violent expulsion of natives from the places chosen for the Greek *apoikiai* in Sicily is a recurrent *topos* in Thucydides' narration. Yet, in reality, it does not seem to reflect the state of affairs. Rather, the archaeological documentation indicates that, at the time of the arrival of the Greeks, almost all the colonial sites were uninhabited. The only exception could be Syracuse, although the archaeological evidence of a large indigenous settlement in the center of Ortygia mainly points to a period preceding the arrival of Arkhias and the Corinthian *apoikoi*.[9]

On the foundation of Leontinoi we have the testimony of Polyaenus who picks up on Thucydides' short narration. Polyaenus recounts that the Chalcidians did not expel the Sikels immediately, but that they tricked them into leaving the place after an indefinite period of cohabitation.[10]

Archaeology substantially corroborates Polyaenus' version. In fact, both hills of Metapiccola and San Mauro, the place of the Greek *polis*, bear evidence of an indigenous presence. Excavations carried out at the top of the Metapiccola hill between 1954/55 and 1986 discovered eight huts characterised by a rectangular or slightly apsidal plan and by a bottom embedded in the rock (Fig. 15.4). The village that was probably in use between the 11th and 9th centuries BC,[11] had, however, already been abandoned by the time the Greeks arrived.[12]

The evidence collected on the San Mauro hill is different. Here the potsherds from different places provide evidence of an uninterrupted human presence from the early Bronze Age to the Iron Age. Pottery belonging to the native *facies* of Pantalica Sud (ca. 850–730 BC) prove the settlement's continued existence even after the abandonment of the village on the Metapiccola hill. Fragments of the Finocchito *facies*, contemporary to the first phase of the Greek *apoikia* (ca. 730–650 BC), suggests, moreover, a period of coexistence of the Sikels with the Greek settlers on the hill.[13]



Figure 15.4. Map of the Metapiccola village (Frasca 2009, 27 fig. 9).

The native necropolis of Cava Ruccia and S. Aloe, dug into the hillside of Metapiccola and Ciricò and opposite the San Mauro hill, also testify to the close relations between Greeks and natives between the end of the 8th and the first half of the 7th century BC. In the funerary offerings of the two necropolises, the Euboean influence is apparent in the choice of motifs such as the series of concentric circles or the figures of grazing birds and horses.[14] Thus, archaeological data confirm that the natives continued to live on the San Mauro hill even after the arrival of the Greeks and that they continued to bury their dead in the rock-cut tombs located in the nearby hills. This burial practice ceased during the first half of the 7th century BC. This could perhaps confirm the expulsion of the Sikels after a period of cohabitation, though it can also not be excluded that the Sikels remained in Leontinoi as part of the *polis* civic board, which was divided into several social classes, as we learn from Polyaenus' narrative on Panaetius' rise to tyrannical rule.

The tyrant Panaetius

According to the Latin version of the Canon of Eusebius, the rise to power of the *polemarch* Panaetius dates back to the year 615/14 BC.[15] As Polyaenus recounts,[16] Panaetius subverted the oligarchic power of the rich aristocrats (the *hippeis*) who ruled Leontinoi during a border war against the neighboring Megara Hyblaia. He used the subordinate military classes of the *peltasts* and the *enoichoi* (helpers who accompanied the warriors on horseback) to establish the oldest known tyranny in Sicily. The event took place toward the end of a century of profound changes in the social and territorial structure of Leontinoi. These changes were not necessarily brought about by Panaetius but were probably precipitated by his tyranny.[17]


Porta
Sud
A
B
C
D
168
166
166
168
170
172
174
176
178
180
182
184
165.3
166.8

Figure 15.5. The walls of the southern gate: A: remains of a 7th-century fieldstone wall; B: traces of the 6th-century gate-system; C: 4th-century double-faced wall; D: 3rd-century proteichisma *(reworked after Frasca 2009, 125, fig. 21).*

According to Tréziny, a city wall, which for the first time enclosed both hills of San Mauro and Metapiccola as well as the valley in-between, belongs to the 7th century BC (letter A in Fig. 15.5). This wall, made up of unworked stones similar to the oldest wall of Megara Hyblaia, was located on the hill of San Mauro and at the bottom of the valley.[18] In consolidating the boundaries of the urban space, which will remain the same during the whole history of the city, the *polis* of Leontinoi acquired its very own physical identity[19] in a rather unusual shape for a Greek town, located on two hills, as has been described by Polybius.

The new town structure necessarily affected the organisation of the urban and peripheral space, altering the initial arrangement and use of the areas: it is, indeed, likely that the southern gate was built within a formal burial area, occupied by the oldest tombs of the Chalcidians, as some funerary vases found near the gate suggest. The reorganisation of the urban space during the 7th century BC probably involved also the abandonment of the native necropolis at Cava Ruccia, carved into the eastern slope of the Metapiccola hill.[20]

Moreover, in the 7th century the *polis* consolidated its area of influence toward the west with the foundation of the city of Euboia, identified as Monte San Mauro near Caltagirone, which ensured the control of the entire western part of the large and fertile Plain of Catania.[21] The consolidated presence of Leontinoi on the plain between the 8th and 7th centuries has undoubtedly given a strong impulse to the formation and the development of numerous indigenous settlements, strategically located on the edge of the Margi river valley and along the main roads toward the interior of Sicily, as demonstrated by a distinct Chalcidian imprint on the indigenous pottery.[22]

Hippocrates of Gela and the Deinomenids of Syracuse

Another war event, which involved Leontinoi directly, occurred at the beginning of the 5th century BC. In 495 BC, Hippocrates of Gela, fulfilling his plan to subdue all the cities of eastern Sicily, conquered Leontinoi entrusting it to the vicarious tyrant, Enesidemos.[23] His conquest marked a decisive turning point in the history of the city. In fact, with the Geloan tyrant, Leontinoi, one of the richest and most powerful cities in Sicily for almost two centuries, experienced a period of submission to the Geloan-

Syracusan rulers that would last until the fall of the Deinomenids (461 BC). According to Giovanni Rizza, the conquest by Hippocrates involved the dismantling of the walls at the southern gate in the 6th century BC (letter B in Fig. 15.5). Thus, the city was left without any defences throughout the period of Syracusan domination and only after the fall of the Deinomenids, Leontinoi would be able to restore the entire wall circuit. However, at the moment, there is no evidence that confirms this hypothesis. It is even more likely that the fortifications built in the archaic age remained fully effective during the Deinomenid tyranny and also in subsequent decades. From the conquest of Hippocrates – and especially under the rule of the Deinomenids – Leontinoi was an integral part of the territorial state of Syracuse.[24] It was one of its fortified places, essential for the control of the agricultural resources and for the defense of its sphere of influence.

Valentina Mignosa pointed out that in 483/82 BC Gelon revolutionised the demographic structure of Syracuse, introducing new citizens from Kamarina and Gela and from the conquered Megara Hyblaea as well as from Euboia. They became landowners and reshaped the urban landscape by creating new residential areas. In Leontinoi, a similar process was carried out a few years later (476) by Hieron I, who increased the civic board of the *polis* by welcoming the inhabitants of Naxos and Katane and gathering all the Chalcidians of the Syracusan epicracy in a single city.[25] At the origin of this action was probably his will to exercise control over the economic potential of the powerful aristocracy of the *hippeis* of Leontinoi, forcing them to share their land with the new immigrants, who were bound to them by bloodline.

Hieron's policy also had a deep effect on the religious sphere of the Chalcidian *polis*. The two peri-urban sanctuaries of Alaimo and Scala Portazza, certainly among the oldest sanctuaries of Leontinoi, built around the time of the foundation of the *apoikia* or soon after, were influenced by the Deinomenid policy of redefinition of cults. In the sanctuary of Alaimo, dedicated to a female polyhedral divinity, identifiable with Artemis,[26] the Deinomenids probably introduced the cult of the Dioscuri[27] (with which Gelon and Hieron, perhaps, identified),[28] as an inscription on a 5th-century BC attic vase suggests. Similarly, the sanctuary of Scala Portazza, dedicated to Hera, the *archegetes* goddess of the Chalcidians, suffered a radical destruction.[29]

The significant concentration of Chalcidians from Naxos and Katane in Leontinoi must have led to the redefinition of the living spaces, probably by adapting the urban landscape to the expansion of the civic board, and creating new spaces for housing. It is likely that the birth of a new district, the yet unknown *Neapolis* mentioned in the literary sources and probably located outside the city walls, is connected with Hieron's policy. A position outside the walled city is indeed conceivable. According to an account by Diodorus concerning the expedition of Timoleon against Hicetas (342 BC), who, together with a large amount of forces, had found refuge in Leontinoi, Timoleon first moved against *Neapolis*. Later, given the large number of people inside the city defending it from above the fortifications without any difficulty, he gave up the siege.[30]

The stasis *after the peace of Gela*

Between 424 and 422 BC, Leontinoi experienced an internal *stasis* that led to the 'dissolution' of the *polis* and gave the Syracusans the opportunity to reaffirm their expansionist aims on the territory of Leontinoi. The historical events narrated by Thucydides and Diodorus Siculus[31] have been carefully reconstructed by Martin Dreher.[32] After the peace of Gela, which managed to stave off the war between Syracuse and Leontinoi for 3 years, the entire social board of Leontinoi, composed of *dynatoi* (rich landowners) and *demos* (subordinate classes), decided to grant citizenship to other subjects, including probably slaves, in an effort to increase the number of armed men in case of conflict with Syracuse. However, when the *demos* began to claim a new redistribution of land, the great landowners, fearing for their interests, expelled the *demos* with the support of the Syracusans and settled themselves as citizens in Syracuse. The inhabitants of Leontinoi who remained in the city were deprived of any arable land. Their possessions were now in the hands of the rich who had moved to Syracuse, thus allowing the Syracusans to annex the *chora leontine.*[33]

The Syracuse project of annexing the *chora leontine* and making Leontinoi an agricultural suburb with no political autonomy was thus implemented.[34] However, despite being garrisoned by the Syracusans, Leontinoi was not destroyed or completely abandoned. In fact, shortly afterward, some of the *dynatoi* who were dissatisfied with the new conditions left Syracuse. Following an agreement with the *demos* they returned to Leontinoi and settled in two fortified places: the walled district (*chorìon*) of Phokaiai, probably the ancient *acropolis* of Leontinoi on the Castellaccio-Tirone hill, and the fortress of Brikinniai, identified with Monte S. Basilio on the road between Gela and Katane, from where they fought against the Syracusans.

According to Rizza, a direct consequence of these dramatic events was the second destruction of the defenses at the south gate, rebuilt after the end of the Deinomenid tyranny. Once again, the *polis* was therefore left without a closed wall circuit. From this moment until the Roman-Carthaginian conflict, the defenses of Leontinoi would have been limited to the top of the hills, where the military garrisons were stationed. However, the subsequent events that saw Leontinoi repeatedly besieged seem to contradict this point of view.

The siege of Dionysius I and the care of defenses

The hypothesis of a defenseless *polis* at the end of the 5th century appears to contrast with two passages from Diodorus Siculus, who describe the siege of Leontinoi by Dionysius I in 403 BC. In his strategy for acquiring control of all the Chalcidian *poleis* of eastern Sicily and their territory,[35] Dionysius camped not far from Leontinoi, near the River Terias (present-day San Leonardo). The tyrant deployed his soldiers and ordered the people of Leontinoi to surrender. Confronted with the refusal of the community ready to endure a siege, Dionysius, who had no war machines, renounced to attack the city and systematically looted instead the entire territory.[36] Later, after conquering the other Chalcidian cities, Dionysius, attacked again with all his troops. He besieged the city and offered the inhabitants of Leontinoi the citizenship of Syracuse in case they surrendered. The besieged lost any hope of help from the outside and, in consideration of the dreadful fate of the citizens of Naxos and Katane, preferred to surrender and left the city to settle in Syracuse.[37] Leontinoi was therefore easily conquered and the city was repopulated with the mercenaries who had served the tyrant well.[38]



Figure 15.6. Detail of the circuit wall of the San Mauro hill (© Jonasch).

The difficulties of Dionysus to take Leontinoi in his first attempt, due to the lack of war machines, helps us understand how the city still had to have a fully efficient fortification system. It is probable that the walls were still those built in the 6th century BC.[39] However, the ancient structures were certainly not fitting the recent developments in poliorcetics and it is therefore not surprising that Dionysius I devoted great attention to strengthening the fortifications once he had conquered the city. Once again, it is Diodorus who provides important information on the activities of the tyrant in Leontinoi. In 396 BC, Dionysius I fortified the *acropolises* to store provisions, reaffirming the strategic importance of Leontinoi for the defense of the Syracusan sphere of influence and for the exploitation of the agricultural land, essential for the economy of Syracuse.[40]

As was the case with Syracuse, the fortifications of Leontinoi had to be part of an organic defence system articulated along various lines.[41] Internal wall circuits surrounded the top of each hill and a larger fortification wall extended from the hills toward the valley where the two gates were situated: one leading toward Syracuse and the other toward the farmland in the north. Remains of the wall which surround the top of San Mauro hill show a series of quarry marks (Fig. 15.6). They were brought to light by the excavations of Giovanni Rizza at a length of about 222 m.[42]



Figure 15.7. Aerial view of the artificial ditches in the Castellaccio hill (©Frasca/Rubino)

On the Castellaccio-Tirone hill, another *acropolis* of Leontinoi, two deep ditches are visible that isolate the Castellaccio from the nearby hills (Fig. 15.7). This building measure has been attributed to Dionysius I, by comparing the ditches to the ones at Euryalus Castle in Syracuse.[43]

The account by Diodorus of the events of the year 356 BC, when Philistos from Syracuse failed to conquer the entire city despite having entered its walls, confirms the complexity of the defence system of Leontinoi in the 4th century.[44]

About a decade later, the tyrant of Leontinoi, Hicetas, expanded the defensive system of the *polis* by creating a network of fortified places (*phrouria*) within its territory. They were meant to ensure the protection of the city's borders and the control of the main roads toward the hinterland. One of these *phrouria* was probably located along the Anapo valley in the protohistoric site of Pantalica, where a fortification and some burials testify to a Greek presence in this period.[45] The efficiency of the territorial fortification system organised by Hicetas is indirectly proven by Plutarch's statement that Timoleon forced the defeated ruler to abandon all the fortresses within his territory.[46]



Figure 15.8. The Roman and medieval city area (© Frasca based on Google Earth).

Hieronymus and the Roman conquest

A rather tragic event happened in Leontinoi before the *polis* was conquered by Marcellus in 214 BC and its independence ended. This incident, which also affected the history of the second Punic war, allows for the reconstruction of some aspects of the urban structure of the Hellenistic town. In 215 the death of Hieron II brought a long period of independence and prosperity for Syracuse and the cities within its territory to an end. Soon thereafter, the nephew of Hieron II, King Hieronymus, went to Leontinoi with an army of 15,000 men to wage war against Rome. However, the king was killed in an ambush as he walked along a narrow and winding street between deserted houses to descend toward the city's forum. For this tragic event happening in the town of Leontinoi we have the account by the Roman historian Titus Livius:

> But everything conspired to hurry him into perdition. For having sent before him Hippocrates and Epicydes with two thousand armed men, to make an attempt upon those cities which were occupied by Roman garrisons, he himself also proceeded to Leontinoi with all the remaining troops, which amounted to fifteen thousand foot and horse, when the conspirators, who all happened to be in the army, took

> possession of an uninhabited house, which commanded a narrow way, by which the king was accustomed to descend to go to the forum. While the rest stood here prepared and armed, waiting for the king to pass by, one of them, by name Dinomenes, as he was one of the body-guards, had the task assigned him of keeping back the crowd behind in the narrow way, upon some pretext, when the king approached the door. All was done according to the arrangement. Dinomenes having delayed the crowd, by pretending to lift up his foot and loosen a knot which was too tight, occasioned such an interval, that an attack being made upon the king, as he passed by unattended by his guards, he was pierced with several wounds before any assistance could be brought.[47]

The description of the ambush shows that a part of the city at the top of the hill, perhaps the oldest part, was no longer inhabited. Thus, it is likely that the long period of peace under the rule of Hieron II had triggered a relocation of the community's activities toward the bottom of the San Mauro valley and the northern area. This part of the city is nowadays occupied by the historical centre of Lentini and was previously used by the Roman and medieval city situated on the Castellaccio-Tirone hill and on the plain below (Fig. 15.8).



Figure 15.9. The Roman road overlapping the remains of the north Hellenistic fortifications (© Frasca).

Among the material evidence of the period of the Roman-Carthaginian conflict is again the strengthening of the defensive system with the construction of a *proteichisma* to increase the protection of the south gate.[48] It was seemingly built rather quickly in order to resist the imminent attack led by Marcellus. The *proteichisma* is described as a double-faced wall of 'very poor workmanship', built with reused ashlars and unworked stones, and could be identified at a length of about 20 m (letter D in Fig. 15.5).[49]

The curtain wall and the defences at the gate were certainly destroyed by the Romans. The traces of the dismantling of the Greek fortifications are particularly evident in the area of the northern gate, at the northern end of the San Mauro valley, where recent excavations have revealed the almost total dismantling of the walls built by Agathokles at the beginning of the 3rd century BC. The traces of a road used in Roman times and the early Middle Ages are still visible above the foundation of the fortification wall that had remained in situ (Fig. 15.9).[50]

The destruction of the city and the subsequent Roman occupation led to a halt in the development of Leontinoi whose physiognomy we still cannot grasp, but which, certainly, from an urban and architectural point of view, had to be modeled on Syracuse, which under Hieron II rose to the level of the main metropolises of the Hellenistic world.

Conclusion

In the case of Syracuse, it is possible to grasp the various ways in which the urban landscape was modified by wars, sieges, civil unrest and skirmishes, as it clearly emerges from the essay by Valentina Mignosa. For Leontinoi this can be done only to a limited extent. It is, however, possible to retrace the effects of the political changes brought about first by the Deinomenids, with the planning of new residential districts (*Neapolis*), and later by Dionisius I. His building program, carried out as a symbol of power in Syracuse and other parts of eastern Sicily, has also left an obvious impact on the city of Leontinoi. This is apparent, for example, in the planning and execution of the complex defensive system and the construction of facilities for storing of the agricultural surplus. The installation of granaries inside the city certainly led to a new organisation of the territory.

The actions of the Deinomenids, of Dionisius I and, later, of Hieron II, confirm the strategic importance of the city for the control and for the agricultural exploitation of the fertile *leontine chora*, which was the principal reason for the foundation of Leontinoi on the southern edge of the Plain of Catania in the first place. When Theokles and the Chalcidians settled in Naxos, the first suitable landing spot on the eastern coast of Sicily, they must have had a clear idea of the agricultural potential of the Plain of Catania, since they quickly founded two other cities, Leontinoi and Katane, erected in key points to exploit the fertile alluvial plain. The choice of a mountainous area for the foundation of Leontinoi, harsh and difficult to inhabit, far from the sea, and already occupied by an indigenous community, was especially a great risk that can only be explained by the strong intent to ensure the possession of the wide and fertile land. The city was founded on the southern margin of the plain on an ancient roadway that dates back at least to the early Bronze Age. It runs through the San Mauro valley and cuts right across the area of the Greek city. This road was the main access to the Plain of Catania from the Hyblaean Mountains and will remain in use even after the decline of the Greek *polis*. In Roman times this route would be resumed by the Via Pompeia and, in modern times, followed by the *regia trazzera* that led from Leontinoi to Sortino and further on to Syracuse, along the valley of the Anapo river.[51]

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[1] Cavallari and Holm 1883.

[2] Polyb. 7.6.1–6.

[3] Orsi 1900; Orsi 1930.

[4] Schubring 1874.

[5] Columba 1891.

[6] Rizza 1955; 1957; 2000.

[7] Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 209–211.

[8] Thuc. 6.3.3.

[9] Frasca 1983; 2017.

[10] Polyaenus, *Strat.* 5.5. On the literary traditions related to the foundation of Leontinoi and the relations with the Megarians and natives, see also Sammartano 1994, 48–50.

[11] Albanese Procelli 2003a, 50.

[12] Frasca 2009.

[13] Rizza 1962; Frasca 2012.

[14] Orsi 1900, fig. 21; Lagona 1975/76, 137–141, figs 71 and 73.

[15] Luraghi 1994, 11–20

[16] Polyaenus, *Strat.* 5.47.

[17] Luraghi 1994, 20.

[18] Tréziny 1999, 243; Frasca 2009, 68.

[19] Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 135–137.

[20] Frasca and Procelli 2018.

[21] On the identification of Euboia, see: Frasca 1997. On the borders of the *chora leontine*, see: Hansen and Nielsen 2004, 210. For Monte San Mauro see also Jonasch in this volume.

[22] Camera 2018, 226.

[23] Hdt. 7.155.1.

[24] De Angelis (2016, 105) estimates an area of 4430 km^2 of land under the control of Syracuse, which would be one of the most powerful states in Greece, between Athens (2500 km^2) and Sparta (8500 km^2).

[25] Asheri 1980, 147; Vanotti 1995, 92.

[26] Grasso 2008, 154.

[27] Manganaro 2004; Parisi 2017.

[28] Grasso 2008, 152; Rizza 2003.

[29] Frasca 2005; 2009.

[30] Diod. Sic. 16.72.2.

[31] Thuc. 5.4.1–6; Diod. Sic. 12.54.7; Sic. 12.83.1–3.

[32] Dreher 1986.

[33] Dreher 1986, 642–653.

[34] Vattuone 1994, 87–88. In this regard see also Giuffrida 1980, 1141.

[35] De Angelis 2016, 304; Giuffrida 2002, 422.

[36] Diod. Sic. 14.14.3–4.

[37] Diod. Sic. 14.15.4.

[38] De Vido 2013, 150.

[39] Frasca 2009.

[40] Diod. Sic. 14.58.1. De Angelis 2016, 304.

[41] Beste and Mertens 2015.

[42] Rizza 2000, 68.

[43] Columba 1891, 130–131.

[44] Diod. Sic. 16.16.1.

[45] For the fortifications of Filiporto, see: Buscemi 2019. For the burials, see: Frasca 2019.

[46] Plut. *Vit. Tim.* 24.1.

[47] Livy 24.7.1–5 (trans. D. Spillan).

[48] Rizza 1955; Karlsson 1992, 112.

[49] Rizza 2000, 54.

[50] Frasca 2009; Camera 2018.

[51] Frasca 2019.

Chapter 16

The city walls of Eryx and the sociopolitical conflicts in western Sicily before the Roman conquest

Salvatore De Vincenzo

I dati restituiti dallo scavo alle mura di Erice hanno evidenziato come questa città costituisca un significativo caso studio per l'analisi di numerosi eventi politici e militari, che hanno interessato la Sicilia occidentale e più in generale il Mediterraneo occidentale a partire dall'età arcaica. Le mura di Erice di prima fase furono impostate su di un precedente insediamento, abbandonato all'inizio del V sec. a.C. Tale rinvenimento offre spunti interessanti per la comprensione dei processi insediativi dei centri indigeni del settore occidentale della Sicilia, nell'ambito dei quali le mutate dinamiche politiche scaturite dalla battaglia di Himera costituiscono un fattore che in qualche modo intensifica dei processi già iniziati a partire dalla fine del VI sec. a.C. La seconda fase delle mura di Erice è stata datata tra la fine del IV e la metà del III sec. a.C., durante il dominio cartaginese della città. Potrebbe essere plausibile ricondurre questo considerevole riarrangiamento delle mura a un rafforzamento della cinta muraria ericina contestuale agli accadimenti della prima guerra punica. Verosimilmente le mura di Erice furono danneggiate durante l'assedio di Pirro nel 277 a.C., a seguito del quale si resero quindi necessari tali rifacimenti realizzati in 'opus

quadratum'.

Western Sicily in the Archaic period: a historical introduction

Within the scope of political and economic relations and of military conflicts between the people of western Sicily, the Elymians, including the city of Eryx prior to the Punic conquest, had always played an important role (Fig. 16.1).[1] Repeated attempts in the course of the 6th century BC by the Greek *poleis* in western Sicily to expand their territories, predominantly by Selinous, have been documented.[2] The written sources thus seem to support the view of a traditional alliance between the Elymians and the Phoenicians, as described by Thucydides, underlining their opposition against a Knidian presence in their territories.[3] At the end of the 6th century BC, the expedition of the Spartan prince Dorieus took place, which aimed to establish the colony of Heraclea in the territory of Eryx.[4] From this 6th century BC conflict emerges a clear picture showing Greek interest in the Elymian-Phoenician area of western Sicily. Shortly thereafter the first peace treaty between Rome and Carthage proves the existence of Elymian and Carthaginian settlements in the Punic sphere of interest in western Sicily.[5] The treaty refers to an area of Sicily controlled by Carthage, but its extension remains doubtful.


Palermo
PANORMUS
Solunto
SOLUS
Trapani
DREPANON
Erice
ERYX
S. Giuseppe Jato
IETAE
Termini Imerese
THERMAI HIMERAIAI
HIMERA
Castellaccio
HIMERA
SEGESTA
Isola S. Pantaleo
MOTYE
Marsala
LILYBAEUM
Poggioreale
HALYKYA ?
ENTELLA
Belice
HYPSAS
Kassar
KRASTOS ?
Monte Cavalli
HIPANNA ?
Platani
MAZARA
Selinunte
SELINOUS
Porto Palo
Lykos
THERMAI
SELINOUNTIAI
S. Angelo Muxaro
KAMICOS ?
M. Giudecca
HERAKLEIA MINOA
Agrigento
AKRAGAS

Figure 16.1. Map of western Sicily (© S. De Vincenzo).

A key event in establishing power balances in western Sicily can certainly be seen in the battle of Himera in 480 BC.[6] Carthage suffered a disastrous defeat, which changed its 'imperialistic' policies and kept the Punic metropolis away from Sicily[7]. This setback has been connected to the crisis that affected many Elymian settlements at the beginning of the 5th century, leading in many cases to an abandonment of sites.[8]

On the other hand, Motya and the remaining Punic settlements demonstrate a period of prosperity and seem to forge their alliances and economic relations autonomously. In this period, the cities of western Sicily found themselves in an alliance with Carthage rather than being subordinated, as evidenced by processes of economic integration into the Hellenic world, which is discernible predominantly for the Elymians. The contract between Segesta and Athens guaranteeing each other *philia* and *symmachia*, signed shortly after 480 BC, is quite telling in this regard.[9] Likewise, directly after the battle of Himera, coinage in the Punic settlements set in, showing Greek as well as Punic legends in Motya and Palermo.[10]

Thus, one of the consequences of the battle of Himera is a turn of the Elymian and Phoenician settlements of the island toward the Greek world, without Carthage showing a significant reaction. This is confirmed by the refusal of Carthage to help Segesta in 416 when it was under pressure by Selinous.[11]

In recent years, Sicily from the archaic to the Hellenistic period has been the subject of numerous historiographical studies. Among these, the study of Greek colonisation in Sicily has also led to a renewed interest in the indigenous populations of the island in the archaic age and the relationship with populations of foreign extraction.[12] An innovative socioeconomic approach to archaic Sicily has highlighted how the interest of the Greeks in conquering the island was not in the territory, available in abundance, but in population control.[13] Going beyond a Hellenistic-centric vision, contacts between the indigenous and foreign populations are highlighted, which appear to be mutually beneficial. On the basis of these considerations, even the fortifications assume a very different meaning for the archaic phase from that of simple defence.[14] The fortifications of Eryx are part of this theoretical discourse.

The city walls of Eryx in the Archaic period

Archaeological data on the Elymian settlements around the time of the battle of Himera is scarce but reveals important insights into this phase.[15] Evidence hints to a phase of crisis in many settlements at the beginning of the 5th century BC, probably connected to new political constellations after the battle of Himera. While many sites were abandoned, some settlements were frequented again in Hellenistic times. This crisis is attested also for Segesta, where the Archaic settlement contracted.[16]

Looking at Eryx, the city is located at an altitude of ca. 750 m on a ridge dominating the coastal plain occupied by Drepana to the north and, to the west, by the harbour of Bonagia which, in all likelihood, acted as the city's port (Fig. 16.2). The history and the fortune of the city are strictly connected with its sanctuary. Historical sources often highlight the undisputed religious and political importance of the temple of Aphrodite, the richest in Sicily according to Polybius.[17] The worship of Aphrodite of Eryx was also introduced in Carthage.[18] Diodorus Siculus states that the eponymous hero Eryx built a temple dedicated to his mother Aphrodite in the highest sector of the city that he himself had founded. Furthermore, he recounts the construction of a wall by Daedalus.[19] Most likely, the temple has to be located outside the city, considering a passage by Polybius, according to whom the temple was situated at the top of mount Eryx, while the city was on a lower level and difficult to access.[20] This statement by the historian from Megalopolis can be confirmed, as we shall see, by the archaeological data collected during the new investigation into the city walls.



Figure 16.2. Aerial view of Eryx. Plan of the remains of the Elymian-Punic (A) and medieval (B) city wall; C. Norman Castle/Venus Erycina Temple (© S. De Vincenzo).

The written sources on the early history of Eryx are meagre. The city is mentioned in the passage on the expedition of Dorieus, son of the Spartan king, who tried to found the colony of Heraclea in western Sicily at the end of the 6th century BC.[21] The literary and epigraphic evidence does not shed light on the foundation phase of Eryx. However, recent investigations of the city wall of Eryx, by the author, give insights into this phase. One of the most significant results of the stratigraphic investigation is the discovery of a settlement phase prior to the construction of the archaic city wall (Figs 16.3 and 16.4).[22] This settlement has been documented in the sector between tower 4 and tower 11, which are located 200 m apart. Until now, the documentation of this area is still partial and does only allow for limited conclusions. The use of irregular limestone blocks of different sizes, as well as rectangular rooms and structures with curvy walls, is not unlike contexts discovered in the excavation of the Elymian settlement on Monte Polizzo.[23] The latter settlement was used mainly in the 6th century BC, while a phase of abandonment has been documented at the end of the century. This hiatus seems to be connected with a phase of *synoikismos,* which took place between the last quarter of the 6th and the first quarter of the 5th century, from which emerged the largest Elymian cities.[24] A hypothesis put forward by S. Vassallo explains the abandonment of the indigenous centres of western Sicily with the changed political dynamics following the battle of Himera. In light of the investigation conducted at Monte Polizzo, the battle rather needs to be interpreted as a contributing factor, which in some way intensifies a process already under way at the end of the 6th century, as shown by Sebastiano Tusa.[25]



Figure 16.3. Structures beneath tower 11 of the city walls of Eryx (© S. De Vincenzo).

It seems justified to compare Eryx and Monte Polizzo, given the similar chronology following pottery finds in these contexts, especially north of tower 11 and in the structure south of tower 8. The pottery is predominantly of local production, both unpainted and with geometric decorations, stemming from the same chronological framework. In the early 5th century BC, thus slightly later than at Monte Polizzo, the settlement of Eryx was abandoned. Afterward, the first phase of the city wall was built over this settlement.

The case of Eryx seems to be paradigmatic for the discourse on crisis as it offers a vivid picture of the settlement processes affecting the indigenous settlements of the most western parts of Sicily. On top of the layers of abandonment, which date from Late Archaic times, a new settlement emerges, most probably deriving from a *synoikismos*. Therefore, the new settlement has a completely different disposition, showing urban features of a *polis* and being defended by a city wall. The city walls not only have a defensive character, but also highlight a new concept of settlement. Unlike the subsequent phase of Punic conquest of western Sicily, the fortifications of the Archaic age assume a sociocultural meaning of political identification that is much more important than the meaning of fortification.



Figure 16.4. Structures beneath tower 11 of the city walls of Eryx (© S. De Vincenzo)

The first coinage from Eryx, dating back to the 5th century is particularly significant in relation to this new self-image.[26] These early mints might give an indication regarding the first formation of the settlement as a *polis.*[27] This is also mirrored by an analysis carried out by D. Musti regarding attestations of the word *polis* in connection to Eryx. Within the scope of the turmoil of the 6th century BC, there is no reference to a *polis* of Eryx, but its γῆ, χώρα and τόποι are mentioned. The term *polis* is, however, used by Thucydides to characterise Eryx in his report on the Athenian embassy to Segesta in 416/5 BC. D. Musti proposed therefore that Eryx developed its status into being a Polis within the course of the 5th century.[28] The chronology of the first coins, as well as the chronology of the first phase of the city wall, do however hint at a *polis* status already at the beginning or in the first half of the 5th century. Stratigraphic investigations into the city walls do speak in favour of this chronology. The walls are made of large limestone blocks which are normally longer than 2 m. The blocks are rough-hewn and thus do not appear regular, even though the rows of stones on the inner side have been laid out to resemble *opus quadratum* (Fig. 16.5).[29]



Figure 16.5. Tower 2. First phase of the city wall (© S. De Vincenzo).

The proposed chronology for the first phase of the city wall derives from pottery finds in the foundation layers of the first phase towers.[30] Besides an Attic skyphos rim of the White Heron group datable to around 500 BC, some fragments of skyphoid cups from 490–480 have been found. The skyphos was found in the foundation layers of tower 9, the cup fragments within a context connected to the foundation layers of tower 8. The fragments establish an indicator for the phase of abandonment of the prior settlement, which is evidenced by structures beneath towers 4, 7, 8, and 11.[31]

The construction of the first phase of the city wall of Eryx is thus paradigmatic for the reorganisation of the bigger Elymian settlements which takes place around the time of the battle of Himera.[32] Like in Eryx, the whole Koinon of the Elymians and their cities now adhered to new urbanistic models. The city wall of Segesta, as documented by stratigraphic research, must have been built shortly before the one in Eryx between the end of the 6th and the beginning of the 5th century BC,[33] a similar time frame has been established for the Late Archaic city walls of Entella.[34] With regard to the centres developed within the context of the wide synecistic phenomenon, the role played by the sacred areas is fundamental, as demonstrated first of all by Segesta, which, with its sanctuary becomes a centre of power while taking on a role of political and cultural mediation.[35]

The city walls during the Punic and the Roman phase of Eryx

Looking at the political and military events in the history of Eryx in the 5th century BC and at the implications for its social and cultural development, Diodorus Siculus states that the city surrendered to Dionysius I of Syracuse in 397/396 during his advance into the Punic territories of western Sicily. According to Diodorus, they both feared the Syracusan army and hated the Carthaginians.[36] In the following year, the city is definitively taken by the Carthaginians led by general Himilco.[37] From this phase onward, Eryx begins its own Punic coinage marked by the legend ‘rk.[38] An inscription, now lost, with a dedication to Astarte of Eryx, in which the Sufetes of Eryx are mentioned, also refers to the Punic phase of the city and demonstrates the adaptation of the settlement to Punic traditions and institutions.[39]

Besides Punic artifacts discovered in the necropolis of Piana delle Forche, a fragment of a votive stele with a dedication to Tinnit and Baal Hammon, which can be dated from the 4th–3rd century BC, refers to this Punic period of the city. It was found in a trench on the north side of tower 1, excavated by A.M. Bisi in 1967.[40] The stele seems to belong to the *tophet* of Carthage, following paleographic considerations.[41]

The second phase of the city wall in Eryx was built in Punic times. It is constructed in *opus quadratum* and is characterised by regular rectangular blocks of various dimensions, with lengths reaching ca. 1.5 m (Fig. 16.6). The chronology of the materials found in the foundation layers of the towers built in this phase seems to fluctuate between the end of the 4th and the middle of the 3rd century BC.[42] This is a particularly turbulent phase in the history of Sicily. It might be plausible to date this considerable rearrangement of the walls from the first half of the 3rd century, when it was necessary to reinforce the city walls because of the first Punic war. A passage of Diodorus Siculus is telling in this regard, as he describes the prominent role of Eryx in this conflict.[43] An important event is the prior long and violent siege of Eryx by Pyhrrus in 277 BC, which ended in the capture of the town by the Epirote commander, who then offered sacrifices and games to the city.[44] Following Plutarch and Diodor, the city had a strong defensive system at the time of the siege.[45] The city probably suffered damages during the siege, which made repairs on the city walls necessary.



Figure 16.6. Tower 6. Second phase of the city wall (© S. De Vincenzo).

This is documented archaeologically by sections in the city wall in *opus quadratum*. Punic letters, which were found exclusively on the square stone blocks of the *opus quadratum*, also hint in this direction.[46] The letters are a clear indication of the Punic character of the repairs on the second phase city wall, thus showing the Punic identity of Eryx after the Carthaginian conquest of the city in the early 4th century BC. After this conquest, Eryx becomes a genuine Punic town, with Punic coinage, magistrates and gods, namely Astarte Erycina, whose cult is introduced in Carthage. The city plays a strategic part during this phase in two regards, politically and religiously.[47] Thus, the passage of Diodorus Siculus is once again interesting, which states that in the first Punic war Hamilcar destroys Eryx, with the exception of the area close to the temple. The fort could not be left in the hands of the Romans. Hamilcar moved the population to Drepana, which had been fortified in the meantime. This is a clear sign of the Punic identity of Eryx's population during this phase.[48] By contrast, the other Elymian settlements show a different development. Sites like Segesta, Iaitas, Entella and Halicyae became incorporated into the Punic eparchy, but do not show clear signs of a 'punisation'.[49] Their reaction to the Roman conquest during the First Punic War has probably been different from the behaviour displayed by Eryx precisely because of these developments. Segesta, having common mythological connections with Troy, went over to the Roman side immediately. A Punic garrison was stationed at Iaitas, but the inhabitants got rid of the Carthaginian soldiers and changed sides as well.[50] In consequence, the population clearly did not have a Punic identity. Similar trends were observable during the conquest of Pyhrrus. The only city that resisted actively was Eryx, while Segesta, Halyciae, Entella and Iaitas opted for the Epirote conqueror. This shows that Carthage always had a stronger connection with Eryx than to the other Elymian settlements.[51]

The role of Eryx in the military conflicts during the First Punic War is well documented, as the city and its territory were an important theatre of the war. After the destruction of Eryx in 259 BC by Hamilcar and the resettlement of its inhabitants to Drepana between 249 and 241, in the final phase of the war, Eryx hosted a war of position between Roman and Carthaginian soldiers.[52] In 249, during a critical phase of the war for the Romans, after Polybios the consul L. Iunius Pullo took the mountain of Eryx and installed two garrisons, one at the top and another at the foot of the hill, near the road to Drepana.[53] The Romans were gathered at the Aegithallum, the modern Pizzo Argenteria, alongside the south-western slopes of the mountain. By a series of movements they controlled every route around the hill from the west and the south-west, laid siege to Drepana and held contact with the Roman troops near Lilybaeum. In 244 Hamilcar Barca retook the city and was able to place a Punic garrison between the two Roman ones. It was situated most likely on the Piano San Matteo and controlled the north-eastern part of the hill. Furthermore, the Carthaginians fortified Drepana and controlled the access to Bonagia.[54] The two sides remained in their position till the end of the war and Hamilcar was forced to surrender only because his troops were completely isolated after the Carthaginian fleet lost the battle of the Aegadian islands.[55]

Historical sources on Eryx after the Roman conquest are again extremely scarce, making reference almost exclusively to events connected to the temple of Venus Erycina. Of special interest is the report of Cicero, who indicates an absence of a citizen body, which could have had a mediating role between the sanctuary and the governor Verrus, almost implying that the settlement was uninhabited at this stage. Another interesting fact is the attestation of the place name *Erycus mons*. The quaestor of Lilybaeum is also defined as *quaestor … qui Erycum montem obtinebat.*[56]

This situation continues in the imperial age, as evidenced in different documents, in both epigraphic and written sources, which present a compelling argument of a possible abandonment of the site in this period. Archaeological data supports this view further. Strabon reports that, in his era in the times of Augustus, the temple and the city of *Erice* were deserted, while, in Rome, there existed a temple near the Porta Collina which was supposedly similar to the temple in *Erice.*[57] Tacitus, on the other hand, states that Segesta made a request to Emperor Tiberius to restore the temple, which had fallen into ruins by then. They aimed, once again, at the shared ancestral connections between emperor and their city, in order to achieve the restoration of the temple.[58] A similar passage can be found in Suetonius' *Life of Claudius*, who tried to restore the destroyed temple using the Roman state treasury.[59] The small number of Punic, Greek and Roman inscriptions from Eryx in this period is a further testament to the abandonment of the city. The Late Republican inscriptions are either dedications to Venus or refer to the garrison of the sanctuary.[60] The place name *in Monte Eruco*, which occurs in one of the inscriptions, and is attested in the speeches against Verres[61] as well, is especially interesting, as it documents the loss of an urban centre at Eryx.

Thus, the city of Eryx ceased to exist after its inhabitants had been relocated to Drepana in the First Punic War. Roman pottery has likewise not been found during the stratigraphic investigations of the city walls. The oldest ancient pottery, discovered in the foundation layers of the late medieval phase, can, in fact, be dated back to the phase of abandonment in the 3rd century BC. From the excavation of the Norman castle in Eryx, the area of the temple of Venus Erycina, emerges a different picture. The Roman frequentation of this area, already noted in written and epigraphic sources, can be attested by artefacts from the Late Republican to Early Imperial periods.[62]

The excavations at the city wall also allowed for a diachronic reconstruction of the city's topographic development. The excavation showed that the towers south of tower 11 did not show ancient structures of the first and second building phase and were made of smaller modules. The southernmost sector of the city wall, starting from tower 12, has been built in a third constructive phase at the beginning of the 15th century. Thus, the city has been extended southwards in late medieval times.[63] This hypothesis is strengthened by a small southern sector of the city wall of the first building phase and by an anomaly in the urban grid of medieval Eryx. In addition, a late 19th century picture shows the Piazza Umberto I in Erice with a tower in its north-eastern corner, which belongs to the ancient city wall. Today, the tower has been knocked down and is no longer visible.

In light of these discoveries, one can postulate a city area of roughly 9 hectares and a perimeter of 1220 m in Elymian and Punic times. The ancient city is hence much smaller than the modern settlement and was extended toward the south in late medieval times. Ancient Eryx must have developed on the northernmost side of the mountain's summit, facing the harbour of Bonagia and the Elymian inland territories, but also remained open for contacts with the Punic cities, in particular, Motya. Furthermore, the identification of the northern limit of the settlement confirms the hypothesis of a suburban location of the temple of Venus Erycina. This reconstruction would help clarify the texts passages by Polybius relating to the events of the First Punic War. The historian claims that the temple was located at the top of Mount Eryx, while the town was situated on a lower area and difficult to access[64]. In another passage, he states that after the Roman conquest of Eryx in 244 BC, the Carthaginians reconquered the town, but the Romans left a garrison on top of the mountain.[65] This can only be explained if the temple was located outside the town.

Conclusion

Looking at the evidence from the excavation of the city walls of Eryx, it has become clear that this city is an important case study to understand numerous political and military phenomena, which have affected western Sicily and the western Mediterranean from Archaic times onward. The walls of Eryx, built upon the Late Archaic settlement, constitute an evident turning point. Evidently, they also present a new urban identity of the Late Archaic Elymian city. Moreover, the analysis of building techniques, the diachronic reconstruction of building phases, while taking into account polyorcetic aspects and topographic developments, lead not only to the clarification of political and military developments, but they also provide insights into the sociocultural background of Mediterranean matrix, in which Eryx took part until at least the Late Republican period.

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[1] Nenci 1990; De Vido 1997; Consolo Langher 2000; Ampolo 2012.

[2] Historical sources name an attempt of Pentathlus, prior to the battle of Alalia, maybe between 580 and 576 BC. Being supported by Selinous he tried unavailingly to establish a colony near Lilybaeum, leading a group of Dorians from Cnidus and Rhodes: Thuc. 3.88.2–3; Diod. Sic. 5.9; Paus. 10.11.3. See also Merante 1967. Following Pausanias, who refers probably to Antiochos, the Cnidians went into battle against the Elymians and the Phoenicians. However, Diodorus, based probably on Timaeus, reports conflicts between Pentathlus, Selinous, and Segesta: Anello 1998, 42–43.

[3] Bondì 1990, 138.

[4] De Vido 1989b.

[5] Polyb. 3.22. Scardigli 1991, 47–87; Kleu 2010; De Vincenzo 2013.

[6] Pugliese Carratelli 1989, 26–32; De Vido 1997, 246–254; De Angelis 2016, 102.

[7] Lancel 1992, 153–161.

[8] Vassallo 2000; Gargini 2001, 133.

[9] De Vido 1997, 262–268.

[10] Anello 1998, 47; Cutroni Tusa 1999, 191–204.

[11] Maddoli 1979, 79; Anello 1986, 135–136; Pugliese Carratelli 1989, 43–44; De Vido 1997, 268–271.

[12] Cooney and Kolb 2007; Kistler *et al.* 2015.

[13] De Angelis 2016.

[14] Frederiksen *et al.* 2016.

[15] Gargini 2001.

[16] De Cesare *et al.* 1997; Vassallo 2000; Gargini 2001, 133.

[17] Polyb. 1.55.7–8.

[18] Ruiz Cabrero 2010; Lietz 2010; 2012.

[19] Diod. Sic. 4.78.4; 4.83.1.

[20] Polyb. 1.55.8–9. Regarding the scarce archaeological evidence on the

temple of Eryx see Cultrera 1935; Barresi 2010; De Vincenzo 2010, 42–45.

[21] Hdt. 5.42–48; Diod. Sic. 4.23.3; Paus. 16.4–5. See also De Vido 1989b.

[22] De Vicenzo 2016, 138–139.

[23] Morris and Tusa 2004.

[24] Morris and Tusa 2004, 78–80, 90.

[25] Vassallo 2000.

[26] De Vido 1989a, 355; Zodda 1989; more recently see Cutroni Tusa 2010, 63–64.

[27] De Vido 1989a, 355; 1997, 388–391; Zodda 1989; Musti 1990; Cutroni Tusa 2010, 63–64.

[28] Musti 1990, 156–159.

[29] De Vincenzo 2016a, 41–44.

[30] De Vincenzo 2016a, 134–135.

[31] Blasetti Fantauzzi 2018, 17–18, 141–142.

[32] Vassallo 2000; Morris and Tusa 2004, 78–80, 90.

[33] Favaro 2008, 28.

[34] Gargini *et al.* 2006.

[35] De Cesare 2015, 314–315.

[36] Diod. Sic. 14.48.1.

[37] Diod. Sic. 14.55.4.

[38] Manfredi 1995, 214–215; 346–347; Garbini 2004, 31.

[39] *CIS* I, 135; Amadasi Guzzo 1967, 53–55; Garbini 2004; Lietz 2012, 307–311.

[40] Bisi 1971.

[41] Lietz 2012, 70–71.

[42] De Vincenzo 2016a, 135.

[43] Filippi 1998; 2006; Lietz 2012, 74–77.

[44] Musti 1990, 168–170.

[45] Plut. *Vit. Pyrrh.* 22.7–12; Diod. Sic. 22.10.3. See also De Vido 1994, 148.

[46] Salinas 1882; Richter 1885, 43–51; Zirone 2003, 1358, 1374.

[47] Garbini 2004; De Vincenzo 2013, 73–74.

[48] Diod. Sic. 23.9; Zon. 8.11.

[49] De Vido *et al.* 2001; De Vido 2009.

[50] Isler 1992; 2000.

[51] Musti 1990, 168–170.

[52] Diod. Sic. 23.8; Zonar. 8.11. See also Filippi 1998.

[53] Polyb. 1.55.5–10.

[54] Filippi 1998, 181–183.

[55] Polyb. 3.9.7; 1.59.5.

[56] Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.22.

[57] Strab. 6.2.5.

[58] Tac. *Ann.* 4.43. See also Rizzo 1990; De Vincenzo 2018b.

[59] Suet. *Claud.* 25.5.

[60] Bisi 1969, 41–43; Grotta 2009; Oliveri 2009; Rizzo 2009, 401; Famà 2010, 57–58; Lietz 2012, 307–322.

[61] *CIL* X 7258. See also De Vido 1989a, 354.

[62] De Vincenzo 2018a, 70–76.

[63] De Vincenzo 2015, 112–113; 2016b; Blasetti Fantauzzi and De Vincenzo 2012, 17–18.

[64] Polyb. 1.55.8–9.

[65] Polyb. 1.58.2–4.

Chapter 17

Roman fears, the Punic way and the Sicilian contribution: the war for Sicily in its first stages (264–263 BC)*

Claudio Vacanti

> ‘Queequeg was a native of Rokovoko, an island far away to the West and South. It is not down in any map; true places never are’ – Herman Melville, *Moby Dick*, 1851, chap. 12

Sulle orme di un case-study sull’espansione di Roma in Italia tra 326 e 264 a.C., in questo articolo i primi anni della guerra per la Sicilia tra Romani e Cartaginesi vengono mappati da carte geopolitiche. Ciascuna carta, strettamente connessa allo studio storico e non semplicemente seguita da un commento storico, mostra differenti prospettive sul conflitto: la percezione immaginaria romana della minaccia cartaginese, la macrostrategia punica e il contributo delle città siciliane. Il lavoro mostra un forte potenziale euristico ed ermeneutico nel rappresentare le dinamiche geopolitiche del conflitto e costituisce il secondo passo verso un Atlante geopolitico della Repubblica romana.

This is the second round of a match between geopolitics and ancient history, the first results of which I published in 2016.[1] In this paper, I will present not only geopolitical maps of ancient Sicily but also (part of) their theoretical approach. My purpose is to open a path for a geopolitical atlas of the Roman Republic, while a wider theoretical study is in progress.

Methodology towards a geopolitical approach

First, a historical map is very different from a geopolitical map. The chart of a historical atlas is, in essence, the placement of historical data on a geographic map.[2] In order to build this map, we may use historical or archaeological data, false data or data perceived as true. On closer inspection, such data are merely the starting point for a geopolitical atlas. The geopolitical chart must illustrate geopolitical dynamics and the reasons for the conflicts.[3] It must not simply depict the distribution of geographical objects but must provide the keys to understand the force factors, the reasons for this particular framework and its possible future configuration. Historical data must not only be represented but must 'move' in the chart. This *quid pluris* should distinguish a historical chart from a geopolitical chart, yet this trait is not enough. There exists, in fact, another distinguishing characteristic. As a geopolitical map communicates an interpretation of a geopolitical reality, a geopolitical map of the ancient world necessarily implies the involvement of historical interpretation. These two factors – dynamic representation and interpretation – have huge implications for a geopolitical atlas of the ancient world. This atlas cannot only serve to illustrate a historical phenomenon but must have a heuristic value. It must not only show us – as a historical chart – historical data on the map but must represent elements that we otherwise would not see within a precise interpretive framework and with correct historical methodology. Each map in a geopolitical atlas of the Roman Republic needs extensive research. In Italy, many difficulties occurred while creating 'scientific' historical atlases, such as the project proposed by the geographer Giuseppe della Vedova in the early 1900s, or by other geographers and historians, including Luigi Pareti,[4] or the extensive 'Giannini project', which was supposed to include geographers and historians, such as Plinio Fraccaro.[5] The historical study needed for a geopolitical map cannot be only preliminary research. The historical analysis of geopolitical dynamics must be followed by a study, *with* the map and *in* the map, of such dynamics. 'With the map' means that the assumptions of the historical study must be verified and modified through the map (the heuristic phase), while 'in the map' means that this study must be expressed cartographically (the hermeneutic phase). The geopolitical chart must not simply be a map combined with comments but must be intrinsically linked to the historical and scientific study of the dynamics. Only such a hendiadys will possess the illustrative purpose of the map, which will make the geopolitical atlas a multifunctional tool.

Limitations and problems

To the inherent difficulties in the development of a geopolitical atlas of the past we must add at least three specific limitations for the period that we will study.

The first limitation is linked to the type of sources extant for the period that we will investigate (*i.e.* Antiquity). If archaeological sources are fundamental to the geolocation of major and minor towns as well as to trade flows – one needs only to think of the role of amphorae. To reconstruct the major part of geopolitical dynamics, we can only rely on historiographical sources, which are extremely incomplete and distorted, as they are only historiographically oriented. The nature of the evidence for the ancient world needs also the method of historical analogy, which occurs among similar processes developed in similar conditions. Although not risk-free, analogy allows us to conceive of a fact that already has passed and works from the particular to the particular, as great historians including Droysen and Rostovtzeff have demonstrated.[6] In addition, there is the analogy between the contemporary and ancient perceptions of the geostrategic importance of a place, an evaluation of which modern historians must avail themselves in order to understand and to illustrate geopolitical dynamics and the strategic reasons of stakeholders, such as Rome and Carthage.

The second limitation is our hindsight bias. In the construction of a geopolitical map of the war for Sicily between Rome, Carthage and the Sicilians,[7] we suffer an inextricable distortion. In our conscience lives the inescapable knowledge of historical consequences and from such knowledge derives unavoidable biases.

As seen, judgements are implied in any geographic representation of a political process, *i.e.* in any geopolitical map. Therefore, such prejudice appears within the geographical and historiographical representation of any historical process that has occurred. To be aware of the risk of hindsight bias, however, does not imply its disappearance, although we should remember that hindsight, although a risk, is also a tremendous advantage for understanding historical issues.

The third limitation concerns the ability of ancient civilizations to perceive the space around them in a cartographical way, especially for military purposes. Janni and Brodersen,[8] independently of each other, created very useful studies to demonstrate that ancient civilizations conceived of space as an itinerary consisting of lines and points. The modern concept of space, cartographical and multidimensional, differs from the ancient concept, which depended on movements, originated from a starting point and developed along the way. From this 'hodological' conception of space, according to Janni, derived many mistakes of ancient cartography that transposed onto maps data and information valid only from this hodological perspective.[9] We nevertheless must not forget that geographical and cartographical studies reached advanced levels in Antiquity. From the 6th to the 2nd centuries BC – precisely the period of the Roman Republic – Anaximander, Hecataeus, Dicaearchus, Eratosthenes and Hipparchus made many representations of the known world in an orthogonal system of reference which (concerning latitude) attained a high degree of accuracy, as shown by the observations of Pytheas of Massalia and Eratosthenes.[10] While the calculation of longitude was imprecise, it remained inaccurate until marine chronometers came into use in the 18th century AD.[11] It is also true that the ancient concept of geographic coordinates perhaps was different than ours, as no abstract preliminary construction existed to place sites, but rather the will of organising geographically a system of real places, perceived as points of departure and arrival.[12]

Finally, such limitations certainly could affect the final picture,[13] yet these issues did not prevent cartographic representation (although inaccurate). The hodological conception likely used in the document is most similar to medieval portolans that we have from antiquity, namely the *Stadiasmus Maris Magni.*[14] Even if Romans had nothing similar to the nautical charts of the modern world – for which one must know dead reckoning navigation techniques and how to calculate a fix with a compass, log and chronometer[15] – their scientific and technical level of cartographic representation, although inferior to today, did not undermine their ability to think militarily and cartographically. As recently shown, Greek representation of maritime spaces integrated both qualitative and quantitative features, based on chronological grounds and on an experiential vision of spatial relations that matched the organisation of space with the organisation of human maritime activities and modified the representation of boundaries.[16] If ancient populations, as Medas rightly remarks, had to project sea routes based on climatic and commercial reasons,[17] the military and strategic dimension must, *a fortiori*, include geophysical and geo-human factors. In order to choose which path to take from point 'x' to point 'y', navigators cannot know merely the shortest route but also the obstacles/advantages in each, in physical terms (spatial, climatic and supply) and in political terms (*e.g.* the presence of hostile, neutral or friendly communities).[18] These lines and angles lie on a physical territory where a crucial factor also exists: the friction of war, which necessarily makes the strategic representation three-dimensional.[19] In other words, the geostrategic reading of space, especially of roads, was not the privilege only of Napoleon or of the geographer and colonel of the Indian Army, Thomas Holdich, as this reading appears in the choice of Hannibal when crossing the Alps, instead of following the shortest route to Italy, Saguntum–Ostia,[20] and by the attention to geographic dimensions in waging war emphasised by Polybius.[21] In addition, in this type of geographical 'flatland' that one may believe was the ancient world, there was no need, as in the novel *Flatland* by E.A. Abbott, of a sphere from 'spaceland' that would understand the existence of a third dimension – territory – for the simple reason that it existed in Roman and Greek reality.

A case-study on Roman Italy

Conscious of these limitations as well as of the temporary nature of the attempts to overcome them, I attempted to offer an initial answer to the question ‘How would one create a geopolitical atlas of the Roman Republic?’ in a case-study of 2016.[22] The first intention was to illustrate the geopolitical dynamics of Roman control on the Italian Peninsula from the three decades before 290 BC to the eve of the First Punic War. The second purpose was to illustrate the ability of Rome to geostrategically perceive the space around it. This research required a wide preliminary study of 2015[23] where I identified the grand strategy of Rome from 290 to 264 BC as aimed at an organic project of garrisons, whose military force was multiplied by their latent suasion and whose hard power, in turn, was strengthened in the southern quadrant by soft power derived from the *fides* of Rome among cities of Magna Graecia.[24] Geopolitical charts, partly designed in 2015, have cartographically depicted these dynamics. In the case-study of 2016, every geopolitical chart is therefore linked to and not simply accompanied by a historical study. Here is not the place to determine whether and within which limits this hendiadys has the same illustrative function of a geopolitical chart. We nevertheless will apply some tools used for those maps to build several charts for the geopolitical atlas of the war for Sicily between the Romans, Carthaginians and Sicilians in its first stages.

Roman fears

I

The first chart that I propose derives from my 2016 case-study[25] but with a ‘reversed’ perspective (Fig. 17.1). Such a perspective does not seek to mock the famous Vatican ‘Gallery of Maps’ of Ignazio Danti, where Sicily is painted from a Roman perspective and with a south-up orientation.[26]


I. The new regional power
CARTHAGO
Utica
Cam.
Finz.
Agr.
Era.
Siracusa
Meg.
Len.
Sel.
Maz.
Lil.
Ent.
Hal.
Erb.
Hipp.
Cat.
Myt.
Enna
Seg.
Cent.
Mak.
Er.
Drep.
Iae.
T. I.
Adr.
Keph.
Halae.
Sol.
Pan.
Heir.
Taur.
Tin.
Myl.
Reg.
Mes.
Lip.
Locr.
Hypp.
Cro.
Thu.
Paes.
Ponza
Met.
Cum.
Neap.
Cap.
Tar.
Ven.
Ben.
Sa.
Su.
Ter.
Bri.
Cal.
Int.
Ant.
Fr.
Ostia
ROMA
Caer.
Luc.
Sor.
Car.
Sutr.
Tarq.
Alb.
Vulc.
Cos.
Nar.
Vols.
Rus.
Vet.
Hadr.
Cast. N.
Volt.
Firm.
Arr.
Faes.
Sen.
Arim.
LEGENDA
Axis/*Limes*
© Claudio Vacanti

Figure 17.1. Chart I: the new regional power.

If we look at the cartographic representation of the Roman garrison system from this perspective, something becomes noticeable: on the eve of the First Punic War, the Roman Federation was a system that Bismarck would have termed a *saturierte Großmacht*, a power that has reached its geopolitical saturation, namely all of its political goals in Italy.[27] Coarelli and Loreto have shown well that the dedication of the Temple of Tellus in 268 BC[28] represented the precise awareness by the Romans that, with the foundation of Rimini and the annexation of Picenus, the *terra Italia* was now identified with the Italic Federation led by Rome.[29] In this new chart (Fig. 17.1), the symbol *limes* appears in the original sense of the word: not a simple boundary but a point of origin of axes for traversing and penetrating into enemy territory,[30] axes which themselves are identified by the arrow symbol (Axis/*Limes*). This *limes* stands on and coincides with the layout of a main road. We note how the axes formed by the garrisons Cosa-Paestum,[31] formed by Ariminum–Castrum Novum Hadriaticum,[32] formed by the quadrilateral which oversees Samnium[33] (Paestum–Beneventum–Luceria–Venusia), formed by the Etruscan *limes* Narnia-Sutri[34] and by the allied Greek *poleis* and the Roman garrisons Regium–Tarentum[35] together constitute the new axes marking this new regional power. This Roman self-representation is confirmed in the contemporary perception of Hellenistic 'chancelleries', as 290 BC – the end date of the Third Samnite War and one year before Agathocles' death – is almost certainly the year of the diplomatic mission to Rome by Demetrius Poliorcetes reported by Strabo. Romans are considered as those who στρατηγεῖν … τῆς Ἰταλίας ('rule over Italy').[36] Even more important are the mutual diplomatic missions between Rome and Ptolemaic Egypt in 273 BC,[37] after the defeat of Pyrrhus and Tarentum, which prove that Alexandria, as a Mediterranean superpower, acknowledged Rome as a regional power – a political recognition by Egypt, who took the diplomatic initiative.[38]

II

The precise grand strategy of this federation can be depicted *in* a chart and *by* a chart, as in the meaning provided above. In this chart (Fig. 17.2), the Barrier icon represents the role of advanced protection from major invasions performed generally by garrisons on the border of enemy territory. The icon Maritime Garrison represents the maritime patrol, sighting and projection capacity of maritime garrisons that gradually reinforced Latium and then the territory of the Italic peoples and Magna Graecia and together formed the maritime *limes*. As seen from Chart II, this new cartography of Roman *limes*-system, the Italian Peninsula was protected against Gallic invasions from the Po valley by the *limes* Castrum Novum–Ariminum, against an amphibious invasion from the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Ionian Sea by maritime garrisons (marked by the dotted line), and against an invasion from the Adriatic by Brindisium, which joined the Castrum Novum–Ariminum *limes*-system.[39] This grand strategy was not that of a major maritime power – which has a major permanent fleet by which it projects its power[40] – but of a regional land power that wishes to protect its own coasts with garrisons, as France did in the 18th century with its port system and unlike Holland or England during the same period, which projected themselves toward the oceans.[41] This federation, which appeared united against external threats was, in truth, a fragile great power.


II. Roman *limes*-system
CARTHAGO
Utica
Cam.
Siracusa
Meg.
Len.
Finz.
Agr.
Era.
Sel.
Maz.
Lil.
Hal.
Ent.
Erb.
Myt.
Hipp.
Cat.
Cent.
Enna
Mak.
Seg.
Er.
Drep.
Iae.
T. I.
Adr.
Halae.
Keph.
Sol.
Pan.
Heir.
Taur.
Tin.
Myl.
Reg.
Mes.
Lip.
Locr.
Hypp.
Cro.
Thu.
Met.
Tar.
Bri.
Paes.
Ponza
Cum.
Neap.
Cap.
Sa.
Cal.
Su.
Ter.
Ven.
Ben.
Ant.
Int.
Fr.
Ostia
ROMA
Caer.
Luc.
Sor.
Car.
Alb.
Sutr.
Tarq.
Vulc.
Cos.
Nar.
Vols.
Rus.
Vet.
Hadr.
Cast. N.
Volt.
Firm.
Arr.
Faes.
Sen.
Arim.
LEGENDA
Barrier
Maritime *limes*
Land *limes*
Maritime garrisons
© Claudio Vacanti

Figure 17.2. Chart II: Roman limes-*system.*

III

This fragility is better portrayed in/by Chart III (Fig. 17.3). The quadrilateral defending Samnium, the Etruscan *limes* Narnia–Sutri (whose wedges represent the capacity of Rome to project its land power in Etruria) and the *limes*-system of Magna Graecia were constrained to handle not one but many threats (represented by geolocalised grids): Samnite, Lucanian, Bruttian, Etruscan, Umbrian[42] and the external Gallic threats from the Po Valley.[43]

IV

Chart IV shows also how the Roman state in its truest sense – which Carl Schmitt would have called, in the technical-juridical sense, a *Reich* – was a power with a small territory, fragile and surrounded by dangers (Fig. 17.4). The proper Roman state, corresponding to the *ager romanus*, is depicted in the form of a rectangular grid.[44]

V

The Roman federation, the *Großraum* of the Roman state in which Rome was the hegemon, was a regional power that could coexist with Carthage, as seen in Chart V (Fig. 17.5). The federation – as deduced from Punic treaties that lasted for centuries[45] and from the anti-Pyrrhus military alliance as junior partner[46] – was complementary to Carthage from a geopolitical and geostrategic point of view. As a geopolitically saturated power, its expansion could be aimed toward the Po Valley, from which came the major geostrategic threat of the Gauls. This Italic directrix – which accompanied the co-rule of the central Mediterranean – changed suddenly in 264 BC.


III. The fragile great power
CARTHAGO
Utica
Cam.
Siracusa
Meg.
Len.
Finz.
Agr.
Era.
Sel.
Maz.
Lil.
Ent.
Hal.
Erb.
Hipp.
Myt.
Enna
Cat.
Cent.
Mak.
Seg.
Er.
Drep.
T. I.
Iae.
Adr.
Halae.
Keph.
Sol.
Pan.
Heir.
Taur.
Tin.
Myl.
Reg.
Mes.
Lip.
Locr.
Hypp.
Cro.
Thu.
Paes.
Ponza
Met
Tar.
Bri.
Ven.
Ben.
Luc.
Neap.
Cum.
Cap.
Sa.
Cal.
Su.
Ter.
Int.
Fr.
Ant.
Ostia
ROMA
Caer.
Sor.
Car.
Alb.
Sutr.
Tarq.
Vulc.
Cos.
Nar.
Vols.
Rus.
Vet.
Hadr.
Cast. N.
Volt.
Arr.
Firm.
Pis.
Faes.
Sen.
Arim.
LEGENDA
Barrier
Maritime *limes*
Land *limes*
Power projection
Maritime garrisons
Peril/Threat
© Claudio Vacanti

Figure 17.3. Chart III: the fragile great power.


IV. The surrounded small power
CARTHAGO
Utica
Cam.
Siracusa
Meg.
Len.
Finz.
Agr.
Era.
Sel.
Maz.
Lil.
Hal.
Ent.
Erb.
Hipp.
Myt.
Enna
Cat.
Cent.
Mak.
Iae.
Seg.
Er.
Drep.
T. I.
Adr.
Halae.
Keph.
Sol.
Pan.
Heir.
Taur.
Tin.
Myl.
Reg.
Mes.
Lip.
Locr.
Hypp.
Cro.
Thu.
Met.
Tar.
Bri.
Paes.
Ponza
Ven.
Ben.
Luc.
Cum.
Neap.
Cap.
Su.
Sa.
Cal.
Int.
Ter.
Ant.
Ostia
ROMA
Caer.
Sor.
Alb.
Car.
Sutr.
Tarq.
Vulc.
Cos.
Nar.
Vols.
Rus.
Vet.
Hadr.
Cast. N.
Firm.
Sen.
Arim.
Volt.
Arr.
Faes.
Pis.
LEGENDA
Barrier
Maritime *limes*
Land *limes*
Power projection
Maritime garrisons
Peril/Threat
Roman *Reich*
© Claudio Vacanti

Figure 17.4. Chart IV: the surrounded small power.


V. The saturated regional power
CARTHAGO
Utica
Cam.
Finz.
Agr.
Siracusa
Meg.
Len.
Era.
Erb.
Ent.
Sel.
Maz.
Lil.
Cat.
Enna
Myt.
Hipp.
Hal.
Seg.
Cent.
Mak.
Iae.
Er.
Dre.
Adr.
Halae.
Keph.
T. I.
Sol.
Pan.
Heir.
Taur.
Tin.
Myl.
Reg.
Mes.
Lip.
Locr.
Hypp.
Cro.
Thu.
Met.
Tar.
Bri.
Paes.
Ponza
Ven.
Ben.
Luc.
Cum.
Neap.
Cap.
Sa.
Cal.
Su.
Ter.
Ant.
Int.
Fr.
Ostia
ROMA
Caer.
Sor.
Car.
Alb.
Sutr.
Tarq.
Vulc.
Cos.
Nar.
Vols.
Rus.
Vet.
Hadr.
Cast. N.
Firm.
Volt.
Arr.
Pis.
Faes.
Sen.
Arim.
Bithia
Nora
Sulcis
Caralis
Tharros
Bosa
Olbia
Alalia
LEGENDA
Barrier
Maritime limes
Land limes
Power projection
Maritime garrisons
Carthaginian Domain
Italic directrix
© Claudio Vacanti

Figure 17.5. Chart V: the saturated regional power.


VI. The encirclement syndrome
CARTHAGO
Utica
Cam.
Siracusa
Meg.
Len.
Panz.
Agr.
Er.
Cat.
Erb.
Myt.
Sel.
Maz.
Hal.
Lil.
Ent.
Hipp.
Cent.
Enna
Mak.
Seg.
Er.
Drep.
Adr.
Herac.
Keph.
T. T.
Sol.
Pan.
Heir.
Taur.
Rh.
Myl.
Locr.
Lip.
Hypp.
Cro.
Thu.
Met.
Tar.
Ven.
Bri.
Paes.
Ben.
Luc.
Ponza
Neap.
Cum.
Cap.
Sa.
Cal.
Su.
Int.
Ter.
Ant.
Ostia
ROMA
Sor.
Alb.
Cer.
Sut.
Caer.
Tarq.
Vulc.
Cos.
Nar.
Vols.
Rus.
Vet.
Hadr.
Cast. N.
Firm.
Sen.
Arim.
Volt.
Arr.
Faes.
Pis.
Bithia
Nora
Sulcis
Caralis
Tharros
Bosa
Olbia
Alalia
LEGENDA
Barrier
Maritime *limes*
Land *limes*
Maritime garrisons
Peril/Threat
Roman *Reich*
Imaginary threat
© Claudio Vacanti

Figure 17.6. Chart VI: the encirclement syndrome.

VI

As argued by Edward Ingram concerning the great game between the British Empire and Russia in Central Asia,[47] the perception (or better the imaginary perception) of a Punic threat played a fundamental role for Rome.[48] When reporting the debate in the Senate about the request for help from the Mamertines in 264 BC, Polybius writes that some senators feared that, if Messana was conquered by Carthaginians, Rome would be surrounded.[49] This encirclement syndrome – analogous to the *Einkreisungspanik* of Germany in the 1910s – is only a projection onto Carthage of the typical mechanisms of a Continental power, such as Rome was and Carthage was not. This proper 'mirror thinking' was vitiated by poor knowledge of the grand strategy of Carthage.[50] From Chart VI (Fig. 17.6) emerges how, in Rome, this geopolitically incorrect perception was further amplified due to its conception not as a federation but as a hegemon and fragile power *in* the Federation – perfectly reasonable from the point of view of the decision makers in the Senate. The dotted line represents the perception of the potential Punic encirclement.

The Punic way

VII

Let us view the same problem from a different point of view: it is what we may call, to paraphrase Liddel Hart, the Punic Way in Warfare.[51] To analyse this issue, we must understand that the heart of the Carthaginian Empire was not Sicily, although the island was part of an imperial system that, although informal, was well-delineated. At least five sectors of territory within the grand strategy of Carthage[52] are represented from a Carthaginian point of view in several charts, where the area of control – not territorial but economical, in terms of control of trade routes and ports – is indicated by a shaded half-moon. In Chart VII A is the Atlantic sector, with Atlantic Africa and the tin trade route (Fig. 17.7); in Chart VII B, the Mediterranean Iberian sector (Fig. 17.8); in Chart VII C (Fig. 17.9), the West African sector; in Chart VII D (Fig. 17.10), the Syrtis sector; in Chart VII E (Fig. 17.11), the Tyrrhenian sector.

VIII

An overall view of this system of chessboards, again from a

Carthaginian point of view, allows for the identification of a meta-chessboard that links and crosses them: this system of Punic trade routes[53] is represented generally by Chart VIII (Fig. 17.12). On this map, it appears that the other sectors are perfectly defendable by the large fleet possessed by Carthage.[54] In none of these sectors were major land threats from middle or regional powers.


VII A.
Atlantic Sector
© Claudio Vacanti
LEGENDA
Area of economical Carthaginian control

Figure 17.7. Chart VII A: Atlantic Sector.


VII B.
Iberic Sector
Tharros
LEGENDA
Area of economical Carthaginian control
© Claudio Vacanti

Figure 17.8. Chart VII B: Iberic Sector.


VII C. West Africa Sector
Sulcis
Bithia
LEGENDA
Area of economical Carthaginian control
© Claudio Vacanti

Figure 17.9. Chart VII C: West Africa Sector.



Figure 17.10. Chart VII D: Syrtis Sector.

IX

In Sicily, on the other hand, the situation was vastly different. In Chart IX, we note how the island was a theatre in which Carthage was extremely vulnerable (Fig. 17.13). In Sicily, medium-sized cities, Greek or not, and Syracuse, the major city, were a threat to Carthage. Each could potentially threaten, depending on its military power, Carthaginian bases on the island. The threats deriving from these cities are represented by geolocalised grids. On closer inspection, Sicily was the only sector for which Carthage was compelled to provide a strong army.[55] As clear from the war against Pyrrhus,[56] the primary interest of Carthage inside Sicily was not to maintain its territorial presence, but to preserve, at all costs, the presence of the major Punic stronghold on the island, Lilybaeum,[57] a crucial hub for Africa and Sardinia. Carthage did not pursue a policy of expansion in Sicily because it had no grand strategic interest of doing so. Nevertheless, lack of interest does not mean that Carthage would have easily surrendered its bases on the island or that it would not have reacted strongly against aggressions.


VII E. Tyrrhenian Sector
Alb.
Sor.
Ben.
Nar.
Car.
Cal.
Sa.
Thu.
Cro.
Fr.
Int.
Su.
Cap.
Neap.
Sutr.
Paes.
Cum.
Tarq.
ROMA
Ter.
Caer.
Ostia
Ant.
Ponza
Hypp.
Locr.
Reg.
Mes.
Lip.
Myl.
Tin.
Taur.
Alalia
Adr.
Halae.
Cent.
Cat.
Keph.
Meg.
Len.
SYRACUSAE
T. I.
Enna
Olbia
Heir.
Pan.
Sol.
Myt.
Erb.
Mak.
Iae.
Hipp.
Cam.
Er.
Seg.
Ent.
Era.
Agr.
Finz.
Drep.
Hal.
Lil.
Maz.
Sel.
Bosa
Tharros
Caralis
Nora
Bithia
Sulcis
Utica
CARTHAGO
LEGENDA
Area of economical Carthaginian control
© Claudio Vacanti

Figure 17.11. Chart VII E: Tyrrhenian Sector.

In several periods, Carthage attempted to benefit from the temporary political weakness of Greek cities or to strengthen its position in Sicily with preemptive interventions.[58] However, Carthage was not interested in conquering Sicily through a long war against Greek cities or in destroying Syracuse – we also may consider the reaction of Ptolemaic Egypt. In fact, after Pyrrhus' defeat, Carthage did not try to conquer Syracuse but to maintain the *status quo* boundary, which roughly corresponds to the banks of the Halykos. This Carthaginian border could change (as indicated by several arcs) – but had to protect Lilybaeum and the system of trade routes[59] (indicated by the dotted grey lines) that guaranteed the link with the other chessboards (indicated by black lines). In this map appears also the extremely crucial roles of Pantelleria and Malta.[60]


VIII. Punic meta-chessboard
© Claudio Vacanti
LEGENDA
Inter-sector trade link
Area of economical Carthaginian control

Figure 17.12. Chart VIII: Punic meta-chessboard.

X

Chart X (Fig. 17.14) demonstrates that, as long as Carthage had the power from its major sea power (indicated by the circular grids, which represent the capacity of patrolling by the fleets from the most important Carthaginian naval bases), the federation led by Rome was not a danger to the grand strategy of Carthage: Carthage was able to project its naval power (indicated by the arrows) to the Italic coasts as well as to the Sicilian coasts.[61] Seas were an obstacle only to those who did not control them. This perspective is quite different from that of Chart VI (Fig. 17.6), where Rome had fears from its own perspective of fragile power of major invasions by land. Chart X also proves that the best logical move for Rome would have been to reinforce its coastal defenses or to provide a fleet capable of better patrolling the coasts, while confirming at the same time the alliance with Carthage in order possibly to expand to the Po Valley.[62]


IX. The Sicilian Theatre
Alb.
Sor.
Ben.
Nar.
Car.
Cal.
Sa.
Thu.
Cro.
Fr.
Int.
Su.
Cap.
Neap.
Sutr.
Tarq.
ROMA
Cum.
Paes.
Ter.
Caer.
Ostia
Ant.
Ponza
Hypp.
Locr.
Alalia
Mes.
Reg.
Lip.
Myl.
Tin.
Taur.
Adr.
Cat.
Halae.
Cent.
Keph.
Meg.
Len.
SYRACUSAE
Enna
Olbia
Heir.
Pan.
Sol.
T. I.
Myt.
Erb.
Iae.
Mak.
Hipp.
Cam.
Er.
Seg.
Ent.
Era.
Agr.
Finz.
Drep.
Hal.
Lil.
Maz.
Sel.
Bosa
Tharros
Caralis
Nora
Sulcis
Bithia
Utica
CARTHAGO
LEGENDA
Inter-sector trade link
Trade route
Hub/Stronghold
Punic maritime basis
Peril/Threat
Carthaginian variable boarder
© Claudio Vacanti

Figure 17.13. Chart IX: the Sicilian Theatre.


X. The Punic Way in Warfare
Alb.
Sor.
Ben.
Nar.
Car.
Cal.
Sa.
Thu.
Cro.
Fr.
Int.
Su.
Cap.
Neap.
Sutr.
Tarq.
ROMA
Cum.
Paes.
Ter.
Caer.
Ostia
Ant.
Ponza
Hypp.
Locr.
Alalia
Mes.
Reg.
Lip.
Myl.
Tin.
Taur.
Adr.
Cat.
Halae.
Cent.
Keph.
Meg.
Len.
SYRACUSAE
Enna
Olbia
Heir.
Pan.
Sol.
T. I.
Myt.
Erb.
Iae.
Mak.
Hipp.
Cam.
Er.
Seg.
Ent.
Era.
Agr.
Finz.
Drep.
Hal.
Lil.
Maz.
Sel.
Bosa
Tharros
Caralis
Nora
Sulcis
Bithia
Utica
CARTHAGO
LEGENDA
Punic Patrolling
Naval power projection
© Claudio Vacanti

Figure 17.14. Chart X: the Punic Way in warfare.

The Sicilian perspective

XI

Let us move to a purely Sicilian perspective of the conflict,[63] as I attempted earlier in another work where, through a primitive cartography of geopolitical dynamics,[64] I identified the value of *la svolta di Centuripe*, the turning point of Centuripe.[65] To follow this argument, we will use Chart XI, which represents the situation in 264 BC from the Syracusan perspective (Fig. 17.15). As seen here, the Sicilian territory controlled by Carthage (marked by grey arcs) and the territory of Messana now allied with Rome (marked by the black arc) encircled geopolitically the *Großraum* of Syracuse whose proper *Reich*, the area under the direct control of Hieron II, is represented by a square grid. From the Syracusan point of view, the previous good relations and the relatively recent anti-Pyrrhus military alliance between Carthage and Rome made possible a rapprochement between the two 'barbarian' cities. This potential entente would have been extremely dangerous for Syracuse. A potential partition of Sicily between Rome and Carthage would have resulted in an annexation of Syracuse or at least in strong losses of its *Großraum*. The Syracusan-Carthaginian war against Rome risked becoming a conflict of Carthage and Rome against Syracuse. For Syracuse and for Hieron II, it would have been a catastrophic alliance – in its etymological meaning of turning traditional relations on their head.


XI. The Sicilian perspective
CARTHAGO
Lil.
Drep.
Er.
Maz.
Sel.
Hal.
Seg.
Iae.
Heir.
Pan.
Ent.
Sol.
Mak.
Hipp.
T. I.
Era.
Keph.
Myt.
Agr.
Halae.
Lip.
Finz.
Enna
Erb.
Cent.
Tin.
Adr.
Myl.
Taur.
Mes.
Cam.
Len.
Cat.
Reg.
Hypp.
Meg.
SYRACUSAE
Locr.
LEGENDA
Syracusan Reich
Carthaginian border
Roman border
© Claudio Vacanti

Figure 17.15. Chart XI: the Sicilian perspective.

XII

After minor clashes for Rome – as inferred by the news of Philinus found in Polybius and by the missed triumph of Appius Claudius[66] – the only fact worthy of note from a military point of view in 263 BC is the taking of Hadranum.[67] Still, while Roman forces were besieging Centuripe, Halaesa and a delegation of Sicilian cities – 67 according to Diodorus – joined forces with the Romans: basically all of eastern Sicily, in addition to Halicyae and Segesta.[68] It was an extraordinary achievement, not only from the Roman point of view but also, in a negative way, from the Syracusan perspective. King Hieron likely understood that at Centuripe there not only was a pact of non-belligerence with the invader but also a declaration of war against him. Diodorus reports, in fact, that Roman forces marched against Syracuse together with Sicilian forces.[69] The Roman war against Carthage, Syracuse and the Sicilians became a war of Rome and the Sicilians against Syracuse and Carthage. The geopolitical inversion made by the turning point at Centuripe is shown by Chart XII and in Chart XII (Fig. 17.16).


XII. The Centuripe turning point
Drep.
Lil.
Er.
Maz.
Seg.
Hal.
Sel.
Iae.
Heir.
Ent.
Pan.
Sol.
Mak.
Hipp.
T. I.
Era.
Keph.
Myt.
Agr.
Halae.
Lip.
Enna
Finz.
Erb.
Tin.
Cent.
Myl.
Adr.
Taur.
Cam.
Cat.
Mes.
Len.
Reg.
Hypp.
Meg.
Locr.
SYRACUSAE
LEGENDA
Syracusan *Reich*
Carthaginian border
Roman border
© Claudio Vacanti

Figure 17.16. Chart XII: the Centuripe turning point.


XIII.
The power of *fides*
Sen.
Caer.
Sutr.
Nar.
ROMA
Ostia
Firm.
Car.
Ant.
Alb.
Cast. N.
Hadr.
Sor.
Ponza
Fr.
Ter.
Int.
Su.
Cum.
Cap.
Cal.
Neap.
Sa.
Ben.
Luc.
Utica
CARTHAGO
Paes.
Ven.
Met.
Tar.
Thu.
Cro.
Drep.
Lil.
Er.
Maz.
Hal.
Seg.
Sel.
Iae.
Heir.
Ent.
Pan.
Mak.
Sol.
Hipp.
T. I.
Era.
Myt.
Keph.
Agr.
Halae.
Lip.
Finz.
Enna
Erb.
Cent.
Tin.
Adr.
Myl.
Taur.
Mes.
Cam.
Cat.
Hypp.
Reg.
Len.
Meg.
Locr.
SYRACUSAE
LEGENDA
Roman soft power
© Claudio Vacanti

Figure 17.17. Chart XIII: the power of fides.

Although the disturbance and fear of Sicilian cities may have played a role, as the king of Syracuse believed according to Polybius,[70] the active collaboration of the Sicilian cities with Rome cannot be explained only by fear. The power of suasion by Roman legions must have played a much stronger role.[71] Poor results in military operations, such as that of Appius Claudius in 264 BC within Syracusan territory, nevertheless demonstrated the irreducible will of the Romans and produced strong political results.[72] If suasion can explain the will to cooperate with weapons and logistical support, we cannot forget that Siceliot cities – likely most of the Sicilian cities who had allied with Romans – were ready not only to shed Greek blood but to do so while obeying a 'barbarian' city. Furthermore, suasion alone – and fear even less – cannot explain the decision of Segesta and Halicyae to join forces with the Romans, for the simple fact that they were in the heart of the Punic eparchy, where Carthaginian influence was strong as well.[73] Hieron decided to ally himself to the Romans after the defection of Sicilian cities because he had seen the Syracusans upset (ἀγανακτοῦντας).[74] The citizens of Syracuse knew that the path of Roman-Sicilian troops against their city was the same as that of the 'liberator' Pyrrhus, who was not able to maintain the support of the Sicilians for long.[75] Now, the Siceliot cities followed Rome, which had demonstrated the preparation of its massive military apparatus against Carthage. This alliance did not seem to the Syracusans a form of collaboration with an occupying power but the chance to chase the Carthaginians out of Sicily.[76] Diodorus, who likely derives his narrative from the Carthaginian perspective of Philinus, reports that, immediately after the alliance between Syracuse and Rome, a Punic naval force arrived off the coast of Xiphonia, not far from Syracuse, ready to help Hieron against the Romans. Nevertheless, not even this projection of Carthaginian power could persuade Hieron and the Syracusan citizens to abandon their alliance with Rome.[77] As I argue, Roman soft power was at work, based primarily on a fundamental political value, *fides*, which was successful with communities in Magna Graecia and, thanks also to their mediation, crossed the Strait of Messina.[78] In Chart XIII, I thus have illustrated soft power as a spiral that attracts to Rome first Campanian cities, then Greek cities in Calabria and Puglia, and finally Sicily, including

Segesta (Fig. 17.17).[79]


XIV. The Sicilian contribution
LEGENDA
Roman allies maritime patrol/ sighting/projection
Carthaginian border
Roman *limes*/Via
Pass-through/ penetration
Roman ally
Drep.
Lil.
Er.
Maz.
Seg.
Hal.
Sel.
Iae.
Heir.
Ent.
Pan.
Sol.
Mak.
Hipp.
T. I.
Era.
Keph.
Myt.
Agr.
Halae.
Enna
Lip.
Finz.
Erb.
Tin.
Cent.
Adr.
Myl.
Taur.
Cam.
Cat.
Mes.
Len.
Reg.
Hypp.
Meg.
Locr.
SYRACUSAE
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Figure 17.18. Chart XIV: the Sicilian contribution.

XIV

The final chart, Chart XIV, illustrates (although partially) a key point in understanding the war for Sicily: the role of the Sicilians, *i.e.* Greek cities, including Syracuse and other communities, Elymian and Punic, all of whom provided fundamental support during this war (Fig. 17.18).[80] The contribution of Sicilian cities to the Romans in the construction of *quinqueremes*, in the training of sailors, in supplying food and siege machines and in providing intelligence[81] are very difficult to depict *with* a chart or *in* a chart.[82] We can try to build a chart with which and in which we show the contribution of these new allies in patrolling the coasts with their own fleet – a fleet of 40 ships for Syracuse and 20 ships for other cities according to my calculations[83] – in the logistics of building and maintaining a fleet[84] and in controlling and defending the territory with their own troops.[85]

As depicted in Chart XIV, after barely a year, Rome could exploit an extensive *limes*-system, composed of tracks that, if not yet Roman roads, allowed for the defence of territory and, just as the *limes*-systems in Italy, were not simple boundaries but points of origin of axes for crossing and penetration into Carthaginian territory, here identified by the arrow symbol. Sicilian ports and their fleet ensured surveillance of the coasts, similar to that provided by maritime garrisons in Italy. The alliance with Segesta established an important logistical base in the heart of the Punic eparchy, even if only as a form of pressure. The circle with arrows is the pictorial representation of the defensive control capacity of the surrounding area by an ally such as Segesta, without major road links to friendly territory and embedded in enemy territory. Rome possessed much more than the bridgehead city of Messana and could exploit Sicilian resources with a policy of offshore balancing, which allowed it to concentrate its troops only on major operations. As Polybius reports, after the alliance with Hieron II, Rome believed that it could continue the war with half of its contingent (two legions), while Carthage realised it needed to recruit a large number of mercenaries.[86]

Conclusion

In this study, we began with several methodological assumptions. For a geopolitical atlas of the Roman Republic, dynamic representation and historical interpretation are necessary. The geopolitical chart must have heuristic value – it must depict elements otherwise unseen – and it must represent them within a precise interpretive framework. Each map requires extensive research and must contain a study of geopolitical dynamics *together with* the map and *inside* the map. Only such a hendiadys can illustrate the purpose of the map, which converts the geopolitical atlas into a multifunctional tool.

Specific limitations exist concerning the geopolitical maps of the first stages in the war for Sicily: sources, hindsight bias and cartographical conception. If the first and the second limitations basically occur in any historical study of the past and any geographic representation of a political process, the third limitation may appear more difficult. Although the modern concept of space, cartographical and multidimensional, may differ from its ancient, hodological counterpart, geographical and cartographical studies attained advanced levels of advancement during the Hellenistic period and produced cartographic representations (although inaccurate). Furthermore, during Antiquity, military and strategic dimensions necessarily included geophysical and geo-human factors.

A published case-study that illustrated the geopolitical dynamics of Roman control on the Italian Peninsula from the three decades before 290 BC to the eve of the First Punic War led me to draft a series of geopolitical charts of the war for Sicily between the Romans, Carthaginians and *Sicilienses* in its first stages.

Charts I–VI: Roman fears

A 'reversed' perspective of the Roman garrison system has demonstrated that, in 264 BC, the Roman federation was a *saturierte Großmacht*. Although it appeared united against the external threats, its fragile great power was actually complementary to Carthage from a geopolitical point of view. Roman expansion could be aimed at the Po Valley from which came the major geopolitical threat: the Gauls. Nevertheless, the imaginary perception of a Punic threat brought about an encirclement syndrome, which was geopolitically incorrect.

Charts VII–X: the Punic way

New charts, from a Carthaginian point of view, have shown that Sicily was part of an incredibly articulate imperial system. This system of chessboards could be defended by a major fleet, and only in Sicily was Carthage extremely vulnerable and compelled to provide itself with a strong army. On the island, it had to protect Lilybaeum, a crucial hub for its system of trade routes. The federation led by Rome was not a danger to Carthage's grand strategy, as it could project its naval power to the Italic coasts as well as to the Sicilian coasts.

Charts XI–XIV: the Sicilian contribution

Maps with a Syracusan perspective of the conflict show how crucial the geopolitical inversion was in the wake of the turning point at Centuripe in 263 BC, when all of eastern Sicily, in addition to Halicyae and Segesta, joined forces with the Romans. Roman soft power, able to attract to Rome a great part of Sicily, is a key point in understanding the War for Sicily: Greek cities, Syracuse and other communities provided fundamental support during this war. The contribution of the new allies, after barely a year, created a *limes*-system similar to that provided by garrisons in Italy. Rome then could exploit Sicilian resources and could concentrate its troops only on major operations.

Results

Each chart has been intrinsically linked to the historical study of the geopolitical dynamics of the conflict and has demonstrated its heuristic and hermeneutical potential by representing different perspectives of a conflict, namely the First Punic War. These geopolitical maps mainly seek to represent the prodromes, preconditions and causes of the war and form the first nucleus of a geopolitical atlas of the War of Rome, Carthage and Sicily for Sicily, which is currently under preparation. A geopolitical map can be a multifunctional tool, as long as we keep in mind, as Black rightly points out, that 'maps become obsolete, not only because mapmakers may become more sophisticated in their approach, but because events, processes and trends have effects that change the way the past impinges on the future'.[87] In addition, as in *Sylvie and Bruno Concluded* by Lewis Carroll (1893) or in Borges' novel *Del rigor en la ciencia* (1946) we should avoid the risk of believing that the best of all maps is at the scale of 1:1, which coincides with the size of the territory. One gram of interpretation is often worth more than a hundredweight of data.

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[*] In memory of Sebastiano Tusa (1952–2019).

[1] Vacanti 2016.

[2] Duby 1991, 1; Robinson *et al.* 1985, 4; Baker 2003, 45; Somaini 2017, 334.

[3] Black 2009; Boria 2012, 159–174.

[4] Ricci *et al.* 1922/23. *Cf*. Somaini 2017, 342 n. 26.

[5] Caracciolo 1995. *Cf*. Somaini 2017, 342 nos 28–29. For the historical atlases, see Black 1997; for the American historical atlases, see also Ayers *et al.* 2013.

[6] Canfora 2010. For the use of analogy by G. De Sanctis and E. Pais, see

respectively Vacanti 2013; 2018.

[7] With this term, I refer to all inhabitants of Sicily: indigenous (including Elymian), Punics, and Greeks.

[8] Janni 1984; Brodersen 1995; 2004. Contra: Loreto 2006, 112.

[9] Janni 1984, 88.

[10] Medas 2008, 49 with full bibliography.

[11] Medas 2008, 50. See also Andrews 1996. For a new estimate of the value of the *stadion* used by Eratosthenes and the thesis that his measurement of the Earth's circumference was remarkably accurate, see Russo 2013.

[12] Medas 2008, 49 with n. 64.

[13] Janni 1984, 65–78.

[14] Medas 2008, 47–49.

[15] Medas 2008, 50–51.

[16] Kowalski *et al.* 2007.

[17] Medas 2008, 48.

[18] Loreto 2006, 111–112.

[19] Loreto 2006, 112.

[20] See now Medas 2018.

[21] Polyb. 3.48.2.

[22] Vacanti 2016.

[23] Vacanti 2015.

[24] For the idea of an organic project of Roman colonisation, see Coarelli 1992, 23–25 and 28; Bandelli 1995, 174–175; Loreto 2007, 75–88. Contra: Bradley 2014, 62. For the debate about the military or social nature of Roman colonisation, see Toynbee 1965, 157–158; Salmon 1969, 15; Galsterer 1976; Càssola 1988, 14; Musti 1988, 533–534; Bandelli 1988, 106; Loreto 2007, 75–76. For the juridical point of view, see Humbert 1978; Sherwin-White 1972; Coarelli 1992, 23; Pelgrom 2014; Stek 2014. For geopolitical approach for the study of the Roman Empire, see Le Bohec 2014.

[25] Vacanti 2016, 286–287.

[26] For a chart with a slightly different orientation, see Pais 1935, 80. As De Romanis (2016) rightly argues, a south-up orientation – the same as Charts I–VI – was the basis of the *discriptio Italiae* of Augustus and likely of the triangular Italy of Polyb. 2.14, for which see also Clarke 1999, 103.

[27] Loreto 2007, 10.

[28] Flor. 1.14.8. For the *picta Italia* (Varro, *Rust.* 1.2.1), *cf.* Janni 1993; Brodersen 1995, 152–155; Palombi 1997, 164–168; Guilhembet 2005; Le Bris 2007; Roth 2007; Russo 2012, 92–94. As De Romanis (2016, 57 n. 39) has recently argued, the *Sardiniae insulae forma* in the *tabula* placed in 175 BC inside the temple of Mater Matuta (Livy 41.28.9)

strengthens the idea that the *picta Italia* was a map.

[29] Coarelli 1997, 199; Loreto 2007, 9. For the idea of Italy, *cf.* Mazzarino 1966, 99–102 and 212–232; Galasso 1979; Gabba 1994, 17–31; Giardina 1997, 3–116; Russo 2010; 2012; Rampazzo 2014. For the concept of *terra Italia*, *cf.* Ilari 1974, 1–23; Catalano 1978; Giardina 1997, 38–42; Mouritsen 1998, 50–54; Prontera 1998; Sordi 2003; Bispham 2007, 53–72; Humm 2010, Russo 2012, 65–94. For the distinction between Cis- and Trans-Apennine, *cf.* Brizzi 1987 and Giardina 1997, 64 and 108. For the name *Italia*, *cf.* De Libero 1994; Polverini 2010.

[30] Forni 1992, 279–284; Loreto 2007, 83.

[31] Both colonies were founded in 273 BC (Vell. Pat. 1.14.7). *Cf.* Loreto 2007, 79–81 and Coarelli 1985–1987, 18. For Paestum, see Mello 1974, 135–137; for Cosa, McCann *et al.* 1987, 15; Fentress and Perkins 2016.

[32] Ariminum was founded in 268 BC (Vell. Pat. 1.14; Livy *Per.* 15; Eutr. 2.16); Castrum Novum Hadriaticum was likely founded in 284 BC (Vell. Pat. 1.14.8 and Livy *Per.* 11). *Cf.* Bandelli 2002, 28–29; Loreto 2007, 78 n. 11 and 90–91 nos 46 and 47. Against the existence of Castrum Novum Hadriaticum as colony, see Salmon 1969, 180 n. 119.

[33] *Cf.* Vacanti 2016, 276–277 and 282–283; Loreto 2007, 83–86. Luceria was founded in 314 BC (Livy 9.26.5; Diod. Sic. 19.72.8); Venusia in 291 BC (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 17.5.1–2; Vell. Pat. 1.14.6); Paestum in 273 BC (Vell. Pat. 1.14.7); Beneventum in 268 BC (Vell. Pat. 1.14; Livy *Per.* 15; Eutr. 2.16). For Beneventum, *cf.* Torelli 2002. For Luceria and Venusia, see now Marchi 2014.

[34] *Cf.* Vacanti 2016, 274–275. Narnia was founded in 299 BC (Livy 10.9.8 and 10.10.1–5); Sutrium was founded in 283 BC (Diod. Sic. 14.98.5). For Narnia, see Bradley 2000, 114 and 128. For Sutrium, see Bandelli 1990, 516–517.

[35] Locri (Just. *Epit.* 18.1.9), Rhegium (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.4; App. *Sam.* 9; Polyb. 1.7.6; Diod. Sic. 22.1; Livy *Per.* 12), Croton (Zonar. 8.6), Tarentum (Polyb. 2.24.13 and 3.75.4). *Cf.* Loreto 2007, 81; Vacanti 2016, 286–287.

[36] Strabo 5.3.5: διόπερ καὶ Ἀλέξανδρος πρότερον ἐγκαλῶν ἐπέστειλε, καὶ Δημήτριος ὕστερον, τοὺς ἁλόντας τῶν λῃστῶν ναπέμπων τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις, χαρίζεσθαι μὲν αὐτοῖς ἔφη τὰ σώματα διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας συγγένειαν, οὐκ ἀξιοῦν δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας στρατηγεῖν τε ἅμα τῆς Ἰταλίας καὶ λῃστήρια ἐκπέμπειν, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῇ ἀγορᾷ Διοσκούρων ἱερὸν ἱδρυσαμένους τιμᾶν οὓς πάντες σωτῆρας ὀνομάζουσιν, εἰς δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πέμπειν τὴν ἐκείνων πατρίδα τοὺς λεηλατήσοντας. *Cf.* Humm 2009, 212–213; Vacanti 2015, 130.

[37] App. *Sic.* 1; Cass. Dio 10 fr. 41; Livy *Per.* 14; Eutr. 2.15; Zonar. 8.6.11.

[38] Loreto 2007, 155–157. For a different interpretation, see Càssola

1962, 45–46; Gruen 1984, 674–675; Staveley 1989, 424; Lampela 1998, 34–35, 43, 48–49, 51; Huss 2001, 294–295; Will 2003, 195–196. For the image of Rome in the Hellenistic East during the 3rd and 2nd centuries BC, see Loreto 1999.

[39] Vacanti 2016, 286–287.

[40] Loreto 2006, 118–125 with full bibliography.

[41] Loreto 2001, 72–73; 2007, 45–50.

[42] Loreto 2007, 135–144. One may think of the rebellions in Picenum in 279 BC (Flor. 1.14.19; Eutr. 2.16; Livy *Per.* 15; Plin. *HN* 3.18.110) and in Caere in 274 BC (Cass. Dio 10 frg. 33), and of the insurgency of the Samnites led by the Roman hostage Lollius in 269 BC (Zonar. 8.7.1; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 20.17.2).

[43] Loreto 2007, 144–153. The great Gallic threat actually occurred in 225 BC (Polyb. 2.23.12), but the Gauls were part of the coalition defeated in 296–295 BC in Sentinum (Polyb. 2.19.5–6; Livy 10.16.3 and 30.8; Frontin. *Str.* 1.8.3; Oros. 3.21.3; Diod. Sic. 21.6). For the battle, see De Sanctis 1960, 339 n. 35, 340 nos. 36–37; Brizzi 2008. For the origin of the *metus gallicus*, see Bellen 1985, 10–11. For the Gallic wars, see Zecchini 2009.

[44] Vacanti 2016, 278–279. The categories of *Reich* and *Großraum* are discussed in Schmitt 1941, 30, 49, 51, 61, 63, 65, 67–69 and are applied to the ancient world by Loreto 1997 and 2000.

[45] For the Roman-Carthaginian treaties, *cf*. Scardigli 1991; Loreto 2000; Espada Rodríguez 2013; Burgeon 2018.

[46] Polyb. 3.25.1; Livy, *Per.* 13; *cf*. Just. *Epit.* 18.2.1; Val. Max. 3.7.10. See also Hoyos 1984; Loreto 2000, 818–821; 2001; 56–61; 2007, 156.

[47] Ingram 2001.

[48] See Loreto 2007, 16–23.

[49] Polyb. 1.10.6.

[50] Loreto 2007, 23–30.

[51] Liddell Hart 1932. For an analogy between the British and Carthaginian empires, see Loreto 2001, 40.

[52] Loreto 2001, 42.

[53] Morel 1990; Fantar 1993, 310–311 and 324–327; Romero Recio 1998; Medas 2000, 49–85; Loreto 2001, 44–47. For the West African sector, see now Manfredi and Soltani 2001; Manfredi and Mezzolani 2013. For Sardinia, see Zucca 2003; Mastino 2005 with full bibliography. For the trade routes and the sailing conditions in the ancient Mediterranean, see Medas 2004; Arnaud 2005.

[54] Medas 2000, 101–189; Loreto 2001, 49–52.

[55] Loreto 2001, 42.

[56] Vacanti 2012, 3–14.

[57] Loreto 2001, 66–68. The function of Lilybaeum was played formerly

by another Punic stronghold in Sicily, the island of Motya, until it was destroyed by Dionysius I. For the fortification of Lilybaeum, see Caruso 2006; Giglio 2006.

[58] For Carthaginian policy in Sicily, see Tusa 1990–1991; Anello 1990/91; 2001; Bondì 1990/91; Cataldi 2003; De Vincenzo 2013; Melliti 2016, 77–92 and 112–153; Hoyos 2019. See also Mazzarino 1947, 1–55 for the issues he raised and his methodological approach.

[59] For the sailing conditions in the Strait of Sicily, see La Rocca 2012.

[60] For Pantelleria, see Mosca 1998; Abelli 2012. For Malta, see Loreto 2007, 273.

[61] Loreto 2001, 74–78 and 85–88.

[62] Loreto 2001, 101–105.

[63] For the perception and the cartographic representation of Sicily in the ancient and modern world, see Gulletta 2006; 2009; 2016; Prontera 2009. For a geostrategic approach to the First Punic War, see Le Bohec 2001. A new book on the First Punic War has been recently published by Burgeon (2017). For the Roman embassy to Hieron II in 264 BC, see now Scuderi 2019.

[64] Vacanti 2012, 203–208.

[65] Vacanti 2012, 15–21 and 59–63.

[66] Polyb. 1.14–15. See also Diod. Sic. 23.3 and Zonar. 8.9.8–9. *Cf.* Vacanti 2012, 20–21.

[67] Diod. Sic. 23.4.1.

[68] Diod. Sic. 23.4.1; Plin. *HN* 7.214; Eutr. 2.19.1; Zonar. 8.9.10; Polyb. 1.16.3. See also Vacanti 2012, 15 with full bibliography.

[69] Diod. Sic. 23.4.1: Ὅτι τῶν ὑπάτων ἀμφοτέρων εἰς Σικελίαν ἐλθόντων καὶ τὴν Ἀδρανιτῶν πόλιν πολιορκησάντων, εἷλον κατὰ κράτος. εἶτα τὴν Κεντοριπίνων πολιορκοϭντων καὶ πρὸς ταῖς χαλκαῖς πϭλαις καθημένων, ἧκον πρέσβεις πρῶτον παρ’ Ἀλαισίνων· εἶτα δειλίας πεσοϭσης καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσι, καὶ αὐτοὶ πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλαν περὶ εἰρήνης καὶ ἐπηγγείλαντο ἐπιδώσειν τὰς πόλεις Ῥωμαίοις· ἦσαν δὲ ἑξήκοντα ἑπτά. ὧν παραλαβόντες τὰς δυνάμεις, εἰς Συράκοσαν ἦλθον πολιορκήσοντες Ἱέρωνα.

[70] Polyb. 1.16.3–4: ὧν παραγενομένων ἀπό τε τῶν Καρχηδονίων αἱ πλείους ἀφιστάμεναι πόλεις προσετίθεντο τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἀπό τε τῶν Συρακοσίων. ὁ δ’ Ἱέρων θεωρῶν τὴν διατροπὴν καὶ κατά-πληξιν τῶν Σικελιωτῶν, ἅμα δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸ βάρος τῶν Ῥωμαϊκῶν στρατοπέδων, ἐκ πάντων συνελογίζετο τοϭτων ἐπικυδεστέρας εἶναι τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἢ τὰς τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἐλπίδας.

[71] Vacanti 2012, 14–21.

[72] Zonar. 8.9.8–9. *Cf.* Vacanti 2012, 20–21.

[73] Vacanti 2012, 21–23.

[74] Diod. Sic. 23.4.1: ὁρῶν δὲ τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἀγανακτοῦντας,

πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλε πρὸς τοὺς ὑπάτους περὶ διαλϭσεως. *Cf.* Vacanti 2012, 24.

[75] Vacanti 2012, 10–14.

[76] *Cf.* Vacanti 2012, 25. Theoc. *Id.* 16. can help us to understand the political atmosphere in Syracuse regarding Carthage during these years.

[77] Diod. Sic. 23.4.1. *Cf.* Vacanti 2012, 25–26. For Xiphonia, most likely in the territory of Augusta near Syracuse, see Copani 2012.

[78] Vacanti 2012, 28–56. The concept of soft power was coined by Nye (1990) and then used in other works (most recently Nye 2011) to show how the US had, in addition to hard power derived from its military power, also this soft power. Criticism of the effectiveness of this type of power appears in Gray (2011a). For the risk of misunderstanding IR concepts by historians, see Ingram 1997. For the concept of *fides*, see Brizzi 1982, 1–37; 2002, 35–43. For the use of kinship diplomacy during the First Punic, War see Prag 2010.

[79] Vacanti 2016, 288–289.

[80] Vacanti 2012, 59–156.

[81] Vacanti 2012, 63–109, 120–134, 142–154.

[82] For the aversion of traditional cartography to representing non-material elements, see Boria 2012, 154–155.

[83] Vacanti 2012, 109–115.

[84] Vacanti 2012, 115–120.

[85] Vacanti 2012, 134–142.

[86] Polyb. 1.17. *Cf.* Vacanti 2012, 59–63.

[87] Black 1997, 225.

Epilogo: guerra e società nella Sicilia greca

Questo libro ci porta nella carne e nel sangue dell'esperienza della guerra. Che la guerra sia un fatto violento, che segna e distorce in maniera indelebile l'esperienza degli uomini è un dato sin troppo ovvio. Forse è meno ovvio che la scrittura della storia abbia come oggetto privilegiato la guerra e le sue cause, ma vuole così una tradizione storiografica occidentale da cui non possiamo prescindere. Pur nella diversità di approcci e di sguardi, gli storici non hanno potuto e non possono non dedicare grande attenzione a questo fenomeno pervasivo, da leggersi ora nei suoi momenti puntuali come perno di scansioni cronologiche e periodizzazioni, ora come fatto di lunga durata che sotto la superficie di battaglie ed eventi militari determina o prepara trasformazioni epocali.

Ma non c'è un modo solo per parlare di guerra, né le guerre sono tutte uguali; ogni lingua (antica e moderna) conosce una propria pluralità lessicale che all'interno della categoria generica di 'guerra' comprende aspetti molto diversi per portata o qualità; il termine 'guerra', inoltre, può essere utilizzato anche in senso metaforico o simbolico e rimandare ad ambiti concettuali non strettamente militari o necessariamente collettivi. In tanta pluralità di approcci e di accezioni, questo libro offre un quadro sostenuto da importanti elementi di unità.

La guerra di cui si parla, in primo luogo, è il *polemos* inteso nel suo senso più immediato e ricorrente, quello che abbiamo appreso leggendo dell'assedio e della caduta di Troia: scontri, soldati, distruzioni, celebrazioni per i vittoriosi, tragedie per gli sconfitti. Tutti gli eventi bellici qui evocati e discussi hanno il proprio centro in uno stesso luogo, la Sicilia, che proprio in ragione della sua insularità ci si propone come teatro intrinsecamente omogeneo, nonostante l'arco temporale ampio (dall'età arcaica al periodo romano) e la molteplicità delle popolazioni coinvolte: gli *ethne* indigeni, i Fenici e i Greci delle colonie, e poi Cartaginesi, Campani, Italici, Etruschi, Greci della madrepatria, Romani, mercenari di ogni dove. Parlare della guerra in Sicilia significa dunque già di per sé ricondurre tanta molteplicità a una insularità non neutra, ma valorizzata come categoria storicamente significativa. L'insularità è certamente un paradigma importante per la costruzione dell'identità della Sicilia, sia nella percezione dei suoi abitanti, sia nella possibilità di riconoscerla come oggetto storico da parte della storiografia antica e moderna. Sui limiti e sulla consistenza oggettiva di tale identità si può discutere a lungo, ma in questa sede è più interessante chiedersi se l'insularità abbia orientato e forse in qualche momento determinato il procedere degli eventi, le scelte politiche e, più sottilmente, le dinamiche sociali, economiche e culturali.

Da questo punto di vista gli studi qui raccolti offrono molti spunti di riflessione, tanto più interessanti quanto più procedono in direzioni non necessariamente convergenti. Per alcuni aspetti, infatti, ne emerge una Sicilia priva di una sua specificità caratterizzante: alcuni fenomeni, cioè, si iscrivono nel più ampio contesto dei processi coloniali e per questa ragione si possono comprendere grazie all'analogia con il vasto mondo dell'*Hellenikon*. Per altri aspetti, invece, l'isola rappresenta un caso davvero peculiare, che come tale merita di essere studiato individualmente e nelle sue particolarità. Ci sono temi, insomma, per cui la Sicilia si spiega soprattutto con la Sicilia, ma perché siano davvero vantaggiose le analisi vanno condotte in un orizzonte di lunga durata, capace di riconoscere sia gli eventi e le cesure, sia le strutture e le dinamiche trasversali. Da questo punto di vista è molto felice la scelta di mettere a fuoco le dinamiche sociali: il riferimento alla Sicilia, infatti, non è una banale specificazione geografica, ma permette di collocare nel giusto contesto il binomio 'guerra e società', ovvero le trasformazioni del corpo sociale causate dalla guerra, e la specificità della guerra nel quadro di peculiari situazioni sociali.

In tanta ampiezza di dati e problemi, cercherò qui di rintracciare e valorizzare in prospettiva critica alcuni fili che mi paiono particolarmente promettenti.

Fonti

Lo storico deve cominciare dalle fonti, e non c'è ricerca che non si debba porre questo problema, anche se non sempre è necessario esplicitare la propria posizione rispetto ai limiti e alle possibilità che un determinato contesto ci offre. Non tutti gli Autori di questo libro hanno su questo aspetto la stessa posizione, questo è evidente. Anche in ragione della diversa provenienza o tradizione formativa (un altro dei pregi del volume) non tutti, ad esempio, ripongono la medesima fiducia nel fatto che le fonti letterarie possano ancora offrire nuovi elementi di riflessione. Ciò non significa, però, che la ricerca archeologica abbia sempre risposte migliori: sono proprio gli archeologi, anzi, a manifestare la difficoltà a inquadrare il tema della guerra, individuando relazioni convincenti tra i fatti noti dalla tradizione e i dati di scavo, o rintracciando nello spazio e nel paesaggio i segni della guerra a prescindere dai testi letterari. Ne discende una consapevolezza che invita a superare qualsiasi dialettica antagonista tra discipline, a mettere al centro della discussione i contesti, e ad affinare strumenti metodologici efficaci che a partire dalle competenze di ciascuno consentano di porre le domande giuste, o più corrette, o più nuove e interessanti, e a formulare possibili risposte senza pregiudizi.

Tempo e memoria

Tutti sono d'accordo, invece, nel riconoscere che quando si parla di storia si parla del tempo, anche se ciascuno può scegliere se scandirlo secondo i ritmi brevi o brevissimi delle battaglie e delle decisioni politiche, o secondo i tempi più lunghi di processi di carattere economico o sociale. Ma il tempo più profondo, quello su cui si misurano tutti gli altri tempi, è quello della memoria; e la memoria, allora come oggi, è particolarmente sollecitata dalla guerra. Di recente, ad esempio, l'Europa occidentale in pace dalla fine della Seconda guerra mondiale ha celebrato in maniera diffusa la Grande Guerra, esorcizzando la paura di conflitti più vicini e rendendo la guerra oggetto di memoria altro da sé. Il mondo antico ha una diversa familiarità con la guerra, che si manifesta in una gamma molto ampia di registri e di occasioni, qui ben rappresentata.

Non possiamo che cominciare dallo storico che ha dato una forma razionale e intellettualmente formidabile alla riflessione sulla guerra, Tucidide. Al centro della discussione è il racconto sul ritiro degli Ateniesi da Siracusa nel 413, a proposito del quale Tucidide utilizza un punto di vista non descrittivo o distaccato, ma ritagliato sul vissuto dei superstiti, e per questo denso di sentimenti, paura, disperazione. In discussione è il senso da attribuire a tale prospettiva 'in soggettiva': ci si chiede cioè se essa possa fornire elementi utili per attribuire su base scientifica ai soldati ateniesi i segni di una sindrome post-traumatica, o se vada letta piuttosto all'interno della logica storiografica che governa il discorso dello storico. Qui, come in altri momenti delle *Storie*, nel tono volutamente drammatico e passionale si annida un messaggio dalla forte impronta morale per gli Ateniesi, chiamati a riflettere su senso e conseguenze delle loro scelte e della loro arroganza. Queste letture, pur diverse, si completano dal punto di vista del metodo e mostrano l'opportunità di tenere sempre ben distinte la prospettiva storiografica sensibile alla logica narrativa ed etica interna all'opera, e quella storica che di essa valorizza piuttosto il valore testimoniale.

Se la memoria storiografica è sempre frutto di un'operazione intellettuale di ripensamento e di ricostruzione, altre forme di memoria marcano in maniera più immediata luoghi e tempi della guerra. Un livello alto di questa memoria è rappresentato dai monumenti, ovvero da quei manufatti che riteniamo legati a specifici eventi bellici perché celebrativi di battaglie e di vincitori, o perché manifestano la ricchezza che grazie a una guerra si è riusciti ad accumulare. Negli studi moderni è stato quasi inevitabile collegare alcuni monumenti a episodi noti grazie alla storiografia antica: il caso forse più noto per la Sicilia è quello della battaglia di Imera, cui la tradizione antica ha precocemente attribuito un carattere universale, con l'apparentamento fittizio alle vittorie nelle guerre persiane. L'autorevolezza di tale tradizione ha pesantemente condizionato la lettura del dato archeologico e la contestualizzazione di alcuni importanti edifici templari sicelioti per i quali l'analisi squisitamente architettonica è stata subordinata alle cronologie suggerite dalla storiografia antica. Si tratta ancora una volta di convergenza (o di divergenza) di dati di natura differente, e della ricerca di un quadro coerente che tenga insieme frammenti spesso disorganici del medesimo contesto. Esemplare è il caso dell'*Athenaion* di Siracusa, ritenuto una sorta di tempio gemello di quello costruito sul sito di Imera per celebrare la vittoria dei Greci sui Cartaginesi: la serrata discussione sui materiali e la rilettura formale del linguaggio architettonico dell'edificio forniscono però seri elementi per rivedere la cronologia tradizionale, allentando il nesso con lo specifico intento celebrativo, e ricostruendo piuttosto la dimensione sociale del monumento. Molte, infatti, sono le implicazioni sociali di una guerra vinta: l'attribuzione allo stratego vittorioso di una funzione fondativa di un nuovo ordine politico e sociale gradito agli dei; l'avviamento di grandiosi programmi edilizi con il coinvolgimento di larghe parti della popolazione libera e servile; l'impiego e la distribuzione delle eccezionali ricchezze acquisite grazie alla guerra. Alleggerire il peso dell'immediato richiamo celebrativo non significa negare gli echi che questa e altre vittorie ebbero nella percezione delle comunità greche, ma invita a leggerli nelle loro ricadute più ampie.

Giungiamo così a un terzo livello di memoria, che pur meno ovvio ha lasciato traccia visibile in molte pagine di questo volume: non la memoria storiografica, non la memoria celebrata, ma una sorta di memoria sociale, attivata dalle più crude testimonianze materiali, corpi e armi. È il caso della necropoli occidentale della città di Imera, ubicata in un'area pianeggiante probabile teatro dei più importanti scontri del V secolo: data la drammaticità dei momenti e la presenza di contingenti da altre città, l'area delle battaglie ha finito per coincidere con quella della sepoltura dei caduti in fosse comuni. Esse non sono di per sé segni di memoria, ma ai fini della presente riflessione è particolarmente interessante il rinvenimento nella necropoli di armi iberiche, tolte ai nemici e poi deposte sul campo di battaglia con intenzione votiva. Armi per lo più in frammenti sono state trovate anche nell'*agora* di Selinunte, ovvero in uno spazio civico e pubblico che non sembrerebbe pertinente alla loro conservazione o deposizione. Si tratta di due casi piuttosto diversi, che però potrebbero essere accomunati nel segno di una memoria né monumentale, né necessariamente politica, ma da riferire a comunità (quella dei soldati che combattono o quella degli abitanti in pace che frequentano lo spazio agoraico) per le quali le armi rivestono un significato che va oltre quello d'uso, e che sembra sfuggire anche all'orizzonte marcatamente votivo dei luoghi di culto. La deposizione intenzionale di armi in spazi 'eterodossi' potrebbe allora trovare senso nell'orizzonte memoriale di gruppi definiti, per i quali armi e/o funzione guerriera rivestivano un senso identitario forte anche oltre lo specifico gesto bellico.

Tempi

La dimensione del tempo della memoria deve comunque fare i conti con i tempi della storia e della guerra, anche in Sicilia ritagliati sugli eventi a noi noti grazie alla tradizione storiografica. Il volume mostra come la specificità del contesto siciliano possa suggerire anche una specie di riassestamento rispetto alla scansione canonica utilizzata per la Grecia propria.

Il primo esempio riguarda il passaggio dall'arcaismo all'età classica, che può essere alzato di almeno una generazione rispetto alla data canonica della battaglia di Imera, il cui carattere epocale può essere ridimensionato. Di contro, è nel passaggio tra i due secoli che in varie aree della Sicilia si assiste al compimento della trasformazione da attribuire agli effetti dirompenti che la cultura greca ha avuto sulle società locali sia a livello culturale che sociale ed economico. In questo periodo si registra infatti un cambiamento nei rapporti tra le diverse comunità (tra quelle greche, tra quelle indigene, tra quelle greche e quelle indigene). Non conosciamo nel dettaglio i processi che portarono le *poleis* costiere a una maggiore aggressività verso le aree interne o all'emergere egemonico di alcuni centri indigeni, ma si trattò certamente di dinamiche non sempre pacifiche, da ascrivere a quell'orizzonte di microconflittualità locale che proprio Tucidide indica come la prima e più comune forma di guerra; certo, proprio la Sicilia mostra come alcuni di questi conflitti possano ampliarsi fino ad assumere una portata che supera di molto la logica che governa le instabili superfici di contatto tra comunità vicine.

Un'altra cesura molto evidente è segnata dai grandi eventi militari degli ultimi quindici anni del V secolo, prima con la grande spedizione ateniese, e poi con l'arrivo in grande stile dell'esercito di Cartagine. È qui che si apre una lunga fase di sperimentazione e ripensamento, che non ha senso definire propriamente 'ellenistica', ma che certamente getta le premesse perché la Sicilia e Siracusa diventino più omogenee ai soggetti politici e territoriali del nuovo mondo inaugurato da Alessandro. In questo periodo la guerra sembra diventare la dimensione dominante, che non si esprime soltanto in singoli episodi militari, ma anche in un processo pervasivo che riscrive la geografia territoriale e i centri urbani in senso più spiccatamente militare.

La definitiva frattura è costituita infine dalla prima guerra punica, quando l'isola è terreno di scontro tra attori che sono ormai al di fuori di essa. All'indomani della fine di quella guerra prende corpo una specie di paradosso: il nuovo statuto provinciale da un lato toglie peso al paradigma dell'eccezionalità insulare, e dall'altro conferisce alla Sicilia una nuova centralità inserendola nelle prospettive mediterranee di Roma.

Questa periodizzazione attraversa implicitamente tutto il volume, e comporta tra gli altri anche il vantaggio 'euristico' di ripensare le vicende dell'isola facendo forza sulle diverse accezioni possibili di 'guerra'. Proprio l'intrinseca dinamicità di questa nozione suggerisce infine un approccio molto promettente che applicato nel volume alla guerra punica può essere pensato e applicato anche ad altri momenti. Il conflitto è descritto e mappato con carte geopolitiche che consentono di rappresentare la molteplicità delle prospettive possibili ben oltre la logica polare di due nemici affrontati: i volubili livelli di valutazione e strategia, il gioco delle alleanze di tutti i soggetti coinvolti, il ruolo giocato da coloro che rimangono neutrali o ai margini, la percezione e la rappresentazione ideologica delle opposizioni. La possibilità di rendere immediatamente visibile questa dinamicità costituisce un autentico avanzamento della ricerca: la congiunzione tra il livello descrittivo e l'atteggiamento interpretativo moltiplica gli sguardi sul territorio e sollecita l'emergere di linee d'indagine inedite grazie a una cartografia che non è specchio passivo di una ricostruzione già acquisita, ma diventa essa stessa attiva esperienza di ricerca.

Paesaggi

L’esperimento cartografico condotto mette in evidenza un altro tema che sostiene in maniera significativa tutto il volume: il paesaggio. La ricerca può lavorare su molte accezioni di paesaggio e di recente si è giustamente sottolineato come alla sua definizione concorrano oltre agli elementi visibili anche suoni, odori, memorie, percezioni, emozioni, intenzioni. Si acquisisce così una nuova profondità che rende conto della complessità della condizione umana sollecitata da tutti gli strumenti sensoriali e in tutte le sue facoltà intellettive ed emotive. Sarebbe stato facile richiamare questi temi parlando di guerra, invitando il lettore a una reazione etica prima che intellettuale davanti a un fenomeno la cui tragicità nessuno, né antico né moderno, mette in discussione. Il volume sa rimanere al riparo da questa tentazione e approfondisce piuttosto la nozione di ‘paesaggio militare’. Non è compito facile: a dispetto delle molte guerre combattute, le emergenze materiali di questo paesaggio sono piuttosto povere e con-segnano qualche segno soprattutto per via residuale e indiziaria (nella toponomastica locale, ad esempio). Così, paradossalmente, è agli storici (Tucidide, Polibio, Diodoro) che si deve tornare per ricostruire i contesti concreti delle battaglie, i movimenti delle truppe, la notizia dell’allestimento di quelle opere mobili (gli accampamenti per esempio) che per loro natura non lasciano quasi traccia. Sul terreno la guerra lascia soprattutto segni in negativo, per sottrazione: il vuoto dei campi di battaglia, privi di tutti quegli elementi che contraddistinguono la vita comunitaria, le fosse scavate in fretta per i soldati morti, le macerie di città prese e distrutte che però, come insegna il caso di Selinunte, riescono a metabolizzare le rovine. Ed è così che la guerra perde il proprio potenziale distruttivo, entra a far parte del profilo memoriale delle comunità, come elemento fondante della fenomenologia identitaria e ideologica dei tempi di pace.

Se però assumiamo un’accezione ampia di guerra, se cioè con essa intendiamo non solo lo specifico atto militare, ma l’espressione di forze economiche e politiche, essa palesa un’immensa capacità di trasformare il paesaggio sia nei suoi elementi costitutivi (naturali o artificiali che siano) sia nella rete di rapporti e di connessioni che insistono su di esso. È una prospettiva massimamente storica che costringe a mettere in attenta diacronia ogni dato e a guardare ogni elemento nella sua rete contestuale.

Si pensi ad esempio all'importanza nel tempo degli insediamenti territoriali a vocazione prevalentemente o esclusivamente militare (i cosiddetti *phrouria*), che innervano le aree interne dell'isola e descrivono snodi strategici o superfici di tensione. Una accurata mappatura di tali insediamenti e la valutazione del loro sviluppo nel tempo consente, tra l'altro, di superare alcune fissità pregiudiziali in merito alla 'scansione' etnografica dell'isola o all'implicita gerarchia tra coste e interno. È anche in questo modo che possiamo recuperare e valorizzare quella che chiamerei l'autonomia del territorio come oggetto storico: esso va studiato secondo le logiche speciali che lo governano, considerando non solo la forza centripeta esercitata su di esso dalle grandi *poleis* costiere, ma anche tutte le forze e le variabili che hanno a che fare con la morfologia, i corsi d'acqua, le risorse, la mutevolezza delle stagioni, le vie di comunicazione, la visibilità, la natura e la densità degli insediamenti. Anche i siti più piccoli per dimensioni o di vita più effimera assumono un significato da leggersi non in funzione del centro urbano più prossimo e più importante, ma in quanto snodi di una rete di cui vanno tenute in conto tutte le componenti (fisiche, economiche, urbane e, ovviamente, militari). Anche l'aspetto militare del territorio può guadagnare così una inedita profondità storica: si pensi, ad esempio, alla nozione di confine, che cessa di essere solo il prodotto artificiale di una volontà politica esterna che traccia un taglio netto tra eserciti e territori, e diventa zona di mediazione capace di produrre dinamiche specifiche, e di trasformare lo spazio intorno a sé.

Città

Ripensare e descrivere lo spazio in termini di network significa superare un'altra polarità canonica. La bipartizione centro urbano/*chora* ci è stata consegnata dal migliore pensiero politico greco, e dunque ha certamente una sua validità, che non va irrigidita però come opposizione, ma riletta in una maniera più fluida, attenta cioè alla porosità tra la parte urbana e la parte rurale della *polis*, che – ricordiamolo – le comprende entrambe. Si tratta di un tema molto ampio, che trova interessanti spunti anche quando declinato a partire dall'interesse sulla guerra. La Sicilia offre più di un esempio interessante, a cominciare da Siracusa, dove proprio la guerra plasma dal di dentro il rapporto tra la parte urbana e il territorio in un crescendo che trova il suo apice con i tiranni di IV secolo. Su un piano generale la dimensione territoriale dell'egemonia siracusana è legata a doppio filo con la guerra: essa è l'espressione della forza militare di Siracusa che si espande fino a forzare i limiti dell'insularità; a sua volta, questa forza è sostenuta dalle risorse (legno, pece, manodopera, rifornimenti alimentari) che dal territorio vengono drenate verso arsenali e porti per il mantenimento degli eserciti e della flotta. Anche su un piano più focalizzato sulla *polis*, Siracusa mostra i segni indelebili del rapporto dinamico tra pratica della guerra e definizione degli spazi: tra V e IV secolo viene ridisegnato l'assetto della costa, ripensato il rapporto funzionale tra l'isola di Ortigia e la terraferma, investito molto denaro su imponenti dotazioni di porti, arsenali e fortificazioni, ridefinito il rapporto tra parte urbana e campagna circostante, 'inventata' una nuova forma di spazio (né propriamente urbano né davvero rurale) costituito dalla terra di mezzo interna all'enorme circuito murario e protetta dal castello Eurialo. Tutto questo rende Siracusa refrattaria ai modelli di lettura classici, e costringe di nuovo a interrogarci sull'efficacia di schemi messi alla prova di situazioni complesse. In tutta la Sicilia, infatti, si apre una casistica molto variegata proprio in tema di rapporto tra guerra e città: città annientate dalla guerra e per questo abbandonate con il trasferimento altrove di quel che rimaneva del corpo civico (Imera), città che da crocevia tra rotte, popoli e culture diventano fortezze (Selinunte), città martiri, sottoposte ad attacchi ripetuti che ne cambiano più volte il profilo sociale e territoriale (Leontini), città che si adattano al rinnovato contesto con una congiunzione felice tra un'antica centralità cultuale e una nuova finzione strategica (Erice), città che di converso enfatizzano funzioni più ampie di quelle determinate dallo specifico contesto militare in cui erano sorte (Alesa). Tutti questi affondi hanno il merito di proporre uno sguardo sostanzialmente unitario sull'isola, che rispettando la specificità dei singoli contesti supera schemi pregiudiziali e oppositivi tra parte orientale e parte occidentale, tra costa e interno, tra indigeni e Greci.

Fortificazioni; *politeiai*

In tanta ampiezza possiamo evidenziare due ambiti specifici che rinnovano in modo originale lo sguardo su guerra e città. Il primo sembra ovvio, se non altro per una potente eredità di immagini che legate a mondi assai più tardi associano mura (castelli), scontri militari, luoghi di potere. La storia dell'isola è anche la storia delle opere di fortificazione che hanno interessato i suoi centri urbani in una casistica tipologica ben documentata anche nel volume: dalla prima definizione spaziale delle fondazioni greche, all'incremento dei sistemi difensivi in tutta l'isola databile alla seconda metà del VI secolo, agli importanti interventi costruttivi che interessano molti centri urbani a partire dalla fine del V secolo (si pensi solo alla fortezza di Ermocrate a Selinunte, o alle opere di fortificazione volute a Siracusa da Dionisio il Vecchio).

Questo libro ci invita però a considerare le fortificazioni anche dal punto di vista più squisitamente politico e sociale, a calarle cioè nel loro contesto non già come manifestazione di una sola specifica esigenza (quella militare), ma come espressione di un sistema compiuto di valori e di funzioni. Così, impariamo a guardare alle fortificazioni anche e forse soprattutto come a un segno di identità e di definizione cittadina: così è per la Leontini arcaica dall'inconsueta morfologia tra due colline, così per Erice di età classica, dove l'edificazione delle mura rivela una nuova concezione insediativa con una fortissima valenza politica, così per la grande Siracusa di Dionisio il Vecchio in cui la riscrittura degli spazi manifesta il potere del tiranno, arroccato nell'isola/ palazzo di Ortigia. Ma è così, ed è una delle acquisizioni più importanti, anche per i centri 'minori' della Sicilia orientale (ma forse dell'isola intera), in cui la definizione del circuito murario risponde in primo luogo a un processo di definizione spaziale che mentre distingue il 'fuori' e il 'dentro' stabilisce in maniera più netta le funzioni dei luoghi e i ruoli sociali, cioè a dire la costruzione di identità locali attraverso la marcatura visibile del paesaggio.

Il caso delle comunità dell'interno e quello della Siracusa dionigiana rappresentano, per certi versi, due aspetti speculari dello stesso fenomeno, perché mettono in luce, anche se in direzioni divergenti, il nesso strutturale tra forma urbana, aspetto militare e significato politico. Nei centri indigeni le fortificazioni mostrano la progressiva assunzione della forma poleica e con essa di una più chiara identità urbana e civica, in quello della Siracusa tirannica, invece, le opere murarie rivelano il progressivo appannarsi della comunità politica di fronte a un potere che si chiude entro il perimetro delle sue fortezze.

Arriviamo così all'altro aspetto, alla parte che la guerra ha avuto nella definizione della *politeia* e della *polis*. In fondo, il potere dei tiranni sicelioti si è costruito proprio a partire da una carica militare, la strategia, che in ragione dell'eccezionalità del conflitto con Cartagine ha generato forme di potere autocratico evolutesi in senso dinastico e regale; e proprio di guerra i tiranni hanno nutrito la più ovvia ideologia antibarbarica e la propria volontà di potenza.

In questo modo a partire almeno dal V secolo la guerra ha contribuito a trasformare non solo le singole *politeiai*, ma il modo stesso di concepire e di pensare la *polis*, che anche attraverso la strettoia di conflitti e poteri diventa più fluida e mutevole. La *polis* è il luogo fisico e istituzionale che conferisce omogeneità a esperienze e a componenti anche molto diverse che in essa si possono riconoscere; e, d'altra parte, proprio tale molteplicità la rende più flessibile, pronta cioè a flettersi e a cambiare a seconda delle linee di frattura interna (*stasis*) e delle forme di pressione dall'esterno (*polemos*). Tutte le città della Sicilia, qualunque fosse la loro matrice etnica, la loro collocazione geografica, o la loro potenza economica, hanno conosciuto queste fratture e queste pressioni, in uno sviluppo duplice e per certi versi strabico. Da un lato la nozione di *polis* sembra progressivamente indebolirsi per l'azione di tiranni che con totale anticonformismo ideologico non hanno alcuno scrupolo a distruggere le città, privare i cittadini di patria e cittadinanza, ridefinire i corpi civici delle comunità. Dall'altro proprio la forma *polis* mostra nuovo vigore e nuova fortuna presso gruppi marginali (mercenari, rifugiati, Campani) in altre condizioni difficilmente integrabili e che invece promuovono la fondazione o la rifondazione di nuove comunità politiche.

Corpo sociale

Per cogliere il destino della *polis* nella Sicilia in guerra bisogna mettere al centro della riflessione la società, ovvero l'insieme di uomini e di donne che ben oltre i confini del corpo politico (come tale sempre ristretto e parziale) sostanziano la complessità delle comunità. In una storia letta attraverso la guerra, a imporsi come soggetto storico è il corpo sociale, individuato così, al singolare, senza distinzioni di origine, *status*, matrice etnica, capacità economica. Non è un paradosso, ma l'effetto del salto in avanti cui ci spinge proprio questo volume, che invita a guardare alla società nel suo insieme, ovvero come a una rete di relazioni e di funzioni che pur strutturandosi caso per caso vanno considerate nella prospettiva generale di tutta l'isola. La parola chiave è, naturalmente, mobilità, questa appassionante nozione che ha rimesso in gioco molti pensieri e molte chiavi interpretative, imponendo di rivedere radicalmente temi che parevano acquisiti. Si rende necessaria, allora, una valutazione complessiva dei processi, guardati come un sistema di cause, concause, effetti, variazioni e ricadute, da considerare non solo sulla superficie orizzontale dello spazio ma anche nella diacronia.

In questo dittico – società e mobilità – la guerra non può che avere un posto privilegiato: la guerra accelera i processi di trasformazione e la mobilità di tutti i gruppi sociali, siano essi quelli più stabili delle comunità poleiche o quelli in perpetuo movimento costituiti da rincalzi, esuli e fuggitivi, soldati e mercenari, mercanti e maestranze specializzate, schiavi venduti e comprati, poeti e intellettuali, medici e sapienti, indigeni che vanno a vivere in città greche, Greci che scelgono le comunità locali. Volutamente li enuncio alla rinfusa: questi gruppi non si dispongono secondo una griglia cronologica precostituita o in una piramide fissa, ma tutti in qualche modo e in qualche tempo hanno a che fare con la guerra secondo intersezioni mai precostituite, di cui il volume fornisce una casistica del più grande interesse.

A Selinunte, ad esempio, le *defixiones* potrebbero essere interpretate come testi-monianza di una conflittualità interetnica all'interno del corpo sociale, che potrebbe aver contribuito alla *stasis* di età tardo-arcaica o almeno all'instabilità suggerita dal dettato della *lex sacra*; a Siracusa invece l'immissione forzata di gruppi esterni (greci e non greci) è un dispositivo deliberatamente utilizzato più volte dal potere tirannico per scompaginare la compattezza della *polis* in funzione delle proprie esigenze.

Nell’ampio alveo della mobilità, infine, i mercenari costituiscono un esempio particolarmente interessante: la loro presenza è ben attestata anche a livello archeologico almeno a partire dalla battaglia di Imera, e da lì in poi essi assumono un’importanza crescente non solo in quanto soldati ben addestrati, ma anche come gruppi etnicamente coesi che si incistano stabilmente nelle comunità o nel territorio. Tanto sono utili nei momenti di conflitto, tanto diventano un problema quando, a guerra finita, cercano la possibilità di insediarsi stabilmente, con opportune forme di integrazione nel corpo civico, assegnazioni di terre o, persino, di siti loro consegnati. Il potenziale di queste dinamiche in termini di novità e trasformazione sociale è enorme: la guerra e i suoi attori dispiegano tutte le potenzialità dell’esperienza militare cambiando gli equilibri all’interno del corpo sociale e facendosi portatori di nuove identità, saperi, *nomoi*.

Non sempre di questi fenomeni si ha adeguata documentazione e quello che rimane è solo una sorta di indistinto rumore di fondo: si pensi ad esempio ai cosiddetti *followers*, mercanti al minuto, artigiani, donne che accompagnavano gli eserciti e ne condividevano le sorti per poi disperdersi nel territorio una volta trascorsa l’emergenza della guerra. Più note se non altro per analogia sono altre forme di mobilità ‘civile’ sollecitate e amplificate dalla guerra: si pensi ad esempio a quanti dotati di sapere tecnico (architetti o operai specializzati) o solo delle braccia (operai salariati) hanno partecipato all’edificazione degli apparati difensivi; o alla forza lavoro che ha contribuito alla crescita e al mantenimento delle città in armi; o alla mercificazione definitiva degli uomini, corpi da mandare al massacro, merce di scambio quando prigionieri o bottino da vendere al miglior offerente. Particolarmente interessante, in questo senso, è l’analisi di due casi molto specifici, quello dei Nassi e quello dei Moziesi, che inaspettatamente invertono il vettore della mobilità e risalgono la china della schiavitù in cui erano caduti a causa della guerra: l’opacità della loro condizione giuridica consente loro di ricostituirsi come comunità di liberi in nuove entità cittadine (rispettivamente Mylai e poi Tauromenio per gli uni, Lilibeo per gli altri).

Mercenari, schiavi, indigeni, stranieri sono intrinsecamente più esposti agli effetti collaterali della guerra: a questo siamo preparati. Ma in Sicilia la guerra incide nel cuore stesso delle comunità siceliote, in quel nucleo costitutivo che tenderemmo a ritenere comunque protetto. Sotto i colpi dei signori della guerra e delle logiche del conflitto nessuno è al sicuro, nemmeno i grandi aristocratici proprietari terrieri che a Siracusa, Megara, Leontini perdono e riacquistano la propria posizione politica, i propri beni, il proprio *status*; nemmeno il *demos* urbano, continuamente insidiato dall'immissione di nuovi cittadini; nemmeno i lavoratori liberi che entrano in competizione con masse di statuto servile.

Il dosaggio tra queste diverse componenti sociali è continuamente rimesso in discussione dal susseguirsi delle guerre e dalla diversa natura, sociale o miliare, dei conflitti: la storia delle città di Sicilia è anche la storia della ricerca di un equilibrio incerto e forse impossibile, nel punto di mediazione tra gli elementi istituzionali propri della *polis* e una pluralità di variabili in grado di disgregare dall'interno quell'identità. Eppure la mobilità legata alla guerra, come mostra benissimo questo volume, rappresenta anche una possibilità positiva, perché attraverso lo spostamento di uomini (e dunque di beni e di idee) disegna sistemi sovrapoleici e orizzonti regionali che superano la frammentazione: in qualche modo la guerra contribuisce a fare della Sicilia un oggetto storico intrinsecamente più omogeneo, perché fondato su una molteplicità di forme di aggregazione trasversale, alimentate da rapporti diplomatici, relazioni sociali, scambi commerciali, trasmissione di saperi e trasferimento di risorse.

Guerra e risorse

A questo punto rimane da sottolineare un ultimo filo che attraversa tutto il volume costituendone una delle acquisizioni a mio parere più significative. Della guerra esiste anche una dimensione squisitamente economica, che comprende la gestione delle risorse, la produzione e la distribuzione dei beni, la sussistenza di un corpo sociale composito, la manifestazione concreta di uno *status*: sono tutti aspetti che vengono amplificati dai conflitti anche in ragione dell'impatto che essi hanno sulla società e sul territorio. La prima ricaduta 'economica' riguarda infatti il modo in cui la guerra cambia e modella la terra, la risorsa primaria a partire dalla quale si costruisce la piramide sociale: si pensi, ad esempio, alla pratica di colpire le città devastando il territorio coltivato, abbandonandolo poi al saccheggio di soldati e mercenari; o alla possibile funzione economica dei *phrouria*, che coniugano in maniera complementare controllo militare del territorio, possibilità di ricovero per la popolazione rurale e gestione (raccolta e distribuzione) dei raccolti.

D'altra parte, l'impatto della guerra ha innescato anche processi di modernizzazione e di sviluppo, visibili sin dal medio e tardo arcaismo, quando la crescita delle colonie greche e la microconflittualità locale, in certa misura endemica, hanno incoraggiato una diversa organizzazione degli insediamenti interni e del territorio rendendolo più sicuro e dunque più produttivo. Centri per cui la tradizione enfatizza la funzione di avamposto militare (Acre e Casmene, ad esempio), inoltre, sembrano aver svolto piuttosto una funzione di snodo e di connessione tra le diverse parti dell'isola. Per il periodo classico le dinamiche sono ancora meglio comprensibili anche grazie all'analogia con situazioni storiche di età moderna: si può ragionevolmente ipotizzare, ad esempio, che tra V e IV secolo i conflitti che interessarono tutta l'isola abbiano accelerato il processo di urbanizzazione, con centri urbani sempre più socialmente articolati ed economicamente complessi, capaci di esercitare il controllo su territori sempre più vasti.

La dimensione economica è chiamata in causa anche dalla moneta coniata, un altro di quei temi che pur non oggetto di alcun contributo specifico ricorrono nella trattazione, se non altro a proposito del pagamento dovuto ai mercenari. Proprio le monete sono un segnale inequivocabile della potenza e delle conseguenze della guerra: con la loro presenza anche fuori della Sicilia evidenziano l'ampiezza della sfera di influenza di una città (di nuovo Siracusa, in particolare); e quando sono nascoste in tesoretti dicono della paura e dello stato di incertezza dettati dai conflitti. Le emissioni monetali consentono inoltre di ricostruire le necessità delle città in termini fiscali, con una attenta gestione della tassazione diretta o indiretta che comprendeva a diversi livelli tutte le componenti del corpo sociale (cittadini, stranieri residenti, artigiani, beneficiari del porto) e i cui proventi andavano reinvestiti negli apparati militari.

La riflessione sull'intima connessione tra guerra ed economia si può infine spostare ancora più all'indietro e concentrarsi non sull'impatto della guerra sui territori e sulle città, ma sul ruolo che il dato economico ha avuto nel causare i conflitti. Non è un modo nuovo di guardare la storia, certo; ma è innegabile che negli ultimi decenni gli studi storici abbiano selezionato e privilegiato altri tagli e altri sguardi, soprattutto lì dove, come nella storia antica, la mancanza di dati seriali inibisce la possibilità di qualsivoglia analisi quantitativa. Ma al di là dell'atteggiamento teorico che si vuole assumere, non si può negare che anche nella storia più antica dell'isola i rapporti di forza (tra individui, gruppi sociali, città, regioni) si siano giocati anche sul piano economico, e con riferimento a dati quali il surplus della produzione cerealicola, lo stoccaggio del cibo, il sistema dei pesi e delle misure, il bisogno nutrizionale e la prestanza fisica dei soldati, il sistema di trasporto via terra e via mare. Il ricorrere di questi temi in molti dei contributi del volume conferisce una grande concretezza alla prospettiva sulla guerra anche nello studio di casi per certi versi canonici, come la Siracusa dei Dinomenidi o la dinastia dei Dionisii; esso consente di collocare i conflitti (le loro cause e i loro effetti) in una ricostruzione di lungo periodo e di riconoscere nella guerra un indubbio fattore di accelerazione di processi che in parte però sono da essa indipendente.

Questo ultimo aspetto consente di chiudere queste considerazioni con due osservazioni che possono dar conto della complessità e della ricchezza di spunti degli studi qui raccolti. In primo luogo, vediamo confermata la dimensione totale della guerra, che in tutte le sue molte e variegate modalità segna profondamente tutta la storia della Sicilia, diventando una lente privilegiata per cogliere dinamiche a diverso livello, da quello politico e militare (il più ovvio), a quello psicologico ed emotivo, a quello economico e sociale. In secondo luogo, si constata come anche nel leggere un fenomeno che sembra strutturale nella vita degli uomini si possono usare strumenti e approcci nuovi o rinnovati.

È proprio qui il sale della ricerca: questo libro ce ne offre un saggio importante, in qualche modo un inizio per una nuova stagione.

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Epilogue: war and society in Greek Sicily

This book takes us deep into the bloody heart of war. We are all aware that war is a violent event leaving lasting traces on those caught up in it. However, not everyone realises that war and its causes are also the preferred subject of historians, as established by the inexorable historiographical tradition of the West. Although they may adopt differing approaches, most historians have devoted great attention to this pervasive phenomenon, examining it both in terms of its salient moments and as a long-term action preparing momentous changes beneath the surface of the single battles.

However, there is no single way of describing war nor are all wars the same. The lexical plurality of every language, whether ancient or modern, means that we will find phenomena with a very different reach and qualities all coming under the general heading of ‘war’. Moreover, the term ‘war’ can also be used in a metaphorical or symbolic sense or to refer to conceptual domains that are not strictly military or necessarily collective. Within this vast plurality of meanings, this book offers us a picture distinguished by important elements of unity.

First, the war in question is *polemos* intended in its most immediate and frequently recurring sense: clashes, soldiers, destruction, celebrations for the victors and tragedies for the defeated. Secondly, all the acts of war taken into consideration refer to a single location, Sicily, an island offering an intrinsically homogeneous setting despite the long time-frame (from the archaic period to Roman times) and the plurality of populations involved.

Any discussion of the Sicilian wars must adopt a unitary perspective, precisely because of this island setting. We should not consider this insularity as an abstract paradigm of identity but as a distinguishing feature allowing us to recognize Sicily as a clearly delineated historical subject that is worth being studied individually and in terms of its specificities. Although there are various topics that require Sicily to be explained in terms of Sicily, any analysis worth its salt must adopt a long-term perspective taking into account both events and interruptions as well as structures and transversal dynamics, including social dynamics, upon which this book has wisely chosen to focus. The reference to Sicily is not merely a geographical specification but allows us to place in their proper context the two terms 'war and society' or, in other words, the transformations of the social body caused by war, and the specificities of war in the framework of particular social situations.

The studies collected here offer a wealth of ideas on all of these aspects, which tend to prove all the more interesting when they branch off in different directions. In my afterword, I will attempt to pursue and discuss critically some of the most promising lines of research.

Sources

Although historians must always begin with the sources, the starting point of every study, the contributors to this book do not necessarily approach them in the same way. In fact, due to their different origins and educational traditions (another of the virtues of this book), some of the authors are not convinced that literary sources are capable of providing new stimulus for debate. However, this does not necessarily imply that archaeological research always has the best answers. In fact, archaeologists are usually the first to draw attention to the difficulties involved in seeking to frame this topic without reference to literary texts. This awareness invites us to overcome antagonistic dialectics between disciplines by placing context at the centre of our debate and by honing methodological instruments that allow us to ask questions that are right, or more correct, or newer, and to formulate possible replies in an unbiased manner.

Time and memory

We all know that when we refer to history, we are, in fact, referring to time, even though we can choose to consider it as being constellated by single events, like battles and political decisions, or in terms of longer economic or social processes. But the deepest time, the time against which all the other times are measured, is the time of memory, which is stimulated by war in a vast gamut of forms, all of which are well represented in this book.

Who better to begin with than Thucydides, the historian who gave reflections on war a rational form? At the centre of the debate is his account of the Athenian defeat at Syracuse in 413, which is written 'subjectively', that is, in terms of the emotional experiences of the survivors. His description can be interpreted in a variety of interesting ways: on the one hand it seems to provide information suggesting that the Athenian soldiers are exhibiting signs of PTSD, on the other, it seems to be a moral lesson inviting the Athenians to reflect on the consequences of their arrogant choices. These complementary interpretations suggest that, as far as method is concerned, it is advisable to separate the historiographic perspective that is responsive to the narrative and ethical reasoning within a work from the historical view emphasising its testimonial value.

While historiographic memory is always the result of an intellectual process, other forms of memory reveal a more immediate approach to the places and times of war. An elevated form of this can be found in the monuments celebrating battles and victors or displaying the wealth acquired thanks to war. One of the most famous cases regards the battle of Himera, to which the literary tradition precociously attributed a universal character, creating a fictitous connection to the Greek victories in the Persian wars. It was the very authority of this tradition that caused it to heavily influence the chronological and ideological contextualization of a number of famous Siciliote temple buildings: an exemplary case is that of the *Athenaion* at Syracuse, which was considered a kind of pendant to the temple built at Himera to celebrate the victory over the Carthaginians. The dense discussion of materials and the rereading of the architectural language provide us with important arguments for moving away from an immediately celebratory intent and invite us to pay closer attention to the social implications of a war that has been won: the emphasis on the socially founding function of the victorious *strategos*, the launch of an ambitious building programme involving large swathes of both the free and servile populations, and the deployment and distribution of exceptional wealth.

We now reach a third level of memory, which has left its traces in many pages of this book, despite being less obvious: I am referring to social memory, evoked by the most basic material testimony in the form of bodies and weapons. One such example is the western necropolis of Himera, which is located on a plain that was the setting of one of most important battles of the 5th century: in fact, the burial site coincides with the battlefield. Although the tragedy of those events is dramatically evoked by the mass graves holding the remains of the Greeks who died in combat, perhaps even more interesting for our reflection is the discovery of Iberian weapons taken from the enemy and deposited as votive items. Fragments of weapons have also been found in the agora of Selinunte, a public civic space that would seem an unusual site for their conservation or deposition. While these two cases are very different, they may both evoke a memory that is neither monumental nor political but referred to a community (of the soldiers fighting or of the peaceful inhabitants using the agora) that considered weapons in terms that went beyond their primary purpose and that may not have direct links to the votive purpose of cult places. The deliberate deposition of weapons in ‘heterodox’ spaces could be explained by the memorial horizon of the groups defined, for whom weapons and/or warriors had an identity that went beyond the specific warlike gesture.

Time

Nonetheless, the dimension of the time of memory must reckon with the times of history and of war, which are shaped by events known to us thanks to the historiographic tradition. This book shows how the specificity of the Sicilian context may also suggest a type of readjustment with regard to the established approach used for Greece itself. Some examples follow below.

The first regards the passage from the archaic period to the classical period, which can be moved back at least a generation with respect to the date of the battle of Himera, whose epoch-making character must be reviewed. On the other hand, at the end of the 6th century, there were changes in the relationships between communities in various areas of Sicily that saw the coastal *poleis* displaying heightened aggression towards inland communities and the rise to hegemony of a number of indigenous centres. In more than one case, these partly conflictual processes expanded well beyond the unstable horizon of contact between neighbouring communities. Another interruption is represented by major military events in the final 15 years of the 5th century, which marked the start of a long phase of experimentation and reappraisals that cannot be described as strictly ‘hellenistic’ but that certainly laid the foundations for a Sicily more closely resembling the political and territorial subjects of the new world inaugurated by Alexander the Great. The definitive break was the First Punic War when Sicily became a battleground for warring factions, which were by now based outside the island. After the end of that war, a kind of paradox came into being: on the one hand, the new provincial statute eroded the exceptional nature of the island while, on the other, it gave Sicily a new centrality by placing it within Rome’s Mediterranean prospects.

The intrinsic dynamism of war suggests a far more promising approach, which the book applies to the Punic Wars but which could also be conceived and applied to other contexts. The conflict is described and mapped using geopolitical maps representing a multiplicity of possible perspectives extending well beyond the polarity of the two enemies facing each other: these include the changeable levels of assessment and strategy, the game of alliances between all the actors involved, the role of those seeking to remain neutral or on the margins as well as the perception and ideological representation of the conflict. The possibility of making this dynamism immediately visible represents a real step forward in the research: the conjunction between the descriptive level and interpretative approach produces multiple visions of the territory and stimulates new lines of investigation thanks to a cartography that plays an active role in research rather than passively reflecting existing reconstructions.

Landscapes

The cartographic experiment highlights another theme underpinning the entire book: that of landscape, explored primarily in terms of its ‘military’ dimension. Despite the many wars fought there, the island’s military landscape has provided mainly residual and circumstantial evidence. In fact, war leaves mainly negative traces, a record of subtraction: the voids of battlefields lacking all of the elements distinguishing community life, the pits hurriedly excavated for the dead soldiers, the rubble of conquered and destroyed cities that still succeed in metabolizing the ruins – as shown by Selinunte. And thus war loses its destructive potential and becomes part of the identity-based phenomenology of times of peace.

However, if we consider war in its broader sense, as the expression of political and economic forces rather than as a specific military action, then it acquires an immense capacity to transform landscape both in terms of its constituent elements – whether natural or artificial – and in terms of the network of relations and connections present in such landscapes. Consider, for example, the lasting importance of territorial settlements with a prevalently or exclusively military vocation, the so-called *phrouria* forming a network of strategic nodes and surfaces of tension throughout the internal areas of the island. The exact mapping of such settlements together with the evaluation of their development in time makes it possible to overcome the rigidity of the traditional approach to the ethnographic analysis of the island as well as the implicit hierarchy of coast and interior. Most importantly, it allows us to recover and enhance what I would describe as the autonomy of the territory as a historical object. The territory needs to be studied in terms of the unique rationale governing it, considering not only the centripetal force exercised upon it by the large *poleis* but also all of the variables (morphology, resources, seasons, communication routes, visibility, settlement density) and the possible functions of the sites concerned, which must be assessed within a network of functions that include the military function. This will allow us to adopt a fresh approach to inflexible notions, like the idea of border, which is not the artificial product of a political will creating a clean break between armies and territories but a mediation zone capable of producing unique dynamics and of transforming the space around it.

Cities

Rethinking and describing space in terms of networks means overcoming another traditional polarity. Even though the dichotomy between urban centre and territory was handed down to us by the leading Greek political thought, it should not be rigidly polarised but, instead, reinterpreted using a more fluid approach taking into account the porosity between the urban and the rural part of the *polis*, which, we must remember, comprises both aspects. This theme, which is undoubtedly very broad, provides interesting food for thought, also when considered from the perspective of war. Beginning with Syracuse, Sicily offers several interesting examples where the relationship between city and territory is shaped by war, in a crescendo that reaches its peak with the 4th-century tyrants. On a more general level, the territorial dimension of the Syracusan hegemony is closely linked to war and expresses the military power of Syracuse, which expands until it breaks through the limits posed by insularity. This power is in turn supported by the territorial resources that are channelled into ports and arsenals. On a level focused more on the *polis*, Syracuse bears the permanent traces of the dynamic relationship between the practice of war and definition of spaces: the period from the 5th to the 4th-century saw the rearrangement of coastal structures; the adjustment of the functional relationship between the island of Ortygia and the mainland; the investment of huge sums of money in the construction of ports, arsenals and fortifications; the redefinition of the relation between the urban part and the surrounding countryside, and the ‘invention’ of a new form of space that was neither strictly urban nor truly rural, represented by the land lying within the huge circuit of walls protected by the Castle of Euryalos.

All of this makes Syracuse impervious to the classic models of interpretation and invites comparisons with the other cities on the island, each of which offers possible variations on the relationship between cities and war: cities annihilated by war that are abandoned by the survivors who move elsewhere (Himera); former crossroads of routes, peoples and cultures that turn into fortresses (Selinunte); martyred cities subjected to repeated attacks that repeatedly change their social and territorial profile (Leontini);

cities that adapt to the new context by successfully combining the centrality of their ancient cults with a new strategic function (Eryx); cities developing functions that are broader than those determined by the specific military context in which they were first established (Halaesa). These are all approaches that have the great merit of proposing a unified overview of the island that takes into account the specificities of the individual contexts while overcoming negative models opposing east and west, coast and interior, indigenous peoples and Greeks.

Fortifications and *politeiai*

In this broad historical outline, we can highlight two specific areas. The first, which seems an obvious choice, concerns the various types of fortification built in the island's urban centres over a wide historical arc: they range from the foundation of settlements by the Greeks to the increase in defensive systems all over the island in the second half of the 6th century and to the major construction work carried out in numerous urban centres from the late 5th century onwards. However, this book also reminds us to consider fortifications in purely political and social terms, inviting us to see them also as the expression of a complete system of values and functions rather than merely a response to a military need. Fortifications are also a sign of civic identity: this was true for archaic Leontini with its unusual morphology between two hills, for classical Eryx where the construction of the walls revealed a new conception of settlement, and for the great Syracuse of Dionysius the Elder in which redesigned spaces were a manifestation of the tyrant's power. But this is also true for the 'minor' centres of eastern Sicily, whose city walls are primarily a response to a process of spatial definition that clearly establishes the functions of the places and the social roles while distinguishing between 'inside' and 'outside'.

The case of the inland communities and that of the Syracuse of Dionysius are two sides of the same coin. Although they approach the problem from different directions, they both highlight the structural link between urban form, military aspect, and political meaning. Fortifications in indigenous centres reveal their gradual assumption of the form of *polis* accompanied by a more clear-cut civic identity, while in tyrannical Syracuse, the walls reveal the progressive erosion of a political community faced with a power withdrawing behind the perimeter of its fortresses.

Let us examine another aspect that regards the role of war in defining the *politeia* and the *polis*. The power of Sicel tyrants developed out of their military role, the *strategia*, which came about due to the exceptional nature of the conflict with Carthage, which generated forms of autocratic power that evolved in a dynastic and regal direction.

From the 5th century onwards, if not earlier, war contributed to transforming the very concept of *polis*, which would emerge from the bottleneck of conflicts and powers in a more fluid and changeable form, ready to adapt and transform in response to the pressure of both internal and external unrest (*stasis* and *polemos*).

Regardless of their ethnic affiliation, geographical location and economic power, all Sicilian cities experienced this pressure, which had two main consequences, that were one-sided in some respects. On the one hand, the notion of *polis* was seemingly being eroded by the actions of tyrants revealing total ideological nonconformism in their willingness to destroy cities, strip citizens of their homeland and citizenship, and redefine the civic bodies of the communities affected. On the other, the *polis* revealed new vigour as a form and enjoyed new success among marginal groups (mercenaries, refugees, Campanians) who would have struggled to become integrated in other conditions and instead promoted the foundation or refoundation of new political communities.

Social body

If we wish to grasp the fate of the *polis* in a Sicily at war, we need to make the focus of our reflections its society, in other words, the group of men and women extending beyond the confines of the body politic (which was by nature always restricted and partial) to form the complexity of the communities, transforming them. In this history seen through the filter of war, it is the social body that imposes itself as a historical subject, identified in the singular, without distinctions of origin, status, ethnic affiliation, economic capacity, yet analysed as a whole, as a network of relations and functions that structure and specify themselves in the landscape of the island. The key word is, obviously, mobility, a fascinating notion calling for a comprehensive evaluation of the processes considered as a system of causes, concauses, effects, variations and consequences, to be assessed not only in terms of the horizontal surface of space but also diachronically. War inevitably occupies a privileged position: it accelerates the transformation processes and mobility of all social groups, whether the more stable groups of the communities of the *poleis* or those in perpetual motion like reserves, exiles and fugitives, soldiers and mercenaries, merchants and specialist craftsmen, slaves being bought and sold, poets and intellectuals, physicians and learned men, members of indigenous communities moving to Greek cities, Greeks choosing to live with local communities. I have deliberately listed these categories in random order: in fact, such groups are not arranged according to a pre-established grid or fixed pyramid but have all had, at some time, some sort of connection to war according to points of intersection, which are never pre-established and which the book illustrates by means of a series of extremely interesting case studies.

The *defixiones* of Selinunte, for example, could be interpreted as evidence of an interethnic conflict within the social body that may have contributed to the *stasis* of the late archaic age; in Syracuse, on the other hand, the forced intake of external groups (Greeks and non-Greeks) is a device deliberately used by the tyrannical powers to disrupt the unity of the *polis*. Mercenaries represent a particularly interesting case within the broad spectrum of mobility: their presence is well attested, also in the archaeological record, from at least the time of the battle of Himera and from then on they assume an increasing importance, not just as soldiers, but also as ethnically unified groups establishing themselves permanently within a community or territory and bringing with them new identities, knowledge and *nomoi*.

These dynamics have huge potential in terms of social transformation: the war and its actors reveal all their potential not only in strictly military terms but also, and to an even greater extent, in the social and political fabric of the island. Such phenomena are not always adequately documented and what remains today is often merely a kind of indistinct background noise as in the case of the so-called camp followers (merchants, artisans, women). We know a little more about other kinds of 'civil' mobility caused by war: this includes, for example, those providing technical skills (architects or specialist workers) or extra pairs of hands (waged workers) for the construction of defensive structures; the labour force that contributed to the growth and maintenance of cities at war; and the definitive commodification of men – cannon fodder, bargaining chips when they were prisoners of war or war booty to be sold to the highest bidder. A particularly interesting case regards the Naxians and the Motyans who were enslaved following the war yet succeeded in making an unexpected comeback, forming communities of free men.

In Sicily, the war struck right at the heart of the communities. No one was safe under the blows of the warlords and in the grip of the conflict; not the major aristocratic landowners losing and winning back their political positions and status at Syracuse, Megara, and Leontini; nor the urban *demos*, constantly undermined by the arrival of new citizens; nor the free workers who found themselves competing with masses of servile status. The ratio between the various components of society was constantly changing due to the succession of wars and various types of conflict (social or military). The history of the cities of Sicily is also the history of a search for an unstable and possibly unattainable equilibrium between the institutional elements distinguishing the *polis* and a plurality of variables capable of breaking up that identity from the inside.

And yet, as this book so clearly shows, the mobility associated with war also has positive consequences. In fact, through the movement of men (and therefore of goods and ideas), it designs systems at supra-polis level as well as regional horizons overcoming fragmentation. War somehow contributes to transforming Sicily into a historical object that is intrinsically more homogeneous and nurtured by a multiplicity of forms and relational experiences.

War and resources

The time has come to draw attention to the economic dimension of war, which includes the management of resources, the production and distribution of goods, the existence of a composite social body, and the concrete manifestation of status. This aspect is present throughout the book and is one of its key acquisitions.

The first ‘economic’ impact regards the way in which war changes and shapes the land, the primary resource upon which the social pyramid is built. Just consider, for example, the practice of attacking cities by devastating cultivated land or the possible economic function of the *phrouria*, which combine military control of the territory with the provision of shelter for the rural population and management (collection and distribution) of harvests. More in general, though, war stimulated territorial modernisation and development processes from the Middle Archaic to the Late Archaic period when the growth of Greek colonies combined with local unrest to encourage a new form of organisation of inland settlements and of the surrounding territory, making it safer and, therefore, more productive. It is reasonable to assume that centres whose military functions have traditionally been emphasised acted as hubs and links between the different parts of the island. The dynamics for the classical period are even clearer: one might suggest that, between the 5th and 4th centuries, conflicts accelerated the process of urbanisation, resulting in centres that were more socially and economically complex and capable of exercising control over increasingly vast territories.

The economic dimension also emerges from coinage, an unmistakeable sign of the demands and consequences of war. Coins with differing nominations, also minted to pay mercenaries, reveal the scope and articulation of a city’s sphere of influence. However, when they are hidden in hoards, they also evoke the fear and state of uncertainty caused by conflict. Through analogies with the other great cities of the classical period, numismatic emissions might allude to the need for the careful management of direct or indirect taxation, also for purely military ends.

This intimate connection between war and economy can also be traced backwards to focus on the causes of the war. It is undeniable that, in recent decades, historical studies have tended to select and give preference to different approaches and points of view, especially regarding situations in ancient history where the lack of serial data hinders the possibility of carrying out quantitative analyses. Nonetheless, it is clear that, even in antiquity, the balances of power on the island (between individuals, social groups, cities, and regions) also played out at an economic level. The book's insistence upon economic aspects gives great weight to its perspective on war. By homing in on purely economic elements (the surplus grain production, stockpiling of food, the system of weights and measures, the nutritional requirements and fitness, the system of transport via land and sea), it is able to contextualise the conflicts and their causes and effects in a long-term reconstruction and to recognize war as an indubitable factor of acceleration.

This last aspect allows me to conclude with two observations reflecting the complexity and wealth of ideas contained in the essays presented in this work. First, we find a confirmation of the totalising dimension of war, which, in its many varied forms, left such a profound impression on the history of Sicily, becoming the ideal lens through which to observe dynamics on various levels – from the most obvious political and military level to the psychological and emotional level or economic and social level. Secondly, we learn that even when interpreting a phenomenon that is seemingly structural in human lives, it is possible to call upon new or updated instruments and approaches.

And this is the essence of the research showcased in this book, which can be seen as marking the start of a new season.

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Timeline

Preliminary note

The following timeline cannot provide a complete list of all conflict situations recorded by the sources for the Greek period in Sicily. The entries presented here therefore should be considered as a selection. The same is true for the cited sources. The dates are approximate values only.

~734	Foundation of Naxos (Thuc. 6.3.1)
~733	Foundation of Syracuse (Thuc. 6.3.2)
~729	Foundation of Megara Hyblaia (Thuc. 6.4.1)
~729	Foundation of Leontinoi (Thuc. 6.3.3)
~700	War between Leontinoi and Megara Hyblaia, Panaitios becomes tyrant of Leontinoi (Polyaenus *Strat*. 5.47)
~688	Foundation of Gela (Thuc. 6.4.3)
~685	Antiphemos of Gela sacks Omphake (Paus. 8.46.2)
~664	Foundation of Akrai (Thuc. 6.5.2)
~648	Foundation of Himera by Zankle and exiles from Syracuse (Thuc. 6.5.1)
~644	Foundation of Kasmenai (Thuc. 6.5.3)

~628	Foundation of Selinous (Thuc. 6.4.2)
~598	Foundation of Kamarina (Thuc. 6.5.3)
~580	Foundation of Akragas (Thuc. 6.4.4)
~580	Pentathlos founds a city near Marsala and gets defeated in a war against the Phoenicians and Elymians (Diod. Sic. 5.9.2)
~570	Phalaris becomes tyrant of Akragas, various assaults on neighbouring Sicel communities (Polyaenus *Strat*. 5.1)
~552	A coalition of Kamarina and Sicels fail in a revolt against Syracuse (Thuc. 6.5.3)
~510/09	Foundation of Herakleia near Eryx by the Spartan Dorieus. Subsequent destruction by the Carthaginians (Hdt. 5.46.1)
~508	Euryleon takes Herakleia Minoa and liberates Selinous from the tyrant Pythagoras (Hdt. 5.46.2)
~508–490	Akragas annexes Herakleia Minoa (*FGrH* 532 F30)
~505	Kleandros becomes tyrant of Gela (Hdt. 7.154.1)
~498	Hippocrates becomes tyrant of Gela (Hdt. 7.154.1)
~496–492	Hippocrates wages war against Callipolis, Naxos, Zankle and Leontinoi (Hdt. 7.154.2)
~493–492	Seizure of Zankle by the Samians during a campaign against the Sicels (Hdt. 6.23)
~492	Battle at Heloron between Hippocrates from Gela and

	Syracuse (Hdt. 7.154.2)
~491	Kamarina annexed and refounded by Hippocrates (Thuc. 6.5.2)
~491	Death of Hippocrates in a battle against the Sicels at Hybla, Gelon becomes tyrant of Gela (Hdt. 7.155.1)
~491	The demos *expels the* gamoroi from Syracuse. The gamoroi *settle in* Kasmenai (Hdt. 7.155.2)
~488	Theron becomes tyrant of Akragas (Polyaenus *Strat.* 6.51)
~488/87	Anaxilas of Rhegion takes Zankle and renames it Messana (Thuc. 6.4.6)
~485	The gamoroi return to Syracuse, Gelon becomes tyrant of Syracuse, Hieron governor of Gela (Hdt. 7.156.1)
~483	War between Syracuse and Megara Hyblaia (Hdt. 7.156.2)
~483	Relocation of people from Gela, Kamarina, Megara Hyblaia and Euboea to Syracuse (Hdt. 7.156.2-3)
~482	Expulsion of Terillus, tyrant of Himera, by Theron from Akragas (Hdt. 7.165)
~480	Battle of Himera and subsequent peace between Syracuse and Carthage (Diod. Sic. 11.20-26)
~480–450	Building of the ‘victory temples’ in Himera, Akragas (?), and Syracuse (?)
~478	Death of Gelon. Hieron becomes tyrant of Syracuse (Diod. Sic. 11.48.3)
~476	Hieron installs new settlers at

	Naxos and Katane and moves the original population to Leontinoi (Diod. Sic. 11.49)
~475	Hieron defeats Etruscans in the battle of Cumae (Diod. Sic. 11.51)
~472	Death of Theron, Thrasydaeus becomes tyrant of Akragas (Diod. Sic. 11.53.1)
~471	War between Syracus and Akragas. Death of Thrasydaeus (Diod. Sic. 11.53.3-5)
~467/66	Death of Hieron, Thrasybulus becomes tyrant of Syracuse (Diod. Sic. 11.67.5)
~466/65	Revolt against Thrasybulus at Syracuse, end of one man rule in Sicily (Diod. Sic. 11.68)
~465–461	Civil war in Syracuse (Diod. Sic. 11.71.2-73; 11.76.1-2)
~463–461	Unemployed mercenaries settle at Omphake and Kakyron and wage war against Gela (P.Oxy 665).
~461	Relocation of mercenaries to Messana (Diod. Sic. 11.76.5-6)
~459	A coalition of Syracuse and the Sicels under the leadership of Ducetius launch an attack on Catane (Diod. Sic. 11.76.3)
~459/58	Ducetius founds Menai and conquers Morgantina (11.78.5)
~453	Ducetius founds Paliké and creates a federation of the Sicels (Diod. Sic. 11.88.6)
~453/52	War between Segesta and Lilybaion (Diod. Sic. 11.86.2)
~451–450	Ducetius takes Aitna and lays siege on Motyon (Diod. Sic.

	11.91.1)
~450–449	Ducetius defeated and exiled to Corinth (Diod. Sic. 11.92)
~446	Ducetius founds Kale Akte. War between Syracuse and Akragas about the question of his return (Diod. Sic. 12.8)
~~443	Syracuse subdues the Sicel town of Trinakie (Diod. Sic. 12.29.2-4)
~427	War between Syracuse and Leontinoi. Leontinoi calls Athenians for help (Thuc. 3.86.1-3)
~427–424	Athenian interventions in Sicily (Thuc. 3.86.-4.65)
~424	Congress of Gela (Thuc. 4.65.1)
~424/3	Civil war in Leontinoi: demos *expelled,* dynatoi *move to Syracuse (Thuc.* 5.4.2-4)
~416	War between Segesta and Selinous. Segesta and Leontinoi call Athens for help (Diod. Sic. 12.82.3-12.83.2)
~415–413	Athenian expedition to Sicily (Thuc. 6.1-7.87)
~414/13	Athenian siege of Syracuse and subsequent flight (Thuc. 6.97-7.87)
~410	War between Segesta and Selinous. Segesta calls Carthage for help (Diod. Sic. 13.43.1-3)
~409/08	Selinous and Himera sacked by the Carthaginians under the lead of Hannibal Mago (Diod. Sic. 13.54-63)
~408	*Timeline* Hermocrates settles in Selinous and builds a fortress around the acropolis. Raids into

	the Carthaginian territories (Diod. Sic. 13.62.3-5)
~407	Naval battle between the Carthaginians and Syracuse in the area of Eryx (Diod. Sic. 13.80.5-7)
~406/05	Carthaginian campaign against Akragas, Gela and Kamarina (Diod. Sic. 13.85-91; 13.108-112)
~405	Sicilian Greeks unsuccessfully revolt against Dionysios I (Diod. Sic. 13.112-113)
~405	Refugees from Gela and Kamarina settle in Leontinoi (Diod. Sic. 13.113.4)
~405	Outbreak of a plague among the Carthaginians. Peace between Carthage and Syracuse (Diod. Sic. 13.114.1)
~404	The Syracusans revolt against Dionysios I (Diod. Sic. 14.7.6-9.7)
~404	Campanian mercenaries occupy Entella (Diod. Sic. 14.9.8-9)
~403	Dionysios I campaigning against Aitna, Leontinoi, Catane, Naxos and Sicel possessions (Diod. Sic. 14.14.2-14.15.4)
~403	Foundation of Alaisa (Diod. Sic. 14.16.2)
~402	Building of the long walls around the Epipolai plateau (Diod. Sic. 14.18.)
~400	Foundation of Adranon (Diod. Sic. 14.37.5)
~400	Start of major developments in weapon technology, military architecture and siege techniques (Diod. Sic. 14.42)

~398	Dionysios I declares war on Carthage (Diod. Sic. 14.47.1-2)
~397	Dionysios I raids western Sicily and captures Motya (Diod. Sic. 14.47.4-53)
~397	Counter attack of the Carthaginians on Motya. Dionysios I retreat (Diod. Sic. 14.55)
~397/96	Himilco II captures Messana, gives Tauromenion to the Sicels (Diod. Sic. 14.57; 14.59.1-2)
~396	Carthage beats Dionysios I in a sea battle at Catane (Diod. Sic. 14.59-61)
~396	Himilco II besieges Syracuse, but loses a sea battle (Diod. Sic. 14.63-64)
~396	Outbreak of a plague in the Carthaginian camp, defeat in battle and flight of Himilco II (Diod. Sic. 14.70.4-75)
~396	Dionysios I moves 10,000 mercenaries to Leontinoi (Diod. Sic. 14.78.2)
~396	Foundation of Tyndaris (Diod. Sic. 14.78.5-6)
~396	Dionysios I takes Menai and Morgantina (Diod. Sic. 14.78.7)
~395	Dionysios I defeats Rhegion in their attack on Messana and takes Mylai (Diod. Sic. 14.87.1-3)
~394	Dionysios I unsuccesfully besieges Tauromenium (Diod. Sic. 14.87.4-88.4)
~393	Dionysios I defeats Mago II in the battle at Abakainon (Diod. Sic. 14.90.2-4)

~392	Carthaginian advance to the area of Agyrion, renewal of peace (Diod. Sic. 14.95-96)
~392–386	Dionysios I engagements in Magna Graecia (Diod. Sic. 14.100-113)
~388	Dionysios I captures and enslaves the population of Rhegion (Diod. Sic. 14.111)
~387–385	Dionysios I ventures into the Adriatic region (Diod. Sic. 15.13.14)
~384/3	Dionysios I raids the Tyrrhenian coast (Diod. Sic. 15.14.3-4)
~383–376	War between Syracuse and Carthage (Diod. Sic. 15.15-17)
~378/77	Battle of Cabala, Death of Mago II (Diod. Sic. 15.15.2-4)
~376	Battle at Cronium, Mago III defeats Dionysios I (Diod. Sic. 15.16.2-3)
~376	Peace between Carthage and Dionysios I (Diod. Sic. 15.17.5)
~368/67	Dionysios I unsuccessfully lays siege to Lilybaion (Diod. Sic. 15.73)
~367	Death of Dionysios I, Dionysios II succeeds (Diod. Sic. 15.73.5)
~365/4	Dionysios II makes peace with Carthage (Diod. Sic. 16.5.2)
~357/56	Dion takes Syracuse and besieges Dionysios II in the fortress Ortygia. (Diod. Sic. 16.9-13)
~355	Dionysios II flees to Locri (Diod. Sic. 16.17.1-2)
~354	Murder of Dion, Callippus tyrant of Syracuse (Plut. *Vit. Dion* 57-58)
~353/2	Hipparinos leader of Syracuse

	(Diod. Sic. 16.36.5)
~346	Dionysios II returns from exile and reconquers Syracuse (Plut. *Vit. Tim.* 1.4)
~345	Carthaginians attack Entella (Diod. Sic. 16.67)
~345/44	Hicetas of Leontinoi allies with the Carthaginians and takes Syracuse. Dionysios II barricades himself in the fortress Ortygia (Diod. Sic. 16.68)
~344	Timoleon from Corinth arrives in Sicily (Diod. Sic. 16.68.7) 397
~344	Battle near Adranon between Timoleon and Hicetas (Diod. Sic. 16.68.9-10)
~344/43	Timoleon drives Hicetas out of Syracuse (Diod. Sic. 16.69.6)
~343	Dionysios II surrenders Ortygia and flees to Corinth (Diod. Sic. 16.70.1-3)
~342	Timoleon’s campaign to regain control in eastern Sicily (Diod. Sic. 16.72.2)
~341	Timoleon’s mercenaries raid western Sicily and take Entella (Diod. Sic. 16.73.1-2)
~341	Timoleon defeats the Carthaginians at the battle of the river Crimisus (Diod. Sic. 16.79-80)
~339	Peace between Timoleon and the Carthaginians (Diod. Sic. 16.82.3)
~339/38	Timoleon’s campaign to restore Syracusan hegemony in eastern Sicily (Diod. Sic. 16.82.4-5)
~336	Death of Timoleon (Diod. Sic.

	16.90)
~316/15	Agathokles instigates massacre among the Syracusan aristocracy and gets elected *strategos autokrator* (Diod. Sic. 19.6.5-9.5)
~315	Agathokles’ campaign against his political rivals in Messana, Mylai and Abakainon (Diod. Sic. 19.65)
~314	Peace between Agathokles and the Syracusan exiles in Gela and Akragas, as well as with Carthage (Diod. Sic. 19.71.6)
~313	Agathokles takes Messana. The Syracusan exiles call the Carthaginians for help (Diod. Sic. 19.102-103.1)
~312/11	Battle at Galaria between the troops of Agathokles and the Syracusan exiles (Diod. Sic. 19.104.1-3)
~310	Hamilkar defeats Agathokles in the battle at the river Himera. Agathokles retreats to Syracuse (Diod. Sic. 19.108-110; 19.20.3.1)
~310–307	Agathokles campaign in Africa (Diod. Sic. 20.3-69)
~310–307	Carthage besieges Syracuse (Diod. Sic. 20.29-62)
~308	Akragas, led by Xenodicos, takes Gela, Henna, Herbessos, Leontinoi and Kamarina (Diod. Sic. 20.31-32.2)
~308	Xenodicos defeated by Agathokles’ troops and retreats to Akragas (Diod. Sic. 20.56.1-2)
~308	Agathokles secretly returns to Sicily, takes Selinous, Herakleia,

	Thermai, Kephaloidion and Kentoripa (Diod. Sic. 20.55.5-56)
∼307	Agathokles frees Syracuse from besiegement and returns to Africa (Dios. Sic. 20.62.1; 20.64)
∼307	Agathokles’ return to Sicily, massacre at Segesta (Diod. Sic. 20.71)
∼307	Punitive operation in Syracuse to avenge the killing of Agathokles’ sons in Libya (Diod. Sic. 20.72)
∼306	Peace between Agathokles and the Carthaginians (Diod. Sic. 20.79.5)
∼305	Agathokles wins over the exiles under the leadership of Deinocrates (Diod. Sic. 20.89.-90.1-2)
∼304–295	Agathokles’ campaigns in Lipara, Kerkyra, Italy and Epirus (Diod. Sic. 20.101; 21.2.-4; 21.8)
∼289	Death of Agathokles and revolt of Menon (Diod Sic. 21.16.4-6)
∼289	Hicetas’ unsuccessful campaign against Menon (Diod. Sic. 21.18.1)
∼289/88	Phintias tyrant in Akragas, Tyndarion in Tauromenion (Diod. Sic. 22.2.1)
∼288	Mercenaries revolt in Syracuse, occupy Messana and rename it Mamertina (Diod. Sic. 21.18)
∼285	War between Phintias and Hicetas at Megara Hyblaia (Diod. Sic. 22.2)
∼282	Phintias from Akragas founds Phintias and destroys Gela (Diod. Sic. 22.2.2)

∼279	Syracuse calls Pyrrhus for help against the Mamertines. Mamertines join Carthage (Diod. Sic. 22.7.3-4)
∼278–275	Pyrrhus’ campaign in Sicily (Diod. Sic. 22.8; 22.10)
∼269	Battle at the river Loitanus between Hieron II and the Mamertines (Diod. Sic. 22.13.1-4)
∼269	Hieron II becomes king of Syracuse (Polyb. 1.9.8)
∼264	Mamertines call Rome for help, Hieron II allies with Carthage (Polyb. 1.10-11)
∼264–241	First Punic War (Livy 16-19)
∼263	Treaty between Syracuse and Rome (Diod. Sic. 23.4)
∼250	Carthage destroys Selinous and relocates its population to Lilybaion (Diod. Sic. 24.1)
∼241	Peace treaty between Rome and Carthage, who must evacuate Sicily (Polyb. 1.62.8)
∼227	First Roman Praetor in Sicily (Solinus 5.1)
∼225	Roman reserve legion stationed in Sicily (Polyb. 2.24.13)
∼218–202	Second Punic War (Livy 21-22)
∼215	Death of Hieron II, Hieronymos becomes king of Syracuse (Livy 24.4)
∼214	Syracuse supports Carthage against Rome, declaration of war (Poly. 7.2.-4)
∼213/12	Siege and fall of Syracuse (Livy 25.40.1-4)
∼210	Siege and fall of Akragas (Livy 26.40)

~210	Reconquest of Sicily (Eutropius 3.14)

Plate I


Mylai
Messana
Rhegion
Tyndaris
Abakainon
Panormos
Solous
Kaphaloidion
Kale Akte
Alaisa
Eryx
Thermai
Himera
Ietai
Segesta
Montagnola di Marineo
Tauromenion
Naxos
Motya
Monte Polizzo
Monte Maranfusa
Troina
Lilybaion
Poggioreale
Entella
Colle Madore
Mendolito di Adrano
Adranon
Agyrion
Kentoripa
Aitna / Inessa
Poggio Cocola
Polizello
Henna
Katane
Selinous
Monte Iudica
Monte Turcisi
Monte Raffe
Sabucina
Gibil Gabib
Vassallaggi
Montagna di Marzo
Morgantina
Palike
Monte San Basilio
Herakleia Minoa
Piano dei Casazzi
Monte Catalfaro
Leontinoi
Menai
Akragas
Monte Saraceno
Monte Bubbonia
Megara
Monte San Mauro
Lavanca nera
Licodia Eubea
Monte Desusino
Butera
Monte Dessueri
Monte Casasia
Syracusai
Akrai
Kasmenai
Gela
Bitalemi
0
25
50
75
100 km
Kamarina
Heloron
Contrada Maestro

Plate I: The island of Sicily with all places mentioned in the chapters of this book (M. Jonasch on the basis of DTM TanDEM-X © DLR 2019)